

Ganganatha Jha

Poona Oriental Series No. 39

JHĀ COMMEMORATION VOLUME

ESSAYS
ON ORIENTAL SUBJECTS

PRESENTED TO

VIDYĀSĀGARA

MAHĀMAHOPĀDHYĀYA

PAṆḌITA GAṄGĀNĀTHA JHĀ, M.A., D.LITT., LL.D.,

ON HIS COMPLETING THE 60TH YEAR ON 25TH SEPTEMBER, 1932

BY

HIS PUPILS, FRIENDS AND ADMIRERS

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PREFACE

Some friends and pupils of Mahāmahopādhyāya Dr. Ganganatha Jha desired to present to him a volume of Essays on Oriental Subjects when he completed his sixtieth year on 25th September, 1932. The proposal did not materialise till the 13th of March, 1932, when an Editorial Board was formed. Work could proceed only when a publisher ready to finance the publication was found. The Oriental Book Agency of Poona having agreed to publish the work, the Secretary of the Editorial Board issued invitations for contributions to scholars in India and outside on the 9th of November, 1932, and to Pandits of the old school on the 12th of March, 1933. It was then intended to present the manuscripts of the papers to Dr. Jha in April 1933. In spite of the shortness of notice the invitations met with very good response.

The presentation ceremony had, however, to be postponed till the 24th of November, 1933. On that day a meeting was held in the Vizianagram Hall of the Allahabad University for this purpose. The Chairman, the Hon'ble Dr. Sir Sita Ram, President of the Legislative Council of the United Provinces, the first post-graduate pupil of Dr. Jha's, presented to him the manuscripts of the contributions received. At that meeting the Secretary read out or referred to greetings sent by Sir George A. Grierson, Professor Otto Strauss, Mahāmahopādhyāya Pandit Gopinatha Kaviraja, Mrs. Rhys Davids, Professor R. L. Turner, Professor Charles Bally, Professor A. B. Dhruva, Professor S. K. Belvalkar, Dr. R. P. Paranjpe and Dr. N. G. Sardesai (proprietor of the Oriental Book Agency). Speeches were also made by Rao Raja Pandit Shyam Behari Misra, Mr. Panna Lal, Maulavi Syed Mohammad

Ali Nami, Dr. Tara Chand, Dr. Ishwari Prasad, Pandit Iqbal Narain Gurtu and the Chairman on the great scholarship of Dr. Jha and his services to the cause of education.

Arrangements for printing the Volume, however, could not be made till after a year. Progress in the Press first selected was extremely slow and we had later to change over to another Press. The Volume is now, at last, completed. On behalf of the Editorial Board, the Secretary offers his apologies to Dr. Jha and to the kind contributors for the great delay in publication. As most of the proofs had to be corrected locally there must be several mistakes which would not have escaped the notice of the authors. We crave their pardon for not being able to send them proofs. It is melancholy to contemplate that during the long time that has elapsed between the receipt of the papers and their publication as many as six contributors have left us for ever and one member of the Editorial Board is also now no more!

Our intention was to present the volume to Dr. Jha on his completing the sixtieth year but circumstances delayed its publication till the end of his sixty-fifth year. May he live long to continue his untiring labours in the interpretation of our past culture and to inspire younger Sanskritists with the noble example of his devoted service in the cause of *Sura-Sarasvatī!*

K. CHATTOPADHYĀYA,
Secretary, Editorial Board,
Ganganatha Jha Commemoration Volume.

ALLAHABAD,
15th September, 1937.

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कालेनापि यशःश्रिया विशदयन्पारं पयोधेः परम्।
प्राचां नः परिपालयन्नविकलं त्वं पण्डितानां प्रथां
गङ्गानाथ सनाथयस्यतितमां विद्यावतां मण्डलीम् ॥१॥

विद्यावैभवजीविनामिह कुले पाश्चात्यवात्याकुले
व्यत्यस्ते च समस्तवस्तुनि बलात्कालात्करालादतः।
श्रीमन् श्रोत्रियमौलिमण्डनमणे गीर्वाणवाणी पुन-
र्द्वित्रानेव भवादृशः शरणदानालम्बते जीवितुम् ॥२॥

भाग्यान्यमूनि भवतो गमयन्ति पूर्णं
पुण्यात्मनस्त्वयि पितुस्तव सम्प्रसादम्।
आशास्महे बुधसभा भवता सनाथा
तेनैव पण्डितशतं शरदां भवित्री ॥३॥

भवदीयः

श्री-श्रीशङ्करदेवशर्मा, तर्करत्नः
वाराणसीविश्वविद्यालये
न्यायवैशेषिकप्रधानाध्यापकः।

॥ श्रीः ॥

प्रयागविश्वविद्यालयभूतपूर्वकुलपतीनाम् महामहोपाध्यायगङ्गानाथझामहोदयानां

षष्ठिसंवत्सरसौवर्णमहोत्सवेऽभिनन्दनम्

धन्यैषा मिथिला मही निरुपमा या विश्वसारायते
विद्वद्रत्नखनीयते मतिमतां वैदुष्यशाणायते ।
ज्ञानाम्भोधिविधूयते नृपगुणै राजन्वती गीयते
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राजर्षिर्जनकाभिधः श्रुतिशिरोगीतश्च यत्रोद्भूत् ।
साध्वीनां हि शिखामणिर्जनकजा सीताऽत्र सीताजनि-
राम्नायाम्बरभास्करो यतिवरो यां मण्डनोऽमण्डयत् ॥२॥
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गङ्गानाथमिमं स्वकीयजनकं रत्नाकरं जानती
नूनं हृष्टमनाश्चकार वसतिं कन्येव पित्रन्तिके ॥६॥

तन्त्रग्रन्थगरिष्ठसौष्ठवलसद्भाषान्तरादेर्गुणैः
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समर्पणम्

पञ्चापाधिप्रचालिते लवपुरस्थ-प्राच्यविद्यालये
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गङ्गानाथमहोदयस्य परमप्रेमानुकम्पाऽऽश्रयः
सन्मान्येऽत्र महोत्सवे वितनुते पद्यैर्हि पुष्पाञ्जलिम् ॥

महामहोपाध्यायः
श्री-माधवशास्त्री भाण्डारी
लवपुरीयप्राच्यमहाविद्यालयप्रधानाध्यापको,
व्याकरणाचार्यः साहित्यतीर्थो मीमांसातीर्थो,
वेदान्तशिरोमणिश्च ।

॥ श्री ॥

श्रीमद्गङ्गानाथोपाध्यायप्रशस्तिः

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श्रीमन् ! समस्तसुजनार्च्यपदाम्बुजात !
विश्वम्भरातलसुधाशनवृन्दमौले ! ॥
वाचस्पते ! विधृतपार्थिवभव्यदेह !
गङ्गादिनाथ ! गुणगृह्यजनाग्रयायिन् ॥३॥
यच्छ्रीमता स्वजननीस्तनमुज्झतैव
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साकल्यादपि तावतां परिचयादेके महापण्डिताः
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मीमांसा किल सा स्वदिष्टिविजयं श्रीमत्प्रसादं पृथुं
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विद्येशो द्विजराजमौलिमहितोमेशप्रथाप्रीतिमान्
स श्रीमान् विबुधः प्रसादसुमुखो गङ्गादिनाथोऽस्तु नः ॥१४॥

शास्त्रज्ञैः प्रतिभाविकासमहितैः शिष्यैरिह श्रीमतो
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दुद्धर्तुमेव सततं विहितप्रयत्नः ।
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प्रक्षालितेन्दुविशदाऽमितकीर्तिराशिः ।।१६।।
रक्षितुमिव मर्यादां विदुषां धृतविग्रहः सुनयः ।
श्रीमान् गङ्गानाथोपाध्यायो भारतीतनयः ।।१७।।
अस्मिन् महति विद्वद्भिरारब्धे वचनाऽध्वरे ।
मितैरप्युदितैर्भक्त्या प्रीणातु वचनैर्मम ।।१८।।

इत्याशंसति काशीस्थो भारतीभवनाश्रयः ।
खिस्ते-वंशाङ्कुरः कश्चित्कविर्नारायणाभिधः ।।

साहित्यवारिधिः
श्री-नारायणशास्त्री खिस्ते
साहित्याचार्यः
काशिकराजकीयसरस्वतीभवन-
पुस्तकालयोपाध्यक्षः ।

قصیدہ

اثر خامۂ مولنا سیّد محمد علی نامی، ایم۔ اے۔

معلّم عربی و فارسی، جامعۂ الہ آباد

سجایا باغبان فکر نے اب اک نیا گلشن
ہے جس کا ہر گل مضموں بشکل مہر و مہ روشن
فتوحات مضامیں میں قلم مثل سکندر ہے
سیاہی بن گئی آب حیات علم کا مخزن
ہر اک نہر سطر میں ہے رواں آب حیات ایسا
ہے جس کے فیض سے ہر شاخ مضموں رو کش گلشن
گل افشانی سے گر رشک بدخشاں طبع رنگیں ہے
تو بحر فکر میں بھی ہیں معانی کے گہر روشن
لب بلبل پہ گلشن میں ہے کس گل کی نواسنجی
کہ اعجاز نواسنجی سے گلشن بن گیا ارگن
بہار آرائے باغ علم وہ ذات مقدس ہے
کہ جس کی خوشہ چینی کے تمنائی ہیں اہل فن
لب غنچہ شگفتہ ہوگیا کس نام نامی سے
یہ کس کے شکر کی شکر سے طوطی کا بھرا دامن

یہ کس کی ذات والا غیرت باد بہاری ہے
بنا شکل زباں کس اسم سامی سے گل سوسن
جناب ڈاکٹر ذی جاہ گنگا ناتھ جھا صاحب
یہ یونیورسٹی ہے جن کے فیض علم سے گلشن
رہے فائز کمال علم سے اعلی مراتب پر
کہ وائس چانسلر بھی بن گئے یہ علم کے اوشن*
نہ کچھ طلاب ہی تک عام تھا لطف و کرم ان کا
ہر اک دل آپ کے اوصاف عالی کا بنا مسکن
ہر اک ماتحت و ہمسر پر رہا وہ مہر کا جلوہ
کہ ہے ہر بزم دل ان کی ضیاء مہر سے روشن
دعا ہے صدق دل سے یہ بھی خواہان مخلص کی
کہ ان کا نام نامی دہر میں دائم رہے روشن
سر اقدس پہ تاج علم و فن دائم رہے رخشاں
در دولت پہ آویزاں رہے تعلیم کی چلمن
رہے نامی گرامی ذات والا فیض علمی سے
فیوض علم کا شہرہ رہے از ہند تا لندن

Ocean

Professor Otto Strauss wrote to Dr. Jhā from Breslau :—

Dear Mahāmahopādhyāya,

It is this old and beautiful title among all you bear, with which I beg to address you on your 60th birthday. For you have been a real Upādhyāya to all of us who strive to understand the philosophical systems of ancient India. Without your works on Mīmāṁsā, Nyāya and Vedānta I could not have written the humble contributions which you perhaps know by name. You appear to me as the happy blend of the ancient Pandit with his depth of knowledge and of the modern scholar with his wide horizon. May God grant you many years to come in such a freshness that you may be able to continue your labour for the good of all who are approaching the jewels of ancient Indian thought.

Yours very sincerely,
Otto Strauss.

From Sir George A. Grierson's letter to the Secretary :—

No one values Dr. Jha's learning more than I do, or can be more grateful to him for what I have learnt from his writings, and I should consider it an honour and a privilege to have an opportunity of showing this by a contribution to the proposed volume. Unfortunately, however, owing to advanced age and failing eyesight I have been compelled to relinquish literary work and must therefore regretfully decline your invitation.

From the Right Honourable Dr. Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru :—

The tributes which have been paid to Dr. Ganga Nath Jha are none too high for his great intellectual gifts and his achievements in the domain of scholarship. Of him it may truthfully be said that no graduate of the Allahabad University has done more for the advancement of learning than he, and no one has in recent years vindicated the claims of Indian scholarship among the learned societies of the world than the great Pandit who combines in himself profound learning and deep reverence for our ancient culture and philosophy with a marvellous faculty for interpreting them to the modern world. His learning and his intimacy with everything that is best in our philosophy and culture is reflected in his daily life, his purity of character, the simplicity of his ways and his inveterate contempt for the advertising methods of modern life. His conservatism may try the patience of the present day reformer but it also extorts his admiration for its genuineness and sincerity. A great scholar and a fine gentleman, he has shed undying lustre upon the University of which he is the product and to the guidance and service of which he has dedicated years of ceaseless and fruitful activity.

Tej Bahadur Sapru.

PART I

श्रीः

॥ शाबरभाष्ये उदाहरणपरिपाटी ॥

(पं० श्रीचिन्नस्वामिशास्त्री, वाराणसी)

जगत्पावनपानीयकृतावासकपर्दकम् ।
वामीकृतस्ववामाङ्गमस्तु स्वस्तिकरं महः ॥

अस्ति तावदशेषपशेमुषीमदभिनन्दनीयवाग्विभवविलासविजृम्भितमध्वरमीमांसासूत्रभाष्यं शबरमुनिभाषितमतिरमणीयम् । तदिदं द्वादशाध्यायात्मकस्य पादषष्टिपरिमितस्याऽधिकरणसहस्रसमुल्लसितस्य पूर्वमीमांसाशास्त्रस्य महर्षिजैमिनिरचितस्य विवरणरूपं प्रायशस्त्रयीकुक्षिप्रविष्टानि विध्यर्थवादमन्त्रनिषेधात्मकानि सकलान्यपि वाक्यानि सन्दिग्धानि प्रयोजनवन्ति च स्वोदाहरणतया परिगृह्णातीति सुविदितमेव सुधियाम् । तत्र च विशेषतो नवमेऽध्यायेऽन्यत्राऽपि च सामान्यतः क्वचित्साममन्त्रास्तद्विधयश्च तद्वेदीया उदाहृताः । एवम् ऋङ्मन्त्रास्तद्ब्राह्मणान्यपि क्वचित्क्वचित्, तथाऽपि अधिकतया याजुर्वैदिका मन्त्रास्तद्ब्राह्मणानि च बहुतरमुदाहृतानि विचारितानि चेति करबदरसमानम् । अतश्च[1] त्रयीमार्गानुसारिण्यपीयं मीमांसा यजुर्वेद एवाऽधिकतरं दृष्टिं निक्षिपति कृपामयीमित्यपि नाऽतिशयितेयमुक्तिः । तत्रैकशतं शाखा याजुष्याः, एकविंशतिरार्चिक्यः, सहस्रं सामशाखाः इति प्रसिद्धिस्साम्प्रदायिकी, महर्षिभिरभ्युपगता च । सत्यप्येवं तेषु

1. यथा कथञ्चिदारब्धा त्रयीमार्गानुसारिणी ।
वाग्वृत्तिरल्पसाराऽपि श्रद्धाधनस्य शोभते ॥ (श्लो. वा. १. १. ८) इति वदता वार्तिककारेणैव मीमांसायास्त्रयीमार्गानुसारित्वं कण्ठत एवोक्तम् ।

तेषु वेदेषु चिरकालादारभ्यैव बहूनां शाखानामुत्सन्नत्वेन[1] आपस्तम्बादिभिर्महर्षिभिरभ्युपगतत्वात् अस्माभिरनुभूयमानत्वाच्च कस्मिन् वेदे कास्काश्शाखा अधिकृत्य विचारयितुं प्रवृत्तेयं मीमांसेति विचारपथमारूढोऽपि विषयः न साधनपौष्कल्याभावेन यथावत्स्वात्मानं लभते। अत उपलभ्यमानशाखाविषय एव कश्चिद्विचारः कर्तुं शक्यते।

तत्र जैमिनीयसूत्रप्रस्थानानन्तरं कृतान्यपि बहुभिर्बहूनि भाष्याणि तत्सम्बन्धीनि तानि तथाऽऽत्मानं तिरोदधति स्म, येषां नामान्यपि न कुत्राऽप्युपलभ्यन्ते, न वा श्रुतिपथमधिरोहति। अत इदानीमुपलभ्यमानशाबरभाष्यगतान्येव विषयवाक्यान्यधिकृत्य विचारः परिशेषसमायातः। तत्राऽपि सामवेदीया ऋग्वेदीयाश्च विचारास्सत्यवसरे समयान्तरे कर्तव्यतयाऽवधारिता इति नाऽधुना तत्र लेखिनी व्यापार्यते। याजुर्वैदिक एव विचार इदानीं प्रस्तूयते। तत्रैतन्मीमांसाधीतेः प्रागेवाऽधीततैत्तिरीयशाखा वयं मीमांसाधीतिकाले शाबरेऽन्यस्मिन् वा मीमांसाग्रन्थे समुदाहृतानां वेदवाक्यानां स्वाधीनतैत्तिरीयशाखीयानां वाक्यानां चाऽऽनुपूर्व्यामत्यन्तं भेदं प्रपश्यद्भिरस्माभिरिदमेवाऽधिगतमवधारितञ्च--यदिमानि वाक्यानि शाखान्तरीयाणीति विशेषतो माध्यन्दिनीयशाखागतानीति च। कालान्तरे च माध्यन्दिनशाखया सहाऽऽमूलचूलं प्राप्तपरिचयोऽहं भाष्याद्युदाहृतानां बहूनां वाक्यानामानुपूर्वीं तत्राऽप्यनुपलभमानस्संशयाविष्टचेतास्तेषां यथावदुपलम्भे तदैव प्रयत्नमारप्सि। ततः प्रभृत्यन्विष्याऽन्विष्य श्रान्तः परं प्रयत्नसाफल्यं नाऽऽवापम्। बिभेमि च समुचितसामग्र्या विहीनेऽस्मिन् कार्ये आयुषोऽन्तेऽपि प्रयत्नसाफल्यं प्राप्नुयां नैव वेति। अस्तु, भगवानचिन्त्यशक्तिर्यदिच्छति कारयत्येव। तथाऽप्यत्र पथि परिश्रान्तेनाऽद्य यावद्यदुपलब्धं मया किञ्चित् तद्विचारशीलानां विपश्चितां श्रवसि निक्षिप्यते। श्रुत्वा प्रमाणं सुधियस्तत्त्वविनिर्णये।

शाखैकशतभिन्नतया प्रथिते यजुर्वेदे षडेव शाखाः प्रचलन्त्यस्माकं पुरतः।

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1. 'तेषामुत्सन्नाः पाठाः प्रयोगादनुमीयन्ते' (१. १२. १०) इत्यापस्तम्बः।

"तेषा (ब्राह्मणाना) मुत्सन्नाः पाठाः अध्येतृदौर्बल्यात्। कथं तर्हि तेषामस्तित्वम्? प्रयोगादनुमीयन्ते। प्रयोगः स्मृतिप्रणयनम्, अनुष्ठानञ्च। तस्माद्ब्राह्मणान्यनुमीयन्ते--मन्वादिभिरुपलब्धानीति" इति हरदत्तः॥ (See P. 75. आप. ध. Chow. Ed.)

(१) तैत्तिरीयशाखा कृष्णयजुर्वेदीया*। (२) मैत्रायणीयशाखा तद्वेदीयैव। (३) कठशाखा तद्वेदीयैव। (४) कपिष्ठलशाखा तद्वेदीयैव (५) काण्वसंहिता शुक्लयजुर्वेदीया। (६) माध्यन्दिनसंहिता तद्वेदीयैव। तत्र तैत्तिरीयमैत्रायणीयमाध्यन्दिनीयशाखाः प्रतिपाद्यविषये तत्प्रतिपादनक्रमे वाक्यशैलीषु मन्त्रेषु च परस्परं बहुशो भेदमावहन्ति। काठकमैत्रायणीययोस्ततोऽल्पीयान् भेदः। काठककापिष्ठलयोस्तु अतिसूक्ष्म एव भेदः। एवं काण्वमाध्यन्दिनीययोरपि संहितयोर्ब्राह्मणयोश्च अध्यायक्रमं काण्डक्रमं च भेदं वर्जयित्वा तान्येव पदानि, तान्येव वाक्यानि, तान्येव चाऽक्षराणि प्रायेण दरीदृश्यन्ते। सति चैवं किंशाखीयानि वाक्यान्यधिकृत्य प्रवृत्तं मीमांसाशास्त्रमिति समापतति विचारे तत्रोदाहृतानां वाक्यानाममूषु सर्वासूपलभ्यमानशाखासूपलब्धेः इमास्सर्वा अपि शाखा विषयीकृता मीमांसाशास्त्रेणेति निश्चेतव्यं भवति। युक्तं चैतत्; वेदवाक्यविचाररूपत्वात्तस्य, यत्र यत्र सन्देहस्समुन्मिषति तस्य सर्वस्याऽपि विचार्यनिर्णेयत्वावश्यंभावात्। यदि च नैवं क्रियते एकदेशविचारत्वापत्त्या शास्त्रस्य परिपूर्णत्वानापत्तिः। अत एव च या इदानीं नोपलभ्यन्ते शास्त्रप्रवृत्तिकाले चोपलब्धिविषया आसन् शाखाः, तदीयान्यपि वाक्यान्युदाहृत्य शास्त्रे विचारः कृतस्समग्रतासम्पादनायेत्यवश्यमभ्युपगन्तव्यं भवति यत आसु षट्स्वपि शाखासु अनुपलभ्यमानानि बहूनि वाक्यानि विचार्य निर्णयं प्रापितानि। परन्तु इमानि शबरस्वामिना भगवता स्वयमेव दृष्ट्वा तत्तच्छाखाभ्य उद्धृत्योदाहरणार्थं तत्र योजितानि? उत पूर्वाचार्यैरुदाहृतान्येव तद्ग्रन्थेभ्य एवोद्धृत्य स्वयमप्युदाहृतानि? इति निर्णये न काऽपि दृढा सामग्री करतलगताऽस्माकम्।[1] क्वचित्क्वचिदेव तु वृत्तिकारेण महाऽऽत्मनः सम्मतिं वैमत्यं वोदाहरणविषये प्रकटयति भाष्यकारः न तु सर्वत्र। अनेन तु स्वानुकूलस्थलेषु प्रायेण वृत्तिकारोदाहृतान्येव वाक्यानि भाष्यकारोऽपि परिजग्राहेत्यनुमातुमस्ति कश्चनाऽवसरो लेशतः। परमिदमनुमानमव्यभिचार्येवेति कथनं यावद्वृत्तिकारग्रन्थोपलम्भं

* संहिता, ब्राह्मणमारण्यकं च तैत्तिरीयशाखासम्बन्धि पुण्यपत्तने Poona आनन्दाश्रममुद्रणालये मुद्रितम्। मैत्रायणीयसंहिता, कठसंहिता च Germany देशे मुद्रिते। काण्वमाध्यन्दिनशाखे तु मुम्बईप्रभृतिषु स्थलेषु, कपिष्ठलसंहिता इदानीमेव लवपुरे (Lahore) श्रीरघुवीर M. A., Ph. D., D. Litt. महोदयैर्मुद्रयित्वा प्रकाशिता।

1. See शा. भा. १. १. ४, २. १. ३२, ३३, २. ३. १६, ३. १. ६, etc.

दुरशकमेव। अस्तु यथा तथा वा। शाबरभाष्य एव परमिदानीं विचारमवतारयामः। तस्मिन् विचारिते प्रायेण सर्वे मीमांसाग्रन्था विचारिता भविष्यन्ति. यतो हि तदनन्तरकालिकास्सर्वेऽपि ग्रन्थकाराः भाष्यकारोदाहृतान्येव वाक्यानि स्वग्रन्थेऽप्युदाहरन्ति, यद्यपि केचिद्भाष्यकारीयमुदाहरणमक्षरशोऽनुद्धृत्यार्थतोऽनुवदन्ति बहुत्र। केचिच्च तत्समानार्थकानीदानीमुपलभ्यमानतैत्तिरीयशतपथवाजसनेयादिवाक्यान्युदाहरन्ति। केचिच्चाऽऽधुनिका[1] वासुदेवदीक्षितप्रभृतयो यावदुपलम्भं स्वशाखागवाक्यानामुदाहरणत्वेन परिग्रहणे दर्शितादरा दृश्यन्ते, तथाऽपि भाष्यकाराणां मनसि कान्यासन् वाक्यानीत्येतदवश्यं विचारणीयम्।

तदत्र सर्वशाखागतान्यपि वाक्यानि सत्यवसरे उदाहरतां यथायथं विचारयतामपि भाष्यकाराणां मैत्रायणीयशाखायां निरतिशया काचन प्रेमदृष्टिरासीदित्यवगम्यते. यतो विषयं कञ्चन विचारयितुमुपाददानास्ते सत्स्वपि तत्समानार्थकेषु वाक्येषु शाखान्तरेषु तानि सर्वाणि परित्यज्य मैत्रायणीयशाखागतमेव वाक्यं नियमेनोदाहरन्ति। तथा हि—द्वितीयेऽध्याये व्यवधानाधिकरणे[2] 'व्यवायान्नाऽनुषज्येते' ति सूत्रे पूर्ववाक्ये श्रुतमपि पदम् असम्बन्धिपदान्तरव्यवधाने सत्युत्तरवाक्येनाऽनुषज्यत इति वक्तव्यम्। तदर्थमुदाहृतम्—'सन्ते वायुर्वातेन गच्छताम्, सं यजत्रैरङ्गानि, सं यज्ञपतिराशिषा' इति[3]। एतत्प्रकरणस्थानि एतत्समानार्थकानि वाक्यानि शाखान्तरेष्वेवमुपलभ्यन्ते—'सन्ते वायुः प्राणेन गच्छताम्, सं यजत्रैरङ्गानि, सं यज्ञपतिराशिषे' ति कठकपिष्ठलसंहितयोः[4]। 'सन्ते प्राणो वायुना गच्छताम्, सं........आशिषे' ति तैत्तिरीयसंहितायाम्[5]। 'सन्ते प्राणो वातेन गच्छताम्' इति वाजसनेयिसंहितायाम्[6]। अत्र पूर्वोक्तेषु वाक्येषु यत्किञ्चिच्छाखीयस्य वाक्यस्य सम्भवत्यप्युदाहरणत्वे मैत्रायणीयमेवोदाजहार भाष्यकारः। एवं तृतीयेऽध्याये द्वितीये पादे काम्येष्टियाज्यानुवाक्यामन्त्रोदाहरणस्थले उपलभ्यमानेषूदाहरणार्थं शाखान्तरमन्त्रेषु, तानुज्झित्वा मैत्रायणीयशाखागतं मन्त्रचतुष्टयमुदाहृतम्[7]। न

1. अध्वरमीमांसाकुतूहलवृत्तिकाराः।

2. जै. सू. २. १. ४६. 3. मै. सं. १. २. १५.

4. काठक. सं २६. २. कपिष्ठ. सं. ४१. ६.

5. तै. सं. १. ३. ८. 6. वा. मा. सं. ६. १०. 7. जै. सू. ३. २. १६.

केवलमुदाहरणमात्रम्, चतुर्णामपि मन्त्राणां प्रतीकग्रहणार्थं तत्रत्या आनुपूर्वी अन्यूनानतिरेकं तथैवोद्धृता—"(क) इन्द्राग्नी रोचना दिवः, (ख) प्र चर्षणिभ्यः, (ग) इन्द्राग्नी नवतिं पुरः, (घ) श्नथद्वृत्रम्" इति[1]। तैत्तिरीयशाखानुसारेण तु "(क) उभा वामिन्द्राग्नी, (ख) अश्रवं हि, (ग) इन्द्राग्नी नवतिं पुरः, (घ) शुचिं नु स्तोमम्"[2] इत्येव मन्त्रचतुष्टयमुदाहर्तव्यमासीत्। काठकोदाहरणाश्रयणे तु "(क) इन्द्राग्नी रोचना दिवः (ख) श्नथद्वृत्रम्, (ग) या वां सन्ति पुरुस्पृहः (घ) ता योधिष्टमभि"[3] इति मन्त्रचतुष्टयमुदाहर्तव्यमासीत्। तत्तु नोदाहृतम्।

एवमस्मिन्नेवाऽधिकरणे—"अथ किमर्थं लिङ्गक्रमौ व्यपदिश्येते? सर्वा याज्यानुवाक्याकार्य एव विनियुज्येरन्, सामिधेनीषु विनियोगो न स्यात्। अथ पुनस्समाख्यानाल्लिङ्गक्रमाच्च निर्वृत्ते याज्यानुवाक्याकार्ये सामिधेनीषु विनियोगस्सिद्धो भवति। यथा—आग्निवारुण्या इष्टेः क्रमेऽधीते सौमारौद्रीणामनागतेनर्चः पठिताः, तास्सामिधेनीषु धाय्या इत्युच्यन्ते। तथा 'पृथुपाजाः' 'तं सबाधः' इति द्वे धाय्ये कल्प्येते। तस्मादुभयं सूत्रितम्" इति भाष्यकारैस्सूत्रस्थानां पदानां प्रयोजनमभिहितम्। तदिदं मैत्रायणीयशाखीयमेव प्रकरणं स्पृशति, नाऽन्यत्। तत्रैव हि "त्वं नो अग्ने" "स त्वं नो अग्ने" इत्याग्निवारुण्येष्टेः याज्यानुवाक्ये ततः "अग्निं वः पूर्व्यं गिरा," इत्याद्याष्षडृचः। ततः "सोमारुद्रा युवम्" इति सौमारौद्रेष्टेः याज्यानुवाक्ये इत्येवं क्रमेण पाठः। तदेतत्सर्वं मैत्रायणीयसंहितायाश्चतुर्थकाण्डस्य[4] सावधानेन मनसाऽवलोकनेन स्फुटमवगन्तुं शक्यते। तैत्तिरीयकाठकसंहितयोरप्येतत्प्रकरणमस्त्येवाऽत्रोदाहर्तुं योग्यम्। तथाऽपि मैत्रायणीयमेवोदाहृतम्।

एवञ्च शाखान्तरवाक्यानामुदाहरणेनाऽपि भाष्यकाराणां स्वाभीष्टे फले सिध्यति, समञ्जसे च भवत्यधिकरणे, तानि परिहाय तत्र मैत्रायणीयान्येव वाक्यान्युदाहरतां तेषां शाखान्तरापेक्षया मैत्रायणीयशाखायां कश्चनाऽभिमानविशेषः परिस्फुरति। विषयेऽत्र इतोऽपि बहून्युदाहरणान्येतादृशानि प्रदर्शयितुमस्ति करगता

१. See मै. संहिता. IV. 11. 1. P. 159. Published in Germany.

२. See तै. संहिता. 1. 1. 13. Poona Anandasrama Series.

३. See काठ. संहिता. 4. 15. P. 39. Published in Germany.

४. See मै. संहिता. IV. 11. 2. P. 164.

समुचिता सामग्री। तथाऽप्यधिकतया तत्प्रदर्शनेन लेखशरीरमकाण्डे वर्धयितुमनीहानेन विषयप्रदर्शनमात्रप्रयोजनेन मयाऽनन्तरोदीरणोपष्टम्भकतयाऽत्र पट्टिकारूपेण पञ्चषाण्युदाहरणानि प्रदर्श्यन्ते। अवसरान्तरे च शाबरेऽस्मिन् भाष्ये कियन्ति याजुर्वैदिकान्युदाहृतानि? तत्रेतरशाखीयानि कियन्ति? कियन्ति वा मैत्रायणीयशाखागतानि? इत्येतत् परिगणय्य वक्ष्यामि। अधुना तु पूर्वोक्तां पट्टिकां सुधियां करकमले समर्प्य तावतैव विरन्तुमभिलषामि। प्रार्थयामि च सानुरोधं विबुधवरान् सकृदप्यवलोक्य लेखमिमं सफलयन्तु मदीयं परिश्रममिति॥

प्राप्तः पीयूषनिष्यन्दो भाष्याब्धिमथनान्मम।
श्रेयसे भूयसे भूयाद् गङ्गाधरपदेऽर्पितः॥

मार्गशीर्ष-शुक्ल-पञ्चमी १९९०
21. 11. 33
वाराणसी

चिन्नस्वामी शास्त्री

शाबरभाष्ये—	मैत्रायणीयसंहितायाम्—	काठकसंहितायाम्—	तैत्तिरीयशाखायाम्—	वाजसनेयिशाखायाम्—
(१)	(१)	(१)	(१)	(१)
कृष्णशीर्षा आग्नेयः इत्याद्याः	कृष्णशीर्षा आग्नेयो मेषी सारस्वती	आग्नेयः कृष्णग्रीवस्सारस्वती मेषी	आग्नेयः कृष्णग्रीवस्सारस्वती मेषी	आग्नेयः कृष्णग्रीवः सारस्वती मेषी
(शा. भा. ८.१. १४)	(मै. सं. ४-७-८)	(काठ. सं. ५-८-१)	(तै. सं. ५-६-१२)	(माध्य. सं. २९-५८)
(२)	(२)	(२)	(२)	
यत्पक्षसम्मितां मिनुयात्कनीयांसं यज्ञक्रतुमुपेयात्कनीयसीं प्रजां कनीयसः पशून् कनीयोऽन्नाद्यं पापीयान् स्यात्	यत्पक्षसम्मितां मिनुयात्कनीयांसं यज्ञक्रतुमुपेयात्कनीयसीं प्रजां कनीयसः पशून् कनीयोऽन्नाद्यं पापीयान् स्यात्	यत्पक्षसम्मितां मिनुयात् कनीयांसं यज्ञक्रतुमुपेयात्पापीयस्यस्यात्मनः प्रजा स्यात्	यत्पक्षसम्मितां मिनुयात् कनीयांसं यज्ञक्रतुमुपेयात्पापीयस्यस्यात्मनः प्रजा स्यात् (तै. सं. ५-६-८)	
(शा. भा. २-४-८)	(मै. सं. ३-४-८)	(काठ. सं. २२-७)		
(३)	(३)	(३)	(३)	
आग्नावैष्णवं प्रातरष्टाकपालं निर्वपेत्सारस्वतं	आग्नावैष्णवं प्रातरष्टाकपालं निर्वपेत् सारस्वतं	आग्नावैष्णवमष्टाकपालं निर्वपेन	आग्नावैष्णवमष्टाकपालं निर्वपेत्प्रातस्सवनस्याकाले	

शाबरभाष्ये-	मैत्रायणीयसंहितायाम्-	काठकसंहितायाम्-	तैत्तिरीयसंहितायाम्-	वाजसनेयिसंहितायाम्-
चरुं बार्हस्पत्यं चरुम्, आग्नावैष्णवमेकादशकपालं मध्यन्दिने सारस्वतं चरुं बार्हस्पत्यं चरुम्, आग्नावैष्णवं द्वादशकपालमपराह्णे सारस्वतं चरुं बार्हस्पत्यं चरुम (शा. भा. ११-२-१६)	चरुं बार्हस्पत्यं चरुम्, आग्नावैष्णवमेकादशकपालं मध्यन्दिने सारस्वतं चरुं बार्हस्पत्यं चरुम्, आग्नावैष्णवं द्वादशकपालमपराह्णे सारस्वतं चरुं बार्हस्पत्यं चरुम (मै. सं. २-१-८)	प्रातस्सारस्वतं चरुं बार्हस्पत्यं चरुम आग्नावैष्णवमेकादशकपालं मध्यन्दिने एतौ च चरू, आग्नावैष्णवं द्वादशकपालमपराह्णे एतौ च चरू (काठ. सं. १०-१.)	सरस्वत्याज्यभागा स्यात् बार्हस्पत्यश्चरुराग्नावैष्णवमेकादशकपालं निर्वपेन्माध्यन्दिनस्य सवनस्याकाले सरस्वत्याज्यभागा स्याद् बार्हस्पत्यश्चरुराग्नावैष्णवं द्वादशकपालं निर्वपेत्तृतीयसवनस्याकाले सरस्वत्याज्यभागा स्याद् बार्हस्पत्यश्चरुः (तै. सं. २-२-९)	
(४)	(४)	(४)	(४)	
अभिघार्या नाभिघार्या इति मीमांसन्ते, यदभिघारयेत् रुद्रायास्ये पशूनपिदध्यात् (यन्नाभिघारयेत् न रुद्रायास्ये पशूनपिदध्यात् अथो खल्वाहुः) अभिघार्या एव नहि हविरनभिघृतमस्ति (शा. भा. १०-८-८)	अभिघार्या३ नाभिघार्या ३ इति मीमांसन्ते यदभिघारयेद्रुद्रायास्ये पशूनपिदध्यात् तन्न सूर्द्यमभिघार्या एव. नहि हविरनभिघृतमस्ति (मै. सं. १-१०-२०)	अभिघार्या ३ नाभिघार्या३ इति मीमांसन्ते अभिघार्या एव नहि हविरनभिघृतम, यदभिघारयेद्रुद्रं पशून-	नाभिघारयति. यदभिघारयेन अन्तरवचारिणछं रुद्रं कुर्यात् (तै. ब्रा. १-६-१०)	

शाबरभाष्ये–	मैत्रायणीयसंहितायाम्–	काठकसंहितायाम्–	तैत्तिरीयसंहितायाम्–	वाजसनेयिसंहितायाम्–
		न्ववनयेत् तस्मान्नाभिघार्याः । (का. सं. २३-१४)		
(५) सौमापौष्ण एकादशकपाल ऐन्द्रापौष्णश्चरुः पौष्णश्चरुश्श्यामो दक्षिणा (शा. भा. ३-३-३९)	(५) सौमापौष्ण एकादशकपाल ऐन्द्रापौष्णश्चरुः पौष्णश्चरुः श्यामो दक्षिणा (मै. सं २-६-४)	(५) सौमापौष्णश्चरुरैन्द्रापौष्णश्चरुः पौष्णश्चरुश्श्यामो दक्षिणा (का. सं. १५-३)	(५) सौमापौष्णं चरुं निर्वपत्यैन्द्रापौष्णं चरुं पौष्णं चरुं श्यामो दक्षिणा (तै. सं. १-८-८)	(५) स आग्नापौष्णमेकादशकपालं पुरोडाशं निर्वपत्यैन्द्रापौष्णं चरुं पौष्णं चरुम् (श. ब्रा. ५-२-५-५)
(६) आग्नेयः पशुरग्निष्टोम आलभ्यः आग्नेयो ह्यग्निष्टोमः । ऐन्द्राग्नः पशुरुक्थ्य आलभ्यः ऐन्द्राग्नानि ह्युक्थ्यानि । ऐन्द्रो वृष्णिष्षोडशिन्यालभ्यः ।	(६) आग्नेयः पशुरग्निष्टोम आलभ्य आग्नेयो ह्यग्निष्टोम ऐन्द्राग्नः पशुरुकथ्य आलभ्यः ऐन्द्राग्नानि ह्युकथ्यानि ऐन्द्रो वृष्णिष्षोडशिन्यालभ्यः ऐन्द्रो वै			(६) आग्नेयमग्निष्टोम आलभेत, यद्युकथ्यस्यादैन्द्राग्नं द्वितीयमालभेत ऐन्द्राग्नानि ह्युक्थानि यदि षोडशी स्यादैन्द्रं तृतीयमालभेत ऐन्द्रो हि षोडशी यद्यतिरात्रस्स्यात् सारस्वतं चतुर्थमालभेत वाग्वै सरस्वती। (श. ब्रा.४-६-४-३)

शावरभाष्ये–	मैत्रायणीयसंहितायाम्–	काठकसंहितायाम्–	तैत्तिरीयसंहितायाम्	वाजसनेयिसंहितायाम्–
ऐन्द्रो वै वृष्णिष्षोडशी। सारस्वती मेष्यतिरात्र आलभ्या, वाग्वै सरस्वती। (शा. भा. ३-६-१८)	वृष्णिष्षोडशी सारस्वती मेष्यतिरात्र आलभ्या वाग्वै सरस्वती। (मै. सं. ३-६-५)			

श्रीराधाकृष्णाभ्यां नमः ।

साहित्यमीमांसा ॥

(पं० श्रीबदरीनाथझा, मुजफ्फरपुरम्)

(मङ्गलम्)

तिरयन्ती कविचेतस्तमः सचेतश्चकोरनिकुरम्बम् ॥
मदयन्ती नक्तन्दिवमविलक्ष्या कौमुदी जयति ॥ १ ॥

(साहित्यसञ्ज्ञानिरुक्तिस्तद्वैशिष्ट्यं च)

साहित्यं सहितानां भावः काव्यैतदङ्गानाम् ॥
सहितानि[1] तानि वा तत् सप्तममाख्यायते शास्त्रम् ॥ २ ॥
पञ्चदशं विद्यानां स्थानं सप्तममङ्गकं श्रुतीनाम् ॥
एकोनविंशतितमा विद्या तन्मन्यते प्राच्यैः[2] ॥ ३ ॥

(काव्यलक्षणपरीक्षे)

काव्यं तत्र सहृदया—ह्लादकशब्दार्थयोर्युगलम् ॥
न तु[3] शब्दार्थौ सगुणौ सालङ्कारावदोषौ च ॥ ४ ॥
शब्दार्थयोर्गुणानां विरहाद् भूषणभूयतः समेषाम् ॥
द्विविधालङ्काराणां, दोषाणां तत्त्वतोऽन्यशक्तेश्च ॥ ५ ॥
नापि[4] रसात्मकवाक्यं रसवैधुर्य्येऽपि केषाञ्चित् ॥
विच्छित्त्याधातॄणां वाक्यानां तत्त्वतोऽनुभवात् ॥ ६ ॥
इदमेवेष्टार्थाव—च्छिन्नपदावलिरभ्यधायि पूर्वैः[5] ॥
रमणीयार्थकशब्दश्चाप्यूचे कैश्चनार्वाग्भिः[6] ॥ ७ ॥

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[1] सुखमेव सौख्यमितिवत्स्वार्थिकः प्रत्ययः । [2] राजशेखरप्रभृतिभिः । [3] प्रकाशमतखण्डनमिदम् । [4] दर्पणमतखण्डनमिदम् । [5] दण्डिभट्टैः । [6] जगन्नाथपण्डितैः ।

किन्त्वर्थो यदि काव्यं न स्यात्, तर्हि कथं तदेकनिष्ठाः ॥
उपमादयो भवेयुः केयूरादिवदलङ्काराः ॥ ८ ॥

(काव्यजीवितनिरूपणम्)

ध्वनिरात्मेव शरीरे जीवितमस्याभिधीयते कैश्चित्[1] ॥
वाच्यार्थोऽपि तथाऽन्यैः[2] प्रचुरचमत्कारकारकः स्याच्चेत् ॥ ९ ॥
वक्रोक्तिमेव षोढ़ा निर्दिश्यात्मानमभिदधुः केचित्[3] ॥
गुणवत्पदसङ्घटना—रूपां रीतिं तथैवान्ये[4] ॥ १० ॥
औचित्यमेव नाना—भेदं जीवितमस्य केऽप्यवोचन्[5] ॥
इतरेऽलङ्कारं[6] त—न्नाम्ना व्यवहृतेः शास्त्रस्य ॥ ११ ॥
एषु तु मतं द्वितीयं मतमुपपत्तेः सचेतसां विदुषाम् ॥
अन्याप्त्यादिकवलनादितरेषां स्वीकृतिः कठिना ॥ १२ ॥

(काव्यात्मध्वनिनिरूपणम्)

वस्तुरसालङ्कार—स्वरूपमूचुर्ध्वनिं त्रिविधम् ॥
तत्प्रत्यायनकर्त्रीं वृत्तिं च व्यञ्जनानाम्नीम् ॥ १३ ॥

(वस्तुस्वरूपमलङ्कारस्वरूपञ्च)

वस्त्वर्थः पृथगुक्तेर्भिन्नोऽलङ्कार—रसप्रभृतिभ्यः ॥
व्यक्त्योपमादयस्ते प्रकाश्यमानास्त्वलङ्काराः[7] ॥ १४ ॥

(रसादिनिरूपणम्)

रस-भाव-तदाभासा भावोदय-शाम-सन्धि-शावल्यानि ॥
अष्टाविमेऽनुशिष्टा रसादयः केवलं व्यङ्ग्याः ॥ १५ ॥
स्थाय्यनुभावविभाव—व्यभिचारिभिरन्वितो भावः ॥
आसादयति रसत्वं रसिकैरास्वाद्यमानः सन् ॥ १६ ॥
आस्वादाभिन्नोऽसा—वानन्दाखण्डचिद्रूपः ॥
ज्ञेयान्तराविमृष्टो ब्रह्मसदृक् स्वप्रकाशश्च ॥ १७ ॥

[1] ध्वनिकारैः । [2] नवीनैः । अपिना ध्वनिः सङ्गृह्यते । [3] कुन्तलाचार्याः । [4] वामनादयः । [5] क्षेमेन्द्रभट्टाः । [6] उद्भटप्रभृतयः । [7] अलङ्कार्यत्वेऽपि तत्त्वं ब्राह्मणश्रमणन्यायात् ।

केचित्[1] तत्सल्लग्नां भग्नावरणां चितं रसं प्राहुः ॥
वास्तवविवेचनायामुभयोरैक्यं तयोः स्फुरति ॥ १८ ॥
अपरिच्छिन्नत्वादति—लौकिकभावाद्भुतान्तरायत्वात् ॥
नित्यानित्यविलक्षण—भावाच्चैषोऽस्त्यनिर्वाच्यः ॥ १९ ॥
स्वाभेदेनास्वादस्तत्सद्भावे सचेतसां मानम् ॥
अत एवैष[2] नवीनैः सामाजिकवृत्तिरेवोक्तः ॥ २० ॥
रामादावनुकार्ये नटेऽनुकर्तरि च नैवायम् ॥
अस्ति विरसताऽऽपातात् सचेतसामनुव्यवसितेश्च ॥ २१ ॥
शृङ्गारवीरकरुणान् हास्याद्भुतरौद्रबीभत्सान् ॥
शान्तं भयानकं च व्याजह्रुर्नव रसान् सुधियः[3] ॥ २२ ॥
रतिमात्मजादिविषयां भावं स्थायिनमभ्युपेत्य केचित्[4] ॥
दशमं वत्सलसञ्ज्ञकमधिकं रसमूचिरे कृतिनः ॥ २३ ॥
पूज्यरतिस्थायिकमपि भक्तिरसं केचनावोचन्[5] ॥
कार्पण्यमपि कियन्तो रसं स्पृहास्थायिकं जगुः ॥ २४ ॥
कतिचिद् गर्वस्थायिकमुद्धतसञ्ज्ञं रसं जगदुः ॥
धैर्ये स्थायिनि दान्तं रसञ्च धीराः परे विविदुः ॥ २५ ॥
आर्द्रत्वस्थायिकमितरे जगदुः स्नेहं रसं सुधियः ॥
सत्यभिलाषे स्थायिनि लौल्यरसं मेनिरे चान्ये ॥ २६ ॥
शिष्टानुशिष्टपद्धति[6]—रेवात्र श्रेयसी श्रेया ॥
भावेष्वन्तर्भावं मन्ये सुकरं यदन्येषाम् ॥ २७ ॥
उत्साहो वीरे स्याद् रौद्रे क्रोधो रतिश्च शृङ्गारे ॥
शान्ते शमो जुगुप्सा बीभत्से विस्मयोऽद्भुतके ॥ २८ ॥
करुणे रसे च शोको हास्ये हासो भयानके भीतिः ॥
स्रजि गुणवत् सम्पृक्तो भावः स्थायीरितः कृतिभिः ॥ २९ ॥
चेतोवृत्तिविशेष—स्थायिजनयितोदितो विभावो यः ॥

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[1]रसगङ्गाधरकाराः । [2]अभिनवगुप्तपादैः । तत्त्वं च भट्टलोल्लटाद्यपेक्षयाऽवगन्तव्यम् । [3]भरतमुनिमतानुसारिणः । [4]इदमग्रेसराण्यनिर्दिष्टाचार्याभिधानानि च मतानि रसप्रकरणं बालबोधिन्यामुपन्यस्तानि । [5]रूपगोस्वामिनो भक्तिरसामृतसिन्धौ । [6]भारती सिद्धान्तसरणिः ।

आलम्बनमुद्दीपनमितिभेदद्वयमुक्तमेतदीयम् ॥ ३० ॥
व्यभिचारिणस्तु भावा निर्वेदाद्यास्त्रयस्त्रिंशत् ॥
आलम्बनचेष्टाद्याः स्थायिभावाश्चानुभावास्ते ॥ ३१ ॥
स्थाय्येकलः प्रमुखतां व्यभिचारी चाप्नुवन् भावः ॥
रसभावानौचित्य—प्रवृत्तियोगात् तदाभासौ ॥ ३२ ॥
भावोदयस्तु भावे व्युदिते शान्ते च तच्छान्तिः ॥
तत्सन्धिः समबलयोर्मिश्रणतश्चानयोर्ज्ञेयः ॥ ३३ ॥
कथितं तच्छाबल्यं भावानां पूर्वपूर्वसम्मर्दात् ॥
आविर्भावः, सर्वे मन्यन्तेऽमी रसारसनयोगात् ॥ ३४ ॥

(काव्यकारणनिरूपणम्)

व्युत्पत्त्यभ्यासाभ्यां सहितां प्रतिभां तदुद्भवे हेतुम् ॥
तामेव वा स्वतन्त्रां मन्यन्ते[1] तौ च तद्बलकौ ॥ ३५ ॥

(काव्यप्रयोजनकथनम्)

तस्य फलं निर्मातुः कीर्त्तिचतुर्वर्गकलुषमोषाद्यम् ॥
प्रतिपत्तुर्विज्ञानं निर्वृतिरसमोपदेशश्च ॥ ३६ ॥

(काव्यभेदनिरूपणम)

काव्यं त्रिधोत्तमं वा मध्यममधमं, ध्वनिस्तत्र ॥
प्रथमं शब्दार्थाधिक—विच्छित्त्याधायिनि व्यङ्ग्ये ॥ ३७ ॥
व्यङ्ग्ये गौणे तु गुणो—भूतव्यङ्ग्यं द्वितीयं तत् ॥
चित्रमलङ्कृतिचित्रं तृतीयमविवक्षिते व्यङ्ग्ये ॥ ३८ ॥
यश्चोत्तमोत्तममिति[2] प्रकारमाख्यन् तुरीयं सः ॥
निजकाव्यपक्षपातादनवस्थापातमवमेने ॥ ३९ ॥
द्वेधा ध्वनिरविवक्षित—वाच्यो यल्लक्षणामूलः ॥
अभिधामूलः ख्यातो विवक्षितान्यपरवाच्यश्च ॥ ४० ॥

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[1] रसगङ्गाधरकृतः । [2] जगन्नाथः । निजकाव्यं 'शयिता' इत्यादिपद्यम् । इत्थमितोऽपि क्वचित् सातिशयव्यङ्ग्योपलब्ध्यावुत्तमोत्तमोत्तमादिभेदकल्पनाया दुर्वारतयाऽनवस्थादोष आपतति ।

तत्राद्यस्यार्थान्तर—सङ्क्रमितस्वार्थनामैकः ॥
अपरोऽत्यन्ततिरस्कृत—वाच्यो भेदो मतः कृतिनाम् ॥ ४१ ॥
चरमस्यासल्लँक्ष्यक्रमो रसादिध्वनिः प्रथमः ॥
शब्दार्थशक्तिजन्मा भेदो लक्ष्यक्रमोऽप्यपरः ॥ ४२ ॥
इतराङ्गं व्यङ्ग्यं स्यादगूढमस्फुटं वाच्यसिद्ध्यङ्गम् ॥
सन्दिग्धप्राधान्यं तुल्यप्राधान्यमसुन्दरं यत्र ॥ ४३ ॥
काकाक्षिप्तं च गुणी—भूतव्यङ्ग्यस्य ते भेदाः ॥
शब्दार्थचित्रभेदाद् द्विविधं चित्रं समाम्नातम् ॥ ४४ ॥
यत्काव्यस्य नवीनै[1] रसादिमात्रात्मतां मत्वा ॥
व्यसनं[2] तद् व्यसनं ध्रुवमस्य तृतीयप्रकारस्य ॥ ४५ ॥
तदवान्तरप्रकारा विवृताः प्राच्यैर्विशेषेण ॥
विपुलत्वादिह तेषां सङ्ख्यानं नो विधीयतेऽस्माभिः ॥ ४६ ॥

(प्रासङ्गिकव्यञ्जनानिरूपणम्)

सङ्केतानुपलम्भात् स्वशब्दवाच्यत्वदोषाच्च ॥
अभिधा स्वकृत्यविरता नास्ति रसादिप्रकाशने शक्ता ॥ ४७ ॥
वाच्यार्थबाधविरहात् प्रयोजनादेरदर्शनाच्चैवम् ॥
एतान् प्रत्याययितुं जातु भवेन्नापि लक्षणा दक्षा ॥ ४८ ॥
सम्बन्धबोधनार्थं कियद्भिरेवाश्रिता[3] तद्वत् ॥
तात्पर्यवृत्तिरपि तान् बोधयितुं न क्षमा भवति ॥ ४९ ॥
व्यभिचारासिद्धिभ्यां दुष्टत्वादिष्टहेतूनाम् ॥
अनुमानमपि[4] कथञ्चित् प्रभवति नैतान् प्रकाशयितुम् ॥ ५० ॥
तद्रूपाऽर्थापत्ति[5]—र्व्यभिचारग्रासतो हेतोः ॥
स्मृतिरपि नैवामीषां धत्ते प्रत्यायने शक्तिम् ॥ ५१ ॥
पदवाक्यवर्णरचना—चेष्टाऽर्थाद्याश्रया तस्मात् ॥
ऊरीकृता तदर्थं तुर्याऽत्रव्यञ्जनावृत्तिः ॥ ५२ ॥

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[1] विश्वनाथमहापात्रैः । [2] विशेषेण खण्डनम् । [3] अभिहितान्वयवादिभिर्भाट्टमीमांसकैः । [4] मतमिदं व्यक्तिविवेककारस्य महिमभट्टस्य । [5] तत्रापि व्याप्तिग्रहणा- ।

(काव्याङ्गनिरूपणम्)

रीति-गुणा-लङ्कार-च्छन्दांस्यङ्गानि[1] काव्यस्य ॥
अङ्गविहीनं वपुरिव तद्विकलं शोभते नेदम् ॥ ५३ ॥
व्यवहितरसोपकर्त्री पदसन्दर्भात्मिका रीतिः ॥
नीवृद्विशेषरचना—परिपाटीभेदतो भिन्ना ॥ ५४ ॥
वैदर्भीं गौडीं तां पाञ्चालीं च त्रिधा केचित्[2] ॥
लाटीयुतां चतुर्धा तामेव व्याहरन्त्यपरे[3] ॥ ५५ ॥
प्राच्यावन्तीसहितां[4] षोढा तामुपदिशन्त्यन्ये[5] ॥
आसु तु गुणानुसारात् त्रिधा व्यवस्थैव साधिष्ठा ॥ ५६ ॥
वैदर्भ्युपनागरिका गौडी परुषा पुरातनैः कैश्चित्[6] ॥
पाञ्चाली ग्राम्येत्थं रीतिर्वृत्तिः स्फुटं कथिता ॥ ५७ ॥
रसमात्रवृत्तयो ये साक्षादेवोपकारकास्तेषाम् ॥
उक्तास्त्रयो गुणास्ते माधुर्यौजःप्रसादाख्याः ॥ ५८ ॥
शाब्दान् दश दश चार्थान् मन्यन्ते यद् गुणान् प्राञ्च्याः ॥
खण्डितमर्वाचीनै[7]—र्भङ्गीभिस्तद् विचित्राभिः ॥ ५९ ॥
तत्रेदं द्रष्टव्यं सौन्दर्याद्या यथा वपुषि लोके ॥
शब्दार्थवृत्तयः स्युस्तथा गुणा नो कथं काव्ये ॥ ६० ॥
शब्दार्थयोर्मधुरयोरुचितावसरे श्रुतिप्रतीती चेत् ॥
आह्लादयतो रसिकान् किं न तदा ते गुणाः कल्प्याः ॥ ६१ ॥
शब्दार्थावधिशयितास्तद्भिन्ना ये परम्परया ॥
उत्कर्षका रसानां, मन्यन्ते तानलङ्कारान् ॥ ६२ ॥
तेऽनुप्रासप्रमुखाः शब्देऽर्थे चोपमाद्यास्तत् ॥
प्रत्येकं विविधा अपि सामान्येन द्विधा कथिताः ॥ ६३ ॥
पुनरुक्तवदाभास—प्रभृतीनां श्लेषरूपकन्यायात् ॥
अन्तर्भावः श्रेया—नर्थालङ्कारनिकुरम्बे ॥ ६४ ॥
छन्दो लौकिकमात्रं पद्यमयस्यैव[8] तस्याङ्गम् ॥

[1]श्रौतच्छन्दस एव वेदाङ्गत्वम्। अङ्गत्वं चैषामुपकारकत्वेनावसातव्यम्। [2]वामनादयः। [3]दर्पणकारप्रमुखाः। [4]प्राच्या मागधीत्यनर्थान्तरम्। [5]भोजराजादयः। [6]मम्मटादिभिः। [7]प्रकाशकारप्रभृतिभिः। [8]गद्ये छन्दोविरहात्।

मात्रावर्णविभेदाद् द्विधा तदाख्यातमाचार्यैः[1] ॥ ६५ ॥

(पुनरन्यथा काव्यभेदनिरूपणम्)


काव्यं पुनर्द्विधा तद् दृश्यं श्रव्यं च, रूपकप्रमुखम् ॥
अभिनेयं दृश्यं स्याच्छ्रव्यमनेतत्तु सर्गबन्धादि[2] ॥ ६६ ॥

(उपसंहरणम्)

स्वमतगुणेन ग्रथिता चिरन्नसिद्धान्तरत्नमालेयम् ॥
सहृदयहृदये राधा—गोविन्दानुग्रहाल्लसतु ॥ ६७ ॥
मानुष्यकसुलभत्रुटि—पूर्त्तिमिह श्लाघ्यसौजन्याः ॥
विबुधाः समाधिकुशलाः स्वयं विधास्यन्त्यनायासम् ॥ ६८ ॥
'बदरीनाथ'-विरचिता सूक्ष्मा 'साहित्यमीमांसा' ॥
श्रुतजलधिपारदृश्व—'श्रीगङ्गानाथ'-तुष्टये भूयात् ॥ ६९ ॥

इति साहित्यमीमांसा ।

—इति शिवम्—



[1] पिङ्गलनागप्रमुखैः । [2] महाकाव्यादि

उपमालङ्कारः

श्रीः

(पं० श्रीभार्गवशास्त्री जोशी, पुण्यपत्तनम्)

नत्वा विद्योपदेष्टारं श्रीविश्वेश्वररूपिणम् ॥
गङ्गानाथप्रमोदार्थं निबन्धोऽयं विरच्यते ॥

प्रबन्धेऽत्रोपमालङ्कारस्य स्वरूपं शास्त्रकृद्भिः कीदृशमभ्यधायीति नातिविस्तरेण विविच्यते। तत्र शब्दशक्तिं स्थिरीकुर्वतामत्रभवतां विदुषामभिप्रायः परस्परं विरुद्धाकारोऽपि फलतो नातिविरुद्ध इति सुस्पष्टम् प्रतिभावताम्। परज्ञापनाय यथा शब्दानाम्प्रयोग आवश्यकस्तथैव शब्दशक्तिनिर्णयोऽपि। ये ह्यविज्ञातशक्तिकाः श्रूयन्ते शब्दास्तेभ्योऽर्थप्रकाशनं नैव भवतीत्याबालवृद्धप्रसिद्धमेतत्। शक्तिज्ञानं विनापि बोधो भवतीति स्वीकृतं चेत् सर्वोऽप्ययं कोशकाव्यादिव्यवहार उच्छिन्नः स्यात्। श्रुतः शब्दोऽर्थम्बोधयेत्। भाषाभेदेऽपि नानिष्टं किंचित्। किमुत भाषाबाहुल्यमप्यसंभाव्यमेवेति। परं विविधाश्च भाषा दृश्यन्ते। नागृहीतशक्तिकाद् बोधो भवति।

स च शक्तिग्रहः कोशात्तवाक्याद्व्यवहारादिना वा भवतीत्युद्घोषस्सार्वजनीनः। शक्तिश्च संकेतरूपा बोधकतारूपा तदन्या वा मतभेदेन भिन्ना भिन्नाश्रिता तत्तदाचार्यैः। तत्र संकेतरूपां शक्तिं स्वीकुर्वतामयमभिप्रायः, व्यवहारम्प्रादुष्कुर्वतादिपुरुषेणास्य शब्दस्यात्रार्थे शक्तिरिति निर्णीतं स एव संकेतः। तज्ज्ञानेन चार्थग्रहो भवतीति। यत्र च लक्षणयान्योऽर्थः प्रतीयते तत्र संकेताभावात् बोधासंभवोऽपि विषयतासम्बन्धेन संकेतस्य तत्र सत्वात् दूरापास्त एवेति न दोषः। शक्तिमत्पदं च शक्तमित्यभिधीयते। तदेव च साधु। आदिपुरुषेण च संकेतस्संस्कृतभाषाशब्देष्वेव कृतो न लौकिकभाषाशब्देषु। शक्तिभ्रमात्साधु-

शब्दमनुमाय वा भाषाशब्दतोऽर्थबोध इति न काप्यापत्तिः। शब्दार्थयोस्सम्बन्ध एव शक्तिरिति वादिनाम् मतमप्येतादृशमेव। केचित् च शक्त्या प्रतिपादकत्वमभिधेति लक्षयन्ति तत् "उपपत्तिविरोधात्। तथाहि इहशब्दाज्जायमानायामर्थोपस्थितौ कारणीभूता सा शब्दवृत्तिरभिधाख्या लक्ष्यतया च प्रस्तुताप्रतिपादकत्वस्य प्रतिपत्तिहेतुत्वरूपस्य शब्दगतस्य न ज्ञानं प्रतिपत्तौ कारणम्। अतः कथन्नाम प्रतिपादकत्वमभिधेत्युच्यत" इत्यालंकारिकमूर्धाभिषिक्तग्रंथेनैव निरस्तमिति प्रतिपादनाक्षममेव। एवं च शक्तिवाद्याचार्याणाम्मतं द्विविधं दृश्यते। संकेतवादिनस्तत्सदृशशक्तिवादिनश्चैके। अपरे तु बोधकतारूपशक्तिवादिनः। संकेतवादिमते भाषाशब्देष्वीश्वरसंकेताभावेन तादृशशब्देभ्यो बोधो न जायते। अनुभवस्तु भाषाशब्देभ्योऽपि बोधविषयकः। स च बोधः शुक्तौ रजतभानमिव भ्रमात्मक एवेति। एतच्च ब्रह्म सत्यञ्जगन्मिथ्येतिवद्रूढमेव। स्यादपि तथा। परन्त्विदमत्राकूतं कस्यचन पुरुषस्य शुक्तौ रजतभ्रमे जातेऽप्यपरस्य तथैव भ्रमो भवतीति न निश्चयः प्रत्युत सर्वेषाम् भ्रमो न तथा भवतीत्येवानुभवसिद्धम्। संकेतवादिनो भाषाशब्देषु सर्वेष्वपि भ्रमं स्वीकुर्वन्ति स चानादिपरम्परया सर्वासामपि व्यक्तीनामेकरूप इति विशेषः। अपि च संकेत एव शक्तिरिति मते उपस्थितिशाब्दबोधकार्यकारणभावगौरवन्दोषावहमिति बोधकतापक्षमङ्गीकुर्वन्ति तत्वविदः। सा च बोधकता येभ्यः शब्देभ्योऽर्थबोधो भवति तेषु सर्वेष्वप्यविशेषेणास्तीति गीर्वाणवाणीशब्द इव भाषाशब्देभ्योऽपि बोधः प्रमात्मक एव। बोधकता च नातिरिक्ता शक्तिरिति न गौरवदोषलेशोऽपि। येभ्यः शब्देभ्यो यस्यार्थस्य बोधस्समुत्पद्यते तेषु तेषु शब्देषु तत्तद्विषयिणी बोधकतास्तीति तादृशशब्दसमुदायरूपं वाक्यम्फलोपधायकं सम्पद्यते। वाक्यादेव प्रवृत्तिनिवृत्त्यात्मकशाब्दबोधो जायते न तु केवलाच्छब्दात्। तस्माच्चोपस्थितिरेव।

एतादृशं रचनाविशेषवैशिष्ट्यं वाक्यं काव्यमित्यालंकारिकाः। अत एव तददोषौ शब्दार्थौ सगुणावनलङ्कृती पुनः क्वापि—इति काव्यलक्षणम्प्रकाशकारैरुक्तम्। नन्वनेन लक्षणेनैकस्यापि शब्दस्य काव्यत्वं वक्तुं युक्तम्। संभवति हि द्वारमित्यादिस्थले पिधेह्यर्थविशिष्टश्शाब्दबोधः। तथा चैकस्यापि शब्दस्य काव्यत्वन्तस्माच्च शाब्दबोध इत्युपपन्नतरमेवेति चेन्न। द्वारमित्यादिस्थले पिधेहीत्यस्याध्याहारेणैव शाब्दबोधः, स चेष्ट एव। अध्याहारे पदसमुदायात्मकवा-

क्यलक्षणस्य तत्र सत्वेन न काप्यापत्तिः सुधियाम्। विदिततरं चैतत् यदसहायस्य शब्दस्य सगुणत्वं सालङ्कारत्वं वाऽसंभवि इति। वस्तुतस्तु तददोषौ शब्दार्थाविति काव्यलक्षणमातीव रमणीयतामादधाति। काव्यं श्रुतं, अर्थो न ज्ञातः, काव्यं गेयम्, काव्यमुच्चैः पठ्यते इत्यादिविश्वजनीनव्यवहारतः काव्यशब्दस्यार्थे शक्तिकल्पनमप्रामाणिकमेव। यदि च बुद्धं काव्यमित्यादिव्यवहारतः केवलमर्थोऽपि काव्यपदवाच्य एवेति स्वीकार्यमितिचेन्न शब्दार्थयोस्तादात्म्याङ्गीकारेण तथा प्रयोगात्। काव्यशब्दस्तु तत्र लाक्षणिक एव। काव्यङ्गेयमित्याद्यनेकप्रयोगानुसारतस्तथैव कल्पना ज्यायसी। अत एव चमत्कारजनकभावनाविषयार्थप्रतिपादकशब्दत्वङ्काव्यस्य लक्षणमिति नव्याः। यथा सौवर्णादयोऽलंकाराः स्वभावसुन्दरस्य सौन्दर्यं वर्धयन्ति विकृतशरीरस्यापि बहूपकुर्वन्त्येव तथाहीमेऽलङ्कारा विभूषयन्ति काव्यम्।

ते च द्विविधाः शब्दालंकारा अर्थालंकाराश्च। शब्दालंकारास्तावद्यमकानुप्रासादयोऽर्थमसंस्पृशन्तः काव्यमलंकुर्वन्ति अर्थालंकाराश्चोपमादयोऽर्थं प्रागुपस्थितं पार्ष्णिग्राहेण प्रकाशयन्ति। सर्वालंकारेभ्योऽप्ययमुपमालंकारः स्फुटतया विभावाद्युत्कर्षकत्वात्सौकुमार्यातिशयादनेकालंकारमूलभूतत्वाच्च प्रथमतः प्रोक्तः। अर्थालंकाराश्च भेदाभेदप्रधानत्वेन द्विविधा दृश्यन्ते। अभेदप्रधाना भ्रान्तिमदुल्लेखपरिणामाऽपह्नुतिरूपकादयः। भेदप्रधानाश्च दृष्टान्तप्रतिवस्तूपमादीपकतुल्ययोगितादयः। उपमा च भेदप्रधानेष्वेवान्तर्भवति। सा चोपमा उपमानोपमेयसादृश्यप्रयोजकसाधारणधर्मघटिता। चंद्रवन्मुखं सुन्दरमित्यत्रोपमानचन्द्रोपमेयमुखवृत्तिसाधारणधर्मस्सुंदरत्वादिः। सादृश्यप्रयोजकशब्दश्च वतिप्रत्ययः। यथा वा हंसीव कृष्ण ते कीर्तिस्स्वर्गंगामवगाहते इत्यत्रोपमानहंस्युपमेयकीर्तिवृत्तिसाधारणो धर्मः स्वर्गंगावगाहनत्वादिः। सादृश्यप्रतिपादकश्चेवशब्दः।

इयं चोपमा बहुभिर्लक्षणकृद्भिर्बहुप्रकारैर्लक्षिता। तत्र प्रकाशकारैस्तावत् 'साधर्म्यमुपमा भेदे' इत्येव लक्षणमुक्तम् परं चैतल्लक्षणमाक्षेपितार्थसाकांक्षमिव प्रतिभाति। यतो भेदे सति साधर्म्यमुपमेति तस्यार्थः, तत्र भेद इत्यनेन कस्य भेद इत्याकांक्षायां यस्य येन साधर्म्यं तयोर्भेद इति फलति। एवमपि गौरिव गवय इत्यत्राप्युपमालंकारत्वप्रसक्तिः। इष्टापत्तौ कथंकारमत्र भूषायितमस्य

वाक्यस्येति विचारणीयम्। यदि न भूषयितम् कथमस्यालंकारत्वं स्यात् । एतदर्थं साधर्म्यमात्रेऽलंकारत्वमनुचितमेव। यत्र च निषेधप्रतियोगि सादृश्यं तत्रास्य लक्षणस्यातिव्याप्तिरपि। असिमात्रसहायोऽपि प्रभूतारिपराभवे। नैवान्यतुच्छजनवत् सगर्वोऽयं महाधृतिः ॥ अस्मिन् पद्ये भेदे सति साधर्म्यस्य सत्वेनोपमालक्षणमतिव्याप्तम्। नचेयमुपमा। ननु भेदे सति साधर्म्यमित्यत्र साधर्म्यस्य पर्यवसितमिति विशेषणं देयं तथा च पर्यवसितं साधर्म्यम्भेदश्च यत्रास्ति तत्रैवेयमुपमा। असिमात्रसहायोऽपीत्यत्र साधर्म्यस्य निषेधेन पर्यवसितत्वाभावान्न दोष इति चेत् केवलमुपमानोपमेययोः साधर्म्यमुपमेत्यनेनैव निर्वाहे 'भेदे'-पदोपादानं, न केवलं भाति नितान्तकांतिर्नितम्बिनी सैव नितम्बिनीव। यावद्विलासायुधलासवासास्ते तद्विलासा इव तद्विलासाः ॥ इत्याद्यनन्वयादिस्थले दोषवारणार्थमेव। अन्यथा यथा कथंचित्साधर्म्यस्य तत्रापि सत्वेन दोषस्य तादवस्थ्यात्। उत्प्रेक्षाद्युदाहरणे लिम्पतीव तमोऽगानि वर्षतीवाञ्जनं नभः। असत्पुरुषसेवेव दृष्टिर्विफलताङ्गता ॥ इत्यत्र साधर्म्यस्य इवार्थाभावेन सादृश्यानुयोगिनः कस्याप्यनुपादानेन च न दोषः। भेदपदसत्वे सादृश्यानुयोगिप्रतियोगिनोरुपादानमावश्यकमेव। सादृश्ये सौन्दर्यश्चोपमास्थलस्यैवानुभवसिद्धश्च व्यतिरेकानन्वयादौ प्रतीयमानस्येत्याग्रहस्तदा 'सुन्दरसाधर्म्यमुपमा' इति सूत्रकरणेऽपीष्टार्थप्रतिपत्तिः स्यात्किमिति भेदपदोपादानम्पर्यवसितत्वानुधावनञ्चेति विमर्शनीयम्।

अलंकारसर्वस्वकारैश्च भेदाभेदतुल्यत्वे साधर्म्यमुपमेति लक्षणमुक्तम्। तस्यायमाशयः–उपमास्थले भेदस्य सर्वसम्मतत्वेऽपि तस्य धर्मसाधारण्येनाभेदतुल्यत्वात्तादृशं साधर्म्यमुपमेति। अत्रापि अभेदतुल्यभेदसत्वे साधर्म्यमुपमेति लक्षणम्फलति। तच्च साधर्म्यं पूर्ववत् पर्यवसितत्वविशिष्टमेव ग्राह्यं तथा सति भेदपदोपादानस्य वैयर्थ्यमुपपादितप्रायमेव। अभेदतुल्यत्वविशेषणवैफल्यमधिकमस्मिन्लक्षणे। यद्यप्यभेदतुल्यत्वविशेषणेन पर्यवसितत्वार्थस्य संग्रहः स्यात्तेन च तस्य सार्थक्यमपि तथापि भेदपदाप्रयोजनं स्पष्टमेव।

केचित् प्रसिद्धगुणेनोपमानेनाप्रसिद्धगुणस्योपमेयस्य सादृश्यमुपमेति प्राहुः। चन्द्रवन्मुखमित्यत्र सौन्दर्यख्यातियुतचन्द्रसादृश्यकथनेन सौंदर्यख्यातिरहितेऽपि मुखे सौंदर्यवत्वमनेन बोध्यते। एवं च पूर्वोक्तदोषाणामत्र संभवाभावः। परन्त्वस्मिन्लक्षणे प्रसिद्धाप्रसिद्धपदोपादानफलं मृग्यम्। यत, उदयति हि

शशांकः कामिनीगण्डपाण्डुरित्यादौ, यस्य कामिनो रतिविशेषवशात् प्रियामुखमेव सारसर्वस्वम् तादृशस्य कवेः प्रतीपाविवक्षायामपि प्रियामुखमिव सुस्निग्धश्चंद्र इत्येतादृशस्थले च प्रसिद्धाप्रसिद्धयोर्वैपरीत्येन उपमाभाव एव ज्ञेयः स्यात्। उत प्रसिद्धाप्रसिद्धपदयोरनावश्यकतैव प्रतिपादनीयेति सुधीभिराकलनीयम्। यदि च प्रसिद्धाप्रसिद्धपदे स्पष्टप्रतिपत्त्यर्थे एव न विवक्षित इत्युच्येत तर्ह्यनन्वयादिस्थले व्यभिचारवारणाय प्रयतितव्यमेभिर्लक्षणकारैः।

अप्पय्यदीक्षितास्तु उपमितिक्रियानिष्पत्तिमत्सादृश्यवर्णनमदुष्टमव्यङ्ग्य-मुपमालंकार इत्याहुः। उपमितिक्रियानिष्पत्तिमत्सादृश्यवर्णनमित्यनेन सादृश्य-मूलक उपमानोपमेयभाव आख्यातः। अदुष्टेत्यादिविशेषणदानेन गौरिव गवय इत्यत्र यत्र वोपमानोपमेयोरभेदः सादृश्यप्रयोजकधर्माभावो वा तादृशस्थले न दोषः। अत्रके चित्प्रत्यवतिष्ठन्ते— वर्णनस्य ज्ञानात्मकत्वाच्छब्दवाच्यत्वा-भावेनास्यालंकारस्यार्थालंकारत्वानापत्तिः। शब्दालंकारत्वस्य त्वसंभवादेवाभावः। उभयवादिमते चायमर्थालंकारः। वर्णनस्य ज्ञानस्वरूपत्वे सिद्धे तत्र दोषादिसंभावनाभावेनादुष्टमपीत्यादि विशेषणदानं व्यर्थमेव स्यात् एवं चातिव्या-प्त्यव्याप्तिपरिहारासमर्थमेतल्लक्षणमित्यसुंदरमेवेति। अत्रेत्थं विचारणीयं काशी-पुरीं वर्णय, सेनानिवेशं वर्णयेत्यादौ वर्णधातोः कथनपरत्वमेव, पराक्रमं वर्णयेत्यत्र स्तवनमेवार्थो भूगोलवर्णनमित्यादौ च भूगोलावयवसंस्थानज्ञापनमर्थः। एवं च वर्णधातोरनेकार्थत्वाद्वर्णनमित्यस्य ज्ञापनमर्थ इत्याग्रहः। परंत्वस्मिन् लक्षणे यावत्पर्यन्तं सादृश्यसिद्धिर्न स्यात्तावत्पर्यंतमुपमितिक्रियानिष्पत्तेरभावेन लक्षणे सादृश्यपदनिवेशाभिप्रायो गूढतर एव। अत एव दीक्षितैः स्वनिषेधा-पर्य्यवसायि सादृश्यवर्णनमदुष्टमव्यंग्यमिति द्वितीयलक्षणमुक्तम्। तेन चान-न्वयव्यतिरेकादौ गौरिव गवय इत्यादौ च न दोषः। वस्तुतस्तु लक्षणद्वय-करणेनाप्यनलंकारभूतायामुपमायामतिव्याप्तिस्तदवस्थैव। स्तनाभोगे पतन्भाति कपोलात्कुटिलोऽलकः। शशाङ्कबिम्बतो मेरौ लम्बमान इवोरगः॥ इत्यादि-स्थल उपमाया वाक्यार्थानतिरेकेण वाक्यार्थोपस्कारकत्वमस्या न संभवतीत्यन-लंकारत्वन्निर्णीतम्। पूर्वोक्तलक्षणेऽस्यालंकारत्वन्दुर्निवारमिति।

ये च, स्वतः सिद्धेन भिन्नेन संमतेन च धर्मतः। साम्यमन्येन वर्ण्यस्य वाच्यं चेदेकगोपमा॥ इति परिष्कुर्वंति, वास्तविकभिन्नयोः पदार्थयोर्यत्किं-

चिद्धर्मवत्वेन साम्यं सोपमेति च द्रढयन्ति, तेऽपि व्यतिरेके, असिमात्रसहायस्य प्रभूतारिपराभवे । अन्यतुच्छजनस्येव न स्मयोऽस्य महाधृतेः ॥ इत्यादौ गत्यंतराभावादपरितुष्यंत एव ।

प्राचीनैस्तु–उपमानोपमेयत्वयोग्ययोरर्थयोर्द्वयोः । हृद्यं साधर्म्यमुपमेत्युच्यते काव्यवेदिभिः ॥ इति लक्षणङ्कृतम् । एतदपि हृद्यतामात्रेण निर्वाहे विशेषणान्तरवैयर्थ्यादित्यनेन संभावितङ्कैश्चित् । वास्तविकपर्यालोचने हृद्यं साधर्म्यमुपमेत्युच्यमानेऽपि हृद्यपदस्य पारिभाषिकत्वात्प्रायशोऽर्थस्य लाभेन न काप्यनुपपत्तिः । साधर्म्ये हृद्यत्वं च यत्रोपमा तत्रैव स्यान्न व्यतिरेकादावित्युपमानोपमेयत्वयोग्ययोरर्थयोर्द्वयोरिति विशेषणं स्पष्टप्रतिपत्त्यर्थं हृद्यत्वस्यार्थाविशदनार्थं च । व्यतिरेकादौ साधर्म्यनिषेधस्यैव रमणीयत्वेन केवलसाधर्म्यस्य हृद्यत्वाभावेऽपि कर्पूर इव दग्धोऽपि शक्तिमान्यो जने जने । नमोऽस्त्ववार्यवीर्याय तस्मै मकरकेतवे ॥ इत्याद्यनुपमास्थलेषु साधर्म्यस्य हृद्यत्वदर्शनादतिव्याप्तिपरिहारार्थं विशेषणमित्यपि वक्तुं सुशकमिति दिक् ।

पण्डितप्रवरजगन्नाथरायास्तु सादृश्यं सुंदरं वाक्यार्थोपस्कारकमुपमालंकृतिरिति प्रावोचन् । यत्र वाक्यार्थोपस्कारकं सुंदरं सादृश्यं भवेत् तत्रोपमेति वाक्यार्थः । उपमास्थले सादृश्यस्यैव हृद्यत्वेन वाक्यार्थोपस्कारकत्वेन च सर्वलक्ष्यसंग्रहः । यत्र च स्तनाभोगे पतन्भाति कपोलात्कुटिलोऽलकः । शशांकबिम्बतो मेरौ लम्बमान इवोरगः ॥ इत्यादौ वाक्यार्थ एव सादृश्यमिति तदुपस्कारकत्वाभावेन न लक्षणातिव्याप्तिः । त्वयि कोपोपमा भाति सुधांशाविव पावक इत्यत्र सुधांशोः पावकानाधारत्वेनोपमाया असंभव इत्यपि न वाच्यम् । यदि सुधांशौ पावकावस्थानं स्यात्तर्हि यादृशी शोभा जायेत तत्सादृश्यबोधनेनाप्यलंकारसत्ताया अबाधात् । कल्पितोपमानस्थले सादृश्यस्य हृद्यत्वसमर्थनन्नातीव दुष्करम् । न चेदं शशशृङ्गवत्कल्पितेन पदार्थेन साम्यं संतोषाजनकमिति वाच्यम् । मनोरथोपनीतरमणीसंश्लेषकल्पनया पुरोवस्थितनारीसंभोगस्यापि तत्सुखोत्पादकत्वदर्शनात् ।

अत्रेत्थमवधेयम्, सादृश्यं सुंदरं वाक्यार्थोपस्कारकमित्यत्र वाक्यार्थोपस्कारकं सुंदरमिति पदाभ्यामिष्टोऽर्थः पारिभाषिकगणनयैव लब्धुं शक्यः । अन्यथा सुंदरत्वस्य रुचिभिन्नतया यं प्रति किंचित्सुंदरन्तदेवान्यम्प्रत्यसुंदरमिति संभाव्यते । लक्षणप्रमाणाभ्यां हि वस्तुसिद्धिरिति सिद्धान्तात्तादृशेन लक्षणेन भाव्यं येन

सर्वान्प्रत्यविशेषाद्वस्तूपस्थितिः स्यात्। न चेदं तथा कविकलितहृद्यत्वानाकलनेऽस्य लक्षणस्योपमापदार्थस्य ज्ञानेऽनुपयोगात्। एतादृशपारिभाषिकशब्दघटितलक्षणस्वीकारे हृद्यं साधर्म्यमुपमेत्येव सूच्यताम्। प्रतीपानन्वयादौ सादृश्यस्य हृद्यत्वास्वीकारेण न दोषः। यदि नैतत्पारिभाषिकमिति स्वीक्रियते तदा न केवलम्भाति नितान्तकान्तिर्नितंबिनी सैव नितंबिनीवेत्यादौ प्रथमोपस्थितसादृश्यस्य हृद्यत्वाभावे किं मानमिति त एव प्रष्टव्याः। गौरिव गवय इत्यादावुपमाया वाक्यार्थत्वात्तदुपस्कारकत्वाभावेनालंकारत्वाभावेऽपि एहि तावत्सुंदरि कर्णं दत्वा शृणुष्व वचनीयम्। तव मुखेन कृशोदरि चंद्र उपमीयते जनेन॥ इत्यादौ तस्या वाक्यार्थोपस्कारकत्वेनोपमालंकारतापत्तिः। न चेष्टापत्तिः। प्रतीपोदाहरणत्वेनास्यालंकारिकैः स्वीकृतत्वात्। एवं चैतल्लक्षणमपि नोत्कृष्टतायाः पराङ्कोटिमारोहति।

अत एव निष्कृष्टार्थलक्षणं 'यत्रोपमानविशिष्टबुद्धिकृतश्चमत्कारस्तत्रोपमालंकारत्वम्। उपमानवैशिष्ट्यं च बुद्धौ स्वप्रतियोगिकत्व—स्वप्रतियोगिकसादृश्यानुयोगिकत्वोभयसंबंधेनेति नव्याः। स्वीकृते चास्मिन्लक्षणे प्रतीपेऽनन्वयादावप्यदोषः। यतः प्रतीपे सादृश्यापेक्षया निषेधस्यैव चमत्कारित्वेनोपमानविशिष्टबुद्धिकृतश्चमत्कारो नास्तीत्यनवद्यम्। अनन्वये ते तद्विलासा इव तद्विलासा इत्यादौ स्वप्रतियोगिकसादृश्यानुयोगिकत्वसम्बन्धाभावेन लक्षणानाक्रान्ततया नोपमात्वम्। शशांकबिम्बतो मेरावित्यादौ बुद्धिकृतचमत्कारप्रतीतिर्यदि सहृदान्तर्ह्युपमालंकारत्वे नो विवादः। यदि च चमत्कारानुभवस्तर्हि लक्षणानाक्रान्तिरेव। लक्षणेऽस्मिन्न पारिभाषिकशब्दाः, न चाध्याहारापेक्षा, नापि निरर्थकपदसमुच्चय इति स्पष्टन्तद्विदाम्।

ननु लक्षणेनानेन बहुतरदोषपरिहारेऽपि कमलेव मतिर्मतिरिव कमला तनुरिव विभा विभेव तनुः। धरणीव धृतिर्धृतिरिव धरणी सततं विभाति बत यस्येत्यत्रोपमेयोपमास्थले दोषापत्तिस्तदवस्थैव। कमलेव मतिरित्यत्र सादृश्यस्य चमत्कारित्वे विवादाभावेनाशक्यः परीहार इति न च वाच्यम्। कमलेव मतिरित्येतावन्मात्रश्रवणे चमत्कारिसादृश्यप्रतीतिरिति निर्विवादम् परन्तु मतिरिव कमलेत्यस्य दर्शनेन कमलेव मतिरित्यत्र निषेध एव प्रतीयते न सादृश्यम्। उपमेयोपमालङ्कारस्य पूर्वार्धे निषेधज्ञापनमेव फलमिति राद्धान्तः। तेन च कमलेव मतिरित्यत्र

न दोषः। नन्वेवमपि मतिरिव कमलेत्यत्रोपमालक्षणस्यातिव्याप्तिर्दुरुद्धरैव। मतिरिवेत्यस्य श्रवणेन कमलेवेत्यस्य निषेधपरत्वे स्वीकृतेऽप्यत्र रमणीयसादृश्यस्य निराबाधेनातिव्याप्तिः स्यादिति चेन्न यथोत्तरार्धस्य श्रवणेन पूर्वार्धस्य निषेधपरता सम्भाव्यते तद्वदेव पूर्वार्धश्रवणोत्तरमुत्तरार्धस्य श्रवणेन तत्रेषत्सादृश्यमेव प्रतीयत इति न दोषः। तडिदिव तन्वी भवतीत्यादौ सादृश्यप्रयोजकधर्मभेदेन न तस्य रमणीयत्वबाधः। एवं च नव्योक्तमुपमालक्षणं सर्वानवद्यमिति सहृदयैरादरणीयम्।

इयं च पूर्णा लुप्तेति भेदेन द्विविधा। पूर्णा चोपमानोपमेयसाधारणधर्मोपमाप्रतिपादकानामुपादाने सति भवति। लुप्ता च उपमेयादीनामेकस्य द्वयोस्त्रयाणामभावे संपद्यते। पूर्णा च वाक्यगा समासगा तद्धितगेति श्रौत्यार्थीभेदैः षड्विधा, लुप्तोपमा चैकोनविंशतिधेति मिलित्वा पंचविंशतिप्रकारा भवन्ति। वस्तुतस्त्वेतत्प्रकारप्रदर्शनम्प्रपंचार्थमेव। कल्पितभेदाश्चेतोऽपि बहवः संभवन्ति। अत एव "इत्यादिका रशनोपमा च न लक्षिता। एवंविधवैचित्र्यसहस्रसंभवात्" इत्युक्तमभियुक्तैः। अस्या उदाहरणानि तु बहुषु स्थलेषु दृश्यंत इत्यतोऽनवधानभिया च नोपादीयन्ते।

सादृश्यस्य शाब्दबोधे भानन्तु पूर्णोपमास्थले नातीव दुरवगाहम्। यथा, शौरिर्भुजैरिव चतुर्भिरदः सदा यो लक्ष्मीविलासभवनैर्भुवनम्बभार। अत्र क्रियामुख्यविशेष्यकशाब्दबोधवादिवैय्याकरणमते चतुःसंख्याकभुजकरणत्वप्रतियोगिकसादृश्यानुयोगिलक्ष्मीविलासभवनाभिन्नचतुःसंख्याकोपायकरणको यद्वृत्तिभुवनभरणानुकूलो व्यापार इति बोधः। प्रथमान्तमुख्यविशेष्यकश्च लक्ष्मीविलासभवनाभिन्नचतुःसंख्याकोपायकरणकभुवनभरणानुकूलव्यापाराश्रयो य इति बोधः। शेषम्पूर्ववत्। अत्र शौरिपदस्य शौरिकर्तृकक्रियावति लक्षणा तस्य च करणेन सहाभेदान्वयः। केचित्तु शौरिवृत्तिक्रियासदृशक्रियावान् राजेति बोध इति वदंति। तेषां शौरिभुजैर्बभारेव भुवनम्बभारेत्यतो बोधे को विशेष इति त एव प्रष्टव्याः। स्वप्नेऽपि समरेषु त्वां विजयश्रीर्न मुञ्चति। प्रभावप्रभवङ्कान्तं स्वाधीनपतिका यथा॥ इत्यत्र प्रभावप्रभवाभिन्नकान्तप्रतियोगिकसादृश्यानुयोगित्वद्विभागानुकूलो व्यापार इति बोधः। चन्द्रसुन्दरमित्यत्र विशिष्टशक्तिवादिमते चन्द्रनिरूपितसादृश्यप्रयोजकसौन्दर्यविशिष्टे चन्द्रसुन्दरमित्यस्य शक्तिरित्यनाकुलम्। समासे विशिष्टशक्त्यस्वीकर्तृणाम्मतं तु चन्द्रपदस्येवार्थसादृश्यविशिष्टे

लक्षणायाश्चन्द्रसादृश्यविशिष्टार्थस्य सुन्दरपदार्थेऽभेदसम्बन्धेनान्वय उचितः। केचित् च चन्द्रसुन्दरम्मुखमित्यादौ सादृश्यप्रयोजकत्वभानं विना न साधर्म्यस्य हृद्यत्वमिति चन्द्रपदस्य चन्द्रसादृश्यप्रयोजके लक्षणा तस्य च सुन्दरपदार्थैकदेशसौन्दर्येणाभेदान्वय इति वदन्ति। तदेकदेशान्वयप्रपातादसमञ्जसमेव। ननु चन्द्र इव सुन्दरम्मुखमित्यत्र चन्द्रनिरूपितसादृश्यप्रयोजकसौन्दर्यवदभिन्नम्मुखमित्येव बोध आश्रयणीयः। तथा चैकदेशान्वयो भवतामपीति चेत्। देवदत्तस्य गुरुरितिवदुभयत्रापि समाधेयमिति केचित्। अपरे तु चन्द्रप्रतियोगिकसादृश्यानुयोगिमुखाभिन्नं सुन्दरमिति बोधः। एवं चैकदेशान्वयशंकालेशदोषोऽपि न। नामार्थयोरभेदान्वयनियमस्तु निपातातिरिक्तविषये। तेनैवार्थसादृश्ये भेदेनान्वयबोधेऽपि न किंचिद्बाधकम्। मालतीकुसुमसदृशम्भ्रमर भ्रमन्नपि न प्राप्स्यसीत्यत्र विशिष्टशक्तिवादिमते दोषाभावेऽपि पृथक्शक्तिवादिभिः सदृशपदस्य मालतीकुसुमप्रतियोगिकसादृश्यानुयोगिनि लक्षणा समाश्रयणीया। पूर्वपदन्तात्पर्यग्राहकमिति दिक्॥

॥ शिवम् ॥

श्रीः

वेदापौरुषेयत्वम् ।

(महामहोपाध्यायः पं० श्रीमाधवशास्त्री भाण्डारी, लवपुरम्)

तत्रादौ वेदानां वर्णपदवाक्यात्मकत्वाद्वर्णादीनां नित्यत्वमन्तरेण वेदापौरुषेयत्वं न सिध्येत्, तदर्थं पूर्वं वर्णनित्यत्वं साध्यते मीमांसकनैरुक्तप्रातिशाख्यकारादिभिः। तथाहि—तदेव वस्तु जन्यं भवति यत्रोत्पत्तिकारणं संभवति, तथा तदेव वस्तु नाशप्रतियोगि भवति, यत्र नाशकारणं समुपपन्नं भवति। वर्णानां तु निरवयवत्वाद्द्रव्यरूपत्वेन गुणरूपत्वाभावाच्च अवयवसंयोगादिकं तद्विभागादिकं च न किंचिदुत्पत्तिविनाशकारणं संभवति।

'मारुतस्तूरसि चरन् मन्द्रं जनयति स्वरम्' 'वायुरापद्यते शब्दताम्' इत्यादिशिक्षावाक्यात्तु वायुसंयोगानामभिव्यञ्जकत्वमात्रं सिध्यति न वर्णजनकत्वम्। तथाहि कश्चिदेकमात्रिकः कश्चिद् द्विमात्रिकः कश्चित् त्रिमात्रिकः, इत्यादिरीत्या ह्रस्वत्वादयो भासमाना वर्णधर्माः अभिव्यञ्जकानां वायुसंयोगानामेकमात्रत्वादिनाभासन्ते। तथा कण्ठादिस्थानेषु ऊर्ध्वादिभागावच्छेदेन वायुसंयोगादेव उदात्तत्वानुदात्तत्वस्वरितत्वधर्मा वर्णेषु भासन्ते तथा नासिकावच्छेदेन वायुसंयोगविशेषादेवानुनासिकत्वं तदभावे चाननुनासिकत्वमित्यपि वायुसंयोगोत्पन्नवैखर्यादिध्वनिधर्मा एव वर्णेषु भासेते, किं बहुना, कलो, ध्मात, एणीकृत इत्यादयो दोषा अपि ध्वनिधर्माः सन्तो वर्णे भासन्ते, तथा च ह्रस्वत्वादीनां धर्माणां कलादीनां च दोषाणामुपाधिवशादेव वर्णे भानं भवति जपादिसन्निधिवशाद्रक्तत्वादिधर्माणां स्फटिके भानमिवौपाधिकं तत्। तथा च वायुसंयोगा मध्यमावैखरीनादाश्च अकारादिवर्णस्य तत्तद्धर्मपुरस्कारेणाभिव्यञ्जका एव न तूत्पादकाः।

अकारादिवर्णः पुनरेक एव, तस्य च देशान्तरे सत्वान्तरे च युगपदनुभवादाकाशादिवद्व्यापकत्वमपि। एवं सर्ववर्णानाम्। अत एव च आत्मीयस्य बोधस्य परपुरुषे संक्रान्तये तेषामभिव्यञ्जनं सर्वपुरुषैर्यथेच्छं युगपत्कर्तुं शक्यते। तदुक्तं यास्काचार्येण निरुक्ते 'व्याप्तिमत्त्वात्तु शब्दस्य' इत्यादिना। तथा महर्षिजैमिनिनाऽपि 'नित्यस्तु स्याद्दर्शनस्य परार्थत्वात्' (पू-मी-१-१-१८) इत्यादिना सहेतुकं नित्यत्वं वर्ण्यते।

तथाहि--शब्दोच्चारणं हि परपुरुषे स्वकीयबोधसंक्रान्तये क्रियते, शब्दाश्च वर्णसंघात्मकाः, वर्णानां च नैयायिकोक्तरीत्या केवलं क्षणद्वयावस्थायित्वे तेषां संघ एव न सिध्येत् उत्पन्नविनष्टानां संघासंभवात्। तथा च कुत एव शब्दसिद्धिः, कथं चासंभविना तेन परत्र बोधसंक्रमसिद्धिः। किंचैवंरीत्या वर्णवत्पदमप्यनित्यं स्यात्, तथा च यस्मिन् पदे व्यवहारादिना यदर्थनिरूपिता शक्तिर्गृहीता, तत्तु शक्तगवादिपदं नष्टमेव, स्वकीयोच्चारणकाले च नूतनमेव तत्पदं स्यात्तस्य च वक्तुः श्रोतुर्वा शक्तिग्रह एव नास्ति तथा च कथमगृहीतशक्तिकेन तेन परेषां स्वस्य वा बोधसंपादनं स्यात्। अथ सादृश्यात्तत्र शक्तिग्रहश्चेत्तर्हि यस्मिन्नुच्चारणे शक्तिग्रहस्तेनैवोच्चारणेन न कथमपि शाब्दबोधः संभवेत् शक्तिग्रहशाब्दबोधयोः कार्यकारणरूपतया यौगपद्यासंभवात्। एवं च सर्वाण्युच्चारणानि शक्तिग्रहे एव पर्यवसन्नानि स्युः। न किंचिदप्युच्चारणं शाब्दबोधपर्यवसायि स्यात्।

किंचैवं प्रत्युच्चारणं गवादिशब्दभेदे तत्र शक्तिनानात्वापत्तिः। अथ एकमेव किंचिद् गोपदं शक्तं तत्सादृश्यात्तु अपराणि गोपदानि शक्त्यभावेऽपि सादृश्यमात्राद्बोधकानि, तर्हि अपरेषां पदानां शक्तत्वाभावात् 'शक्तं पदम्' इति पदत्वलक्षणानुपपत्तिस्तेषु स्यात्। विनिगमनाविरहाच्छक्तं पदं किं किं च लाक्षणिकमिति व्यवस्थाऽनुपपत्तिः। किंचिदेकं गोपदं शक्तं विहाय सर्वेषां गोपदानां लाक्षणिकत्वं वा स्यात्, शक्तिलक्षणाराहित्यमेव वा स्यात्।

किंच येन क्रमेण वर्णानामनुभवस्तेन क्रमेण स्मृतिरपि न भवति, संस्कारस्य क्रमविषयकत्वाभावेन संस्कारजन्यस्मृतौ क्रमानवगाहनात् तथा च न् अ द् ई इति चतुर्णां वर्णानामनुभवोत्तरं वर्णमात्रविषयसंस्कारेण दीन इत्यस्यापि संस्मरणापत्तिः र्, आ, ज्, अ इति वर्णानुभवेन जरा-पदस्यापि स्मरणापत्तिः, एतेन वर्णानां द्विक्षणावस्थायित्वेन तेषां समुदायासंभवेऽपि वर्णानुभवोत्तरं

स्मर्यमाणेन पदेन बोधसिद्धिरित्यपास्तम्। अनुभूयमानस्मर्यमाणयोरेकानुपूर्वीकत्वनियमाभावात्। इत्याद्यनेकदूषणानां स्पष्टत्वेन वर्णानामनित्यत्वपक्षो न बोधोपकारी स्यात्, तस्मान्नित्यत्वं वर्णानां सिध्यति, 'दर्शनस्य' पदोच्चारणस्य 'परार्थत्वात्' परत्र बोधसंक्रमार्थत्वात् इति जैमिनेः सूत्रार्थः। तथा पातञ्जले व्याकरणमहाभाष्येऽपि 'नित्येषु शब्देषु कूटस्थैर्वर्णैर्भवितव्यमनपायोपजनविकारिभिः' इति स्पष्टमेव वर्णनित्यत्वमुक्तम्। वेदेऽपि 'वाचा विरूपनित्यया' इत्यनेन वर्णपदवाक्यरूपाया वेदवाचो नित्यत्वं बोध्यते अत एव योगिनां समाधौ वर्णप्रत्यक्षत्वं सिध्यति अन्यथा तत्रोच्चारणाभावाद्वर्णानामसत्वमेवेति कथं प्रत्यक्षमुपपद्येतेत्यलम्। तदेवं वर्णनित्यत्वे सिद्धे पदनित्यत्वमिदानीं विचारयामः।

अथ पदनित्यत्वविचारः।

अथ वर्णसंघातः पदमिति हि सर्वेषां दार्शनिकानां सिद्धान्तः। तत्र वर्णानामनित्यत्वपक्षे उत्पन्नविनष्टानां समुदायासंभवात्पदं न संभवतीत्युक्तमेव। तथा वर्णनित्यत्ववादिमतेऽपि वर्णानां नित्यत्वाद्व्यापकत्वाच्च कथं तेषां तिलतण्डुलादिवत्संघातः कथं च पूर्वापरीभाव इति शङ्का सुदृढैवोदेति। तत्र विवेचयामः—

'अथ गौः इत्यत्र कः शब्दः? गकारौकारविसर्जनीया इति भगवानुपवर्षः'। इति 'औत्पत्तिकस्तु' (पू. मी. १-१-५) इत्यादिसूत्रस्थेन शबरस्वामिवचनेन वर्णातिरिक्तं पदं नास्तीति उपवर्षादिमहर्षीणामुल्लेखेन सुदृढमपि पुनर्दृढीक्रियते। तथा चैष यः क्रमः स उच्चारणनिष्ठः स केवलं शब्देष्वारोप्यते तथा चैतादृशक्रमिकोच्चारणोपाधिविशिष्टास्ते ते वर्णाः पदमित्युच्यन्ते, तथा च न साक्षाद्व्यापकवर्णानां तिलतण्डुलवत्समुदायापेक्षा नापि पूर्वापरीभावः।

किंच वर्णानित्यत्ववादिनैयायिकमतेऽपि उच्चारणनिष्ठः क्रम एव पदं आरोपणीयः, साक्षाद्वर्णानां क्रमासंभवात्, क्रमस्य क्रियाविषयकत्वनियमात्। वर्णानां क्रमिकोच्चारणमपि एकार्थबोधोपाधिना भवति, तथा च एकार्थबोधौपयिकोच्चारणकर्मत्वमेकपदत्वमिति सिध्यति, अत्रैव च वर्णात्मके पदे तत्तदर्थनिरूपिता शक्तिरङ्गीक्रियते।

तच्च तथाभूतं गवादिपदमेकमेवेति तस्य प्रत्युच्चारणमभिव्यञ्जनं भवति न त्वपूर्वमुत्पादनं, तथा च प्रत्युच्चारणं गवादिशब्दभेदाभावाच्छक्तिग्रहकाले यो गोशब्दः स एव परत्र बोधसंक्रमकालेऽप्युच्चारणेनाभिव्यक्त इति तस्य गृहीत-शक्तिकत्वादर्थोपस्थापकत्वं भवत्येवेति न वर्णानित्यत्वपक्षे पूर्वमुक्तदोषाणा-मस्मिन्पक्षेऽवकाशः। सर्वेषां पदानां शक्तिमत्वं च सिध्यति।

किंच अत्र पदोच्चारणेऽपि वर्णक्रमस्य नियतत्वाल्लेशतोऽपि पुरुषस्वातन्त्र्यं नास्ति घटे बोधनीये तदर्थे टघ इति व्युत्क्रमेणोच्चारयन् टमात्रं वोच्चारयन् कथं साफल्यं लभेत किंतु घट इत्येव क्रमिकोच्चारणं फलेग्रहि स्यात्, तथा कुम्भकारे बोधनीये कु-म्भ-का-र इति क्रमबद्धमेवोच्चारणं तत्र साफल्यमश्नुवीत, नान्यथा। एवं राज्ञः सखा इति राजविशेषणकसखिप्रधानकबोधे जननीये रा-ज-स-ख इति आकारान्तस्यैव निरुक्तक्रमविशिष्टं चोच्चारणमपेक्ष्यते। राजा सखा यस्येति राजसख्युभयविशेषणकान्यपदार्थविशेष्यकबोधे तु 'राजसखि' इतीकारान्तस्यैव निरुक्तक्रमेणोच्चारणम्, एवं पूर्वं च तदहश्च पूर्वाह्णः, अह्नः पूर्वः पूर्वाह्णः, चित्रा गावो यस्येति चित्रगुः, चित्रश्चासौ गौश्च चित्रगवः, चित्रा चासौ गौश्च चित्रगवी, इत्यादिविवक्षितार्थभेदवशाद्भिन्नानुपूर्वीमतामेव शब्दानामुच्चारणमपेक्ष्यते तत्त-दुच्चारणकर्मीभूतानामेव पदानां तत्तदर्थवाचकत्वस्य तत्तदर्थबोधानुकूलशक्तिमत्वस्य च नियतत्वात्। तत्तदर्थबोधकत्वघटितस्य पदानां साधुत्वस्य ज्ञाने एव च व्याकरणमप्युपयुज्यते। यथा राजसंबन्धिसखिरूपार्थे, राजाऽभिन्नसखि-रूपार्थे च राजसख इत्यकारान्तं साधु नान्यत्र, राजाभिन्नसखिसंबन्धी अन्यपदार्थः। राजसख्योरितरेतरयोग इत्याद्यर्थे च 'राजसखि' इतीकारान्तमेव साधु इत्याद्यर्थबोधकत्वघटितं साधुत्वं नियमेन व्याकरणेनैव ज्ञातव्यम्।

तथा कुम्भकर्मककृतिकर्ता इत्यर्थे कुम्भकार इत्येव साधु,न तु'कारकुम्भ' इति वा कुम्भकृत्वा इत्यादि वा, इति नियमो व्याकरणगम्यः सर्वविदित एव। तथा च तत्तत्पदानामप्यानुपुर्वीनियमात् (नियतवर्णक्रमशालित्वात्) नित्यत्वमेव। अत्र नित्यत्वं नाम अपौरुषेयत्वं पुरुषस्वातंन्त्र्यराहित्यरूपमेव बोध्यम्। तत्र घट इति पदे टघ इत्यादिरूपेण कुम्भकार इत्यादिपदे कारकुम्भ इत्यादिरूपेण परिवर्तनं कर्तुं पुरुषस्वातन्त्र्यं सर्वथा नास्ति अत एव तानि तानि साधूनि पदानि अपौरुषेयाणीति दार्शनिकसिद्धान्तः।

अथ वेदवाक्यानामपौरुषेयत्वम् (नित्यत्वम्) ।

अथैवमेव यथा 'वर्णसंघातः पदम्' एवं पदसंघातो वाक्यम्' । 'वर्णानुपूर्वीमतां पदानामानुपूर्व्याद्वाक्यसिद्धिः, यथा 'अग्निमीडे पुरोहितम्' इति वेदे, 'राज्ञः पुरुषो गच्छति' इत्यादि लोके ।

तत्रेयान् भेदः, यत राज्ञः पुरुषो गच्छति, गच्छति पुरुषो राज्ञः, पुरुषो राज्ञो गच्छतीत्यादिरीत्या पदानां भिन्नानुपूर्वीविरचने पुरुषाणां स्वातन्त्र्यं वर्तते कर्तुम् अकर्तुम्, अन्यथा वा कर्तुं, सामर्थ्यं हि स्वातन्त्र्यमित्युच्यते, तच्च लौकिकानां स्वस्ववाक्ये, कालिदासादीनां स्वस्वकाव्ये, व्यासमहर्षिप्रभृतीनां स्वस्वभारतादिवाक्येऽव्याहतमेव अत एव तानि पौरुषेयाणीत्युच्यन्ते । अत एव तत्तद्वाक्यघटकपदानामानुपूर्वीविशेषे व्याकरणमुदास्ते अत एव महाभाष्यकारः पतञ्जलिः 'संस्कृत्य संस्कृत्य पदान्युत्सृज्यन्ते तेषां यथेष्टमभिसंबन्धो भवति आहर पात्रं पात्रमाहरेति' वाक्ये पदानामानुपूर्वीनियमाभावमाह । यद्यपि कटं करोति इति तिङन्तयोगे द्वितीयैव 'कटस्य कर्ता' इति तृजन्तयोगे षष्ठ्येवेत्यादि अनुशासननियमो वर्तते तथापि तदपि पदसाधुत्वमेव न वाक्यसाधुत्वम्, अत एव करोति कटं, कटं करोतीत्यादिर्यथेच्छं प्रयोगः सिध्यति । एवमेव राज्ञः पुरुषः, पुरुषो राज्ञः, अत्र वाक्यत्वात्पुरुषस्य प्रयोगे स्वातन्त्र्यं, राजपुरुष इति समासे तु एकपदत्वात्तस्मिन्नर्थे पुरुषराज इति करणे पुरुषस्वातन्त्र्यं नास्ति, एवमेव मूलकेनोपदंशं भुङ्क्ते, इति वाक्ये पुरुषस्वातन्त्र्यं वर्तते । परन्तु मूलकोपदंशमिति समासे तु न स्वातन्त्र्यं तस्यैकपदत्वात्, अत एव व्याकरणस्य पदशास्त्रमित्यन्वर्थं नाम । एवं च लौकिकवाक्ये पुरुषस्वातन्त्र्यादपौरुषेयत्वं नित्यत्वं च नास्तीति सिद्धम् । वेदवाक्ये तु न पुरुषस्वातन्त्र्यमिति विशेषः ।

ननु वेदवाक्ये न पुरुषस्वातन्त्र्यम् इत्युच्यते, तद् न संगच्छते—तथाहि वर्णेषु पदेषु वा याऽऽनुपूर्वी सोच्चारणमन्तरेण न सिध्यति, वर्णविषयकक्रमिकोच्चारणोपाधिकमेवानुपूर्व्यं पदे भासते, इत्युक्तमेव, तथा पदविषयकक्रमिकोच्चारणोपाधिकमेवाऽऽनुपूर्व्यं वाक्ये भासते । तथा च लौकिकवाक्ये यथाऽऽनुपूर्व्यन्यथाऽनुपपत्त्योच्चारणद्वारा कर्ता कल्प्यते, तेन च लौकिकवाक्यानां सकर्तृकत्वं सिध्यति, तथा वैदिकवाक्यानामपि आनुपूर्वीमत्त्वादानुपूर्व्याश्चोच्चारणोपाधि-

कत्वनियमात् उच्चारणद्वारा वेदवाक्यकर्तृकल्पनाऽवश्यंभाविनी। तथा च कथं वेदवाक्यानामपौरुषेयत्वं कथं च तत्र पुरुषाणां स्वातन्त्र्यं नास्तीति सिद्धान्तोपपत्तिरिति चेदुच्यते।

बाढम्! उच्चारणमन्तरेण वेदवाक्ये आनुपूर्वी न संभवेदित्यानुपूर्व्यन्यथाऽनुपपत्त्योच्चारणस्य उच्चारणकर्तुश्चाक्षेप आवश्यक इति, परन्तु नैतावता वेदवाक्यकर्तृसिद्धिः। तथाहि आनुपूर्वी अन्यथाऽनुपपद्यमानोच्चारणमात्रमाक्षिपन्ती अपि, न तद्गतं प्राथम्यमाक्षिपेत्, उच्चारणसामान्येन आनुपूर्व्याः सिद्धत्वात्, तथा च प्रथमोच्चारणस्यानाक्षेपात् प्रथमोच्चारयितुरेव च कर्तृत्वात् न वेदवाक्यकर्ता सिध्यति यदि हि महाभारते व्यास इव रघुवंशादौ कालिदास इव प्रथमोच्चारयिता वेदेऽपि स्यात्, तर्हि अवश्यं स स्मर्येत, न च स्मर्यते, तस्मात्प्रथमः कश्चिदुच्चारयिता नास्ति वेदवाक्येषु, अत एव श्रूयते 'वाचा विरूपनित्यया' 'धाता यथापूर्वमकल्पयत्' इत्यादि। अत एव ईश्वरोऽपि येषां मते वेदानुपदिशति, तन्मतेऽपि ईश्वरो गतकल्पीयं वेदं यथावदेव स्मृत्वोपदिशति न तु नूतनतां संपादयति, इति सिद्धान्तः। अत एव 'यो ब्रह्माणं विदधाति पूर्वं यो वै वेदांश्च प्रहिणोति तस्मै' इति श्रुतौ प्रापणार्थकस्य प्रपूर्वकस्य हिधातोः प्रयोगः संगच्छते। प्रापणं हि सिद्धस्यैव वस्तुनः संभवति, न निर्मीयमाणस्य, प्रहितो दूतः, प्रहिणु नयने इत्यादौ महाकविप्रयोगे तदर्थस्यैव दृष्टत्वात्।

स्यादेतत्, 'तस्माद्यज्ञात्सर्वहुत ऋचः सामानि जज्ञिरे' (यजुः अ. ३१ मं. ७) (अत्र 'यज्ञो वै विष्णुः' शतप. कां.१-१-१-१५ इति श्रुत्या व्यापक ईश्वरो विष्णुपदवाच्यः) तथा 'त्रयो वेदा असृज्यन्त अग्नेर्ऋग्वेदो वायोर्यजुर्वेद आदित्यात्सामवेदः' (शत. कां. ११ अ. ५)। तथा 'प्रजापतिर्वेदानसृजत' इत्यादिश्रुत्या जज्ञिरे असृज्यन्त इत्यादिपदैः नूतनं निर्माणं प्रतीयते इति चेत्, उच्यते, जनी प्रादुर्भावे इति धातोः प्रकटीभवनमेवार्थो मुख्यो, नत्वपूर्वं निर्माणम्, तथा सृजधातोरपि शरान् सृजतीत्यादौ, 'सृजन्तमाजाविषुसंहतीर्वः,' (किराता. स. २) 'भोजेन दूतो रघवे विसृष्टः' (रघुवंशम् स. ५) इत्यादौ प्रापणमात्रार्थस्य प्रसिद्धेः। अत एव 'यो ब्रह्माणं विदधाति पूर्वं यो वै वेदांश्च प्रहिणोति तस्मै' इति पूर्वोक्तश्रुत्या एकवाक्यता निर्दिष्टसकलश्रुतीनां सिध्यति। किंच निरुक्तश्रुतौ अपूर्वोत्पादनार्थकस्य सृजादिधातोरङ्गीकारे तेषामेव वेदानां कचित् विष्णोः कचित्प्र-

जापतेः, कचिदग्निवायुसूर्येभ्य उत्पत्तिश्रवणान्न कापि व्यवस्था संभवेत्, नापि श्रुतीनामेकवाक्यता स्यात् वेदस्य अनेककर्तृकत्वापत्तिश्च स्यात्, सिद्धान्ते तु उच्चारणमात्रार्थकत्वे सृजादिधातोः न काऽप्यनुपपत्तिः, एकेनोच्चारितस्यान्येनो-च्चारणसंभवात्। तस्माच्छ्रुतिः सर्वथा वेदस्यापौरुषेयत्वे प्रधानं लिङ्गं सकलदार्शनिकादिसंमतमेव।

तथा मत्स्यपुराणेऽपि स्पष्टमिदं वेदापौरुषेयत्वम्। तथाहि—

अस्य वेदस्य सर्वज्ञः कल्पादौ परमेश्वरः।
व्यञ्जकः केवलं विप्रा नैव कर्ता न संशयः॥
ब्रह्माणं मुनयः पूर्वं सृष्ट्वा तस्मै महेश्वरः।
दत्तवानखिलान् वेदान् विप्रा आत्मनि संचितान्॥

अपरं च—ब्रह्मणा चोदितो विष्णुर्व्यासरूपी द्विजोत्तमाः।
हिताय सर्वभूतानां वेदभेदान् करोति सः॥ इति च।

पराशरोऽपि—न कश्चिद्वेदकर्ता च वेदं स्मृत्वा चतुर्मुखः।
तथैव धर्मान् स्मरति मनुः कल्पान्तरेऽन्तरे॥ इत्यादि।

तदेवं लौकिकवाक्यसाधर्म्येण वेदवाक्येष्वपि पुरुषस्वातन्त्र्यं यदुत्प्रेक्ष्यते तत्सर्वथाऽऽगमबाधितं कर्तुरस्मरणादिन्यायबाधितं च। एतेन काठकादिसमाख्या-मात्रबलेन पौरुषेयत्वमापादयन्तः परास्ताः। समाख्यायाः प्रवचनमात्रनि-मित्तकत्वेनोपपत्त्या तत्तत्कर्तृकत्वकल्पने सामर्थ्याभावात्। किंच आध्वर्य-वादिसमाख्यायाः अपि परिक्रयणेन वरणेन चोपात्तानामृत्विजां कर्मस्वनियमेन सामान्येन च कर्तृत्वप्राप्तौ सत्यामेव नियामकत्वं दृष्टं, न च तथा वेदानां कर्तृ-सामान्यं कुतश्चित्प्राप्तं येन कठकादिसमाख्यया विशेषतो नियम्येत, वेदवाक्यगता-नुपूर्व्या तु उच्चारणकर्तृमात्रमाक्षिप्यते न तु प्रथमोच्चारकरूपः कर्ताऽऽक्षिप्यते, उच्चारणगतप्राथम्यं विनाऽऽनुपूर्व्या अनुपपद्यमानत्वाभावादिति पुरस्तादुक्तमेवे-त्यलम्।

अत्रार्थे भट्टकुमारिलपादानां संमतिमप्युपस्थापयामः
(तन्त्रवार्तिके पू.मी. १-३-१०-सूत्रे):

वेदे हि तावदेव पदवाक्यसंघातात्मकत्वादिहेत्वाभासैः कृतकत्वभ्रान्ति-र्भवति—

यावद्बहिरवस्थानाद्वेदरूपं न दृश्यते ।
ऋक्सामादिस्वरूपे तु दृष्टे भ्रान्तिर्निवर्तते ॥
आदिमात्रमपि श्रुत्वा वेदानां पौरुषेयता ।
न शक्याऽध्यवसातुं हि मनागपि सचेतनैः ॥
दृष्टार्थव्यवहारेषु वाक्यैर्लोकानुसारिभिः ।
पदैश्च तद्विधैरेव नराः काव्यानि कुर्वते ॥
प्रपाठकचतुःषष्टिनियतस्वरकैः पदैः ।
लोकेष्वप्यश्रुतप्रायैर्ऋग्वेदं कः करिष्यति ॥
'अग्निमीडे पुरोहितं यज्ञस्य देवमृत्विजम् ।
होतारं रत्नधातमम्' इत्येतन्नृवचः कथम् ॥
किमालोच्य क वा दृष्ट्वा वाक्प्रतिच्छन्दमीदृशम् ।
रचयेत्पुरुषो वाक्यं किं चोद्दिश्य प्रयोजनम् ॥
अग्नेः पुरोहितत्वं च क दृष्टं येन कीर्त्यते ।
'ईडे' शब्दप्रयोगश्च क दृष्टः स्तोत्रगोचरः ॥
देवत्वं चास्य यज्ञस्य विहितं कोपलक्षितम् ।
विधिनैव हि देवत्वं प्रतिकर्मावधार्यते ।
न जात्या देवतात्वं हि क्वचिदस्ति व्यवस्थितम् ॥
होतृत्वमपि यज्ञस्य देवताह्वानहेतुकम् ।
रत्नधायितमत्वं च तत्र वै ज्ञायते कथम् ॥
अविज्ञातगुणानां च कल्पनं स्तवनं न तु ।
स्वतन्त्रो वेद एवैतत्केवलो वक्तुमर्हति ॥
'इषे त्वे' त्ययमप्यर्थः पुरुषेणोच्यतां कथम् ।
शाखाच्छेदोपयोगश्च पुंभिरुत्प्रेक्ष्यतां कुतः ॥
एव 'मूर्जे' त्ययं मन्त्रः केन शाखानुमार्जने ।
वक्तुं शक्यो नियोक्तुं वा बुद्धिपूर्वककारिणा ॥
'वायवः स्थे' त्ययं मन्त्रो वत्सापाकरणं प्रति ।
एकशो विनियोक्तव्य इति कः कथयिष्यति ॥

वायुशब्देन बहुवचनान्तेन मातुर्वियोज्यमान एकैको वत्सोऽभिधीयत इति नैतद्बुद्धिपूर्वकारिणा चिन्तितुं शक्यम् ।

सामवेदे यत् 'ओग्नायी' प्रभृतीनां प्रयुज्यते ।
रूपं तत्रापि पौंस्नत्वे नाभिप्रायोऽस्ति कश्चन ॥

को नाम बुद्धिपूर्वकारी पुरुषोऽर्थाभिधानपराणामक्षराणां लोकव्याकरणादिष्वनवगतपूर्वम् 'अग्ने' इति पदस्य अकारमोकारेण प्लुतेन विकुर्यात् ।

तथा 'वीतय' इत्यस्मिन् ईकारस्यायि विक्रियाम् ।
तशब्दस्य च 'तो' शब्दं येशब्दस्याऽऽयिरूपताम् ॥
को मूढो बुद्धिपूर्वो वा नियमात्कल्पयिष्यति ।
तेन वेदस्वतन्त्रत्वं रूपादेवावगम्यते ॥
किं चिदेव तु तद्वाक्यं सदृशं लौकिकेन यत् ।
तत्रापि छान्दसी मुद्रा दृश्यते सूक्ष्मदर्शिभिः ॥

एवं च यदाऽध्येतारोऽध्यापयितारः पार्श्वस्था वा वेदे वाक्यतदर्थरूपाण्यालोचयन्ति, तदा स्वसंवेद्यमेवापौरुषेयत्वमध्यवस्यन्ति । इति ।

अथ येषां मन्त्राणां ये ऋषयस्तैरेव ते मन्त्रा निर्मिता इति केषां चिदाशङ्का जायते, तदर्थमृष्यादिस्वरूपं यथाशास्त्रं पर्यालोचयामः ।

ऋषिस्वरूपपरीक्षणम्

'यो ह वा अविदितार्षेयच्छन्दोब्राह्मणदैवतेन मन्त्रेण यजति, याजयते वागर्तपतितमिव तद्भवति' इति श्रुतिः । शौनकः—

अविदित्वा ऋषिच्छन्दोदैवतं योगमेव च ।
योऽध्यापयेज्जपेद्वापि पापीयान् जायते तु सः ॥ (बृहद्देवता ८-१३६)

इत्यादिवचनैस्तत्तन्मन्त्रसंबन्ध्यृषिज्ञानं देवतादिज्ञानं चावश्यकम् । तत्र ऋषिपदार्थविचारे क्रियमाणे, किमु मन्त्राणां विरचनादृषित्वं भवति, आहोस्विन्मन्त्राधिष्ठातृदेवतासाक्षात्कारकरणादिति संशये 'ऋषिर्दर्शनात्' इति निरुक्तवचनात्, 'य एवाऽऽप्ता वेदार्थानां द्रष्टारः प्रवक्तारश्च' (अ-२-१-६७) इति न्यायभाष्यकृदुक्तेः

येन यदृषिणा दृष्टं सिद्धिः प्राप्ता तु येन वै ।
मन्त्रेण तस्य तत्प्रोक्तमृषेर्भावस्तदार्षकम् ॥

इत्यादिवचनैश्च 'मन्त्रतात्पर्यविषयीभूतदेवतायाः मन्त्रकरणकोपासनया साक्षात्कारपूर्वकं तत्तद्देवताऽनुग्रहेण संप्राप्तसिद्धिशालित्वम्। इत्येव ऋषित्वलक्षणं पर्यवस्यति। तथा च तत्तद्देवताऽऽराधनकाले तत्तन्मन्त्र उपासनायां करणीभूत इति स्पष्टोक्तया तत्तदुपासके ऋषित्वसिद्धेः प्राक्, तत्कर्तृकोपासनाकाले एव करणीभूतस्य मन्त्रस्य सत्ता सिद्धैव। अन्यथा तत्तदुपासनायां तत्तन्मन्त्रकरणकत्वाऽसिद्धेः।

अत एव श्रीमच्छंकराचार्यभगवत्पादैः 'स्मृत्यनवकाशदोषप्रसङ्ग' (२-१-१) इत्यादिव्याससूत्रे 'कपिलादीनामपि सिद्धेः सापेक्षत्वात्। धर्मानुष्ठानापेक्षा हि सिद्धिः, स च धर्मश्चोदनालक्षणः, तथा च पूर्वसिद्धायाश्चोदनाया अर्थो न पश्चिमसिद्धपुरुषवचनेनाऽतिशङ्कितुं शक्यते' इत्युक्तम्। अनेन च स्पष्टमेव तत्तन्महर्षीणां सिद्धिसंपत्तेः प्राक् धर्ममूलभूताया मन्त्रब्राह्मणात्मकचोदनायाः सत्वमुक्तम्।

किं च शुनःशेपर्षिका ऐन्द्रवैष्णवादिमन्त्राः शुनःशेपात्प्रागासन् इति स्पष्टं वाल्मीकिरामायणे बालकाण्डे ६२ सर्गे उक्तम्। तथा हि विश्वामित्रवचनम्—

इन्द्रविष्णू सुरश्रेष्ठौ स्तुहि त्वं मुनिपुत्रक।
इमे तु गाथे द्वे दिव्ये गायेथा मुनिपुत्रक॥
अम्बरीषस्य यज्ञेऽस्मिन् ततः सिद्धिमवाप्स्यसि।
शुनःशेपो गृहीत्वा ते द्वे गाथे सुसमाहितः॥
त्वरया राजसिंहं तमम्बरीषमुवाच ह।
राजसिंह महासत्व शीघ्रं गच्छामहे सदः॥
निर्वर्तयस्व राजेन्द्र दीक्षां च समुपाविश॥ इति॥

देवीरहस्ये तन्त्रेऽपि—

षष्टिकल्पसहस्राणि येनैव विहितो जपः।
तथाऽब्दषष्टिलक्षाणि षष्टिजन्मान्तरेषु च॥

पुरश्चर्याकरो देवि सर्षिरित्यभिधीयते ।

स्यादेतत् । तत्तन्मन्त्राणामेवंरीत्या तत्तन्मन्त्रद्रष्टृभ्यः प्राक्तनत्वसिद्धावपि तत्तन्महर्षिकर्तृकोपासनाकाले तत्तन्मन्त्राणां सर्षिकत्वमासीन्नवेति विचारे 'यो ह वा अविदितार्षेयच्छन्दोब्राह्मण' इत्यादिपूर्वोक्तश्रुत्या तदानीमपि अवश्यं मन्त्राणां सर्षिकत्वमङ्गीकरणीयम् । अन्यथा श्रुत्यैवोपासनाया असिद्धिकीर्तनात् । अत एव सामान्यतः सर्वेषां मन्त्राणां परमेष्ठी प्रजापति-र्ऋषिः कात्यायनेनोक्तः, परमेष्ठिना सर्वमन्त्रार्थानां साक्षात्करणात् । कचिच्च सर्वेषां विवस्वानृषिः विवस्वताऽपि भगवता सर्वमन्त्रार्थसाक्षात्करणात् ।

इदं चर्षित्वमुपासनाविशेषलभ्यं मनुष्येष्विव देवेष्वपि दृश्यते । तत्रेयान् विशेषः अग्निवाय्वादित्यपरमेष्ठिप्रभृतयः पूर्वकल्पे एव मनुष्यदशायां कृतसाक्षात्कारा इह कल्पे तत्तद्देवतास्थानविशेषप्राप्ताधिकारास्तत्तत्साक्षात्कृतमन्त्रानुपदिशन्ति तथा च श्रूयते 'प्रजापतिर्वेदानसृजत' इति 'त्रयो वेदा असृज्यन्त अग्नेर्ऋग्वेदो वायोर्यजुर्वेद आदित्यात्सामवेद' इति च ।

ये तु विश्वामित्रप्रभृतय इह कल्पे तत्तन्मन्त्रार्थविषयकसाक्षात्कारवन्तः, तेऽस्माभिस्तत्तन्मन्त्रपाठकाले ऋषित्वेन विशेषतः स्मर्तव्याः सन्निकृष्टत्वात्, प्रजापत्यादीनां पूर्वकल्पीयत्वेन विप्रकृष्टत्वादित्यपि स्पष्टमेव ।

यद्यपि विश्वामित्राद्यनन्तरं तत्तन्मन्त्रोपासनया सिद्धिरपरैरुपासकैः प्राप्ता, ऋषित्वं च तत्तन्मन्त्रांशे संपादितं संभाव्यते, तथाप्यस्माभिः प्राथम्याद्विश्वामित्रा-दीनामेव ऋषित्वस्मरणेन मन्त्रेषु विश्वासः करणीयो नाऽनन्तरकालीनानामिति न्याय्यमेव ।

तत्सिद्धं तत्तन्महर्षिभिर्न मन्त्रा निर्मिताः, किंतु तत्तन्मन्त्रकरणकोपासनया सिद्धिरेव प्राप्ता इति । अत एव प्रपाठकचतुःषष्टिरूपादिना स्थितासु तत्तच्छाखीयसंहितासु भिन्नभिन्नमण्डलादिस्थविशेषविशेषमन्त्राणामेव द्रष्टृत्वेन एकस्मिन् वर्ण्यमानमृषित्वं घटते तेन महर्षिणा तत्तन्मन्त्रविशेषाणामेव यथाकालं जपादिना सिद्धिसंपादनादित्यलम् ।

अनेन च वेदापौरुषेयत्वनिबन्धेन सर्वान्तर्यामी वेदपुरुषो भगवान् विश्वेश्वरः प्रीयताम् ।

महामहोपाध्यायो

माधवशास्त्री भाण्डारी

वै. कृ. ११ गुरौ सं १९९० । ता. २० — ४ — ३३



ॐ तत्सत्

श्रीमहिम्नःस्तोत्रं वेदश्च ।

[श्रीरघुवरमिट्ठूलालशास्त्री, वेदान्ततीर्थः, काव्यतीर्थः, साहित्याचार्यः, एम् ए, एम ओ एल्,
प्रयाग-विश्वविद्यालयः]

शिवरूपान् गुरून् नत्वा चतुर्णां सम्प्रदर्श्यते ।
महिम्नःस्तवपद्यानां वेदसंवादिता मया ॥

शिवस्य सर्ववेदान्तलक्ष्यतुरीयब्रह्मरूपत्वाच्छ्रीशिवमहिम्नःस्तोत्रस्य सर्वश्रुतिस्मृतिपुराणागमप्रसिद्धैतद्विषयकगहनार्थमुपजीव्य विरचितत्वेन सर्वस्तोत्रमूर्द्धन्यत्वाच्च "महेशान्नापरो देवो महिम्नो नापरा स्तुति"—रिति यदुक्तं तन्नास्ति मनागपि विशयस्पृष्टम् ।

एकत्रिंशत्पद्यात्मकमेतत्स्तोत्रं बहुप्राचीनव्याख्याकृद्भिर्व्याख्यातमिति "पूर्वाचार्यकृतव्याख्यासङ्ग्रहः क्रियते मया ।" इति श्रीमधुसूदनसरस्वतीविरचितव्याख्यानस्य प्रारम्भादेवावगम्यते । तत्र कियानंशस्तावत्पूर्वाचार्यकृतव्याख्याभ्यः सङ्गृहीतः कियती वा श्रीमधुसूदनसरस्वतीपादानां स्वतन्त्रा कृतिरिति ज्ञानस्य साधनवैधुर्ये पुराणमूलार्थानि वेदैकमूलार्थानि वा पद्यानि तैस्तैः प्राचीनाचार्यैः कथं व्याख्यातानीति ज्ञानं तु सुतरां दुर्लभम् ।

मधुसूदनीव्याख्यायां महिम्नःस्तोत्रप्रसङ्गागतकथाविशेषाणां मूलान्वेषणे प्रायेण प्रयत्नविशेषो न कृतोऽपि तु यत्कथाविशेषमूलं सविस्तरं वेदे साक्षादुपलभ्यते तत्प्रसङ्गेऽपि तत्र तत्र स्थलविशेषे "पुराणेषु प्रसिद्धम्" इत्यादिवचनोपन्यासेनैव सन्तोषः कृतः । अस्य स्तोत्रस्य द्वितीयचतुर्थसप्तमविंशसप्तविंशाष्टाविंशपद्येषु

श्रुतित्रयीशब्दयोरन्यतरस्य प्रयोगदर्शनात् [1]सुप्राचीनत्वसाधकप्रमाणबाहुल्यविरहेऽप्यर्वाचीनत्वविनिगमकहेत्वनुपलम्भाच्च क्वचित्क्वचित्साक्षाद्वेदाश्रितत्वमेव सिध्यतीति नातितिरोहितं प्रेक्षावताम्। एवं बहुपद्योपवर्णितविषयविस्तरस्यागमपुराणेतिहासादेर्गृहीतत्वेऽप्यत्र कतिचित्पद्यानि वेदमेवोपजीव्य विरचितानि प्रतीयन्त इति तन्मूलान्वेषणमिह किञ्चित्प्रस्तूयते।

१ (अ) वैक्रमचतुर्दशशताब्दीपूर्वार्धकाले जैनश्रीसोमसुन्दरसूरिविरचितायां युगादिदेवस्तुतौ श्रीशिवमहिम्नःस्तोत्रस्यैकत्रिंशतः पद्यानामन्त्यान्त्यचरणसमस्यापूरणेनोपयोगो दृश्यते। [जैनग्रन्थावल्याः १३६ तमग्रन्थे २८७ तमपृष्ठावलोकनं कर्तव्यम् ।] युगादिदेवस्तुतिरचनाकालनिर्णये तु देवगिरीययादवमहाराजकृष्णदेवनामोल्लेख एव पर्याप्तं साधनम्।

(इ) विंशत्यधिकैकादशशततमवैक्रमाब्दे भट्टारकगान्धध्वजादेशेन नीमाडप्रान्तान्तर्गतनर्मदादक्षिणतटस्थामरेश्वरदेवालये समुत्कीर्णमेकत्रिंशत्पद्यात्मकं श्रीशिवमहिम्नःस्तोत्रमुपलभ्यते। [गोरखपुरात्प्रकाशितस्य 'कल्याण'-शिवाङ्कस्य ४६७-४७१तमपृष्ठावलोकनं कर्तव्यम्।]

(उ) वैक्रमदशमशताब्दीयमहाकविश्रीराजशेखरविरचितकाव्यमीमांसाया अष्टमाध्याये न्यायवैशेषिकीयतार्किकप्रामाणिकवर्णनावसरे "स किंसामर्थ्यक ईश्वरः कर्ता ? इति पूर्वपक्षः। निरतिशयैश्वर्यस्य तस्य कर्तृत्वमिति सिद्धान्तः। अत्र—" इतिग्रन्थसन्दर्भयोगेन

"किमीहः किङ्कायः स खलु किमुपायस्त्रिभुवनं
किमाधारो धाता सृजति किमुपादान इति च।
अतर्क्यैश्वर्ये त्वय्यनवसरदुःस्थो हतधियः
कुतर्कोऽयं कांश्चिन्मुखरयति मोहाय जगतः॥ [५]॥"

इति महिम्नःस्तोत्रस्थपञ्चमपद्यमुदाहृतं दृश्यते [गायकवाडप्राच्यग्रन्थमालायाः प्रथमग्रन्थस्य ३७तमे पृष्ठे]।

(ऋ) नवमशताब्दीयकाश्मीरिकभट्टजयन्तकृतन्यायमञ्जर्यां षष्ठाह्निके पुष्पदन्तप्रसङ्ग इत्थमुपलभ्यते—"मनुना च पङ्क्तिपावनत्वेनाधिगतव्याकरणो मीमांसकश्च स्वस्मृतौ पठितौ 'यश्च व्याकुरुते वाचं यश्च मीमांसते गिर'-मिति। पुष्पदन्तोऽप्याह—

तत्र

प्रजानाथं नाथ प्रसभमभिकं स्वां दुहितरं
गतं रोहिद्भूतां रिरमयिषुमृश्यस्य वपुषा।
धनुष्पाणेर्यातं दिवमपि सपत्राकृतममुं
त्रसन्तं तेऽद्यापि त्यजति न मृगव्याधरभसः ॥२२॥

इत्येतस्य पद्यस्य किं मूलमिति विचारोऽस्यास्मत्प्रस्तावस्य प्रथमो विषयः। अत्र श्रीमधुसूदनसरस्वत्यस्तावदाहुः—

"शर एव तथाऽऽरोपितः। स चार्द्रानक्षत्ररूपेण परिणत इति पुराणप्रसिद्धः।" इति।

रुद्रस्य क्रोधोत्साहविशेष एवार्द्रानक्षत्ररूपेण परिणत इति पुराणान्तरप्रसिद्ध्या द्रष्टव्यम्।" इति।

भ्रष्टः शापेन देव्याः शिवपुरवसतेर्वन्द्यहं मन्दभाग्यो
भाव्यं वा जन्मना मे यदि मलकलिले मर्त्यलोके सशोके।
स्निग्धाभिदुग्धधारामलमधुरसुधाबिन्दुनिष्यन्दिनीभिः
कामं जायेय वैयाकरणभणितिभिस्तूर्णमापूर्णकर्णः ॥'' इति।

[लाजरसकम्पनीप्रकाशितविजयनगरसंस्कृतग्रन्थमालादशमग्रन्थन्यायमञ्जरीप्रथमभागान्यपत्रस्थ४२६तमपृष्ठे।]

(ख) न्यायमञ्जर्यां पुष्पदन्तोक्तत्वेनोद्धृतं पद्यं दृष्ट्वाध्यापककीथेन संस्कृतवाङ्मयेतिहासे २२१तमपृष्ठे 'पुष्पदन्त इत्येतन्नाम वास्तविकं न' इत्यूरीकृत्यापि 'महिम्नःस्तवो नवमशताब्द्या नार्वाचीनः' इति साधितम्।

तद्यदि केनचित्कविना पुष्पदन्तोक्तिरूपेण विरचितं पद्यं न्यायमञ्जरीस्थपुष्पदन्तनामोल्लेखमात्रसम्बन्धेनैव महिम्नःस्तोत्रस्यापि पुष्पदन्तकृतत्वेन प्रसिद्धस्य भट्टजयन्तात्प्राचीनतरत्वसाधने पर्याप्तं प्रमाणमित्यङ्गीकर्तुं शक्यते तदा किं नामापराद्धं गुणाढ्यविरचितबृहत्कथायां तथैव प्राप्तेन पुष्पदन्ताभिधानोल्लेखेन यावता महिम्नःस्तवो बृहत्कथारचयितुर्गुणाढ्यादपि रचितपूर्वं इति न साध्येत ? यतो जयन्तोद्धृतपद्ये 'देव्याः शापेन शिवपुरवसतेर्भ्रष्टोऽहं मन्दभाग्यो बन्दी। यदि मर्त्यलोके मे जन्म

"एवं हि पुराणेषु प्रसिद्धम्—ब्रह्मा स्वदुहितरं सन्ध्यामतिरूपिणीमालोक्य कामवशो भूत्वा तामुपगन्तुमुद्यतः। सा चायं पिता भूत्वा मामुपगच्छतीति लज्जया मृगीरूपा बभूव। ततस्तां तथा दृष्ट्वा ब्रह्मापि मृगरूपं दधार। तत्र दृष्ट्वा त्रिजगन्नियन्त्रा श्रीमहादेवेनायं प्रजानाथो धर्मप्रवर्तको भूत्वाप्येतादृशं जुगुप्सितमाचरतीति महतापराधेन दण्डनीयो मयेति पिनाकमाकृष्य शरः प्रक्षिप्तः। ततः स ब्रह्मा व्रीडितः पीडितश्च सन् मृगशिरोनक्षत्ररूपो बभूव। ततः श्रीरुद्रस्य शरोऽप्यार्द्रानक्षत्ररूपो भूत्वा तस्य पश्चाद्भागे स्थितः।" इति च।

अयमेव प्रसङ्गः श्रीमद्भागवते तृतीयस्कन्धे द्वादशाध्यायेऽनेन प्रकारेणोपवर्णितो दृश्यते—

"वाचं दुहितरं तन्वीं स्वयम्भूर्हरतीं मनः।
अकामां चकमे क्षत्तः सकाम इति नः श्रुतम्॥ २८॥
तमधर्मे कृतमतिं विलोक्य पितरं सुताः।
मरीचिमुख्या मुनयो विस्रम्भात्प्रत्यबोधयन्॥ २९॥
नैतत् पूर्वैः कृतं त्वद्य न करिष्यन्ति चापरे।

भवेत्'—इत्यादिपुष्पदन्तोदन्तो बृहत्कथानिबद्धपुष्पदन्तवृत्तान्तेन पूर्णतया संवदति। तथा हि—

"पुष्पदन्तमथाहूय भ्रुकुटीधूमविभ्रमम्।
शशाप शैलतनया दधती कोपपावकम्॥ ६०॥
मर्त्यलोके पत क्षिप्रमिति सख्या समीरिते।...॥ ६१॥...
कौशाम्बीवासिनः सुभ्रु पुत्रतामग्रजन्मनः।
प्रयातः सोमदत्तस्य पुष्पदन्तो महीतले॥ ६९॥
कात्यायनः श्रुतधरस्तथा वररुचिश्च सः।
गुणिनामग्रणीर्लोके नामभिस्त्रिभिरुच्यते॥ ७०॥"

इति प्रथमतरङ्गे—

"निशम्येति वचस्तस्य शनैः कात्यायनः कथाम्।
सस्मार पुष्पदन्तोऽहमिति संविदमास्थितः॥ ८॥

इति च द्वितीयतरङ्गे—क्षेमेन्द्रकृतबृहत्कथामञ्जर्याम्

यत् त्वं दुहितरं गच्छेरनिगृह्याङ्गजं प्रभुः ॥ ३० ॥
तेजीयसामपि ह्येतन्न सुश्लोक्यं जगद्गुरो ।
यद्वृत्तमनुतिष्ठन् वै लोकः क्षेमाय कल्पते ॥ ३१ ॥
तस्मै नमो भगवते य इदं स्वेन रोचिषा ।
आत्मस्थं व्यञ्जयामास स धर्मं पातुमर्हसि ॥ ३२ ॥
स इत्थं गृणतः पुत्रान् पुरो दृष्ट्वा प्रजापतीन् ।
प्रजापतिपतिस्तन्वं तत्याज व्रीडितस्तदा ॥ ३३ ॥" इति ।

तथा—"इति देव्या हरो यावद् वक्ति तावदुपागमत् ॥ ४८ ॥
प्रसादवित्तकः शम्भोः पुष्पदन्तो गणोत्तमः ।
न्यषेधि च प्रवेशोऽस्य नन्दिना द्वारि तिष्ठता ॥ ४९ ॥
निष्कारणं निषेधोऽद्य ममापीति कुतूहलात् ।
अलक्षितो योगवशात् प्रविवेश स तत्क्षणात् ॥ ५० ॥......
योगी भूत्वा प्रविश्येदं पुष्पदन्तस्तदाश्रृणोत् ॥ ५५ ॥
जयायै वर्णितं तेन कोऽन्यो जानाति हि प्रिये ॥
श्रुत्वेत्यानाययद् देवी पुष्पदन्तमतिक्रुधा ॥ ५६ ॥
मर्त्यो भवाविनीतेति विह्वलं तं शशाप सा ।
माल्यवन्तं च विज्ञप्तिं कुर्वाणं तत्कृते गणम् ॥ ५७ ॥"

इति प्रथमतरङ्गे—

"स्मृत्वा वररुचिर्जातिं सुप्तोत्थित इवावदत् ।
स एव पुष्पदन्तोऽहं मत्तस्तां च कथां शृणु ॥ २५ ॥"

इति च द्वितीयतरङ्गे—सोमदेवकृतकथासरित्सागरे बृहत्कथामूलक एव लेखो दृश्यते ।

अतो बृहत्कथोपवर्णितो भट्टजयन्तोदाहृतपद्यवक्तृत्वेनोपनिबद्धश्च पुष्पदन्तो महिम्नःस्तुतिकर्तुरभिन्न एवेति भेदसाधकसामग्र्यभावेऽवश्यमेषितव्यम् ।

एवमसौ सातवाहनसमकालिकगुणाढ्यसमयाद् बहुपूर्वं जात इति स्थिते श्रीशिवमहिम्नःस्तोत्ररचनाकालः कीथोपदर्शितसरण्यैवेदानीमुपसंहरद्भ्यामस्माभिरितोऽधिकोऽपि वा भवेदित्यवदातम् ।

भट्टकुमारिलैस्तु "अपि वा कारणाग्रहणे प्रयुक्तानि प्रतीयेरन्"[२] इति जैमिनीयमीमांसासूत्रव्याख्यानावसरेऽवादि—

"यत् त्वेतदपि वा कारणाग्रहणे प्रयुक्तानि प्रतीयेरन्निति सूत्रम्। अत्र सदाचारानुदाहृत्य त्रिवर्गसिद्ध्यर्थं विचार्यते। तद्विपरीतसङ्कीर्णव्यवहारिषु शिष्टेष्वपथ्यकारिवैद्यातुरवदविस्रम्भणीयचरितत्वात् सम्भाव्यमानवेदमूलत्वाच्च धर्मसंशयं दर्शयित्वा 'धर्मस्य शब्दमूलत्वादशब्दमनपेक्ष्य'मिति पूर्वः पक्षः कश्चिच्च 'विरोधे त्वनपेक्षम्'—इत्येतन्न्यायानुसारेण। सदाचारेषु हि दृष्टो धर्मव्यतिक्रमः साहसं च महतां प्रजापतीन्द्रवसिष्ठविश्वामित्रयुधिष्ठिरकृष्णद्वैपायनभीष्मधृतराष्ट्रवासुदेवार्जुनप्रभृतीनां बहूनामद्यतनानां च।

"प्रजापतेस्तावत्। 'प्रजापतिरुषसमभ्यैत्स्वां दुहितरम्' इत्यगम्यागमनरूपादधर्माचरणाद्धर्मव्यतिक्रमः। इन्द्रस्यापि......(पृ० १२८).........अद्यत्वेऽप्यहिच्छत्रमथुरानिवासिब्राह्मणीनां सुरापानम्।......उदीच्यानाम्।......दाक्षिणात्यानाम्।......उभयेषाम्।......इति नैवञ्जातीयकमिश्रसदाचारधर्मत्वाध्यवसानसम्भवः।...... (पृ० १२९)......तस्मान्निर्मूलत्वादनपेक्षाणि शिष्टाचरणानि।

"इति प्राप्तेऽभिधीयते 'अपि वा कारणाग्रहणे प्रयुक्तानि प्रतीयेरन्निति।

'दृष्टकारणहीनानि यानि कर्माणि साधुभिः।
(पृ० १३०) प्रयुक्तानि प्रतीयेरन् धर्मत्वेनेह तान्यपि॥
शरीरस्थितये यानि सुखार्थं वा प्रयुञ्जते।
अर्थार्थं वा न तेष्वस्ति शिष्टानामेव धर्मधीः॥
धर्मत्वेन प्रपन्नानि शिष्टैर्यानि तु कानिचित्।
वैदिकैः कर्तृसामान्यात् तेषां धर्मत्वमिष्यते॥'

२ वाराणसीयसंस्कृतग्रन्थमालायां प्रकाशिते कुमारिलतन्त्रवार्तिके पूर्वमीमांसाप्रथमाध्यायतृतीयपादसप्तमसूत्रव्याख्यानं १२७–१३४तमेषु पृष्ठेषु द्रष्टव्यम्।

(पृ० १३३)......"यत्तु 'प्रजापतिरुपसमभ्यैत् स्वां दुहितरम्' 'अहल्यायां मैत्रेय्यामिन्द्रो जार आसीत्' इत्येवमादिदर्शनादितिहासदर्शनाच्च शिष्टाचारेषु धर्मातिक्रमं पश्यद्भिः शिष्टाचारप्रामाण्यं दुरध्यवसानमिति । तत्रोच्यते—

'श्रुतिसामान्यमात्राद्वा न दोषोऽत्र भविष्यति ।

मनुष्यप्रतिषेधाद्वा तेजोबलवशेन वा ॥

यथा वा न विरुद्धत्वं तथा तद् गमयिष्यति ॥'

"प्रजापतिस्तावत् प्रजापालनाधिकारादादित्य एवोच्यते । स चारुणोदयवेलायामुषसमभ्यैत् सा तदागमनादेवोपजा(पृ० १३४)यत इति तद्दुहितृत्वेन व्यपदिश्यते तस्यां चारुणकिरणाख्यबीजनिक्षेपात् स्त्रीपुरुषयोगवदुपचारः ।" इति ।

इत्थं भट्टपादैरस्याः प्रसिद्धकथाया मूलत्वेन "प्रजापतिरुषसमभ्यैत्स्वां दुहितरम्" इत्यादिका श्रुतिरुपन्यस्ता ।

सा चेयं ताण्ड्यमहाब्राह्मण एवमाम्नाता—

[3] " प्रजापतिरुपसमभ्यैत् स्वां दुहितरं तस्य रेतः परापतत् तदस्यां न्यषिच्यत तदश्रीणादिदं मे मा दुषदिति तत्सदकरोत् पशूनेव ।" इति ।

भट्टपादोक्तसमाधानमूलमपि तत्रैवेत्थं श्रूयते—

[4] "वाग्वै त्रिरात्रो ००० (पृ० ५७१) । त्रयो गन्धर्वाः... त्रयो घर्मास उपसँ सचन्ते ॥२॥ अग्निरुषसँ सचते वायुरुपसँ सचतेऽसावादित्य उषसँ सचते ॥३॥ (पृ०५७२) । त्रीणि मिथुनानि तान्येषः ॥४॥ (पृ० ५७३) ।" इति ।

इयं कथा शाखान्तरेष्वपि श्रूयते । तथा हि —

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३ कलिकातीयबिब्लियोथेका-इण्डिका-संस्करणे ताण्ड्यमहाब्राह्मणस्य प्रथमभाग-(८।२।१०)गतः सन्दर्भः ४८६तमपृष्ठे द्रष्टव्यः ।

[अस्यामित्यस्य पृथिव्यामिति । अश्रीणादित्यस्य पचदिति । मा दुषदित्यस्य दुष्टं मा भूदिति चार्थो भाष्याज्ज्ञेयः ।]

४ यथोक्तस्य ताण्ड्यब्राह्मणस्य द्वितीयभागे । [सचते सेवते ।]

५ "प्रजापतिर्ह वै स्वां दुहितरमभिदध्यौ। दिवं वोषसं वा मिथुन्येनया स्यामिति ताँ सम्बभूव ॥१॥ तद् वै देवानामाग आस। य इत्थँ स्वां दुहितरमस्माकँ स्वसारं करोतीति ॥२॥ ते ह देवा ऊचुः। योऽयं देवः पशूनामीष्टेऽतिसन्धं वाऽअयं चरति य इत्थँ स्वां दुहितरमस्माकँ स्वसारं करोति विध्येममिति तँ रुद्रोऽभ्यायत्य विव्याध तस्य सामि रेतः प्रचस्कन्द तथेन्नूनं तदास ॥ ३ ॥ तस्मादेतदृषिणाभ्यनूक्तम्। पिता यत् स्वां दुहितरमधिष्कन् क्ष्मया रेतः सञ्जग्मानो निषिञ्चदिति तदाग्निमारुतमित्युक्थं तस्मिंस्तद् व्याख्यायते यथा तद् देवा रेतः प्राजनयंस्तेषां यदा देवानां क्रोधो व्यैदथ प्रजापतिमभिषज्यंस्तस्य तँ शल्यं निरकृन्तन्त्स वै यज्ञ एव प्रजापतिः ॥४॥ ते होचुः। उपजानीत यथेदं नामुयासत् कनीयो हाहुतेर्यथेदँ स्यादिति ॥५॥"

—इति शतपथब्राह्मणस्य प्रथमकाण्डे [षष्ठप्रपाठके द्वितीयब्राह्मणे] सप्तमाध्याये चतुर्थब्राह्मणे।

'योऽयं देवः पशूनामीष्टे' स 'पशूनाम्पती रुद्रः' इति प्रथमकाण्ड एव षष्ठप्रपाठकीयप्रथमब्राह्मणे [सप्तमाध्यायगततृतीयब्राह्मणे] 'यो ह्येव सविता स प्रजापतिः' इति च द्वादशकाण्डे द्वितीयप्रपाठकीयद्वितीयब्राह्मणस्य [तृतीयाध्यायगतपञ्चमब्राह्मणस्य] प्रथमकण्डिकायां शतपथब्राह्मण एवोक्तम्।

एवमेव—

६ "प्रजापतिर्वै स्वां दुहितरमभ्यध्यायद्। दिवमित्यन्य आहुरुषसमित्यन्ये। तामृश्यो भूत्वा रोहितं भूतामभ्यैत्। तं देवा अपश्यन्नकृतं वै प्रजापतिः

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५ [प्रजापतिः प्राणपिण्ड-लोक-काल-यज्ञात्मा अभिध्यातवान्। लोकात्मना दिवं कालात्मनोषसं प्राणपिण्डात्मना ऋश्यो मृगो रोहितं रोहिणी नाम नक्षत्रं यज्ञात्मना वाचम् ॥ १ ॥ तद् दुहितृगमनं देवानां चेतसि अपराधो बभूव ॥ २ ॥ अतिसन्धं मर्यादामतीत्य। विध्य इमं ताडय इषुणा। तथेन्नूनं यस्मात्तथैव ॥ ३ ॥ ऋषिणा मन्त्रेण। अधिष्कन् अधिस्कन्नः। सङ्गतः सन् क्ष्मायां पृथिव्यां यद् रेतः अभिषिक्तवान् [निषेकमकरोत्] ॥ ४ ॥ यदिदमिषोरनीकं यज्ञसर्वलिप्तं तद् यथा न वृथा स्याद् यथा च प्रधानाहुतेर्न महत् स्यात्तथोपायं जानीतेति ॥ ५ ॥]

६ [ऋश्य मृगविशेषः (अमर० २।५।१०)। रोहितं भूता लोहितं प्राप्ता

करोतीति। ते तमैच्छन् य एनमारिष्यत्येतमन्योन्यस्मिन्नाविन्दंस्तेषां या एव घोरतमास्तन्व आसंस्ता एकधा समभरंस्ताः सम्भृता एष देवोऽभवन्। तदस्यैतद् भूतवन्नाम। भवति वै स योऽस्यैतदेवं नाम वेद। तं देवा अब्रुवन्नयं वै प्रजापतिरकृतमकरिमं विध्येति। स तथेत्यब्रवीत्। स वै वो वरं वृणा इति वृणीष्वेति। स एतमेव वरमवृणीत पशूनामाधिपत्यम्। तदस्यैतत्पशुमन्नाम। पशुमान् भवति योऽस्यैतदेवं नाम वेद। तमभ्यायत्याविध्यत्। स विद्ध ऊर्ध्व उदप्रपतत्। तमेतं मृग इत्याचक्षते। य उ एव मृगव्याधः। स उ एव स या रोहित् सा रोहिणी। यो एवेषुस्त्रिकाण्डा। सो एवेषुस्त्रिकाण्डा। तद्वा इदं प्रजापते रेतः सिक्तमधावत् तत् सरोऽभवत्। ते देवा अब्रुवन् मेदं प्रजापते रेतो दुषदिति। यदब्रुवन् मेदं प्रजापते रेतो दुषदिति। तन्मादुषमभवत्। तन्मादुषस्य मादुषत्वं मादुषं ह वै नामैतद् यन्मानुषम्। तन्मादुषं सन्मानुषमित्याचक्षते परोक्षेण। परोक्षप्रिया इव हि देवाः॥ ९ (३३)॥"

ऋतुमती जातेत्यर्थः। अभ्यैत् मिथुनधर्मं प्राप्तवान्। अकृतं वै अकर्तव्यमेव निषिद्धाचरणम्। आरिष्यति आर्त्तिं प्रापयितुं क्षमः। ऐच्छन् अन्वेषणं कृतवन्तः। एतं प्रजापतिघातकं नालभन्त त्वं हन्तुं शक्नोषि त्वं हन्तुं शक्नोषीति परस्परं पृष्ट्वा एकैकस्य शक्तिराहित्यं निश्चितवन्तः। सर्वेषु देवेषु या एव काश्चिद् घोरतमाः तन्वः अत्युग्राणि शरीराण्यासन् ताः सर्वा मेलयित्वैकमेव शरीरं कृतवन्तः। ता एकत्वेन सम्पादिताः सत्यः। एष इति हस्तेन प्रदर्श्य रुद्रोऽभिधीयते। भूतपतिरिति भूतवन्नाम। अथ तेन रुद्रेण सह देवानां संवादं दर्शयति—हे रुद्र अयं प्रजापतिः अकृतम् अकः निषिद्धाचरणं कृतवान् तस्मादिमं विध्य बाणेन प्रहरेति। स रुद्रः तदङ्गीकृत्य उत्कोचत्वेन पशूनामाधिपत्यं कृतवान्। तस्मात्कारणादस्य रुद्रस्य एतत् लोकप्रसिद्धं पशुपतिरित्येतादृशं पशुशब्दोपेतं नाम सम्पन्नम्। स रुद्रः। अभ्यायत्य बाणयुक्तं धनुरभित आकृष्य तं प्रजापतिमविध्यत्। ऋश्यमृगरूपः स प्रजापतिः विद्धः सन् ऊर्ध्वमुखः उदप्रपतत् प्रकर्षेणोत्पतनमकरोत्। तमेतमुत्पतितमृश्यमृगरूपं प्रजापतिमाकाशे दृष्ट्वा सर्वे एव एते जनाः मृग इत्याचक्षते रोहिण्यार्द्रयोर्नक्षत्रयोर्मध्येऽवस्थितं मृगशीर्षनक्षत्रं कथयन्ति। नक्षत्ररूपेण निष्पन्न इत्यर्थः। यस्तु रुद्रः मृगव्याधो मृगघाती स आकाशे दृश्यमानो लोकप्रसिद्धो मृगव्याध आसीत्। या दुहिता रक्तवर्णा मृगी सैा इयमाकाशे रोहिणीनक्षत्रमभूत्। या तु रुद्रेण प्रेरिता इषुः त्रिकाण्डा—'अनीकं शल्यः तेजनम्' इति—अवयव-

—इत्यैतरेयब्राह्मणस्य तृतीयपञ्चिकायां तृतीयाध्याये नवमः खण्डः।

उद्धृतेष्वेषु सर्वेषु वाक्येष्वैतरेयब्राह्मणोक्तकथैव महिम्नःस्तोत्रस्थद्वाविंश-पद्यमूलभूतेत्यसन्दिग्धत्वेन प्रतीयते [7]शब्दानामपि सविशेषसंवादात्।

मन्त्रब्राह्मणात्मकवेदे तु न केवलं ब्राह्मणभागेऽस्याः कथाया वर्णनमुपलभ्यते यावन्मन्त्रभागेऽप्यस्या नातिसंक्षिप्तं स्वरूपं दृश्यते। तथा ह्यृग्वेदसंहितायां दशममण्डल एकषष्टितमसूक्ते—

[8] "प्रथिष्ट यस्य वीरकर्ममिष्णदनुष्ठितं तु नर्यो अपौहत्।
पुनस्तदा वृहति यत्कनाया दुहितुरा अनुभृतमनर्वा ॥ ५ ॥
मध्या यत्कर्त्वमभवदभीके कामं कृण्वाने पितरि युवत्याम्।
मनानग् रेतो जहतुर्वियन्ता सानौ निषिक्तं सुकृतस्य योनौ ॥ ६ ॥

त्र्यंपेता सैव लोकप्रसिद्धा इषुः बाणोऽभवत्। अथ मनुष्योत्पत्तिं दर्शयति—मृगरूपेण प्रजापतिना यद्रेतो भूम्यां सिक्तं तद्धेतदतिबहुत्वाद् भूमौ पतितं सत् प्रवाहरूपेणा-धावत्। तच्च कस्मिंश्चिन्निम्नदेशेऽवस्थाय प्रौढं सरोऽभूत्। ते देवा एवमब्रुवन् प्रजापतेरिदं रेतो दुष्टमस्पृश्यं मा भूदिति। तस्माद्दोषरहितस्य रेतसो मादुषमिति नाम सम्पन्नम्। तद् वस्तुतो देवाचारेण दोषरहितत्वान्मादुषमेव परोक्षेण नाम्ना व्यवहर्तव्यमित्यभिप्रेत्य वर्णव्यत्ययेन मानुषमित्याचक्षते ब्राह्मणक्षत्रियादिशरीरम्। लोके हि देववत्पूज्या उत्तमाः पुरुषाः प्रत्यक्षे मातापितृनिर्मिते देवदत्तादिनाम्नि प्रीतिं न कुर्वन्ति किन्तु 'उपाध्यायः' 'आचार्यः' 'स्वामी' इत्यादिके मातापित्रादीनामक्लृप्तत्वेन परोक्षे नाम्नि प्रीतिं कुर्वन्ति। तस्मात्परोक्षत्वाय नकारप्रक्षेपो युज्यते ॥ ६ ॥]

७ 'रोहिद्भूताम्' 'ऋश्यस्य वपुषा' 'सपत्राकृतं दिवं यातम्' 'मृगव्याध—' इति महिम्नःस्तोत्रे प्रयुक्तानां शब्दानां यथाक्रमं मूलभूता 'रोहितं भूता [या रोहित् सा रोहिणी]' 'ऋश्यो भूत्वा' 'स विद्ध ऊर्ध्व उदप्रपतत्' 'मृगव्याधः' इत्यैतरेयब्राह्मण-गता एव शब्दा न तु श्रुत्यन्तरगताः पुराणादिगता वेत्यैतरेयश्रुतिमूलकत्वमेवोक्तपद्यार्थस्य सिध्यति।

८ [यस्य प्रजापतेरपणवद्वीरकर्म (येन रेतसोत्पन्ना वीरा भवन्ति तादृग् रेत इत्यर्थः) प्रथितमासीत् तद् रेतः प्रजापतिनाऽपत्यार्थं निषिक्तं नरेभ्यो नेतृभ्यो देवै-

पिता यत् स्वां दुहितरमधिष्कन् क्ष्मया रेतः सञ्जग्मानो नि षिञ्चन् ।
स्वाध्योऽजनयन् ब्रह्म देवा वास्तोष्पतिं व्रतपां निरतक्षन् ॥ ७ ॥" इति ।

अथर्ववेदसंहितायां नवमकाण्डस्थदशमसूक्तान्तःपातिद्वादशमन्त्रे पितुः सकाशाद् दुहितुर्गर्भाधानवचनं मूलतोऽस्याप्यर्थस्य द्योतकत्वेनाङ्गीकर्तुं शक्यते । यथा—

"द्यौर्नः पिता जनिता नाभिरत्र बन्धुर्नो माता पृथिवी महीयम् ।
उत्तानयोश्चम्वोर्योनिरन्तरत्रा पिता दुहितुर्गर्भमाधात् ॥ १२ ॥" इति ।

ऋक्संहितायां तु प्रथममण्डलीयचतुःषष्ट्यधिकशततमसूक्तेऽस्य मन्त्रस्य पाठ एवंरूप उपलभ्यते—

"द्यौर्मे पिता जनिता नाभिरत्र बन्धुर्मे माता पृथिवी महीयम् ।
उत्तानयोश्चम्वोर्योनिरन्तरत्रा पिता दुहितुर्गर्भमाधात् ॥ ३३ ॥" इति ।

एवमस्माभिर्महिम्नःस्तोत्रस्थस्य द्वाविंशपद्यार्थस्य वेदमूलकत्वं सुस्पष्टतया प्रदर्शितम् ।

भ्यो वा हितो रुद्रोऽपाहति । पुनस्तद् रेतः सर्वत उत्खिदति (उद्गमयति पुरुषाकारेण स्वयमुत्पन्नः सन्) यद् रेतः कान्तायाः स्वपुत्र्याः (तस्यामित्यर्थः । प्रजापतिना) आसीदनुभृतम् । कीदृशो रुद्रः । अनर्वाण्यस्मिन्नप्रत्यृतः । "प्रजापतिर्वै स्वां दुहितरमभ्यध्यायद् दिवमित्यन्य आहुरुषसमित्यन्ये" इति ब्राह्मणम् ॥ ५ ॥ यथेच्छं कुर्वाणे पितरि प्रजापतौ युवत्यां दुहितर्युषसि दिवि वा तयोर्मध्येऽन्तरिक्षमध्ये वा समीपे यत्कर्माभवन्मिथुनीभावाख्यं तदानीं मनानगल्पं रेतस्त्यक्तवन्तौ । किं कुर्वाणौ । वियन्तौ परस्परमभिगच्छन्तौ । प्रजापतिना समुच्छ्रिते स्थाने यज्ञस्य योनौ निषिक्तमासीदित्यर्थः ॥ ६ ॥ पिता प्रजापतिर्यदा स्वां दुहितरं दिवमुषसं वाऽध्यस्कन्दत् तदानीमेव पृथिव्या सह सङ्गच्छमानः प्रजापतिरस्मिँल्लोके रोहितो भूत्वा रेतो नि षिञ्चत् । निषेकमकरोत् । "तामृश्यो भूत्वा रोहितं भूतामभ्यैत्" इति ब्राह्मणम् । तदानीं सुध्यानाः सुकर्माणो वा देवा ब्रह्मोदपादयन् । किं तद् ब्रह्मेति तदाह । यज्ञवास्तुस्वामिनं व्रतस्य कर्मणो रक्षःप्रभृतिभ्यः पालकं (रुद्रं) समुदपादयन् । यज्ञवास्तुस्वामित्वं दत्त्वा कर्मरक्षकत्वेन निर्मितवन्त इत्यर्थः ॥ ७ ॥]

अधुना षड्विंशाष्टाविंशपद्ययोर्वैदिकमूलान्वेषणं प्रस्तूयते। ते च पद्ये—

त्वमर्कस्त्वं सोमस्त्वमसि पवनस्त्वं हुतवह-
स्त्वमापस्त्वं व्योम त्वमु धरणिरात्मा त्वमिति च।
परिच्छिन्नामेवं त्वयि परिणता बिभ्रतु गिरं
न विद्मस्तत् तत्त्वं वयमिह तु यत् त्वं न भवसि॥२६॥ इति।
भवः शर्वो रुद्रः पशुपतिरथोग्रः सहमहां-
स्तथा भीमेशानाविति यदभिधानाष्टकमिदम्।
अमुष्मिन् प्रत्येकं प्रविचरति देव श्रुतिरपि
प्रियायास्मै धाम्ने प्रविहितनमस्योऽस्मि भवते॥२८॥ इति च।

अत्र प्रथमपद्यव्याख्यानावसरे—

"एते चाष्टौ श्रीरुद्रमूर्तित्वेनागमप्रसिद्धा वक्ष्यमाणभवादिनामाष्टकसहिता-श्चतुर्थ्यन्ता नमोन्ता अष्टौ मन्त्रा भवन्ति ते गुरूपदेशेन ज्ञातव्याः। एतदष्ट-मूर्तित्वं चान्यत्राप्युक्तम्—

'क्षितिहुतवहक्षेत्रज्ञाम्भःप्रभञ्जनचन्द्रम-
स्तपनवियदित्यष्टौ मूर्तीर्नमो भव बिभ्रते।' इति

तेन सर्वात्मकमपि त्वामर्काद्यष्टमात्रमूर्तिं वदन्तीत्यर्थः।" इति।

एवमेव द्वितीयपद्यव्याख्यानोपक्रमे—

"(१) श्रुतिर्वेदः प्रविचरति प्रकर्षेण बोधकतया चरति। वर्तत इत्यर्थः। अपिशब्दात् स्मृतिपुराणागमादिकमपि। (२) अथवा प्रणव इवामुष्मिन्नपि श्रुतिः प्रविचरतीति योज्यम्। यद्यप्यष्टाध्यायार्थकाण्डे वह्निनामत्वेनैतानि समाम्नातानि तथापि वह्नेर्भगवद्विभूतित्वात् तन्नामत्वेऽपि न भगवन्नामत्वव्याघातः। (३) यद्वा अमुष्मिन्नामाष्टके देवानां ब्रह्मादीनामपि श्रुतिः श्रवणेन्द्रियं प्रविचरति सावधान-तया वर्तते।" इति, "महता महच्छब्देन सह वर्तत इति सहमहान् महादेवः। तथैवागमप्रसिद्धः।" इति च—

—श्रीमधुसूदनसरस्वत्य आहुः ।

तत्रागमशास्त्रप्रमाणितोऽयमर्थ इत्येतस्मिन् विषये श्रीसायणाचार्या अप्यथर्ववेदसंहिताया एकादशकाण्डगतद्वितीयसूक्तस्थप्रथममन्त्रस्य[१] भाष्ये—

"एतदादिसूक्तत्रयेण भौमान्तरिक्षाद्युत्पातदोषनिवृत्तये अष्टमूर्तिर्महादेवः प्रार्थ्यते। ताश्च पारमेश्वर्यो मूर्तयः आगमिकैरेवमनुक्रान्ताः—

'शर्वं[१] पशुपतिं[२] चोग्रं[३] रुद्रं[४] भव[५]मथेश्वरम्[६] ।
महादेवं[७] च भीमं[८] च'—इति ।

"तासामुत्पत्तिः शतपथब्राह्मणे षष्ठकाण्डे 'असद्वा इदमग्र आसीत्' [६।१।१।१] इत्यादिना प्रपञ्चिता। तत्र सृष्ट्यादौ भवति यस्मात्सर्वं जगदिति भवः। शृणाति सर्वं जगद्धिनस्ति संहृतिसमये इति शर्वः। स्थितिकालवर्तिनीनामन्यासां मूर्त्तीनामुपसङ्ग्रहाय सृष्टिसंहृतिकारिण्यौ आद्यन्तवर्तिन्यौ परमेश्वरस्य मूर्ती निर्दिश्येते।"

—इत्याहुः।

एतद्देवेशमूर्त्यष्टकमधिकृत्य कविकुलगुरुः श्रीकालिदासोऽभिज्ञानशाकुन्तलाख्यनाटकं प्रारिप्सुः "या सृष्टिः स्रष्टुराद्या"—इत्याद्याशिषं प्रयुयुजे। तद्व्याख्याने च राघवभट्टः—

"धराम्भोऽग्निमरुद्व्योममखेशेन्द्वर्कमूर्तिभिः।"

इत्यादिसमासयुक्तिमुपन्यस्तवान्। एवमेव रघुवंशद्वितीयसर्गस्थस्य "अवेहि मां किङ्करमष्टमूर्तेः"—इत्यस्य पञ्चत्रिंशपद्यांशस्य सञ्जीवन्यां मल्लिनाथः—

'पृथिवी सलिलं तेजो वायुराकाशमेव च।
सूर्याचन्द्रमसौ सोमयाजी चेत्यष्टमूर्तयः॥'

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१ स चाथर्वणमन्त्रः—

भवाशर्वौ मृडतं माभि यातं भूतपती पशुपती नमो वाम्।
प्रतिहितामायतां मा वि स्राष्टं मा नो हिंसिष्ट द्विपदो मा चतुष्पदः॥ १॥

इति।

—इति यादववचनमुदलिखत् ।

शिवपुराणे तु शतरुद्रसंहिताया द्वितीयेऽध्याये—

"नन्दीश्वर उवाच—

शृणु तात महेशस्यावतारान् परमान् प्रभो ।
सर्वकार्यकराँल्लोके सर्वस्य सुखदान् मुने ॥ १ ॥
तस्य शम्भोः परेशस्य मूर्त्त्यष्टकमयं जगत् ।
तस्मिन् व्याप्य स्थितं विश्वं सूत्रे मणिगणा इव ॥ २ ॥
शर्वो[१] भव[२]स्तथा रुद्र[३] उग्रो[४] भीमः[५] पशोः[६]पतिः ।
ईशान[७]श्च महादेवो[८] मूर्तयश्चाष्ट विश्रुताः ॥ ३ ॥
भू[१]म्यम्भो[२]ऽग्नि[३]मरुद्[४]व्योम[५]क्षेत्रज्ञा[६]र्क[७]निशाकराः[८] ।
अधिष्ठिताश्च शर्वाद्यैरष्टरूपैः शिवस्य हि ॥ ४ ॥
धत्ते चराचरं विश्वं रूपं विश्वम्भरात्मकम् ।
शङ्करस्य महेशस्य शास्त्रस्यैवेति निश्चयः ॥ ५ ॥
सञ्जीवनं समस्तस्य जगतः सलिलात्मकम् ।
भव इत्युच्यते रूपं भवस्य परमात्मनः ॥ ६ ॥
बहिरन्तर्जगद् विश्वं बिभर्ति स्पन्दते स्वयम् ।
उग्र इत्युच्यते सद्भी रूपमुग्रस्य सत्प्रभोः ॥ ७ ॥
सर्वावकाशदं सर्वव्यापकं गगनात्मकम् ।
रूपं भीमस्य भीमाख्यं भूपवृन्दस्य भेदकम् ॥ ८ ॥
सर्वात्मनामधिष्ठानं सर्वक्षेत्रनिवासकम् ।
रूपं पशुपतेर्ज्ञेयं पशुपाशनिकृन्तनम् ॥ ९ ॥
सन्दीपयज्जगत्सर्वं दिवाकरसमाह्वयम् ।
ईशानाख्यं महेशस्य रूपं दिवि विसर्पति ॥ १० ॥
आप्याययति यो विश्वममृतांशुर्निशाकरः ।
महादेवस्य तद् रूपं महादेवस्य चाह्वयम् ॥ ११ ॥
आत्मा तस्याष्टमं रूपं शिवस्य परमात्मनः ।
व्यापिकेतरमूर्तीनां विश्वं तस्माच्छिवात्मकम् ॥ १२ ॥

शाखाः पुष्यन्ति वृक्षस्य वृक्षमूलस्य सेचनात्
तद्वदस्य वपुर्विश्वं पुष्यते च शिवार्चनात् ॥१३॥
यथेह पुत्रपौत्रादेः प्रीत्या प्रीतो भवेत्पिता ।
तथा विश्वस्य सम्प्रीत्या प्रीतो भवति शङ्करः ॥१४॥
क्रियते यस्य कस्यापि देहिनो यदि निग्रहः ।
अष्टमूर्तेरनिष्टं तत्कृतमेव न संशयः ॥१५॥
अष्टमूर्त्यात्मना विश्वमधिष्ठायास्थितं शिवम् ।
भजस्व सर्वभावेन रुद्रं परमकारणम् ॥१६॥"

—इत्येवंरूपं शिवनामाष्टकमूर्त्यष्टकयोर्विवरणं दृश्यते ।

[10]बौधायनधर्मसूत्रे (बौधायनस्मृतौ) द्वितीयप्रश्नगतपञ्चमाध्याये—

"ओं भवं देवं तर्पयामि ॥५७॥ ओं शर्वं देवं तर्पयामि ॥५८॥ ओमीशानं देवं तर्पयामि ॥५९॥ ओं पशुपतिं देवं तर्पयामि ॥६०॥ ओं रुद्रं देवं तर्पयामि ॥६१॥ ओमुग्रं देवं तर्पयामि ॥६२॥ ओं भीमं देवं तर्पयामि ॥६३॥ ओं महान्तं देवं तर्पयामि ॥६४॥

"ओं भवस्य देवस्य पत्नीं तर्पयामि ॥६५॥ ओं शर्वस्य देवस्य पत्नीं तर्पयामि ॥६६॥ ओमीशानस्य देवस्य पत्नीं तर्पयामि ॥६७॥ ओं पशुपतेर्देवस्य पत्नीं तर्पयामि ॥६८॥ ओं रुद्रस्य देवस्य पत्नीं तर्पयामि ॥६९॥ ओमुग्रस्य देवस्य पत्नीं तर्पयामि ॥७०॥ ओं भीमस्य देवस्य पत्नीं तर्पयामि ॥७१॥ ओं महतो देवस्य पत्नीं तर्पयामि ॥७२॥

"ओं भवस्य देवस्य सुतं तर्पयामि ॥७३॥ ओं शर्वस्य देवस्य सुतं तर्पयामि ॥७४॥ ओमीशानस्य देवस्य सुतं तर्पयामि ॥७५॥ ओं पशुपतेर्देवस्य सुतं तर्पयामि ॥७६॥ ओं रुद्रस्य देवस्य सुतं तर्पयामि ॥७७॥ ओमुग्रस्य देवस्य

१० बौधायनधर्मसूत्रं गोविन्दस्वामिविवरणोपेतं (महीसुरीयबिब्लिओथेकासंस्कृतागत-चतुस्त्रिंशाङ्के प्रकाशितं) २३४-२३६तमपृष्ठेषु द्रष्टव्यम् । पुण्यपत्तनस्थानन्दाश्रमसंस्कृतग्रन्थावलावष्टचत्वारिंशग्रन्थाङ्कतया प्रकाशिते 'स्मृतीनां समुच्चये' बौधायनस्मृतिर्वा ४२४-४२५तमपृष्ठयोर्द्रष्टव्या ।

सुतं तर्पयामि ॥७८॥ ओं भीमस्य देवस्य सुतं तर्पयामि ॥७९॥ ओं महतो देवस्य सुतं तर्पयामि ॥८०॥"

इत्येते तर्पणमन्त्राः प्रणवव्याहृतित्रयसावित्र्यात्मकपञ्चब्रह्मयज्ञेभ्यो द्वाविंश-सूत्रे प्राप्तोल्लेखेभ्योऽनन्तरमनुक्रान्तस्य देवतातर्पणस्यान्तःपातिनो दृश्यन्ते ।

एष्वागमपुराणसूत्रवाक्येषु [१]भव-[२]शर्वे[३]शान-[४]पशुपति-[५]रुद्रो[६]ग्र-[७]भीम-[८]महादेवेति नामानि महिम्नःस्तोत्रस्थक्रमभेदेनोपलभ्यन्ते ।

[११]एवमेव हिरण्यकेशिगृह्यसूत्रे द्वितीयप्रश्ने तृतीयपटलेऽष्टमखण्डेऽपि—

"व्याहृतिपर्यन्तं कृत्वौदनानभ्याहृत्य जुहोति । भवाय देवाय स्वाहा । रुद्राय देवाय स्वाहा । शर्वाय देवाय स्वाहा । ईशानाय देवाय स्वाहा । पशुपतये देवाय स्वाहा । उग्राय देवाय स्वाहा । भीमाय देवाय स्वाहा । महते देवाय स्वाहा । इति ॥ ६ ॥

"अथ पत्न्योदनस्य पत्न्यै जुहोति । भवस्य देवस्य पत्न्यै स्वाहा । रुद्रस्य देवस्य पत्न्यै स्वाहा । शर्वस्य देवस्य पत्न्यै स्वाहा । ईशानस्य देवस्य पत्न्यै स्वाहा । पशुपतेर्देवस्य पत्न्यै स्वाहा । उग्रस्य देवस्य पत्न्यै स्वाहा । भीमस्य देवस्य पत्न्यै स्वाहा । महतो देवस्य पत्न्यै स्वाहा । इति ॥ ७ ॥"

इति शौलगवे [शूलगवो रुद्रस्तद्देवताके] कर्मणि ['अष्टाहुतीः शूलगवौदनस्य जुहोति' इत्यादिमातृदत्तव्याख्यानुसारेण] [१]भव-[२]रुद्र-[३]शर्वे[४]शान-[५]पशु-[६]पत्यु[७]ग्र-भीम-[८]महादेवेति नामानि भिन्नक्रमाण्येव दृश्यन्ते ।

अनन्तरोक्तोभयग्रन्थगतभवादिविषया मन्त्रा मूलतः कस्मिन्वेदे क्व पठिता आसन्निति ज्ञातुं न शक्यतेऽद्यावधिप्रकाशितवेदग्रन्थेष्वेषामनुपलम्भात् ।

तदेवमस्मदन्वेषणगोचरे हिरण्यकेशिगृह्यसूत्रे बौधायनधर्मसूत्रे शिवपुराणादौ वा न क्वापि महिम्नःस्तोत्रपद्ययोर्मूलं वर्तते तत्र तत्र प्राप्तभवादिनामसु क्रमभेददर्शनान्महिम्नःस्तोत्रे साक्षाच्छ्रुतिशब्दस्यैव प्रयोगदर्शनाच्च ।

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११ 'डाक्टर जे० किर्स्ते' इत्यनेन सम्पादितं वियेन्नानगर्यामल्फ्रेड्होल्डेर्-इत्येतेन च १८८९ तमख्रिस्ताब्दे प्रकाशितं हिरण्यकेशिगृह्यसूत्रं ७०-७१ तमपृष्ठयोर्द्रष्टव्यम् ।

न च श्रीमधुसूदनकृतश्रुतिशब्दव्याख्यानत्रयमध्यादाद्यान्त्ययोर्विकल्पयोरन्यतराश्रयणे प्रकृतार्थस्य श्रुतिमूलत्वानपेक्षतया पुराणादिमूलत्वमेव किं नेष्टं स्यादिति वाच्यं 'श्रुतिरपी-'त्यत्र कैमुतिकन्यायेन ग्रन्थान्तरापेक्षया परमप्रमाणभूतायाः श्रुतेरेव ग्रहणे तात्पर्यावधारणाद् द्वितीयस्यैव व्याख्यानस्य वस्तुतत्त्वनिदर्शकतयोपादेयत्वेन विकल्पासङ्गतेः ।

श्रीमधुसूदनाचार्याणाम् "अष्टाध्यायार्थकाण्डे" इति वचनस्य को मूलपाठः को वास्यार्थः किं वामुना ते रुद्राष्टाध्यायीं वाथर्वणसंहिताकाण्डविशेषं वा शतपथब्राह्मणकाण्डविशेषं वा परामिमृक्षन्नित्येतदवलोकनसमकालमेव निश्चयेन वक्तुं न शक्यते । अत एव तत्तद्वेदग्रन्थावलोकनमप्यावश्यकं भवति ।

तत्र तावद् ये रुद्राष्टाध्याय्याः सप्तमाध्याये पठिता आद्यास्त्रयो मन्त्रास्तेषु भवादिनामान्युपलभ्यन्ते । ते तु शुक्लयजुर्वेदसंहिताया एकोनचत्वारिंशेऽध्याये सप्तमाष्टमनवमा अग्निपरत्वेन व्याख्याताश्च भाष्यकृद्भिः । ते चेमे—

"उग्रश्च भीमश्च ध्वान्तश्च धुनिश्च । सासह्वांश्चाभियुग्वा च विक्षिपः स्वाहा ॥ ७ ॥

"अग्नि्ँ हृदयेनाशनि्ँ हृदयाग्रेण पशुपतिं कृत्स्नहृदयेन भवं यक्ना । शर्वं मतस्नाभ्यामीशानं मन्युना महादेवमन्तःपर्शव्येनोग्रं देवं वनिष्ठुना वसिष्ठहनुःशिङ्गीनि कोशाभ्याम् ॥ ८ ॥

"उग्रं लोहितेन मित्र्ँ सौव्रत्येन रुद्रं दौर्व्रत्येनेन्द्रं प्रक्रीडेन मरुतो बलेन साध्यान् प्रमुदा । भवस्य कण्ठ्य्ँ रुद्रस्यान्तःपार्श्व्यं महादेवस्य यकृच्छर्वस्य वनिष्ठुः पशुपतेः पुरीतत् ॥ ९ ॥" इति ।

अत्र यद्यप्युग्र[१]-भीम[२]-पशुपति[३]-भव[४]-शर्व[५]ेशान[६]-महादेव[७]-रुद्रे[८]त्यभिधानानामुल्लेखः स्पष्टं प्राप्यते तथाप्यत्रैव श्रुतावेषां वह्निनामत्वेन समाम्नानाभावाच्छ्रीमधुसूदनाभिमतश्रुतिरतो भिन्नैव भवितुमर्हति । वस्तुतस्त्वत्रोत्तरमन्त्रद्वय एव भीमं विनान्यानि सर्वाणि महिम्नःस्तोत्राष्टाविंशपद्योक्तभवादिनामान्युपलभ्यन्ते ।

अथर्ववेदसंहितायाः पञ्चदशकाण्डस्य पञ्चमे सूक्तेऽपि—

"००० भवमिष्वासमनुष्ठातारमकुर्वन् ॥ १ ॥००० शर्वमिष्वास००॥४॥०० पशुपतिमिष्वास०० ॥ ६ ॥ ०० उग्रं देवमिष्वास०० ॥ ८ ॥ ०० रुद्रमिष्वास ०० ॥ १० ॥ ०० महादेवमिष्वास ०० ॥ १२ ॥ ०० ईशानमिष्वास ०० ॥ १४ ॥"

इत्येवं भीमं विहायान्येषां सप्तानां नाम्नां स्पष्टोल्लेखः प्राप्यते। अत्र यद्यप्यग्निनामत्वमेषां न श्रूयतेऽतो मधुसूदनाचार्याभिप्रेतश्रुत्याऽतोऽपि भिन्नयैव भाव्यं तथापि महिम्नःस्तोत्रस्थाभिधानाष्टकमध्ये सप्तानामभिधानानां वर्णनं शिवपरत्वं च महिम्नःस्तोत्रसामीप्यबुद्धिं जनयति।

एवमेव "भवः शर्वो रुद्रः पशुपतिः" इतिमहिम्नःस्तोत्रस्थाभिधानाष्टकीयाद्यनामचतुष्टयक्रमोऽप्याथर्वणसंहितैकादशकाण्डषष्ठसूक्तस्थे

"भवाशर्वाविदं ब्रूमो रुद्रं पशुपतिश्च यः।
इषूर्या एषां संविद्म ता नः सन्तु सदा शिवाः ॥९॥"

इति नवममन्त्रे प्रकाशितं क्रममेवानुरुणद्धीति नातितिरोहितं स्यात्तद्विदुषाम्।

श्रीमधुसूदनाभिमता श्रुतिस्तु शतपथब्राह्मणषष्ठकाण्डप्रथमाध्यायतृतीयब्राह्मणान्तःपातिनी "तान्येतान्यष्टावग्निरूपाणि ०० ॥ १८ ॥" इत्येतत्प्रकरणसम्बद्धैवेत्याभाति। श्रीसायणचार्यैरप्यथर्ववेदसंहिताभाष्ये मूर्त्यष्टकोत्पत्तौ षष्ठकाण्डीयशतपथप्रमाणमेवोपस्थापितमित्यस्माभिः प्रागेव प्रदर्शितम्। यत्तु पुनस्तैस्तत्रोक्तम्—"असद्वा इदमग्र आसीत् [शत० ६। १। १। १]"—इत्यादिना मूर्त्यष्टकोत्पत्तिः प्रपञ्चितेति तन्नातिमनोरमं तस्याः प्रथमद्वितीययोर्ब्राह्मणयोरनुपलम्भात् तृतीय एव ब्राह्मणे प्रपञ्चितत्वाच्च। तदित्थम्—

"अभूद्वा इयं प्रतिष्ठेति। तद्भूमिरभवत्तामप्रथयत्सा पृथिव्यभवत्तस्यामस्यां प्रतिष्ठायां भूतानि च भूतानां च पतिः संवत्सरायादीक्षन्त भूतानां पतिर्गृहपतिरासीदुषाः पत्नी ॥ ७ ॥ तद्यानि तानि भूतानि। ऋतवस्तेऽथ यः स भूतानां पतिः संवत्सरः सोऽथ या सोपाः पत्न्यौषसी सा तानीमानि

भूतानि च भूतानां च पतिः संवत्सर उषसि रेतोऽसिञ्चन्त्स संवत्सरे कुमारोऽजायत सोऽरोदीत् ॥ ८ ॥

"तं प्रजापतिरब्रवीत् । कुमार किँ रोदिषि यच्छ्रमात्तपसोऽधि जातोऽसीति सोऽब्रवीदनपहतपाप्मा वा अस्म्यहितनामा नाम मे धेहीति तस्मात्पुत्रस्य जातस्य नाम कुर्यात् पाप्मानमेवास्य तदपहन्त्यपि द्वितीयमपि तृतीयमभिपूर्वमेवास्य तत्पाप्मानमपहन्ति ॥९॥

"तमब्रवीद् रुद्रोऽसीति । तद्यदस्य तन्नामाकरोदग्निस्तद्रूपमभवदग्निर्वै रुद्रो यदरोदीत् तस्माद् रुद्रः सोऽब्रवीज्ज्यायान् वा अतोऽस्मि धेह्येव मे नामेति ॥१०॥ तमब्रवीत्सर्वोऽसीति । तद्यदस्य तन्नामाकरोदापस्तद्रूपमभवन्नापो वै सर्वोऽद्भ्यो हीदँ सर्वं जायते सोऽब्र००० नामेति ॥११॥ तमब्रवीत् पशुपतिरसीति । तद्यदस्य तन्नामाकरोदोषधयस्तद्रूपमभवन्नोषधयो वै पशुपतिस्तस्माद् यदा पशव ओषधीर्लभन्तेऽथ पतीयन्ति सोऽब्र००० नामेति ॥१२॥ तमब्रवीदुग्रोऽसीति । तद्यदस्य तन्नामाकरोद् वायुस्तद्रूपमभवद् वायुर्वा उग्रस्तस्माद्यदा बलवद्वात्युग्रो वातीत्याहुः सोऽब्र००० नामेति ॥१३॥ तमब्रवीदशनिरसीति । तद्यदस्य तन्नामाकरोद् विद्युत् तद्रूपमभवद् विद्युद्वा अशनिस्तस्माद्यं विद्युद्धन्त्यशनिरवधीदित्याहुः सोऽब्र००० नामेति ॥१४॥ तमब्रवीद् भवोऽसीति । तद्यदस्य तन्नामाकरोत् पर्जन्यस्तद्रूपमभवत् पर्जन्यो वै भवः पर्जन्याद्धीदँ सर्वं भवति सोऽब्र००० नामेति ॥ १५ ॥ तमब्रवीन्महादेवोऽसीति । तद्यदस्य तन्नामाकरोच्चन्द्रमास्तद्रूपमभवत् प्रजापतिर्वै चन्द्रमाः प्रजापतिर्वै महादेवः सोऽब्रवी००० नामेति ॥ १६ ॥ तमब्रवीदीशानोऽसीति । तद्यदस्य तन्नामाकरोदादित्यस्तद्रूपमभवदादित्यो वा ईशान आदित्यो ह्यस्य सर्वस्येष्टे सोऽब्रवीदेतावान् वा अस्मि मा मेतः परो नाम धा इति ॥ १७ ॥

"तान्येतान्यष्टावग्निरूपाणि । कुमारो नवमः सैवाग्नेस्त्रिवृत्ता ॥१८॥ ०००॥१९॥००० यद्वाव रेतः सिक्तं तदेव जायते तत्तो विक्रियमाणमेव वर्धमानँ शेते तस्मात्संवत्सर एव चिनुयात् संवत्सरेऽनुब्रूयात् तस्य

चितस्थ नाम करोति पाप्मानमेवास्य तदपहन्ति चित्रनामानं करोति चित्रोऽसीति सर्वाणि हि चित्राण्यग्निः ॥ २० ॥" इति ।

अत्र चित्राभिधकुमाराग्ने रूपाणि रुद्र[१]-सर्व[२]-पशुपत्यु[३]ग्राशनि[४]-भव[५]-महादेवे[६]-[७]शाननामानि[८] यथाक्रममग्न्य[१]बोषधि[२]-वायु[३]-विद्युत्[४]-पर्जन्य[५]-चन्द्रम[६]आदित्याभिन्नान्यु[७]-[८]क्तानि ।

ऋग्वेदशाङ्खायन(कौषीतकि)-ब्राह्मणे षष्ठाध्याय एवं श्रूयते—

"हरिः ॐ प्रजापतिः प्रजातिकामस्तपोऽतप्यत तस्मात्तप्तात् पञ्चाजायन्ताग्निर्वायुरादित्यश्चन्द्रमा उषाः पञ्चमी तानब्रवीद् यूयमपि तप्यध्वमिति तेऽदीक्षन्त तान् दीक्षितांस्तेपानानुपाः प्राजापत्याप्सरोरूपं कृत्वा पुरस्तात् प्रत्युदैन् तस्यामेषां मनः समपतत् ते रेतोऽसिञ्चन्त ते प्रजापतिं पितरमेत्याब्रुवन् रेतो वा असिञ्चाम हा इदं नो मामुया भूदिति स प्रजापतिर्हिरण्मयं चमसमकरोदिषुमात्रमूर्ध्वमेवं तिर्यञ्चं तस्मिन्नेतत्समसिञ्चत्तत उदतिष्ठन् सहस्राक्षः सहस्रपात् सहस्रेण प्रतिहिताभिः ॥ १ ॥

"स प्रजापतिं पितरमभ्यायच्छत् तमब्रवीत् कथा माऽभ्यायच्छसीति नाम मे कुर्वित्यब्रवीन्न वा इदमविहितेन नाम्नाऽन्नमत्स्यामीति स वै त्वमित्यब्रवीद् भव एवेति यद् भव आपस्तेन ह वा एनं न भवो हिनस्ति नास्य प्रजां नास्य पशून्नास्य ब्रुवाणं चनाथ य एनं द्वेष्टि स एव पापीयान् भवति न स य एवं वेद तस्य व्रतमार्द्रमेव वासः परिदधीतेति ॥ २ ॥ तं द्वितीयमभ्यायच्छत् तमब्रवीत् कथा माऽभ्यायच्छसीति द्वितीयं मे नाम कुर्वित्यब्रवीन्न वा इदमेकेन नाम्नाऽन्नमत्स्यामीति स वै त्वमित्यब्रवीच्छर्व एवेति यच्छर्वोऽग्निस्तेन न ह वा एनं शर्वो हिनस्ति नास्य ०००००० तस्य व्रतं सर्वमेव नाश्नीयादिति ॥ ३ ॥ तं तृतीयमभ्यायच्छत् तमब्रवीत् कथा माऽभ्यायच्छसीति तृतीयं मे नाम कुर्वित्यब्रवीन्न वा इदं द्वाभ्यां नामभ्यामन्नमत्स्यामीति स वै त्वमित्यब्रवीत् पशुपतिरेवेति यत् पशुपतिर्वायुस्तेन न ह वा एनं पशुपतिर्हिनस्ति नास्य ००००० तस्य व्रतं ब्राह्मणमेव न परिवदेदिति ॥ ४ ॥ तं चतुर्थमभ्यायच्छत् तमब्रवीत्कथा माऽभ्यायच्छसीति चतुर्थं

मे नाम कुर्वित्यब्रवीन्न वा इदं त्रिभिर्नामभिरन्नमत्स्यामीति स वै त्वमित्यब्रवीदुग्र एव देव इति यदुग्रो देव ओषधयो वनस्पतयस्तेन न ह वा एनमुग्रो देवो हिनस्ति नास्य ००००० तस्य व्रतं स्त्रिया एव विवरं नेक्षेतेति ॥ ५ ॥ तं पञ्चममभ्यायच्छत् तमब्रवीत् कथा माऽभ्यायच्छसीति पञ्चमं मे नाम कुर्वित्यब्रवीन्न वा इदं चतुर्भिर्नामभिरन्नमत्स्यामीति स वै त्वमित्यब्रवीन्महानेव देव इति यन्महान् देव आदित्यस्तेन न ह वा एनं महान् देवो हिनस्ति नास्य ००००० तस्य व्रतमुद्यन्तमेवैनं नेक्षेतास्तं यन्तं चेति ॥ ६ ॥ तं षष्ठमभ्यायच्छत् तमब्रवीत् कथा माऽभ्यायच्छसीति षष्ठं मे नाम कुर्वित्यब्रवीन्न वा इदं पञ्चभिर्नामभिरन्नमत्स्यामीति स वै त्वमित्यब्रवीद् रुद्र एवेति यद् रुद्रश्चन्द्रमास्तेन न ह वा एनं रुद्रो हिनस्ति नास्य ००००० तस्य व्रतं विमूर्तमेव नाश्नीयान्मज्जानं चेति ॥ ७ ॥ तं सप्तममभ्यायच्छत् तमब्रवीन् कथा माऽभ्यायच्छसीति सप्तमं मे नाम कुर्वित्यब्रवीन्न वा इदं षड्भिर्नामभिरन्नमत्स्यामीति स वै त्वमित्यब्रवीदीशान एवेति यदीशानोऽन्नं तेन न ह वा एनमीशानो हिनस्ति नास्य ००००० तस्य व्रतमन्नमेवेच्छमानं न प्रत्याचक्षीतेति ॥ ८ ॥ तमष्टममभ्यायच्छत् तमब्रवीत् कथा माऽभ्यायच्छसीत्यष्टमं मे नाम कुर्वित्यब्रवीन्न वा इदं सप्तभिर्नामभिरन्नमत्स्यामीति स वै त्वमित्यब्रवीदशनिरेवेति यदशनिरिन्द्रस्तेन न ह वा एनमशनिर्हिनस्ति नास्य प्रजां नास्य पशून्नास्य ब्रुवाणं चनाथ य एनं द्वेष्टि स एव पापीयान् भवति न स य एवं वेद तस्य व्रतं सत्यमेव वदेद्धिरण्यं च बिभृयादिति स एषोऽष्टनामाऽष्टधा विहितो महान् देव आह वा अस्याष्टमान् पुरुषात् प्रजाऽन्नमत्ति वशीयान् वशीयान् हैवास्य प्रजायामाजायते य एवं वेद ॥ ९ ॥" इति ।

अत्र शतपथप्रदर्शितक्रमभेदेन भव[१]-शर्व[२]-पशुपत्यु[३]ग्र[४]-महादेव[५]-रुद्रे[६]-शाना[७]शनि[८]-नामानोऽग्नि[१]-वाय्[२]वोषधि[३]वनस्पत्या[४]दित्य[५]-चन्द्रमो[६]ऽन्ने[७]न्द्राः[८] साक्षादष्टनाम्नोऽष्टधा विहितस्य महादेवस्यैव रूपतया निर्दिष्टाः ।

तदेवं प्रदर्शितवेदवचनेषु नामतः शुक्लयजुर्वेदीयमन्त्रद्वयेऽथर्ववेदीयैकादश-पञ्चदशकाण्डमन्त्रेषु शतपथशाङ्खायनब्राह्मणयोश्च मन्त्रेषु सर्वत्र भीमव्यतिरिक्तानामेव महिम्नःस्तोत्रोक्तभवादिनाम्नां साहचर्येणोल्लेखो दृश्यते ।

तत्राथर्ववेदीयवचनेषु तावत् किञ्चिदष्टमं नाम नामान्तरेणापि न गृहीतम् । अत एव महिम्नःस्तोत्रस्थषड्विंशाष्टाविंशपद्ययोरेकस्याप्यथर्वमूलकत्वपक्षो नामक्रमस्यांशिकसंवाददर्शनेऽपि प्ररोहकक्षामारोढुं न क्षमः ।

शुक्लयजुर्वेदीयमन्त्रद्वये भीमस्थानीयत्वेनेन्द्रस्य[१२] ग्रहणं कृतमित्यनुमातुं यद्यपि शक्यते तथाप्यत्राष्टव्यतिरिक्तनामदर्शनान्महिम्नःस्तोत्रोक्ताभिधानाष्टकमूलमितोऽप्यन्यत्रैव मृग्यम् ।

एवं यद्यपि श्रीमधुसूदनाचार्याणामभिप्रायमनुसृत्य शतपथश्रुतिवचनान्यस्माभिर्वैशद्येनोद्धृतानि तथापि न तान्यपि महिम्नःस्तोत्रपद्यमूलत्वपदेऽभिषेक्तुं शक्यन्ते रुद्रादीनि नामानि तत्र कुमाराग्नेरेव साक्षान्न तु महिम्नःस्तोत्रानुसारेण शिवस्येति प्रधानहेतोः । वह्नेर्भगवद्विभूतित्वस्वीकारेण व्यवस्थितावपि परम्परासम्बन्ध एव शरणं स्यात् ।

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१२ ऋग्वेदमन्त्रेषु तावत्साक्षादिन्द्रस्य विशेषणत्वेन वा सम्बन्धान्तरेण वा भीमपदप्रयोगबाहुल्यमुपलभ्यते । यथा—"भीमस्तुविष्माञ्चर्षणिभ्य आतपः शिशीते वज्रं तेजसे न वंसगः ।" (१।५५।१) । "अस्मै भीमाय नमसा समध्वर उषो न शुभ्र आ भरा पनीयसे ।" (१।५७।३) । "क्रत्वा महाँ अनुष्वधं भीम आ वावृधे शवः ।" (१।८१।४) । "स वज्रभृद् दस्युहा भीम उग्रः सहस्रचेताः शतनीथ ऋभ्वा ।" (१।१००।१२) । "मृगो न हस्ती तविषीमुषाणः सिंहो न भीम आयुधानि बिभ्रत् ।" (४।१६।१४) । "गिरिर्न यः स्वतवाँ ऋष्व इन्द्रः सनादेव सहसे जात उग्रः । आदर्ता वज्रं स्थविरं न भीम उद्नेव कोशं वसुना न्यृष्टम् ॥" (४।२०।६) । "अग्निर्न शुष्कं वनमिन्द्र हेती रक्षो नि धक्ष्यशनिर्न भीमा ।" (६।१८।१०) । "सत्यसत्वन्महते रणाय रथमातिष्ठ तुविनृम्ण भीमम् ।" (६।३१।५) । "यस्तिग्मशृङ्गो वृषभो न भीम एकः कृष्टीश्च्यावयति प्र विश्वाः ।" (७।१९।१) । "भीमो विवेषायुधेभिरेषामपांसि विश्वा नर्याणि विद्वान् । इन्द्रः पुरो जर्हृषाणो वि दूधोद्वि वज्रहस्तो महिना जघान ।" (७।२१।४) । "न हि त्वा शूर देवा न मर्तासो दित्सन्तम् । भीमं न गां वारयन्ते ॥" (८।८१।३) । "सूरश्चिदा हरितो अस्य रीरमदिन्द्रादा कश्चिद् भयते तवीयसः । भीमस्य वृष्णो जठरादभिश्वसो दिवे दिवे सहुरिः स्तन्नबाधितः ॥" (१०।९२।८) । "आशुः शिशानो वृषभो न भीमो घनाघनः क्षोभणश्चर्षणीनाम् । सङ्क्रन्दनोऽनिमिष एकवीरः शतं सेना अजयत्साकमिन्द्रः ॥" (१०।१०३।१) । इति ।

अस्मन्मतेन तु शाङ्खायनब्राह्मणश्रुतिरेवोदाहृतसर्वश्रुतिषु प्रकृतविषयस्यानुकूलतमा महिम्नःस्तोत्राष्टाविंशपद्यस्थश्रुतिशब्दार्थतया ग्राह्या च पारिशेष्यात्सद्दशतमत्वात् "स एषोऽष्टनामाऽष्टधा विहितो महान् देवः" इति वाक्यशेषेऽष्टनामत्वेन महादेवस्यैव परामर्शाच्च । किञ्चात्रत्यो "महान् देवः" इति पदप्रयोग एव "सहमहान्" इति पदेन महिम्नःस्तोत्रेऽनूदितः । अन्यच्च "शर्वः" इति शाङ्खायनब्राह्मणपाठोऽपि शतपथधृतस्य "सर्वः" इति पाठस्य महिम्नःस्तोत्राद् दवीयस्त्वं स्वस्य च तदपेक्षया नेदीयस्त्वमवगमयति । एवमेव नामक्रमस्यान्यत्र सामान्यतया प्रबलयुक्तित्वाङ्गीकरणायोग्यत्वेऽप्यत्र हेत्वन्तरयोगे विशेषभावमापन्नो महिम्नःस्तोत्रस्य भवादिनामक्रमोऽपि यथा शाङ्खायनब्राह्मणश्रुत्यानुगुण्यं पोषयति न तथा शतपथानुगुण्यम् । वेदवाक्यान्तरेष्वपि भवशर्वौ प्रायशः साहचर्येण नामान्तरापेक्षया चादात्रिवागच्छतो न तु तथा शतपथे । यद्यपि यथा शतपथे तथा शाङ्खायनेऽपि महिम्नःस्तोत्रस्थभीमशब्दस्य स्थानेऽशनिशब्दस्य ग्रहणं कृतं तथापि तेन सह शतपथे प्रयुक्ताद् विद्युच्छब्दाच्छाङ्खायने प्रयुक्त इन्द्रशब्दो भीमशब्दस्य समीपतरः प्रदर्शितप्रकारेणानेकमन्त्रेषु भीमेन्द्रशब्दयोर्विशेषणविशेष्यभावसम्बन्धोपलब्धेः ।

देवान्तरसम्बन्धेन भीमशब्दप्रयोगस्यापेक्षाकृतन्यूनत्वमेव दृश्यते दाशतय्याम् । यथा—अग्निसम्बन्धेन (१।३६।२०) (१।६५।७) (१।७०।६) (१।१४०।६) (६।३।३) (६।६।५) । मरुत्सम्बन्धेन (२।३४।१) (५।५६।२) (५।५६।३) (७।५८।२) सोमसम्बन्धेन (६।६१।३) (६।७०।७) (६।६७।२८) । बृहस्पतिसम्बन्धेन ब्रह्मणस्पतिसम्बन्धेन च (१।१६०।३) (२।२३।३) (१०।१०६।४) । दधिक्रासम्बन्धेन (४।३८।८) । विष्णुसम्बन्धेन (१।१५४।२) रुद्रसम्बन्धेन च (२।३३।११) । इति । एवमथर्ववेदसंहितायामपि भीमशब्दप्रयोग इन्द्रसम्बन्धेन (४।३७।८) (४।३७।६) (७।८४।३) (१६।१३।२) (२०।१५।३) (२०।३७।१) । रुद्रादिसम्बन्धेन च (११।२।१८) (१८।१।४०) इत्यादौ ।

एवमेव शुक्लयजुर्वेदे इन्द्रसम्बन्धेन (१७।८६) (१८।७१) (२१।३६) इत्यादौ । रुद्रादिसम्बन्धेन च (१६।२८) (१६।४०) (१६।४१) इत्यादौ ।

इत्थं सर्वत्रेन्द्रसम्बन्धेनैव भीमशब्दस्य प्रयोगबाहुल्याद्दग्वेदसंहितायां (६।१८।१०)

महिम्नःस्तोत्रषड्विंशपद्यस्थात्मशब्दस्य मूलमपि यथा शाङ्खायनब्राह्मणस्थ इन्द्र-शब्दो न तथा शतपथोक्तो विद्युच्छब्दो भवितुमर्हति "तस्मादिदन्द्रो नामेदन्द्रो ह वै नाम तमिदन्द्रं सन्तमिन्द्र इत्याचक्षते परोक्षेण परोक्षप्रिया इव हि देवाः ।" (२।४।१४) इत्यैतरेयारण्यक आत्मन एवेन्द्रशब्दवाच्यत्वात् अयमिन्द्रपदवाच्य आत्मैवान्यत्र "होता" "सोमयाजी" "मखेशः" "क्षेत्रज्ञः" इत्यादिपदैः परामृष्टः । शाङ्खायनब्राह्मणोक्ता ओषधयो वनस्पतयश्च व्योम-शब्देनान्नं च धरणिशब्देनात्र स्तोत्रेऽभिहितानीत्यपि विद्वद्भिरनुसन्धेयम् ।

इत्थमस्माभिर्महिम्नःस्तोत्रस्थषड्विंशाष्टाविंशपद्ययोर्वेदमूलकत्वं वैशद्येन प्रत्यपादि ।

एवमेव—

त्रयीं तिस्रो वृत्तीस्त्रिभुवनमथो त्रीनपि सुरा-
नकाराद्यैर्वर्णैस्त्रिभिरभिदधत् तीर्णविकृति ।
तुरीयं ते धाम ध्वनिभिरवरुन्धानमणुभिः
समस्तं व्यस्तं त्वां शरणद गृणात्योमिति पदम् ॥ २७ ॥

इत्येतस्य महिम्नःस्तोत्रस्थसप्तविंशपद्यस्य किं श्रौतं मूलमिति जिज्ञासायां श्रीमधुसूदनसरस्वतीकृतस्य "त्रयीं वेदत्रयम् । तिस्रो वृत्तयो जाग्रत्स्वप्नसुषुप्ता-ख्या अन्तःकरणस्यावस्थाः । ००० । त्रिभुवनं भूर्भुवः स्वः । त्रयः सुराः ब्रह्मविष्णु-महेश्वराः । ००० । ००० । एवमत्र प्रकारः, ऋग्वेदो जाग्रदवस्था भूर्लोको ब्रह्मा चेति चतुष्टयमकारार्थः । तथा यजुर्वेद स्वप्नावस्था भुवर्लोको विष्णुश्चेति चतु-ष्टयमुकारार्थः । तथा सामवेदः सुषुप्त्यवस्था स्वर्लोको महेश्वरश्चेति चतुष्टयं मकारार्थः । इदं माण्डूक्यनृसिंहतापनीयाथर्वशिखादावन्यदप्युक्तं गुरूपदेशा-ज्ज्ञातव्यम् । अतिरहस्यत्वान्नेह सविशेषमुच्यते ।" इत्यादिव्याख्यानस्यानु-सारेण माण्डूक्याद्युपनिषद्भ्य एवायमर्थो गृहीत इति प्रतीतिः स्यात् । किन्तु नैतन्मतं समीचीनं भात्यधोनिर्दिष्टकारणकलापसद्भावे ।

त्वशन्यौपम्यस्यापि दृष्टत्वाच्च यदृग्वेदीयशाङ्खायनब्राह्मणे भीमस्थानीयत्वेनाशनीन्द्रनामप्रयोगो दृश्यते तदुचितमेवेति विस्तराद्भिरस्यतेऽस्माभिः ।

माण्डूक्योपनिषदि तावत् सप्तमद्वादशमन्त्रयोर्य ओङ्कारवाच्यश्चतुर्थोऽव्यवहार्यः प्रपञ्चोपशमः शिवोऽद्वैत आत्मेत्युक्तो महिम्नःस्तोत्रे तु तस्यैव तीर्णविकृतितुरीयशिवधामरूपत्वेन समस्तोम्पदवाच्यत्वं स्वीकृतमित्युत्तरार्धपद्यार्थस्योपनिषत्संवादितायाः स्पष्टत्वेऽपि त्रयी-त्रिभुवन-सुरत्रय-पदार्थानामेतस्यामुपनिषद्यनुपलब्धेर्न माण्डूक्योपनिषन्मूलत्वं समस्ति पूर्वार्धपद्यार्थस्य। वृत्तिपदस्य श्रीमधुसूदनकृतं व्याख्यानं तु "स्वप्नवृत्तावपि०" इति "जाग्रद्वृत्तावपि०" इति चैतयोर्गौडपादीयवैतथ्यप्रकरणस्थनवमदशमकारिकयोस्तदर्थीयवृत्तिशब्दप्रयोगदर्शनेन माण्डूक्यागमप्रमाणितमित्यभ्युपेतुं शक्यते।

माण्डूक्योपनिषदाद्यमन्त्रसप्तकविषयावलम्बित्वादेव नृसिंहपूर्वतापनीयचतुर्थोपनिषद्द्वितीयखण्डस्य नृसिंहोत्तरतापनीयप्रथमद्वितीयखण्डयोश्च, नैतन्मूलतापि प्रकृतपद्यपूर्वार्धार्थस्य सम्भवति।

नृसिंहपूर्वतापनीयद्वितीयोपनिषत्प्रथमखण्डे नृसिंहोत्तरतापनीयतृतीयखण्डे च यदपूर्वं [१३]व्याख्यानं प्रणवस्योपलभ्यते तत्र 'तिस्रो वृत्तीः' इतिपदवाच्यानां जाग्रदाद्यवस्थानां न कश्चित्सङ्केतोऽपि दृश्यते। अपि च तत्र ब्रह्मा विष्णू रुद्रश्च न केवलाः किन्तु वसवो रुद्रा आदित्या अपि यथाक्रमं तेषां सहचरत्वेन तत्संयुक्ता उपलभ्यन्ते। अत एव विशिष्टरूपत्वान्नैते प्रकृतपद्योक्तास्त्रयः सुराः। गायत्र्यादिच्छन्दसां गार्हपत्याद्यग्नीनां च प्रस्तावस्तत्र महिम्नःस्तोत्रव्यतिरिक्तविषयः। किञ्च तत्रार्धमात्रारूपसमस्तोङ्कारस्योपव्याख्यानं न प्रपञ्चातीतशिवधाम्नो निदर्शकमपि तु सोमलोकाथर्ववेदसंवर्तकाग्निमरुद्विराडेकर्षिभास्वतीरूपतया चतुर्थवेदचतुर्थलोकचतुर्थदेवप्रदर्शकतया च प्रकृतपद्यार्थस्य सर्वथैव विरुद्धम्।

अतो न नृसिंहतापनीयोपनिषन्मूलकत्वं प्रकृतपद्यपूर्वार्धपदार्थानाम्।

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१३ तस्य ह वै प्रणवस्य या पूर्वा मात्रा पृथिव्यकारः स ऋग्भिरृग्वेदो ब्रह्मा वसवो गायत्री गार्हपत्यः सा साम्नः प्रथमः पादो भवति। द्वितीयान्तरिक्षं स उकारः स यजुर्भिर्यजुर्वेदो विष्णुरुद्रास्त्रिष्टुब्दक्षिणाग्निः सा साम्नो द्वितीयः पादो भवति। तृतीया द्यौः स मकारः स सामभिः सामवेदो रुद्रादित्या जगत्याहवनीयः सा साम्नस्तृतीयः पादो भवति। यावसानेऽस्य चतुर्थ्यर्धमात्रा सा सोमलोक ओङ्कारः सोऽथर्वणैर्मन्त्रैरथर्ववेदः संवर्तकोऽग्निर्मरुतो विराडेकर्षिर्भास्वती स्मृता सा साम्नश्चतुर्थः पादो भवति ॥ १ ॥

एतेनैषामथर्वशिखोपनिषन्मूलत्वमपि प्रत्युक्तं भवति ।

अस्मन्मतेन तु स्तोत्रकृदभिप्रायः प्रस्तुतप्रबन्धान्तभागे वक्ष्यमाणरीत्यापि व्याख्यातुं शक्यते । एवं चैतत्पद्योत्तरार्धप्रतिपादितस्यार्थस्य श्रीमधुसूदनाभिमत-प्रकारेणैव माण्डूक्याद्युपनिषन्मूलतायाः स्वीकर्तव्यत्वेऽपि प्रकृतपद्यपूर्वार्धप्रति-पादितपदार्थानां श्रौतं मूलं त्वन्यत्रैव मृग्यम् ।

तत्र तावच्छान्दोग्योपनिषदो द्वितीयाध्यायत्रयोविंशखण्डे शाङ्खायन-ब्राह्मणस्य षष्ठाध्यायदशमखण्डे शतपथब्राह्मणस्यैकादशकाण्डस्थे पञ्चमाध्याया-ष्टमब्राह्मणे [चतुर्थप्रपाठकद्वितीयब्राह्मणे] ऐतरेयब्राह्मणस्य पञ्चमपञ्चिकाया द्वात्रिंशे खण्डे च प्रकृतपदार्थेषु केचित्केचिदुपलभ्यन्ते । एतच्चाधस्तनोद्धरणपर्यालो-चनेनानुपदमेव स्फुटीभविष्यति—

"प्रजापतिर्लोकानभ्यतपत् तेभ्योऽभितप्तेभ्यस्त्रयी विद्या सम्प्रास्रवत् ताम-भ्यतपत् तस्या अभितप्ताया एतान्यक्षराणि सम्प्रास्रवन्त भूर्भुवःस्वरिति ॥ २ ॥ तान्यभ्यतपत् तेभ्योऽभितप्तेभ्य ओङ्कारः सम्प्रास्रवत् तद्यथा शङ्कुना सर्वाणि पर्णानि सन्तृण्णान्येवमोङ्कारेण सर्वा वाक् सन्तृण्णोङ्कार एवेदँ सर्वमोङ्कार एवेदँ सर्वम् ॥ ३ ॥" इति— (छा०२।२३)

"प्रजापतिस्तपोऽतप्यत स तपस्तप्त्वा प्राणादेवेमं लोकं प्रावृहदपाना-दन्तरिक्षलोकं व्यानादमुं लोकं स एतांस्त्रीँल्लोकानभ्यतप्यत सोऽग्निमेवा-स्माल्लोकादसृजत वायुमन्तरिक्षलोकादादित्यं दिवः स एतानि त्रीणि ज्योतीं-ष्यभ्यतप्यत सोऽग्नेरेवर्चोऽसृजत [14]वायोर्यजूंष्यादित्यात्सामानि स एतां त्रयीं विद्यामभ्यतप्यत स यज्ञमतनुत ००००० स भूरित्यृचां प्रावृहद्भुव इति यजुषां स्वरिति साम्नाम् ०००" इत्यादि—(शाङ्खा० ब्रा० ६ । १०)

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१४ एवमिहान्यत्र च सर्वत्र त्रयोऽप्येतेऽग्निवाय्वादित्याः पृथिव्यन्तरिक्षद्युलोकस्थाना ज्योतिरपरपर्याया देवा एवोक्ता न तु क्वचिदप्यृषयः । अत एवैवञ्जातीयवेदवचनाश्रयेण 'सृष्ट्यादौ चत्वारो वेदा अग्निवाय्वादित्याङ्गिरोनाम्नां चतुर्णामृषीणां हृदयेऽभाविर्भूताः' इत्याधुनि-कार्यसमाजप्रचारितं मतं न समीचीनम् । "तिस्र एव देवता इति नैरुक्ताः । अग्निः पृथिवीस्थानो वायुर्वेन्द्रो वान्तरिक्षस्थानः सूर्यो द्युस्थानः ।" इति "स न मन्येतायमेवाग्निरिति-प्येते उत्तरे ज्योतिषी अग्नी उच्येते । ततो नु मध्यमः । 'समुद्रादूर्मिर्मधुमाँ उदारद्'

"प्रजापतिर्वा इदमग्र आसीत्। एक एव सोऽकामयत स्यां प्रजायेयेति सोऽश्राम्यत्स तपोऽतप्यत तस्माच्छ्रान्तात् तेपानात् त्रयो लोका असृज्यन्त पृथिव्यन्तरिक्षं द्यौः ॥ १ ॥ स इमाँल्लोकानभितताप । तेभ्यस्तप्तेभ्यस्त्रीणि ज्योतीँष्यजायन्ताग्निर्योऽयं पवते सूर्यः ॥ २ ॥ स इमानि त्रीणि ज्योतीँष्यभितताप । तेभ्यस्तप्तेभ्यस्त्रयो वेदा अजायन्ताग्नेर्ऋग्वेदो [14]वायोर्यजुर्वेदः सूर्यात्सामवेदः ॥ ३ ॥ स इमांस्त्रीन्वेदानभितताप । तेभ्यस्तप्तेभ्यस्त्रीणि शुक्राण्यजायन्त भूरित्यृग्वेदाद् भुव इति यजुर्वेदात् स्वरिति सामवेदात् तदृग्वेदेनैव होत्रमकुर्वत यजुर्वेदेनाध्वर्यवँ सामवेदेनोद्गीथं यदेव त्रय्यै विद्यायै शुक्रं तेन ब्रह्मत्वमथोच्चक्राम ॥ ४ ॥" इति—(शत० ब्रा० ११।४।२ [५ । ८])

"प्रजापतिरकामयत । प्रजायेय भूयान्त्स्यामिति । स तपोऽतप्यत स तपस्तप्त्वेमाँल्लोकानसृजत पृथिवीमन्तरिक्षं दिवम् । ताँल्लोकानभ्यतपत् तेभ्योऽभितप्तेभ्यस्त्रीणि ज्योतींष्यजायन्ताग्निरेव पृथिव्या अजायत वायुरन्तरिक्षादादित्यो दिवः । तानि ज्योतींष्यभ्यतपत् तेभ्योऽभितप्तेभ्यस्त्रयो वेदा अजायन्त [14]ऋग्वेद एवाग्नेरजायत यजुर्वेदो वायोः सामवेद आदित्यात् । तान् वेदानभ्यतपत् तेभ्योऽभितप्तेभ्यस्त्रीणि शुक्राण्यजायन्त भूरित्यृग्वेदादजायत भुव इति यजुर्वेदात् स्वरिति सामवेदात् । तानि शुक्राण्यभ्यतपत् तेभ्योऽभितप्तेभ्यस्त्रयो वर्णा अजायन्ताकार उकारो मकार इति । तानेकधा समभरत् तदेतदो३मिति । तस्मादोमिति प्रणौत्योमिति वै स्वर्गो लोक ओमित्यसौ योऽसौ तपति । स प्रजापतिर्यज्ञमतनुत तमाहरत् तेनायजत स ऋचैव

इत्यादित्यमुक्तं मन्यन्ते ।......यस्तु सूक्तं भजते यस्मै हविर्निरुप्यतेऽयमेव सोऽग्निः । निपातमेवैते उत्तरे ज्योतिषी एतेन नामधेयेन भजेते ।" इति च निरुक्तसहभाष्यायोक्ती अप्यत्र सङ्गच्छेते । अपि च "अग्निमीडे पुरोहितं यज्ञस्य देवम्" इति पुरःस्थापितभौमाग्निमधिकृत्य कृतस्यर्ग्वेदप्रारम्भस्य "इषे त्वोर्जे त्वा वायवः स्थ" इति मध्यमस्थानाग्नि(ज्योती)-रूपवायोर्नामग्राहं विहितस्य यजुर्वेदप्रारम्भस्य "अग्न आयाहि वीतये" इति द्युस्थानाग्निरूपादित्याह्वानपूर्वकस्य सामवेदप्रारम्भस्य चेदमेव रहस्यम् । सर्वमेतन्मनसिकृत्य मनुनाप्युक्तम्— "अग्निवायुरविभ्यस्तु त्रयं ब्रह्म सनातनम् । दुदोह यज्ञसिद्ध्यर्थमृग्यजुःसामलक्षणम् ॥" इति । ज्योतिःशब्दस्तु त्रयाणामपि साधारण इत्यलं बहुपल्लवितेन विदुषामग्रे ।

हौत्रमकरोद्यजुषाध्वर्यवं साम्नोद्गीथं यदेतत् त्रय्यै विद्यायै शुक्रं तेन ब्रह्मत्वमकरोत् ०००००” इत्यादि—(ऐत० ब्रा० ५ । ३२)

तदेवमत्र महिम्नःस्तोत्रपद्ये व्यस्तस्योमिति पदस्याकारादिभिस्त्रिभिर्वर्णैर्ये त्रय्यादिपदार्था उच्यन्ते ते तु साकल्येनैतरेयब्राह्मण एवोक्ता प्राह्या येभ्यो यथाक्रममभितप्तेभ्योऽन्तेऽकारोकारमकारेति वर्णत्रयं तत्सम्मेलनरूप ओङ्कारश्च सर्वसाररूपत्वेनाजायेताम् । एवञ्चाकारादिवर्णोत्पत्तिपूर्वभाविन्यः शुक्रापरपर्याया भूर्भुवःस्वरिति तिस्रो महाव्याहृतय एव महिम्नःस्तोत्रोक्तास्तिस्रो वृत्तयः । तत्पूर्वभाविन ऋग्वेदयजुर्वेदसामवेदा एव त्रयीशब्दार्थः । तत्पूर्वभावीन्यग्निवाय्वादित्याख्यानि त्रीणि ज्योतींष्येव देवापरपर्यायास्त्रयः सुराः । तत्पूर्वभाविनश्च पृथिव्यन्तरिक्षद्युलोका एव त्रिभुवनम् । इत्येतत्सर्वमकारोकारमकारेषु व्यस्तरूपस्योङ्कारस्यैवार्थः । सर्वेषां मूलं प्रजापतिस्तु “अनिरुक्तो वै प्रजापतिः” (शत० १४ । २ । ३ [३ । २] । १५) इत्यादिश्रुत्यनुसारेण तीर्णविकृतितुरीयशिवधामरूपः समस्तोम्पदार्थः । इति महिम्नःस्तोत्रसप्तविंशपद्याभिप्रायः स्तोत्रकृदभिमतत्वेन स्वीकर्तुं शक्यते । व्युत्क्रमश्च पदार्थानां नेयश्छन्दोऽनुरोधतः ।

छान्दोग्यादौ न तथा वैशद्यमेतेषां पदार्थानां यथैतरेयब्राह्मणेऽत एव विशेषतस्तु “अकारादिवर्ण”-शब्दसंवादाद्, एकधा तत्सम्भरणरूप-समस्तोम्पदस्य स्वर्गलोकरूप-शिवधामाभिधायकत्वाच्च, प्राधान्यादैतरेयमूलत्वमेवास्य पद्यस्य सिध्यति ।

तदेवमस्माभिः सप्तविंशपद्यस्य वेदमूलता साधिता ।

एवं गवेषितानां महिम्नःस्तोत्रस्थद्वाविंशषड्विंशसप्तविंशाष्टाविंशपद्यमूलभूतवेदवचसामैतरेयब्राह्मणे वा शाङ्खायनब्राह्मणे वैतरेयारण्यके [ऐतरेयोपनिषदि] वोपलब्धेः, इह प्राधान्येनैतेषां ग्रन्थानामुपयोगः स्तोत्रकृता कृत इति, एषां च सर्वेषामृग्वेदान्तर्भूतत्वेनर्ग्वेदे पक्षपातविशेषप्रदर्शनान्महिम्नःस्तोत्ररचयितर्ग्वेदीय इति च, वयमनुमिमीमह इति शिवम् ।

पण्डितरघुवरशास्त्री श्रीवास्तव्याभिधे कुले जातः।
वेदान्त-काव्य-तीर्थं साहित्याचार्यविरुदधरः॥ १॥
श्रीगिरिधारितनूजो योऽध्यापकः प्रयागसुनगरस्थे।
विद्यालये वरिष्ठे गुरुदेवाङ्घ्रिप्रसादेन॥ २॥
वियद्ग्रहाङ्कमृगाङ्केऽब्दे पौषे कृष्णदलदशम्यां सः।
वारे कुजे शिवपरप्रबन्धपूर्तिं व्यधात्सम्यक्॥ ३॥

नमः शशिकलाकोटि-कल्प्यमानाङ्कुरश्रिये।
प्रपन्नजनसङ्कल्प-कल्पवृक्षाय शम्भवे॥



अथैकोद्दिष्टश्राद्धाधिकारनिरूपणम्

महामहोपाध्यायः पं० राजनाथमिश्रः (प्रसिद्धो रजेमिश्रः)

सौराठ-दरभङ्गा (इदानीं स्वर्गीयः)

तत्र कृतसपिण्डनान्तमध्यमक्रियस्यैव पुत्रादेरुत्तरक्रियायामाब्दिकैकोद्दिष्ट-श्राद्धादावधिकारः शास्त्रार्थः, कृतपूर्वक्रियस्यैव मध्यमक्रियायामधिकारवत् । दृष्टान्तेऽपि किं विनिगमकमिति चेदुभयत्र निबन्धव्यवहाराविति गृहाण । यदाहुः—

"दैवादन्येन दाहे कृते पश्चादधिकारिणि चागतेऽपि दाहकर्त्रा पिण्डा देया एव—

असगोत्रः सगोत्रो वा यदि स्त्री यदि वा पुमान् ।
प्रथमेऽहनि यो दद्यात्स दशाहं समापयेत् ॥"—

इत्याश्वलायनस्मृत्या विहितत्वात् । तत्राधिकारिणाऽपि पिण्डा देया एव—

"अकृत्वा प्रेतकार्याणि प्रेतस्य धनहारकः"

इत्यादिस्मृतेः ।

"पितुः पुत्रेण कर्त्तव्याः पिण्डदानोदकक्रियाः"

इत्यादिस्मृतेश्चासङ्कुचितश्रवणात् ।

न च शरीरद्वयापत्तिर्द्वितीयस्यापि प्रथमारब्धशरीरपूरकत्वात् । 'भवतु वा शरीरद्वयं किन्तावते'ति द्वैतपरिशिष्टे केशवमिश्राः । एतदेवाश्वलायनस्मृति-विवरणावसरे "दद्यादग्निं श्राद्धकर्त्ता दाहमकृत्वापि गात्रपूरकपिण्डान् दद्यात्

पूर्वां क्रियां विना मध्यमक्रियात्वस्य षोडशश्राद्धेऽनुपपत्तेः। मध्यमां क्रियां विनोत्तरक्रियात्वस्याब्दिकैकोद्दिष्टपार्वणादावेवेति मे प्रतिभाती"ति गूढार्थदीपिकायां वामदेवोपाध्यायाः।

तथा—

पूर्वाः क्रिया मध्यमाश्च तथा चैवोत्तराः स्मृताः।
त्रिप्रकाराः क्रियाश्चैतास्तासां भेदान् शृणुष्व मे ॥

आ दाहाद्द्वाद्यायुधादिस्पर्शान्ताश्च याः क्रियास्ताः पूर्वाः । मध्यमा मासि मास्येकोद्दिष्टसञ्ज्ञकाः।

"प्रेते पितृत्वमापन्ने सपिण्डीकरणादनु।
क्रियन्ते याः क्रियाः पित्रोः प्रोच्यन्ते ता नृपोत्तराः" ॥

तत्राधिकारविभागमाह—

"पितृमातृसपिण्डैस्तु समानसलिलैस्तथा।
सङ्घातान्तर्गतैर्वापि राज्ञा वा धनहारिणा ॥
पूर्वाः क्रियास्तु कर्तव्याः पुत्राद्यैरेव चोत्तराः।" इत्यादि।

अत्र पितृमातृसपिण्डादयः पूर्वक्रियां कुर्युर्नोत्तराम्। मध्यमक्रियाया-न्त्वेषामनियमः। पुत्राद्या भ्रातृसन्ततिपर्यन्ता एवोत्तरक्रियायामधिकारिण इत्यादि रुद्रधरकृतशुद्धिविवेकप्रदर्शितमध्यमत्वोत्तरत्वयोरनुपपत्तिर्गूढार्थदीपिकायां प्रदर्शिता। अत्रेदमवधेयम्—कृतमध्यमक्रियत्वव्यतिरेकिण औरसपुत्रा आब्दिकैको-द्दिष्टमाचरन्तीति नियमभङ्गप्रसङ्ग इति चेत्—न।

"बहवः स्युर्यदा पुत्राः पितुरेकत्र वासिनः।
सर्वेषान्तु मतं कृत्वा ज्येष्ठेनैकेन यत्कृतम् ॥
द्रव्येण चाविभक्तेन सर्वैरेव कृतम्भवेत्" ॥

इति च मरीचिवचनेनानुमतिद्रव्यादिदानेन च सर्वेषामेव पुत्राणां सपिण्डी-करणान्तक्रियाकर्तृत्वसम्पत्तेः। अत एव पौत्रप्रपौत्रपतिपत्नीसोदराद्यधिकारिभिरकृत-सपिण्डीकरणैराब्दिकन्न क्रियते। शिष्टाचारोऽप्येवमेव। न च भ्रातृपुत्रसपत्नीपुत्रयोः

पुत्रत्वाविशेषादधिकारोऽस्त्विति वाच्यम्, तयोः पुत्रत्वे प्रमाणाभावात्। न च वचनबजाद्दातिदेशिकन्तदिति वाच्यम्, तस्याप्यभावात्। तथा हि

"भ्रातुर्भ्राता स्वयञ्चके तद्भार्या चेन्न विद्यते।
तस्य भ्रातृसुतश्चक्रे यस्य नास्ति सहोदरः॥"

इति स्मृतेः। सहोदराभावे भ्रातृपुत्रस्याधिकारबोधनात्।

"बहूनामेकजातानामेकश्चेत्पुत्रवान् भवेत्।
सर्वे तेनैव पुत्रेण पुत्रिणो मनुरब्रवीत्"॥

इति मनुवचनं पितृव्याणां पुत्रित्वातिदेशकं न तु भ्रातृपुत्रस्य पुत्रत्वातिदेशकमिति व्यक्तमेव प्रतीयते। अन्यथा पुत्रत्वाद्भ्रातृपुत्रस्यैवाधिकारः स्यात्। यावद्वचनं हि वाचनिकमिति न्यायाच्च। भ्रातृपुत्रस्य पुत्रत्वातिदेशकञ्च मनुवचनमित्यवसीयते। एवञ्चैतत्तुल्यन्यायतया

"बह्वीनामेकपत्नीनामेका चेत्पुत्रिणी भवेत्।
सर्वास्तेनैव पुत्रेण पुत्रिण्यो मनुरब्रवीत्॥"

इत्यतिदेशेऽपि सत्यपि सपत्नीपुत्रे पत्युरधिकारः। न चैवं पुत्रित्वातिदेशे किं फलमिति वाच्यम्, पितृव्ये पुन्नामनरकाप्राप्तिरूपस्य सपत्नीमातरि सपिण्डनसम्भवस्य च फलस्य विद्यमानत्वादिति शुद्धिविवेके रुद्रधरोपाध्यायाः। एवमेव वाचस्पतिमिश्राः पुत्रित्वातिदेशफलं कृत्रिमपुत्रान्तराकरणमपीति विशेषोऽपीत्याहुः। हन्तैवं पतिसत्त्वेऽपि सपत्नीपुत्रस्याधिकारो व्यवहारगोचरः कथमुपपद्यतामिति चेदागमाचार्यदेवनाथमतेनेत्यवधेहि। तथा हि—स्त्रीणां श्राद्धादौ पुत्राभावे सपत्नीपुत्रस्य तदभावे पत्युरधिकारः। "बह्वीना" मित्यादिना पुत्रत्वातिदेशात् पुत्रसत्त्वे चान्येषामनधिकारात्।

ननु सपत्नीपुत्रे पुत्रत्वमातिदिश्यते तथाऽश्रवणात्। किन्तु सपत्नीमातरि पुत्रिणीत्वन्तत्फलं सपिण्डनमेवेति चेत्—न। "तेन पुत्रेणे"ति तस्य पुत्रत्वातिदेशात्पुत्रिणीत्वस्यानुवादकत्वात्। पुत्रत्वातिदेशतत्सम्बन्धस्य प्रमाणान्तरगोचरत्वात्। न च विनिगमकाभावः पुत्रत्वातिदेशे लाघवस्यैव विनिगमकत्वात्।

वस्तुतस्तु पुत्रत्वातिदेशेऽपि तत्सम्बन्धो न संयोगादिलक्षणोऽपि तु विशेषः कश्चिद्वक्तव्यः। स च न प्रमाणान्तरवेद्य इति तदर्थं शास्त्रारम्भः स्यादित्यलं विस्तरेणेति स्मृतिकौमुदी। यद्यप्येतन्मतं सुश्लिष्टकृता केशवमिश्रेण "स्वीयेन धनेन धनी" त्यत्र द्वाभ्यामपि धनशब्दाभ्यामेकस्मिन्नपि धनेऽभिहिते तद्धनसम्बन्धो वाक्यार्थस्तथा तेन पुत्रेण पुत्रिण्य इत्यत्रापि द्वाभ्यां पुत्रपदाभ्यामुपस्थापितस्य सपत्नीपुत्रस्य जनकत्वलक्षणः सम्बन्धो वाच्यतार्हः। स च तदजनन्यां सपत्नीमातरि बाधित इति सूक्तं वाचस्पतिमिश्रेण पुत्रिणीत्वातिदेशोऽयमित्यन्तेन तिरस्कृतन्तथाऽपि शिष्टाचारानुगृहीतमित्यास्तान्तावत्।

हरिनाथरुद्रधरवाचस्पत्यादिमते सपत्नीमातरि पुत्रिणीत्वातिदेशः देवनाथमते सपत्नीपुत्रे पुत्रत्वातिदेश इति। एतस्मिन्नपि मते पुत्रत्वाभाववति पुत्रत्वारोप एव पुत्रत्वातिदेशस्तथा च सपत्नीपुत्रे पुत्रपदशक्यतावच्छेदकपुत्रत्वाभावान्निरुपाधिपुत्रपदावाच्यतया

"बहवः स्युर्यदा पुत्राः पितुरेकत्र वासिनः"
"पितुः पुत्रेण कर्तव्या"

इत्यादिवचनस्थपुत्रपदेनाग्रहणम्। अत एव सपत्नीपुत्रे वस्तुतः पुत्रत्वासम्भवादिति द्वैतनिर्णयः सङ्गच्छते। न च पुन्नामनरकत्राणकर्तृपुंस्त्वमेव पुत्रपदशक्यतावच्छेदकन्तस्य सपत्नीपुत्रे सत्त्वात्कथन्न पुत्रपदग्राह्यतेति चेत्—न।

"आज्यं विना यथा तैलं सद्भिः प्रतिनिधीकृतम्।
तथैकादश पुत्राः स्युः पुत्रिकौरसयोर्विना॥" इति

तथा

"क्षेत्रजादीन् सुतानेतानेकादश यथोदितान्।
पुत्रप्रतिनिधीनाहुः क्रियालोपान्मनीषिणः॥"

इत्याभ्यामेकादशानां प्रतिनिधित्वं दर्शितम्। प्रतिनिधित्वञ्च यवगोधूमयोरिव तत्सदृशत्वे सत्येव तत्कार्यकारित्वम्। तथा च औरसपुत्रिकापुत्रान्यतरत्वं पुत्रपदशक्यतावच्छेदकं तस्य सपत्नीपुत्रेऽसत्त्वात्। मतान्तरेऽपि त्रयोदशान्यतमत्वे सति पुन्नामनरकत्राणकर्तृपुरुषत्वमेव पुत्रपदशक्यतावच्छेदकम्। अत एव

"पुत्रान् द्वादश यानाह मनुः स्वायम्भुवो नृणाम् ।
सन्तानकारिणौ तेषामौरसः पुत्रिका तथा ॥"

"पुत्रास्तु द्वादश प्रोक्ता मनुना येन पूर्वशः ।"

तथा "पारशवस्त्रयोदश" इत्यादौ सर्वत्र तेषां सर्वेषामपि पुत्रत्वेन निर्देशः सङ्गच्छते । तदन्यतमत्वाभावान्न सपत्नीपुत्रे पुत्रत्वमिति सिद्धम् । अत एव पुत्रिणीत्वस्य पुत्रत्वस्य वातिदेशविधायकं शास्त्रञ्चरितार्थम् । तद्धर्माभाववति तद्धर्मारोपस्यैवातिदेशपदार्थत्वात् । एवञ्च सुष्ठु व्यवस्थापितम्—अकृतमध्यमक्रियस्य सपत्नीपुत्रस्य भ्रातृपुत्रस्य च नोत्तरक्रियायामधिकारस्तयोर्निरुपाधिपुत्रशब्दावाच्यतया त्रयोदशान्यतमपुत्रेण कृते मध्यमकर्मणि तत्कृतत्वाभावादौरसादिष्वेकेनापि ज्येष्ठेन कृतेऽनुमतिधनदानादिना सर्वानुजकृतत्वात्सर्वेषामनुजौरसानामुत्तरक्रियायामाब्दिकैकोद्दिष्टपार्वणादावधिकार इति च । अकृतसपिण्डनान्तमध्यमक्रियस्य कस्यापि नोत्तरक्रियायामधिकार इति च ॥

योगपदार्थविचारः ।

(पं० श्रीरविनाथझा, मुजफ्फरपुरम्)

अथ महर्षिर्भगवान् पतञ्जलिः कापिलनयसिद्धान् पदार्थानभ्युपगम्यैव तदितरमपीश्वराऽऽख्यं तत्त्वमभ्युपजगाम । सांख्यप्रतिपादिततत्त्वानां योगेऽप्यभ्युपगन्तव्यतया तयोरैक्येन तदुत्तरं योगाऽनुशासनं प्रादर्शयन् ।

ननु योगस्तावन्निदिध्यासनायैव प्रवर्त्तते । निदिध्यासनं नाम नितरां ध्यातुं-चिन्तितु-मेषण-मिच्छा, न च तदन्तरेण मननं सम्भवति, तस्मान्मननात्मकं वेदान्तविषयं प्रतिपाद्यैव योगाऽनुशासनं वक्तव्यमितिचेन्न सांख्य-वैशिषक-न्याय-सिद्धपदार्थेभ्य इतरेषामपि मननविधानान्न नियमेन तदन्तरं वक्तुं साम्प्रतम् । अयञ्च पादचतुष्टयाऽऽत्मकं योगशास्त्रं विरचयामास ।

तत्र प्रथमे पादे चित्तवृत्तिनिरोधात्मकं योगमुपदिदेश । स च सम्प्रज्ञाताऽसम्प्रज्ञातभेदाद् द्विविधः । सम्यक्—संशयविपर्य्ययराहित्येन—प्रज्ञायते साक्षात् क्रियते ध्येयं वस्तु यस्मिन् स सम्प्रज्ञातः । योऽभ्यासवैराग्यादिसाधनाऽनुष्ठानेन प्रमाणादिसर्ववृत्तिनिरोधाद्विशुद्धसत्त्वप्रधानस्य चेतसो ध्येयमात्रैकगोचरः सात्त्विकपरिमाणलक्षणोऽवस्थाविशेषः स सम्प्रज्ञात इति यावत् । परवैराग्येण चाऽभ्यस्यमानेन तस्या अपि निरोधे यश्चित्तस्य निर्वासनस्य सतो भर्जितचणकवत्कार्य्यजननाक्षमतया स्वकारणे संस्कारमात्राऽवशेषेणाऽवस्थानलक्षणोऽवस्थाविशेषः सोऽसम्प्रज्ञातः । तदवोचन् 'मनसो वृत्तिशून्यस्य ब्रह्माऽऽकारतया स्थितिः । असम्प्रज्ञातनामाऽसौ समाधिरभिधीयते ॥' इति । तत्राऽऽद्यो द्विविध उपायप्रत्यय-भवप्रत्यय-भेदात् । तत्रोपायप्रत्ययो योगिनाम् । तदवोचन्-'श्रद्धा-वीर्य्यस्मृतिसमाधिपूर्वक इतरेषाम्' इति । 'भवप्रत्ययो विदेहप्रकृतिलया-

नाम्' इति च। भूतेन्द्रियाणामन्यतममात्मत्वेनाऽभिमत्य तदुपासनया शरीरत्यागाऽनन्तरमिन्द्रियेषु वा भूतेषु वा लीना संस्कारमात्राऽवशेषमनसो विगतस्थूलदेहाः विदेहाः। अव्यक्तमहदहङ्कारपञ्चतन्मात्राणामन्यतममात्मत्वेनाऽभिमत्य तदुपासनया शरीरत्यागाऽनन्तरमव्यक्तादीनामेवान्यतमस्मिन् लीनाः संस्कारमात्राऽवशेषमनसः प्रकृतिलयाः। तदवोचत् 'दश मन्वन्तराणीह तिष्ठन्तीन्द्रियचिन्तकाः। भौतिकाश्च शतं पूर्णं सहस्रं त्वाभिमानिकाः॥ बौद्धा दश सहस्राणि तिष्ठन्ति विगतज्वराः। पूर्णशतसहस्रन्तु तिष्ठन्त्यव्यक्तचिन्तकाः॥ निर्गुणं पुरुषं प्राप्य कालसंख्या न विद्यते।' इति।

ननु चित्तस्य कति वृत्तयः सन्ति या निरोद्धव्याः। उच्यते। प्रमाण-विपर्य्यय-विकल्प-निद्रा-स्मृति-भेदात् पञ्च। तत्र प्रमाणानि प्रत्यक्षाऽनुमानाऽऽगमरूपाणि। इन्द्रियद्वारा बाह्यवस्तुनि चेतस उपरागादुपरक्तबाह्यवस्तुविषया सामान्यविशेषात्मनोऽर्थस्य विशेषाऽवधारणप्रधाना वृत्तिः प्रत्यक्षम्। तुल्यजातीयेष्वनुवृत्तो भिन्नजातीयेभ्यो व्यावृत्तो योऽनुमेयस्य सम्बन्धस्तद्विषया सामान्यावधारणप्रधाना वृत्तिः अनुमानम्। परस्मिन् बोधसंक्रान्तये भ्रम-प्रमाद-विप्रलिप्सा-करणाऽपाटवादि-दोषरहितेन पुरुषेण शब्देन दृष्टोऽनुमितो वाऽर्थ उपदिश्यते शब्दात्तदर्थविषया वृत्तिः श्रोतुरागमः। विपर्य्ययो मिथ्याज्ञानम्। विकल्पः—शब्दज्ञानाऽनुपाती वस्तुशून्यः प्रत्ययः। निद्रा जाग्रत्स्वप्नवृत्तीनामभावकारणविषया वृत्तिः। स्मृतिश्च अनुभूतविषयाऽनपहरणविषया वृत्तिः। एतासां चित्तवृत्तीनामभ्यासवैराग्याभ्यां निरोधः। तदवोचत् 'असंशयं महाबाहो मनो दुर्निग्रहं चलम्। अभ्यासेन तु कौन्तेय वैराग्येण च गृह्यते॥' इति। तत्र राजसतामसवृत्तिरहितस्य हर्षशोकादितरङ्गरहिता एकाग्रवृत्तिधाराऽभ्यासः। वैराग्यं द्विविधम्। अपर-पर-भेदात्। तत्राऽप्यपरं चतुर्विधं यतमानव्यतिरेकैकेन्द्रियवशीकारभेदात्। बहिर्विषयेन्द्रियप्रवृत्तिहेतुरागादिमलपरिपाकार्थं मैत्र्यादिभावनाऽऽरम्भो यतमानसंज्ञा। मैत्र्यादिभावनाऽऽरम्भे सति केचन मलाः पक्वाः केचित्पक्ष्यन्ते। तत्र पक्ष्यमाणेभ्यः पक्वानां व्यतिरेकावधारणं व्यतिरेकसंज्ञा। इन्द्रियप्रवर्त्तनाऽसमर्थतया पक्वानामौत्सुक्यमात्रेण चेतसि व्यवस्थानमेकेन्द्रियसंज्ञा। औत्सुक्यस्यापि निवृत्तिः—उपस्थितेष्वपि दिव्याऽदिव्यविषयेषूपेक्षाबुद्धिरिति यावत्—वशीकारसंज्ञा। अपरवैराग्यजन्यपुरुषदर्शनाऽभ्यासेन समाप्तपुरुषार्थमतिको गुणात्मिकायां सत्त्वपुरुषान्यताख्यातावपि विरक्तो

भूत्वाऽवतिष्ठमानस्याऽसम्प्रज्ञातस्थस्य परवैराग्यम् । तद्वोचत् 'तत्परं पुरुषख्यातेर्गुणवैतृष्ण्यम्' इति । ते च योगिनो नवधा मृदूपायमृदुसंवेग-मृदूपायमध्यसंवेग-मृदूपायाऽधिमात्रसंवेग-मध्योपायमृदुसंवेग-मध्योपायमध्यसंवेग-मध्योपायाऽधिमात्रसंवेगा-ऽधिमात्रोपायमृदुसंवेगा-ऽधिमात्रोपायमध्यसंवेगा-ऽधिमात्रोपायाऽधिमात्रसंवेग-भेदात् । तेषां नवविधानां योगिनां मध्येऽधिमात्रोपाय-तीव्रसंवेगानामासन्नः समाधिस्तत्फलं च भवति । मृदु-मध्या-धिमात्र-भेदेन तेषामपि त्रैविध्यादन्तिमस्याऽऽसन्नतमः समाधिर्भवति तत्फलमपि । तद्वोचत् 'विनिष्पन्नसमाधिस्तु मुक्तिं तत्रैव जन्मनि' इति । लभते इति शेषः ।

ननु कश्चिदन्योऽप्युपाय समाधिलाभस्य न वा । उच्यते 'ईश्वरे भक्तिविशेषात्' । ननु कोऽयमीश्वरः । क्लेशकर्म्मविपाकाशयैरपरामृष्टः पुरुष-विशेष एव । तत्र क्लेशा अविद्याऽस्मितारागद्वेषाभिनिवेशाख्या एत्र । तत्राऽविद्या नाम अनित्येषु पृथिव्यादिषु नित्यख्यातिः अशुचौ शरीरे वा शुचिख्यातिः । तद्वोचत् 'स्थानाद् बीजादुपष्टम्भान्निष्यन्दान्निधनादपि । कायमाधेयशौचत्वात्पण्डिता ह्यशुचिं विदुः ॥' इति । दुःखे जगद्रूपे वा सुखख्यातिः । अनात्मनि भोगाऽधिष्ठाने देहे पुरुषोपकरणे वा मनसि आत्मख्यातिः । तद्वोचत् 'अनात्मन्यात्मविज्ञान-मसतः सत्स्वरूपता । सुखाऽभावे तथा सौख्यं माया विद्याविनाशिनी ॥' इति । अस्मिता नाम भोक्तृभोग्यशक्त्योरत्यन्तविभक्तयोः स्वरूपतो धर्म्मतश्चात्यन्त-मेकाकारः । रागो नाम सुखाऽभिज्ञस्य सुखाऽनुस्मरणपूर्वकं सुखे तत्साधने वा तृष्णा । द्वेषो नाम दुःखाऽभिज्ञस्य दुःखाऽनुस्मरणपूर्वकं दुःखे तत्साधने वा जिघांसा । अभिनिवेशो नाम यथाऽविदुषां नैसर्गिको मरणत्रासस्तथा श्रुताऽन्वितविवेकिनामपि स्वाभाविको मरणत्रासः । कर्म्माणि धर्म्माधर्माः । क्लेशकर्म्मणोः फलं विपाकः । स च जात्यायुर्भोगाः । तदनुगुणा वासना आशयाः, एतैरस्पृष्टः पुरुषविशेष ईश्वर इत्यर्थः । स चायं चेतनोऽचेतनस्य प्रधानस्याऽधि-ष्ठातृतया जगतो निमित्तकारणम् ।

ननु 'यतो वा इमानि भूतानि जायन्ते' इत्यादिश्रुत्या हीश्वरस्याधि-ष्ठानत्वरूपमुपादानत्वमेवाऽस्ति न निमित्तकारणत्वमितिचेन्न पुरुषाणां विकारित्व-भ्रमनिरासाय तद्वावश्यकत्वम् । पुरुषाऽर्थं प्रधानस्य प्रवृत्तेरभ्युपगमे-नोभयोर्म्महदाद्यखिलसृष्टिकारणत्वं संयोगमात्रेण नोपादानतया । तद्वोचत्

'बुद्ध्यादयो विशेषान्ता अव्यक्तादीश्वरेच्छया। पुरुषाधिष्ठितादेव जज्ञिरे मुनिपुङ्गवाः॥ सत्त्वं रजस्तम इति प्रकृतेरभवन् गुणाः। मया प्रक्षोभ्यमाणाया पुरुषाऽनुमतेन च॥' इति। तत्राऽऽकाशवाय्वनलभूमयः शब्द-स्पर्श-रूप-रस-गन्ध-तन्मात्राणामविशेषाणां विशेषाः। श्रोत्रत्वक्चक्षुर्जिह्वाघ्राणानि बुद्धीन्द्रियाणि। वाक्-पाणिपादपायूपस्थानि कर्म्मेन्द्रियाणि। एकादशं मनः। एतान्यस्मितालक्षणस्याऽविशेषस्य विशेषः। एवमन्योऽप्यूह्यः। प्रक्षोभ्यमाणाया उपचीयमानायाः, अपचीयमानाया वा। अन्योऽपि 'प्रधानपुंसोरजयोर्य्यतः क्षोभः प्रवर्त्तते। नित्ययोर्व्यापिनोश्चैव जगदादौ महात्मनः॥ तत्क्षोभकत्वाद् ब्रह्माण्डसृष्टौ हेतुर्निरञ्जनः। अहेतुरिति सर्वात्मा जायते परमेश्वरः॥' इति च।

नन्वयमीश्वरः केनाहूयते। प्रणवेणेति गृहाण। तदवोचत् 'अदृष्टविग्रहो देवो भावग्राह्यो मनोमयः। तस्योङ्कारः स्मृतो नाम तेनाहूतः प्रसीदति॥' इति। एवञ्च प्रणवाऽर्थं भावयन् प्रत्यूहनिराकारणपूर्वकं तत्स्वरूपं जानाति। ननु के ते प्रत्यूहा ये निराकृता भवन्ति। उच्यन्ते, व्याधि-स्त्यान-संशय-प्रमादाऽऽलस्याऽविरति-भ्रान्तिदर्शनाऽलब्धभूमिकत्वा-नवस्थितत्व-रूपाश्चित्तविक्षेपाः, तेषां च सहभुवो दुःखदौर्म्मनस्याऽङ्गमेजय-श्वास-प्रश्वासाख्याः। ननु कथं चित्तप्रसादो भवेद्यदनन्तरं तं भावयेत्। उच्यते 'मैत्रीकरुणामुदितोपेक्षाणां सुख-दुःख-पुण्या-पुण्य-विषयाणां भावनया, हठयोगेन वा, लक्ष्ययोगेन वा, ब्रह्मयोगेन वा, शिवयोगेन वा, वासनायोगेन वा, ध्यानयोगेन वा। तानेवाहुः— 'प्रच्छर्दनविधारणाभ्याम्' इत्यादिभिः सूत्रैः। यथाऽन्ये तेषां लक्षणान्याहुः 'हकारेण तु सूर्य्योऽसौ ठकारेणेन्दुरुच्यते। सूर्य्याचन्द्रमसोरैक्यं हठ इत्यभिधीयते॥ सूर्य्यचन्द्राख्ययोः प्राणायामयोरैक्यलक्षणः। हठयोगो योगबीजं प्राणायामः प्रकीर्त्तितः॥' इति। 'या हि नासादिदेशेषु दृष्टिः पुंसां स्थिरा भवेत्। स लक्ष्ययोग आख्यातो योगे श्रद्धाकरः परः॥' इति। 'अनाहतस्य शब्दस्य तस्य शब्दस्य यो ध्वनिः। ध्वनेरन्तर्गतं ज्योतिर्ज्योतिरन्तर्गतं मनः॥ तन्मनो विलयं याति तद्विष्णोः परमं पदम्॥' इति। 'अन्तर्लक्ष्या बहिर्दृष्टिर्निमेषोन्मेषवर्जिता। एषा हि शाम्भवी विद्या सर्वतन्त्रेषु गोपिता॥' इति। 'सत्त्वाऽवलम्बनं यत्तद् बीजं चित्तविशोधने भवेत्स वासनायोगो योगाऽन्तरविवर्द्धकः॥' इति। 'विना देशादिबन्धेन वृत्तिर्य्याऽभिमते स्थिता। ध्यानयोगो भवेदेवं चित्तचाञ्चल्यनाशकः॥' इति। एवं सति परमाणुपरममहत्त्वान्तं सर्वमेवार्थं वशीकुरुते समापत्तिं च लभते।

सा च समापत्तिश्चतुर्विधा सवितर्क-निर्वितर्क-सविचार-निर्विचार-भेदात्। शब्दाऽर्थज्ञानानामभेदाऽवभासैर्म्मिश्रा विकल्पविषयीभवदर्थविषयिणी समापत्तिः सवितर्का। शब्दसंकेतस्य स्मृतेरपगमे शब्दज्ञानयोरनुपस्थितत्वादर्थमात्रनिर्भासा घटाद्यर्थमात्रप्रकाशिका स्वकीयग्रहणात्मकरूपशून्येव या समापत्तिः सा निर्वितर्का। देश-काल-कारणानामनुभवैरवच्छिन्नेषु अभिव्यक्त-घटपटादिधर्म्मकेषु सूक्ष्मग्राह्येषु या शब्दादिविकल्पसंकीर्णा समापत्तिः सा सविचारा। देशकाल-कारणानामनुभवैरतीतवर्तमानभविष्यद्भिर्घटपटादिधर्म्मैश्चानवच्छिन्नेषु केवलसूक्ष्मग्राह्येषु या शब्दादिविकल्पशून्या समापत्तिः सा निर्विचारा। निर्विचारायाः समापत्तेर्वैशारद्ये स्वयमेव प्रकृतिपुरुषौ विविनक्ति, परमेश्वरतत्त्वं वा साक्षात्कुरुते न तु तत्साक्षात्काराय पुनर्य्योगाऽपेक्षेति भावः॥

अत्रेदं वक्तव्यं यदि महर्षिणा कपिलेनानभ्युपगतमीश्वराख्यं तत्त्वमभिहितं नैतावताऽस्माकं प्रकृतिसृष्टौ किञ्चिद्धानमापतितं, न हि तेन सृष्टिकर्तृतया तदभ्युपगम्यते, किन्तु समाधिलाभप्रकरणे तदभिधीयते। परमात्मनीश्वरे भक्तिविशेषादपि समाधिः शक्यते लब्धुं नैतावानेव समाधेरुपाय इति तात्पर्य्यम्। ननु प्रधानपुरुषाऽतिरिक्तं तत्त्वं नास्तीत्यभ्युपगम्यते, तत्रेश्वरो न प्रधानं चेतनत्वात्। न वा पुरुषो बन्धमोक्षरहितत्वात्। तदवोचन् 'तत्र यः परमात्मा हि स नित्यं निर्गुणः स्मृतः। कर्म्मात्मा पुरुषो योऽसौ बन्धमोक्षैः स युज्यते॥' इति। तस्मादतिरिक्तं प्रधानपुरुषाभ्यामीश्वरनामकं तत्त्वमभ्युपगन्तुमिष्यत एवेति चेदुच्यते। कस्मिंश्चित्तत्त्वे मनो निधाय तत्त्वान्तरान्मनो निवर्त्तयन् ध्येयं वस्तु लभते नान्यथा। उक्तरूपं हीश्वरं चेतसि चिन्तयन्नर्थान्तरान्मनो निवर्तयन् स्वाभिप्रेतं समाधिं नयते। यदि त्वेतादृशं तत्त्वं नाऽभ्युपगच्छेत् तदा तत्त्वाऽन्तरस्य स्थैर्य्यविरहेण चेतश्चाञ्चल्यात्समाधिमेव न लब्धुं शक्नुयात्। प्रधानादीनां सर्वेषामैकरूप्यविरहेण तादृशे तत्त्वे मनःसन्निवेशेऽपि मनसः स्थैर्य्यमेव न सिध्येत्। प्रणवेन नाम्नाऽऽहूतः स न केनचिदर्थेन संबध्नाति। तस्माद्योगिनो योगसिद्ध्येऽभ्युपगतोऽपीश्वरो न सृष्टिकर्तृतया प्रयोजनवानिति सिद्धम्।

द्वितीयपादे व्युत्थितचेतसामपि योगसिद्धये तपःस्वाध्यायेश्वरप्रणिधानादीनि, पञ्च विपर्य्ययान्, तज्जन्यान् प्रसुप्ततनुविच्छिन्नोदारान्, क्लेशमूलान् जात्यायुर्भोगान्, हेयं दुःखं दृश्यस्वरूपं, द्रष्टृस्वरूपम्, भोगाऽपवर्गौ, योगाङ्गानि यम-

नियमाऽऽसन-प्राणायाम-प्रत्याहार-धारणा-ध्यान-समाधिरूपाणि, तत्स्वरूपाणि चोपदिदेश ।

तृतीयपादे धारणा-ध्यान-समाधीन् निरोधपरिणामसमाधिपरिणामैकाग्रतापरिणामादीन् परिणामत्रयसंयमफलादीनि चोपदिदेश ।

चतुर्थपादे जन्मौषधिमन्त्रतपःसमाधिजादिसिद्ध्यादिप्रदर्शनपूर्वकं कैवल्यमुपदिदेश । अस्य च विशेषतो योगादिप्रदर्शनमेव प्रयोजनमिति संक्षेपेण प्रतिपादितम् ॥

रविनाथझा

धर्म्मसमाजसंस्कृतमहाविद्यालये व्याकरण-प्रधानाध्यापकः,
मुजफ्फरपुरे ।

॥ श्रीः ॥

आरोग्यविषयको निबन्धः ।

(महामहोपाध्यायः पं० श्रीवासुदेवशास्त्री अभ्यङ्करः, पुण्यपत्तनम्)

आरोग्यशास्त्रमिति यज्जगति प्रसिद्धं
तस्य स्वरूपमिह नोद्ध्रियते कथंचित् ।
सूक्ष्मेक्षिकां हृदि निधाय कृतः प्रयत्नः
साफल्यमेतु सुधियामवलोकनेन ॥

नास्ति रोगो यस्यासावरोगः । तस्य भाव आरोग्यम् । रोगराहित्यमिति यावत् । रोगो हि द्विविधः लौकिकः शास्त्रीयश्च । लौकिकप्रमाणसमधिगम्यो लौकिकः । शास्त्रैकसमधिगम्यः शास्त्रीयः । स्थूले देहे जायमानो रोगो लौकिकः, सूक्ष्मे देहे जायमानो रोगः शास्त्रीयः । तत्र सूक्ष्मो देहो न घटपटादिवल्लौकिकप्रमाणगम्यो भवतीत्यतोऽर्थादेव तत्रत्या रोगा अपि न लौकिकप्रमाणगम्या अपि तु शास्त्रैकसमधिगम्या एव भवन्ति ।

अथ कीदृशं तत्सूक्ष्मशरीरं कीदृशाश्च तत्रत्या रोगा भवन्ति । उच्यते–

बुद्धिकर्मेन्द्रियप्राणपञ्चकैर्मनसा धिया ।
शरीरं सप्तदशभिः सूक्ष्मं तल्लिङ्गमुच्यते ॥ (प. द.)

ज्ञानेन्द्रियपञ्चकं कर्मेन्द्रियपञ्चकं प्राणपञ्चकं मनो बुद्धिश्चेत्येवं सप्तदशपदार्थात्मकं सूक्ष्मं शरीरम् । एतदेव च लिङ्गशरीरमित्यप्युच्यते । एते च

सप्तदश पदार्था अतीन्द्रिया इत्यतस्तादृशसप्तदशपदार्थसमुदायात्मकं सूक्ष्मं शरीरमप्यतीन्द्रियं शास्त्रैकसधिगम्यमेव भवति । अतस्तत्रत्या रोगा अपि शास्त्रैकसमधिगम्या एवेत्यतस्ते रोगाः शास्त्रीया इत्युच्यन्ते । ते चावश्यमेव प्रथमतश्चिकित्स्याः परिहार्याश्च भवन्ति । इतरथा हि स्थूले देहे क्रियमाणा रोगचिकित्सा वृथा स्यात् । यथोक्तं तत्त्ववेदिभिः—

यदि दुष्टं भवेत्सूक्ष्मं स्थूले दोषस्य का कथा ।
यद्यदुष्टं भवेत्सूक्ष्मं स्थूले दोषस्य का कथा ॥ इति ।

चर्चाविशेषः कथा । तस्यां कापदगम्योऽधिक्षेपश्च द्विविधः । सत्यामपि तस्यां प्रयोजनानुपलम्भादेकः । असत्यामपि तस्यां प्रयोजनोपलम्भादपरः । यथा हि सप्तधातुमयेऽमुष्मिन्स्थूले देहे आन्तरधातुगते दोषे विद्यमाने तत्रौदासीन्यमवलम्ब्य प्रथमतः केवलं बाह्यधातुगतं दोषं परिहर्तुं प्रयतमाना नैव संदृश्यन्ते भिषग्वराः । यतो रक्ते दोषे विद्यमाने त्वग्दोषो नैवाञ्जनविलेपनादिना परिहर्तुं पार्यते । यतः—

यदि दुष्टं भवेद्रक्तं त्वचि दोषस्य का कथा ।

अत्रेदृशोऽयं त्वचि दोषः, अमुकेन चाञ्जनविलेपनेनायं परिहार्यते इत्येवं त्वग्गतदोषचर्चायां क्रियमाणायां तादृशविलेपने कृतेऽपि च तेन त्वक्सामीचीन्यस्य कार्यस्यासाधनादाक्षेपः, अतः प्रथमतो रक्तगत एव दोषोऽपसारणीयो भवति । दूरीकृते च रक्तगते दोषे

यद्यदुष्टं भवेद्रक्तं त्वचि दोषस्य का कथा ।

तत्रानायासत एव स्वल्पेनैव च यत्नेन त्वग्गतो दोषः परिहर्तुं शक्य इत्यतस्तत्रापि प्रागुक्तप्रकारेण क्रियमाणा त्वग्दोषचर्चानवसरग्रस्तैव भवति । तामन्तरेणापि च कार्यस्य सौलभ्येन साधनात्प्रकारान्तरेणाक्षेपः समुद्भवत्येव । एवं प्रकृतेऽपि ज्ञेयम् । अतः सूक्ष्मो देहो रोगरहितो यथा भवेत्तथा प्रथमतः प्रयतितव्यं प्रेक्षावता । तदर्थं च सूक्ष्मे देहे कीदृशा रोगाः केन च कारणेन प्रादुर्भूताश्च, केनौषधेन परिहृता भवेयुस्तत्सर्वमवश्यवक्तव्यतयात्र समापतितं भवति । अतस्तदुच्यते ।

स्थूले हि देहे समुत्पद्यमानानां रोगविशेषाणां कारणं किं स्यादित्येवं निदानान्वेषणे क्रियमाणे तत्रात्यम्बुपानात्यशनादिकं प्रसिद्धं वैद्यशास्त्रे प्रतिपादितदिशा किंचिन्निश्चीयते। तत्र च रोगनिवृत्त्यर्थमौषधं यत्सेव्यते तदुचितमेव। किंतु निदानतया निश्चितस्यात्यम्बुपानादेर्निवृत्तये पिपासादिनिवृत्त्यमर्थमौषधं सेव्यते चेद्रोगस्य समूलं निवृत्तिः स्यात्। पिपासानिवृत्तिश्च तत्कारणनिवृत्त्यधीनेति तस्यापि पुनः किं निदानमित्यन्वेषणीयं भवति। व्याधेः शत्रोश्च समूलं विनाशः खलु कर्तव्यो भवति। अन्यथा तु विनाशाभास एव। कदा पुनरुत्थानं तस्य स्यादिति नियमाभावात्। तदुक्तम्—

अग्न्यामयसपत्नानामवशेषः सुदुःसहः।
न जाने प्राप्य साहाय्यं कदा स प्रज्वलिष्यति॥ इति।

एवं च तस्य निदानस्यापि पुनर्निदानान्वेषणे

जन्मान्तरकृतं पापं व्याधिरूपेण सेव्यते।

इत्यभियुक्तोक्त्यनुसारेण निदानपरंपरा पातके पर्यवस्यति। पातकान्येव च सूक्ष्मदेहगता रोगा ज्ञेयाः। यथा च लोकप्रसिद्धे वैद्यशास्त्रे—

रोगनाशकपदार्थचिन्तनं दोषकारकपदार्थवर्जनम्।
शक्तिवर्धकपदार्थयोजनं वैद्यकं त्रिविधमुच्यते बुधैः॥

इत्येवंप्रकारेण त्रैविध्यं दृश्यते। तथान्तरसूक्ष्मदेहगतरोगसंबन्धेनापि त्रैविध्यं संदृश्यते। तत्रान्तररोगविनाशकमौषधं च नैमित्तिकं कर्म प्रायश्चित्तरूपेण विधीयमानम्। पथ्यभूतं च कर्मैव नित्यतया विहितम्। शक्तिवर्धकमपि च कर्मैव यत्काम्यमिति विहितम्। तथान्तररोगनिदानमपि च कर्मैव यन्निषिद्धमपि सेव्यते यथा 'न हिंस्यात्सर्वाणि भूतानि' इत्यादि।

यथा हि लौकिका रोगा द्विविधाः साध्या असाध्याश्च, तत्र साध्या अपि द्विविधा यत्नसाध्या अयत्नसाध्याश्चेत्येवं संकलनया 'त्रिविधा भवन्ति तथा शास्त्रीया रोगा अपि त्रिविधा भवन्ति यत्नसाध्या अयत्नसाध्या असाध्याश्चेति।

तत्रोपपातकादयो रोगा यत्नसाध्याः। कण्डणीपेषण्यादिव्यापारेष्वज्ञानतो जायमानक्षुद्रजन्तुविघातात्समुत्पद्यमानानि यानि क्षुद्रपातकानि तद्रूपा रोगा अयत्नसाध्या भवन्ति। अयत्नसाध्या इत्यत्र नञल्पार्थे। यथाऽनुदरी कन्येत्यत्र स्वल्पोदरीत्यर्थस्तथात्राप्यल्पयत्नसाध्या इत्यर्थः। वैश्वदेवमात्रेणैव हि तेषां निवृत्तिर्भवति। पञ्चमहापातकरूपा रोगास्त्वसाध्या इत्युच्यन्ते। एषु च रोगेषु लोके यथा केचिद्रोगविशेषा औषधसेवनेन विनष्टा भवन्ति। केषुचित् रोगविशेषेष्वविनश्यत्स्वौषधसेवनेन केवलं तेभ्यः सकाशाज्जायमाना पोडा परिह्रियते तथा पातकाख्यशास्त्रीयरोगविषयेऽपि द्वैविध्यं दृश्यते। अज्ञानतो जायमानं पातकं प्रायश्चित्तरूपेणौषधेन निवर्तते। ज्ञानतः कृतं तु पातकं प्रायश्चित्तेनापि न निवर्तते। किंन्तु तादृशपातकाज्जायमाना या लोकेष्वव्यवहार्यतारूपा पीडा सा केवलं प्रायश्चित्तेन निवर्तते। तदुक्तम्—

प्रायश्चित्तैरपैत्येनो यदज्ञानकृतं भवेत्।
कामतो व्यवहार्यस्तु वचनादिह जायते॥ (याज्ञ.) इति।

अत्र च बाह्यानां लौकिकानां रोगाणामान्तरशास्त्रीयरोगमूलकत्वाद् बाह्यरोगनिवृत्तिप्रधानप्रसिद्धवैद्यशास्त्रापेक्षया आन्तररोगनिवृत्तिप्रधानं मीमांसाशास्त्रमभ्यर्हितं प्रतिभाति। यथौषधरूपेणोपयुज्यमानं प्रायश्चित्तात्मकं नैमित्तिकं कर्म, तथा पथ्यरूपेणोपयुज्यमानं नित्यं कर्म, तथा स्वोत्कर्षसाधकत्वेन विहितं मानसशक्तिवर्धकं काम्यं च कर्म कस्यामवस्थायां कीदृशेनाधिकारिविशेषेण कथं सेवनीयं तत्सर्वमसंदिग्धं सुस्पष्टमभिहितं सूत्ररूपेण जैमिनिमहर्षिणा। शबरस्वामिप्रभृतिभिश्च तदेव विस्तारं प्रापितं तत्र संभावितानामाक्षेपाणां निरासं चिकीर्षुभिः। तदेव च बालानां सुखप्रतिपत्तये रूपान्तरेण प्रकाशं नीतं श्रीमाधवाचार्यैर्जैमिनीयन्यायमालायाम्। एवं प्रकृतेः स्वास्थ्यमवतिष्ठापयिषूणां जनानां पूर्वमीमांसाशास्त्रमतीवोपयुक्तं दृश्यते।

तथोत्तरमीमांसाशास्त्रमप्युपयुक्ततरमेव। यथा हि लोके भिषग्वरा रुग्णस्य प्रथमतो जठरस्थान्तराशयशोधनं यथायथं पाचकसारकरेचकपदार्थद्वारा संपाद्य तदनन्तरमेवौषधं सेवयन्ते। तत्राशयस्थान्दुष्टानर्थान् रोगवृद्धिकरान्पाचकेन वस्तुना पाचयन्ति। पक्वा एव हि निसर्गतो बहिर्निःसरणयोग्या

भवन्ति । सारकेण वस्तुना च तेषु बहिर्निःसरणयोग्यता शैघ्र्येण संपाद्यते । रेचकेन वस्तुना च ते दुष्टाः पदार्था बहिर्निःसार्यन्ते । एवमन्तराशयं संशोध्य पश्चादौषधं ग्राहयन्ति । उत्तरमीमांसायामप्येवमेव संदृश्यते । तत्र पाचकस्थानीया शमादिसंपत्तिश्चित्तस्थान्कामादीन्मलान्वृद्धिप्रतिबन्धेन क्षयोन्मुखान्करोति । क्षयोन्मुखा एव ह्यर्था बहिर्निःसरणयोग्या भवन्ति । क्षयोन्मुखतैव हि पक्वता । सारकस्थानीयेन नित्यानित्यवस्तुविवेकेन च कामादिषु बहिर्निःसरणयोग्यता शैघ्र्येण संपाद्यते । रेचकस्थानीयेन वैराग्येण च ते कामादयो दुष्टा अर्थाश्चित्ताद्बहिर्निःसार्यन्ते । काम एव हि चित्तदोषेषु प्रधानः । स एव च बहिर्निःसृतश्चेच्छास्त्रीया रोगाः पातकाख्या नैवोद्भवेयुः । अत्यल्पं चेदमुच्यते । रोगस्वरूपोऽप्यरोगवदेव भासमानः संसाररूपो रोगोऽपि चित्तसंशोधनेन विनश्यति । भगद्गीतायां तृतीयाध्याये—

> अथ केन प्रयुक्तोऽयं पापं चरति पूरुषः ।
> अनिच्छन्नपि वार्ष्णेय बलादिव नियोजितः । (गी० ३।३६)

इत्येवमर्जुनेन पापाख्यस्य शास्त्रीयस्य रोगस्य कारणं पृष्टो भगवान्—

> काम एव क्रोध एव रजोगुणसमुद्भवः ।
> महाशनो महापाप्मा विद्ध्येनमिह वैरिणम् ॥ (गी० ३।३७)

इत्येवं शास्त्रीयरोगमूलं काममेवोदाजहार । तथा च काम एव चित्ताद्पसृतेऽर्थादेव चित्तं सर्वथैव स्वाभाविकीं शुद्धिमापद्यते । एवमधिकारिणां चित्तं संशोध्य पश्चात्संसाररोगनिवृत्तये आत्मज्ञानरूपमौषधं ज्ञानिनः सेवयन्ते । एवमन्तरारोग्यकरं मीमांसाशास्त्रं सर्वेषां जनानामतीवोपयुक्तं भवति ।

योगशास्त्रेऽप्यान्तररोगबीजभूतः कामोऽकिंचनकारितां प्रापितः । तत्र हि मनःप्रभृतीन्यशेषाणीन्द्रियाणि प्राणाधीनस्थितिकानीति प्राण एव प्राणायामेन निरुद्धे निगडितानीव तानि स्वव्यापारं कर्तुं नोत्सहन्ते । तथा सति महाबलीयानपि कामः स्वयमसहायः संमर्दितो बलीवर्द इव कार्यजननासमर्थः किमपि कर्तुं न प्रभवति । प्रत्युत 'अतृणे पतितो वह्निः स्वयमेवोपशाम्यति' इतिवत् क्षयोन्मुख एवेति तन्मूलकाः शास्त्रीया रोगा दूरोत्सारिता भवन्ति ।

अन्यान्यपि शास्त्राण्येवमारोग्यकराण्येव भवन्ति। किन्तु केवलमज्ञानादेव तत्र भूयसां जनानामप्रवृत्तिः। तेषां च

यद्यदाचरति श्रेष्ठस्तत्तदेवेतरो जनः।
स यत्प्रमाणं कुरुते लोकस्तदनुवर्तते॥

इत्युक्तरीत्या मीमांसादिशास्त्रेषु प्रवृत्तिं संपादयितुमर्हन्ति महान्तः। अज्ञानिनो हि साधारणजनाः स्वेष्टं साधयितुं साधनविशेषमजानाना महतामाचारे दृष्टिं निक्षिपन्ति। अतो महद्भिरपि मान्यैः स्वार्थसाधनापेक्षया लोकसंग्रहमेव मुख्यतः कर्तव्यमनुसंदधानैर्भवितव्यम्। महतामाचारे दृष्टिं निक्षिपद्भिरज्ञानिभिरपि न केवलं यस्मिन्नाचारविशेषे स्वार्थसाधनप्रतीतिः स्यात्तत्रैव दृष्टिर्विधेया अपि तु स्वार्थसाधनप्रतीतिर्भवतु मा वा भूत् सर्वविध एव महतामाचारस्तैरनुविधेयो भवति। तथा सत्येव तेषां शास्त्रीयरोगबीजं विनश्यदवस्थं भवेत्। एवं सूक्ष्मे देहे निरामये जाते श्रेयःप्राप्तिस्तेषामवश्यं भविष्यतीति शम्॥

निरामयः सूक्ष्मदेहः साधितो यैर्महात्मभिः।
तान्मन्ये धन्यवादार्हान् जनुःसाफल्यमीयुषः॥
निरामयं सूक्ष्मदेहं सिषाधयिषवश्च ये।
नरास्ताननुगृह्णातु सर्वदा परमेश्वरः॥

(पुणे ७-१०-३२) वासुदेवशास्त्री अभ्यंकरः

शब्दब्रह्मवादः ।

(पं० श्रीहाराणचन्द्रभट्टाचार्य्यशास्त्री—काशीस्थराजकीयसंस्कृतमहाविद्यालयाध्यापकः)

गुरोः शिवकुमारस्य चरणेन्दुकरोच्चयः ।
तमस्तोमं हरन् सद्यो हृदयेऽस्य विसर्पतु ॥
परिणामे विवर्त्ते च शब्दब्रह्मविदां स्थितिः ।
आलोच्य विविधान् ग्रन्थान् मयाऽत्र प्रतिपाद्यते ॥

भारतीयदार्शनिकसिद्धान्तेषु संक्षेपतश्चत्वारो वादाः प्रपञ्चिताः—आरम्भवादः संघातवादः परिणामवादो विवर्त्तवादश्चेति* । तत्रारम्भवादो नैयायिकवैशेषिकादीनां परमाणुकारणवादिनाम् । भाट्टमीमांसकास्त्रसरेणुनित्यत्ववादिन इति प्रत्यक्तत्त्वप्रदीपिकायां चित्सुखीतिप्रसिद्धायां द्वितीयपरिच्छेदे मानमेयोदयादौ च प्रतिपादितमतस्तेषामप्यारम्भवादे निर्भरः । आरम्भवादे हि परमाण्वादिद्रव्यमवयवरूपमवयवान्तरेण स्वसदृशेन संयुज्यमानमवयवि द्रव्यान्तरमारभते, स्वावयवाच्चात्यन्तभिन्नमवयवि द्रव्यमभ्युपगम्यते । पार्थिवजलीयतैजसवायवीयभेदाच्चतुर्विधाः परमाणव एव कार्य्यजातस्यावयविरूपस्य मूलभूता इति न्यायवैशेषिकपक्षनिष्कर्षः । तन्त्ररहस्ये "अभ्युपगमसिद्धान्तन्यायेन काणादतन्त्रसिद्ध एव प्रमेयवर्गोऽङ्गीक्रियत" इत्युक्तया परमाणुवादस्य निराकरणादर्शनाच्च प्राभाकरमतेऽपि स्वीकृत आरम्भवादः । भाट्टास्तु परमाणुस्थाने त्रसरेणूनभिषिञ्चन्ति तांश्च परमाणुशब्देन व्यपदिशन्तीति विशेषः । जैनास्तु पुद्गलसंज्ञया परमाणून् व्यपदिशन्तस्तांश्चैकविधानभ्युपगच्छन्ति, पृथिव्यादीनि चत्वारि भूतानि स्थावरं जङ्गमं चेति षट्कं परमाणुभिः पुद्गलशब्दव्यपदेश्यैरारब्धं मन्यमाना आरम्भवादपक्षपातमात्मनः प्रकाशयन्ति ।

* आभासवादोऽपि काश्मीरकप्रत्यभिज्ञामतावलम्बिभिरङ्गीक्रियते । स च वादो निर्दिष्टवादचतुष्टयविलक्षणोऽपि नातिप्रसिद्धः । एतन्मते "चितिः स्वतन्त्रा विश्वसिद्धिहेतुः" "स्वेच्छया स्वभित्तौ विश्वमुन्मीलयति" (प्रत्यभिज्ञाहृदय-सूत्रे); तद् विश्वं वास्तवं, नतु कल्पितम् ।

पार्थिवादिचतुर्विधपरमाणूनां समुदाय एव घटादिः, समुदायश्च प्रत्येकादनतिरिक्तो न वस्त्वन्तरम् इति संघातवादिनां पक्षः। अयं पक्षः पुञ्जवादशब्देनापि व्यपदिश्यते। स चायं सौत्रान्तिकानां वैभाषिकाणां च सर्वास्तित्ववादिनां बौद्धानाम्।

कस्यचिद् वस्तुनः परमार्थरूपस्य सत्या रूपान्तरापत्तिः परिणामः। स एव विकारपदेनापि व्यपदिश्यते। अयं पक्षः प्रकृतेर्जगदुपादानत्वमभ्युपगच्छतां सांख्यपातञ्जलपाशुपतमाध्वनिम्बार्कगौडीयवैष्णवप्रभृतीनाम्, चैतन्यमात्रमुपादानं जगतः प्रतिपादयतां भट्टभास्करपाञ्चरात्रप्रभृतिमतावलम्बिनां वाल्लभानां च वैष्णवानाम्। ये खलु भास्कररायश्रीकण्ठरामानुजप्रभृतयो जडविशिष्टचेतनस्य जगदुपादानत्वं मन्यन्ते, तेऽपि परिणामवादिन एव। साकारविज्ञानवादिनो योगाचारा नीलपीताद्याकारतां विज्ञानस्य क्षणिकस्य स्वाभाविकीं मन्वाना न परिणामपक्षेऽन्तर्भवन्ति, नापि वक्ष्यमाणविवर्त्तपक्षे विज्ञानाकाराणां तैस्तात्त्विकत्वाभ्युपगमात्।

एकस्य वस्तुनोऽबाधितस्याज्ञानसहकारेण विचित्रमिथ्यारूपेण प्रतिभासनं विवर्त्तो रज्ज्वा इव सर्पभावेन। स चायं पक्षो भगवच्छङ्कराचार्य्यानुयायिनाम्, तैरविद्यासहायस्य सत्यस्य ब्रह्मणो जगद्रूपेण मिथ्याप्रतीयमानत्वाभ्युपगमात्; शून्यवादिनां च माध्यमिकनामधेयानां बौद्धानाम्, तेषां नये शून्यस्यैकस्य भ्रान्तिवासनारूपसंवृतिमहिम्ना जगद्रूपेण प्रतीत्यङ्गीकारात्; निराकारविज्ञानवादिनो योगाचारा अपि विवर्त्तवादिनः, तेषां सिद्धान्ते वस्तुत ज्ञातृज्ञेयाकाररहितानामपि क्षणिकविज्ञानानामविद्यावासनावशेन ज्ञातृज्ञेयादिभेदवत्तया विचित्रनानारूपेण प्रत्यवभासस्य स्वीकृतत्वात्।

तदेवं विविक्तेषु वादेषु शब्दब्रह्मविदामग्रेसरो वाक्यपदीयकारो वैयाकरणमहाचार्य्यवर्य्यो भगवान् भर्त्तृहरिः कतमं पक्षमालम्बत इति विमर्शः समुदेति। आद्यं तावत् पक्षद्वयं हरेर्नाभिमतमिति सुस्पष्टमेव, तयोरारम्भसंघातपक्षयोः परमाणूनामुपादानत्वाङ्गीकारात्, हरिणा च परमाणुवादस्यास्पृष्टत्वात्। विवर्त्तपरिणामवादयोस्तु भवति विचारणा।

माधवाचार्य्येण सर्वदर्शनसंग्रहे पाणिनीयदर्शननिरूपणं परिसमाप्य सांख्यदर्शननिरूपणारम्भे—"परिणामवादे परिपन्थिनि जागरूके कथंकारं विवर्त्तवाद आदरणीयो भवेद्" इत्युक्तम्। तेन च विवर्त्तवाद एव शब्दब्रह्मविदां वैयाकरणानां

सम्मत इति ध्वनितम्। तथाच वैयाकरणशिरोमणेर्भर्त्तृहरेरपि विवर्त्तवादे निर्भरः पर्य्यवसितः। एवंच नैवात्र विमर्शावसर इति चेदुच्येत,—तत्रेदमपरेषां समाधानं समुन्मीलति—नैतेन माधवाचार्य्यग्रन्थेन भर्त्तृहरेर्विवर्त्तवादित्वं निश्चेतुं शक्यम्, आचार्य्यवाचस्पतिमिश्रेण न्यायकणिकायाम् (मेडिकाल् हाल् प्रेस—२९३ पृ०)—"ये पुनरभिन्नस्य शब्दब्रह्मणो विवर्त्तं वा परिणामं वाऽर्थमाचक्षते" इत्युक्तवता शब्दब्रह्मवादिनां परिणामवादित्वस्यापि सूचनेन वैयाकरणानामेकान्तेन विवर्त्तवादित्वस्यानवधारणात्।

"शब्दस्य परिणामोऽयमित्याम्नायविदो विदुः।"

इति वाक्यपदीयम् (१।१२१) अपि परिणामवादसूचकं निरुक्तार्थे साहायकमाचरति।

अनादिनिधनं ब्रह्म शब्दतत्त्वं यदक्षरम्।
विवर्त्ततेऽर्थभावेन प्रक्रिया जगतो यतः॥ (वाक्यपदीये १।१)

इति पद्ये 'विवर्त्तते' इतिपदप्रयोगेण भर्त्तृहरेर्विवर्त्तवादित्वं नात्रधारयितुं युक्तम्—

श्रीलक्ष्मीरमणं नौमि गौरीरमणरूपिणम्।
स्फोटरूपं यतः सर्वं जगदेतद्विवर्त्तते॥

इति वैयाकरणभूषणसारीयमङ्गलश्लोकस्थस्य 'विवर्त्तते' इति पदस्य "दर्पणे" 'उत्पद्यते' इति व्याख्यानदर्शनात्तद्रीत्या "अनादिनिधनं ब्रह्म"त्यत्रापि 'विवर्त्तते' इति पदस्य 'उत्पद्यते' इति व्याख्यानसम्भवात्। एवं च 'विवर्त्तते' इति शब्दमात्रदर्शनेन अतत्त्वतोऽन्यथाप्रतीतिरूपस्य विवर्त्तस्य भर्त्तृहरिसम्मतत्वं प्रतिज्ञातुमशक्यम्। आचार्य्यशङ्करभगवानपि रचनानुपपत्त्यधिकरणे (२।२।१) पूर्वपक्षे सांख्यसिद्धान्तमुपपादयन् "त्रिगुणं प्रधानं मृद्वदचेतनं चेतनस्य पुरुषस्यार्थं साधयितुं स्वभावेनैव विचित्रेण विकारात्मना विवर्त्तते" इति परिणामतात्पर्य्येण 'विवर्त्तते' इति पदं प्रयुञ्जानो व्युपसर्गपूर्ववृतधातोः परिणामवाचकत्वमपि सूचयांबभूव। तस्माद् 'विवर्त्तते' इति शब्दमात्रदर्शनेन भर्त्तृहरेर्विवर्त्तवादित्वं साधयितुमशक्यम्।

नालन्दाविश्वविद्यालयमहास्थविरेण बौद्धदार्शनिकानां प्रवरेण शान्तरक्षितेन स्वोपज्ञे "तत्त्वसंग्रहे" शब्दब्रह्मवादिमतं द्विधोपपादितम्—तत्र तावत्परिणामवादमभिप्रेत्यादौ शब्दब्रह्मवादिनां सिद्धान्तः प्रादर्शि—

नाशोत्पादासमालीढं ब्रह्म शब्दमयं परम्।
यत्तस्य परिणामोऽयं भावग्रामः प्रतीयते॥ (तत्त्वसंग्रहे १२८)

व्याख्यातं चैतत्कमलशीलेन तत्त्वसंग्रहपञ्जिकायाम्—"पूर्वापरादिविभागरहितमनुत्पन्नमविनाशि यच्छब्दमयं ब्रह्म तस्यायं रूपादिर्भावग्रामः परिणामः प्रतीयते। यथोक्तम्—

अनादिनिधनं ब्रह्म शब्दतत्त्वं यदक्षरम्।
विवर्त्ततेऽर्थभावेन प्रक्रिया जगतो यतः॥ इति।

तत्र आदिः=उत्पादः, निधनं=नाशः—तदभावादनादिनिधनम्। अक्षरमिति। अकाराद्यक्षरस्य निमित्तत्वात्। एतेनाभिधानरूपेण विवर्त्तो दर्शितः। अर्थभावेनेत्यादिना पुनरभिधेयविवर्त्तः। प्रक्रियेति भेदाः। ब्रह्मेति नामसङ्कीर्त्तनम्। अस्यैव श्लोकस्यार्थं निर्दिशति—नाशोत्पादासमालीढमिति।"

तथा च "अनादिनिधनं ब्रह्मे"ति वाक्यपदीयाद्यपद्यस्य परिणामवादे तात्पर्य्यमाश्रित्य शब्दब्रह्मविदां मतमुपदर्शितम्। इत उत्तरमत्रैव शब्दब्रह्मपरीक्षाप्रस्तावे विवर्त्तवादपक्षाभिप्रायेणापि शब्दब्रह्मवादिनां मतमुपदर्शयता वैयाकरणानां विवर्त्तवादपक्षाश्रयणमपि सूचितम्—

"अथाविभागमेवेदं ब्रह्मतत्त्वं सदा स्थितम्।
अविद्योपप्लवाल्लोको विचित्रं त्वभिमन्यते॥" (तत्त्वसंग्रहे १४४)

व्याख्या चात्र कमलशीलप्रणीता दृश्यते

"अथापि स्यादविभक्तमेव सदा ब्रह्मात्मकं तत्त्वमविकारि परमार्थतोऽवस्थितम्। न तस्य परमार्थेन परिणामः, किन्त्वविद्यातिमिरोपहतबुद्धिलोचना नीलादिभेदेन विचित्रमिव मन्यन्ते। यथोक्तम्—

यथा विशुद्धमाकाशं तिमिरोपप्लुतो जनः।
संकीर्णमिव मात्राभिश्चित्राभिरभिमन्यते॥
तथेदममृतं ब्रह्म निर्विकारमविद्यया।
कलुषत्वमिवापन्नं भेदरूपं विवर्त्तते॥ इति"

एतेन ग्रन्थेन शब्दब्रह्मवादिनां विवर्त्तवादपक्षावलम्बित्वं सुष्ठु प्रतीयते। अन्यच्चात्र द्रष्टव्यम्—तत्त्वसंग्रहे नान्ये केऽपि विवर्त्तवादितयोपन्यस्ता अन्तरेण शब्दब्रह्मविदो वैयाकरणान्।

श्रीमृगेन्द्रागमवृत्तौ परमोत्तनिरासप्रक्रमे काश्मीरकभट्टनारायणकण्ठेन वेदान्तसिद्धान्तमुपक्षिपता भगवान् भर्त्तृहरिरेव विवर्त्तवादीति प्रादर्शि; "यथा विशुद्धमाकाशम्" इति पूर्वोक्तं कारिकाद्वयं भर्त्तृहरिप्रणीतमित्यभ्यधायि। तथाहि—

"वेदान्तेष्वेक एवात्मा चिदचिद्व्यक्तिलक्षितः।" (श्रीमृगेन्द्रागमे ११३) इतीदं सूत्रं वृत्तिकृता नारायणकण्ठेनेत्थं व्याख्यातम्—" 'आत्मैवेदं जगत्सर्वं नेह नानास्ति किञ्चन।' तथा 'एको वशी सर्वभूतान्तरात्मा एकं विश्वं बहुधा यः करोती'त्यादिश्रुतिभिः परमात्मैव सकलचिदचिद्भावाविर्भावतिरोभावप्रकृतिभूतः परिपूर्णषाड्गुण्यवैभवः स्वतन्त्र एकोऽपि सन् संसरति। तत्तद्विविधमनोलक्षणोपाधिभेदस्वभावान्तरानुविधायी यथावदवगतोऽभ्युदयाय भवतीति वेदान्तविदः प्रतिपन्नाः। स एव हि सत्त्वात्मन्युपाधौ शान्त इव रजोबहुले तु रागवानिवाज्ञानात्मके तु तमसि मुग्ध इवास्ते। न तु ततोऽन्यत्पृथक् किञ्चिदवतिष्ठते। तस्यैव तथा तथा वैचित्र्येणावस्थितेरसत्यत्वाद् द्वैतप्रतिभासस्य द्विचन्द्रादिज्ञानवद् भ्रान्तत्वान्। तथा चाह तत्रभवान् भर्त्तृहरिः—

यथा विशुद्धमाकाशं तिमिरोपप्लुतो जनः।
संकीर्णमिव मात्राभिश्चित्राभिरभिमन्यते॥
तथेदममृतं ब्रह्म निर्विकारमविद्यया।
कलुषत्वमिवापन्नं भेदरूपे प्रवर्त्तते॥ *

एवं चाभिन्नमेवेदं परं ब्रह्म परमात्मलक्षणम्, मनसां हि संसारधर्म्मैः सुखदुःखादिभिर्योगः। परमात्मा तु सूर्य्य इवाम्भःप्रतिबिम्बभेदैरुपाधिभिरभिन्नोऽपि भिन्न इव प्रतिभाति। तथा च श्रुतिः 'यथायं ज्योतिरात्मा विवस्वानपो भिन्ना वाऽथ एकोऽनुगच्छन्। उपाधिना क्रियते भेदरूपो देवः क्षेत्रेष्वेवमजत आत्मे'ति।" इति।

*अत्र "कलुषत्वमिवापन्नं भेदरूपं विवर्त्ततः" इति पाठान्तरं तत्त्वसंग्रहपञ्जिकायामिति पूर्वं दर्शितम्।

**ब्रह्मसूत्रशाङ्करभाष्ये (३।२।१८) पाठान्तरमस्याः श्रुतेर्दृश्यते—
"यथा ह्ययं ज्योतिरात्मा विवस्वानपो भिन्ना बहुधैकोऽनुगच्छन्।
उपाधिना क्रियते भेदरूपो देवः क्षेत्रेष्वेवमजोऽयमात्मा॥"

"अनादिनिधनम्" इति वाक्यपदीयस्थमाद्यं पद्यं तत्त्वसंग्रहपञ्जिकायां परिणामवादपरतया व्याख्यातमपि वाक्यपदीयटीकायां पुण्यराजेन विवर्त्तवादपरत्वेन विवृतम्। पुण्यराजेन हि "विवर्त्ततेऽर्थभावेनेति" प्रतीकमुपादाय—"एकस्य तत्त्वादप्रच्युतस्य भेदानुकारेणासत्या विभक्तान्यरूपोपग्राहिता विवर्त्तः स्वप्नविषयप्रतिभासवत्"—इत्युक्तम्, योजिता चैषा कारिका विस्तरेण विवर्त्तवादपक्ष एव।

इत्थं शब्दब्रह्मवादिनां परिणामवादित्वेन विवर्त्तवादित्वेन च ग्रन्थकृद्भिस्तत्र तत्र समुल्लेखात् स्फोटाख्यं शब्दब्रह्माभ्युपगच्छतां वैयाकरणानां परिणामवादे विवर्त्तवादे वाऽभिमतिरिति नासङ्कीर्णतया निर्णीयते। इत्थमाकुले शास्त्रार्थेऽयमत्र निष्कर्षः प्रतिभाति—

महाभाष्ये भगवता पतञ्जलिना
"ध्वनिः स्फोटश्च शब्दानां ध्वनिस्तु खलु लक्ष्यते।" (१ । १ । ७०)

इत्येवं कुत्रचित्कृतायामपि स्फोटस्य चर्चायां भगवता भर्त्तृहरिणैव वैयाकरणेषु स्फोटसिद्धान्तो विशेषतः प्रपञ्चितः। भर्त्तृहरेः शिष्येषु ग्रन्थव्याख्यानभेदेन द्वौ पक्षौ प्रचलितौ—परिणामपक्षो विवर्त्तपक्षश्च।

भर्त्तृहरिशिष्याणां मध्ये कालवशेन परिणामवादिनां सम्प्रदाये क्षीणीभूते विवर्त्तवादिनां सम्प्रदायः प्राबल्यमभजत्; तदानीं विवर्त्तवादिसम्प्रदायमनुसृत्य पुण्यराजेन वाक्यपदीयस्य विवरणं कृतम्। कैयटादयश्च विवर्त्तवादमाश्रितवन्तः। माधवाचार्य्यश्च विवर्त्तवादमेव शब्दब्रह्मवित्सु प्रचलितमुपलभ्य सर्वदर्शनसंग्रहे पाणिनीयदर्शनप्रस्तावे तमेव शब्दब्रह्मविदामभिमततया न्यरूपयत्।

काश्मीरकेण भट्टनारायणकण्ठेन स्वाभ्युदयकाले भर्त्तृहरिशिष्येषु विवर्त्तवादपक्षस्य प्राबल्यमवलोक्य विवर्त्तवादमेव भर्त्तृहरेरभिमतमवधार्य्य श्रीमृगेन्द्रवृत्तौ विवर्त्तवादो भर्त्तृहरिपक्षत्वेन निरूपितः। यद्यपि भगवान् शङ्कराचार्य्योऽपि विवर्त्तवादी, विवर्त्तवादिषु च तत्पक्ष्याणामेव साम्प्रतं प्राधान्यम्, तथापि नारायणकण्ठसमये तथा नासीदासीच्च भर्त्तृहरेः सम्प्रदायस्य विवर्त्तवादिषु प्राधान्यमिति प्रतीयते। भर्त्तृहरेः शङ्कराचार्य्यस्य च सत्यामपि केषुचिद् विषयेषु विमतौ विवर्त्तवादांशे सम्प्रतिपत्तिरेव; एवं च विवर्त्तवाद-

सिद्धान्तनिरूपणायां नवीनं भगवन्तं शङ्कराचार्य्यं परित्यज्य प्राचीनो भर्त्तृहरिराहृतश्चेत्का नाम तत्रासङ्गतिः ?

पूर्वोक्तम् —

"यथा विशुद्धमाकाशं तिमिरोपप्लुतो जनः ।"

इति कारिकाद्वयं नारायणकण्ठीयायां मृगेन्द्रवृत्तौ भर्त्तृहरिनिर्म्मित-तया प्रदर्शितम् । कमलशीलेन तु न कस्यचिन्नाम्ना तद् व्यपदिष्टम् । "अनादिनिधनं ब्रह्म शब्दतत्त्वं यदक्षरम्" इत्यादिकारिकाऽपि कमलशीले-नानिर्दिष्टकर्त्तृका प्रदर्शिता । परन्तु सा साम्प्रतं वाक्यपदीयारम्भे समुप-लभ्यते, "यथा विशुद्धमाकाशमि"त्यादि कारिकाद्वय तु सम्प्रति वाक्यपदीये न दृश्यते । "यथा विशुद्धमाकाशमि"त्यादि कारिकाद्वयं स्पष्टतया विवर्त्तवादस्य प्रतिपादकम् । निरुक्तकारिकाद्वयस्य हरिग्रन्थान्तः समुपलभ्यमानत्वे "अनादिनिधनं ब्रह्मे"ति कारिकायाः परिणामवादपरत्वेन व्याख्यानमसमञ्जसं स्यात्, शब्दब्र-ह्मवादिनां परिणामवादित्वमपि निरालम्बनं प्रतिपादितं भवेत् । नत्वेकस्यै-वाचार्य्यस्य भर्त्तृहरेः परिणामवादित्वं विवर्त्तवादित्वं च सम्प्रदायभेदेन ग्रन्थव्या-ख्यानभेदमनाश्रित्याञ्जसा समर्थयितुं शक्यम् । तस्माद् भर्त्तृहरिशिष्याणामेव मध्ये कश्चिदाचार्य्यो विवर्त्तवादपक्षावलम्बी स्वमतप्रतिपादनाय विवर्त्तवादप्रतिपा-दकं निरुक्तं कारिकाद्वयं प्रणिनाय, अन्याश्च काश्चन तादृशीः कारिका हरिग्रन्थेऽनु-पलभ्यमाना अपि हरिप्रणीतत्वेन ग्रन्थकृद्भिरुद्धृता विवर्त्तवादसमर्थिकाः । कालप्रभावेणाचार्य्यस्य तस्य ग्रन्थो विलोपमुपागतः । तद्ग्रन्थप्रणेतुराचार्य्यस्य हरिसम्प्रदायान्तर्गततया हरिनाम्नैव तत्कारिकाः प्रसिद्धिमागताः ।

एवं च भर्त्तृहरिशिष्येषु द्वौ सम्प्रदायौ प्रवर्त्तितावास्ताम्,—एकः परिणा-मवादिनामन्यश्च विवर्त्तवादिनाम् ; तत्राप्यग्रत्वे परिणामवादिसम्प्रदायः सर्वथैवोच्छेदमगच्छत्, विवर्त्तवादिसम्प्रदायश्च प्रचलितो वर्त्तते । परिणामवादिनां काऽपि टीका नाधुना वाक्यपदीये दृश्यते, तन्मतमनुसृत्य न कञ्चन ग्रन्थं केनचिदाचार्य्येण निर्मितं वा पश्यामः । इत्थं परिणामवादिसम्प्रदायो भर्त्तृहरिशिष्येषु पुरातनः प्रतीयते, अर्वाचीनस्य विवर्त्तवादिसम्प्रदायस्य प्रबलेनाभ्युदयेन स सम्प्रदायो नाशं गत इति सम्भाव्यते ।

नागेशभट्टेन लघुमञ्जूषायां स्फोटनिरूपणप्रकरणे शब्दब्रह्मण उत्पत्तिः प्रतिपादिता—

"प्रलये नियतकालपरिपाकाणां सर्वप्राणिकर्म्मणामुपभोगेन प्रलयाल्लीन-सर्वजगत्का माया चेतन ईश्वरे लीयते। * * * *। ततोऽपरिपक्वप्राणिकर्म्मभिः कालवशात्प्राप्तपरिपाकैः स्वफलप्रदानाय भगवतोऽबुद्धिपूर्विका सृष्टिर्मायापुरुषौ प्रादुर्भवतः। ततः परमेश्वरस्य सिसृक्षात्मिका मायावृत्तिर्जायते। ततो बिन्दुरूपमव्यक्तं त्रिगुणं जायते। * * * * अस्माद् बिन्दोः शब्दब्रह्मापरनामधेयं वर्णादिविशेषरहितं ज्ञानप्रधानं सृष्ट्युपयोग्यवस्थाविशेषरूपं चेतनमिश्रं नादमात्रमुत्पद्यते। एतज्जगदुपादानमेव रवपरादिशब्दैर्व्यवह्रियते।" इति।

नायं सिद्धान्तः शब्दब्रह्मविदां वैयाकरणानाम्, वैयाकरणशिरोमणेर्भर्तृहरेर्वा। प्राचीनेषु वैयाकरणसिद्धान्तग्रन्थेषु कुत्रापि शब्दब्रह्मणो जन्यताया अनुक्तेः। न कैश्चन पुरातनैर्ग्रन्थकारैः शास्त्रान्तरग्रन्थनिर्म्माणावसरे वैयाकरणसिद्धान्तप्रपञ्चनप्रवृत्तैः शब्दब्रह्मणो जन्यत्वं वैयाकरणाभिमतमिति प्रत्यपादि। तस्मान्नायं सिद्धान्तो वैयाकरणानाम्, किन्तु शैवागमसिद्धान्तोऽयम् शैवागमतत्त्वविदामुत्तमेन भास्कररायेण स्वीये ललितासहस्रनामभाष्ये—

परा प्रत्यक्चितीरूपा पश्यन्ती परदेवता।
मध्यमा वैखरीरूपा भक्तमानसहंसिका॥ (१३२)

इत्यस्य पद्यस्य व्याख्यानावसरे शब्दब्रह्मणः पूर्वदर्शितदिशोत्पत्तिः प्रतिपादिता। तत एव सर्वमाकृष्य निरूपयता नागेशेन शैवागमसिद्धान्तानुरूप्येण वैयाकरणसिद्धान्तोऽन्यथाकारमुपपादितः। तत्रैव च साधकतया

"अनादिनिधनं ब्रह्म शब्दतत्त्वं यदक्षरम्"

इत्यादिकारिका वाक्यपदीयप्रारम्भस्था प्राचीनव्याख्यातृपदवीं सर्वथैवोल्लङ्घ्य नवीनया व्याख्ययोपस्कृत्य योजिता।

सेयं नागेशभट्टस्य प्राचीनवैयाकरणसिद्धान्तानादरेण साम्प्रदायिकेषूपेक्षा किंनिबन्धनेति निश्चेतुं न पारयामः।

PART II

THE MEASURES OF GODS

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The spiritualists and philosophers have apologised for even bringing down the gods within the sphere of description (dhyāna).[1] Historically it is not quite certain from when the gods began to be idolised. So far as the faithful and devoted worshippers are concerned, the idea of figure-representation of gods and goddesses appears to have been conceived even in the nature-worship of the early Vedic times. Later in the Vedic period the unlimited, the immeasured god, beyond the conception of thought and words, was represented as possessing a thousand heads, a thousand eyes, a thousand feet and other features, obviously a multiplied number of human limbs.[2] Thus the idolisation of gods

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1. (*a*) अज्ञानेन मया देव यत्कृतं मूर्तिकल्पनम् ।
तत्सर्वं कृपया शंस क्षमस्व मधुसूदन ॥ (Bhavishya-Purāṇa)

(*b*) न्यूनातिरिक्तानि परिस्फुटानि यानीह कर्माणि मया कृतानि ।
क्षम्याणि चैतानि मम क्षमस्व प्रयाहि तुष्टः पुनरागमाय ॥
(Skanda-Purāṇa)

2. (*a*) सहस्रशीर्षा पुरुषः सहस्राक्षः सहस्रपात् ।
स भूमिं सर्वतः स्पृत्वात्यतिष्ठद्दशाङ्गुलम् ॥
(Purusha-sūkta, Yajurveda)

(*b*) नमोऽस्त्वनन्ताय सहस्रमूर्तये सहस्रपादाक्षिशिरोरुबाहवे ।
सहस्रनाम्ने पुरुषाय शाश्वते सहस्रकोटीयुगधारिणे नमः ॥
(Mahābhārata, Śānti-parvan. 47, 20; Bhavishya Purāṇa)

and goddesses appears to have been going on from very early times for hundreds of years till we come across in the Rāmāyaṇa of at least 500 B.C. an undoubted reference to the sculpturing of Sītā in the form of a golden image which was unavoidably required as King's Consort for a royal public function. The early archaeologists who refused in the absence of archaeological remains to go far beyond the Christian era on the basis of the literary evidences, both Vedic and post-Vedic, for the sculptural representation of gods and goddesses in India, must have been wiser by the recent discoveries made at Mohenjo-daro and Harappa, which have shifted the sculptural history of India beyond the Vedic period by not less than a few thousand years. But both the literary references and archaeological finds have left the practical artists in a state of utter confusion. Even today the sculptor or the painter does not know, at any rate he does not put into practice, the uniform proportion of the image he makes. In fact he could have no guidance until the Śilpa-śāstra was codified.

The image-maker of Sītā must have made a realistic representation, because Sītā was his contemporary. The image-makers of Gautama Buddha, of Gāndhāra or Amarāvatī school, or of Sarnath and other places, were not Buddha's contemporaries. Nor were there any photographs or models available for the sculptors. And it is also doubtful if those sculptors could have met any man of Buddha's race or family. Thus their images of Buddha if not guided by the Śilpa-śāstra must have been imaginary and unauthorised so far as the physical features and personal proportions of the Buddha's figure are concerned. Naturally, therefore, the artist's confusion will be endless when he attempts to represent from his imagination the unknown gods and god-

desses of whom there are no models or photographic copies and no ethnical representations for his guidance. Let the artist be as much idealistic as he chooses to be, even more than the Vedic seers, but only as regards the expressions he gives to the images of the gods and goddesses, and let the individual artists be content with this much originality. But there must be a harmony among the artists themselves regarding the general features and proportionate measures of the limbs of deities, for, otherwise, there is bound to be a fundamental unreality about the whole production, and thus the very object of the artist will be frustrated. It is easy to imagine the god Śiva, for instance, in his various moods and activities, such as the lover and bridegroom of the Mountain-maid, or as fury incarnate at the sacrificial function of his father-in-law, Daksha, where his most beloved wife, Satī, lost her life, or at the dance of destruction. But it would create an unreality about his very existence if one artist gives to the Śiva image the features of the Grecian warrior Alexander the Great, or the French conqueror Napoleon Bonaparte, another artist makes him the replica of a Chinese or Japanese monk, a third one gives to Śiva the short stature of a Gurkha soldier or the tall bearded figure of a Sikh horseman, and a fourth artist represents Śiva in the delicate womanly figure of a Burmese or Siamese gentleman clad in coloured silk. Another great God, Vishṇu, who has been perhaps the most popular deity for centuries and has undergone as many as ten incarnations, is, like Śiva, found in fundamentally divergent forms, some of which are indistinguishable even from female figures. The goddesses of wealth and learning, Lakshmī and Sarasvatī, have been retaining their popularity down to the modern age and their figures often appear as the frontispiece in monthly

magazines published in various modern languages of India. These images like those of Rāma and Sītā, and Rādhā and Krishṇa have undergone much more startling physical changes at the hands of the artists; the southern variety of the Madras Presidency bears no similarity with the western variety of the Bombay Presidency including the Mahratta and Gujarat types, nor has the northern variety, comprising of sub-divisions of the Punjab, United Provinces and Bihar types, any affinity to the Eastern variety with sub-divisions of Bengal and Orissa types. The other gods and goddesses as well as the epic heroes aud heroines have met with a similar fate owing to the boundless fancies of the artists. One can understand and even tolerate the racial or provincial stamp inevitably marked on the goods in the countries of their origin. The local beauties or heroes may supply the model to the imagination of the artists. But the realistic fundamental uniformity in the measure and proportion of images need not interfere with the idealistic expression of the artist's mind, and does not injure his individual originality. The general rules of grammar and metre have never injured the style or diction of the individual composition. Even the employment of new metres by a poet presupposes the restriction of uniformity. To be original one need not be lawless. Even under the limitation of proportionate measure the artist can have unlimited scope for his original production.

There has, however, been a uniformity among different groups of authoritative works dealing with the subject of measure of gods and goddesses and other beings. The subject has been elaborately treated in a number of *Purāṇas*, *Āgamas* and *Silpaśāstras* under *tāla-māna*.[1]

[1] See the writer's Dictionary of Hindu Architecture under Tālamāna.

The term *tāla* according to the *Brahmāṇḍa-purāṇa* (Part 1, Second Ānusaṅgapāda, Chap. VII. 97) and the *Suprabhedāgama* (Chap. XXX. 22) implies the distance between the tips of the fully stretched thumb and the middle finger. But both in the *Matsya-purāṇa* (Chap. 258, V. 19) and the standard work on the subject, the *Mānasāra* (Chaps. 65 & 66), the *tāla* system of measurement has been further simplified for the practical artist by prescribing the face to be the unit of measure for individual images. Thus the total length of an image of the ten *tāla* measure, for instance, should be ten times its own face-length, i.e., the distance between the chin and the top of the head. The neck, thence the navel zone, thence the thigh-root, thence the knee-cap, thence the ankle and feet are given a certain proportional measures in this unit. Similarly the arms, hands, palms and fingers etc, bear certain proportional measures. And the variations of interspace between different limbs are distinguished in four *bhaṅgas* or poses (viz. samabhaṅga, ābhaṅga, atibhaṅga and tribhaṅga) and in three postures or attitudes, *viz.*, straight or standing, sitting and recumbent.

The *Bimbamāna* (Ms., British Museum, no. 558-592) in an appendix has referred to twelve varieties of this *tāla* measure, while the *Mānasāra* has illustrated with full details up to the tenth variety, leaving out the eleventh and the twelfth varieties which, as stated in the *Bimbamāna*, should be employed in measuring certain (super-) gods and fiends (Rākshasas). Each of these twelve or ten varieties admits of three sizes, namely, large, medium, and small. The classification of the *tāla* systems and their details as given in the *Mānasāra* almost reappear without much alteration in the *Aṁśumadbheda* of Kāśyapa (Ms. Egg. 3148, 3012, Fol. 251),

Suprabhedāgama (Chap. XXXIV 30-40), *Bṛhat-Saṁhitā* (Chap. LVIII. 4) and other works.

According to all these authorities the different varieties of the *tāla* measure are used in measuring different classes of gods and people and other beings:-

Large ten *tāla* is prescribed for superior gods (Brahmā, Vishṇu, Śiva and others), Buddha, Jain images (Jina, Siddha, Saugandha, Arhat, Pārśva and the other Tirthaṅkaras), and devotees of the Sāyujya class.

Middle ten *tāla* is recommended for superior goddesses (Lakshmī, Sarasvatī, Sāvitrī, Bhūdevī, Durgā, and the Love-goddess), the Sārūpya class of devotees and others.

Small ten *tāla* is suggested for Sāmīpya class of devotees and others.

Nine *tāla* is prescribed for inferior goddesses (e. g. Brahmāṇī, Vaishṇavī, Māhendrī, Bhairavī, Chāmuṇḍī, Kaumārī, Vārāhī and others), the Sālokya class of devotees, superior sages (Vaśishṭha, Bhārgava, Viśvāmitra, Bharadvāja), certain mythical beings (e. g. Yaksha and Vidyādhara), Garuḍa and others.

Eight *tāla* is recommended for Sages (like Kāśyapa) and ordinary human beings, etc.

Seven *tāla* is suggested for Sages (like Agastya), certain demigods and mythical beings, and ordinary females.

Six *tāla* is prescribed for tiger and such other animals,

Five *tāla* for Gaṇeśa (a mythical being),

Four *tāla* for Goblins (Bhūta), etc.,

Three *tāla* for Kinnara (a mythical being),

Two *tāla* for goose and other birds, and

One *tāla* for Banduka and Kabandha (headless body).[1]

This method of the Śilpa-śāstra has been commended by the modern European artists. "The (Ancient) Hindu image-maker or sculptor" observes Mr. Hadaway "does not work from life, as is the usual practice among Europeans, but he has in place of the living model, a most elaborate and beautiful system of proportions, which he uses constantly, combining these with the observation and study of natural detail. It is, in fact, a series of anatomical rules and formulæ, of infinitely more practical use than any European system which I know of, for the Indian one treats of the actual proportion and of the surface form rather than the more scientific attachments of muscles and the articulation of bones"[2].

"There is in the Hindu system," observes Mr. Vincent Smith, "nothing complicated or difficult to understand or remember, but like every other canon of artistic proportion, these methods are no more capable of producing works of art in unskilled hands than are any other aids or methods."[3]

Will the modern Indian artist think over these weighty remarks? Will he also take into consideration the fact that the greater majority of Indians are practical idol-worshippers? Their ordinary worship is hardly performed except in presence of an idol. This idol should, therefore, be of such a nature and form as would command their respect and incite their faith. An image of unusual

[1] For futher details and illustrations see the writer's *Architecture of Mānasara*, Vol. V, pages 53-70 and Plate CLVI, Volume IV, Chapter LI-LXVII, pp. 497-632, Volume III, pp. 334-497.

[2] *Dictionary of Hindu Architecture*, pp. 221-244.

[3] *Indian Antiquary*, XLIV, pp. 90—91.

proportions which does not answer the *dhyāna* (description) of the deities, by uttering which the worshippers try to concentrate their mind and offer prayers to the idol, cannot give rise to that genuine faith which must be based on truth. If a map is to be used for learning the geography of a place that must correspond to the mental picture of the place which the reader has formed after reading an authoritative description. It is hardly necessary to add that the dirty surroundings and defaced and broken images of several temples and shrines have caused untold injury to the religious susceptibility of the educated and uneducated Indians alike. Cleanliness is certainiy next to godliness. But a lovable image carved after the *dhyāna* is all the more necessary to create an atmosphere of reality and faith. If not for the sake of mere art, at least for the sake of the faithful, the artists should cast the images of gods and goddesses, which are meant for worship, strictly after the directions of the Śilpa-śāstra which has now been made available for the artists by the publication of the series under the general title of Mānasāra (Essence of Measurement) together with the Text, English Translation, Plates and an encyclopaedic Dictionary of Hindu Architetcure.

CONTRIBUTION OF INDIA TO ARABIC LITERATURE DURING THE PRE-GHAZNAWID PERIOD.

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The most important contribution of India to Arabic literature undoubtedly begins with the Ghaznawid period, the tenth century A. D.; but she also certainly made some contributions to Arabic, in respect of vocabulary and otherwise, from a much earlier period. However insignificant they may be, they deserve notice. But before enumerating them, some account may be given of the relations between India and Arabia during the pre-Ghaznawid period.

LEGENDARY RELATION

Legend speaks of relations between these two countries, before the dawn of history. In the Ḥadīth literature there are many traditions which refer to the legend that Adam, the father of mankind, being driven out of Paradise, alighted on the peak, called after him, of a mountain in Ceylon.[1] When his repentance was accepted by God, he was brought to 'Arafāt near Mecca where he met Eve who had been thrown down at Jiddah. These traditions are not only found in the religious literature of Islam but also in works of history and geography. For example, we find this legend in the

[1] Ṭabari, T'arīkh, I., 119 & following pages, Ṭabari, Tafsir, Commentary on the verse I. 28.

works of Ibn Qutaybah (d. 276 A. H.), Maqdisī (d. 375 A. H.) and Yāqūt-al-Ḥamawi (d. 626 A. H.)[1]

In the legend there is a controversy about the place of the death of Adam. According to one or two traditions [2] he is said to have died in Ceylon.

He is also said to have made many pilgrimages, not less than forty, to Mecca, going back to Ceylon every time.[3]

It is also asserted that the Black Stone of the Ka'bah, in the form of a brilliant ruby, fell from Paradise along with Adam and was carried to Mecca when he was ordered by God tobuild the Ka'bah.[4]

The story of Hābil and Qābil is said to have taken place in India according to one tradition.[5]

According to this legend, Arabia and India have had intercourse with each other from the very beginning of human life on the earth.

RELATIONS OF HISTORICAL TRUTH

Though political relations between India and Arabia were first established as late as the seventh century after Christ, yet these two countries, entirely different from each other in race and language, had been connected through trade from so early a time as the commencement of the seventh century before Christ, or perhaps even from pre-historic times.[6]

Two of the three routes by which trade was carried in ancient times between India and the West, passed

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[1] Ibn Qutaybah, Ma'ārif (Göttingen) p. 9, Maqdisī, p. 13 Yāqūt's Mu'jam, V., 74.

[2] Ghulām 'Alī Āzād, Subḥat al Marjān (Bombay) 1st Section.

[3] Ibid.

[4] Ibid.

[5] Ibid.

[6] Rawlinson. Intercourse between India and the Western World, first chapter.

through Arabia. The first route ran from the mouth of the Indus and up the Euphrates, at the point where the road branches off to Antioch and the Levantine ports. This route attained high importance during the golden days of the Babylonian Empire, with the decay of which it fell into oblivion.

The second route, more important than the first, lay from the Indian coast to that of Yaman and Ḥaḍramawt and from there, passing along the Red Sea coast, to Syria and thence to Europe, either directly from the Syrian coast or via Egypt and Alexandria. This route was of great importance and the prosperity of South-west Arabia in ancient times was largely due to it, and it formed a highway of commercial traffic until the Ptolemies established an overland route from India to Alexandria.[1]

This route, passing from Yaman to Syria through the Ḥijaz, has been referred to in the Qur'ān as IMĀM MUBĪN (A Manifest Road).[2] This Imām Mubīn has been generally taken by the commentators to be the road passing from Yaman to Syria. Another Qur'ānic verse, referring to the commercial caravans of Sabā, throws some light on the prosperity of this route. This verse (XXXIV, 18) is as follows:—

> "And We made continuous towns between them
> "(the people of Sabā) and the towns which
> "We had blessed — (the Syrian towns)—
> "and We apportioned the journey therein.
> "Travel through them nights and days."

In this verse, the phrase "Qurā Zāhirah" has been explained by Ṭabarī to mean Qurā Mutāwāṣilah (continuous towns), that is to say, towns lying close

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[1] Encyclopaedia Britannica, 11th edn. Vol. II, p. 264.

[2] Qur'ān, XV, 79.

to one another.[1] In the Qur'ān there is another reference, though indirect, to this commerce carried by the Quraysh. In verse CVI, 1, لايلاف قريش ايلافهم رحلة الشتاء والصيف the summer and winter journeys mean those made by the Quraysh on the highway called Imām Mubīn.[2]

It is certain that Ceylon was early known to the Arabs on account of its pearl fisheries and trade in precious stones, and Arab merchants had formed commercial establishments there centuries before the rise of Islam.[3] When and how the Muslims reached the island is unknown. From Balādhurī it appears that some Muslim merchants had been there long before the attack on Sind by Muḥammad b. Qāsim. The cause of this attack has been stated by Balādhurī to have been vengeance for the plunder, by some pirates of Debal, of vessels which the ruler of Ceylon had despatched, filled with Muslim orphans.[4]

As to the political connection of India with Arabia, it is sufficient here to point out that the first invasion of the Indian coast by the Arabs was at so early a date as the reign of the second Caliph (13-23, A. H., 632-644 A. D.) But the Arab inroads did not penetrate far until 710 A. D., when Multan with the country of Sind fell before Muḥammad b. Qasim during the reign of Walīd (705-715).

CONTRIBUTION OF INDIA TO ARABIC LITERATURE

After the above account of the relations between India and Arabia before the Ghaznawid period, it will be easy to make a survey of the contribution of India to Arabic literature during this period.

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[1] Ṭabarī, Tafsīr, Part 22nd, p. 58.

[2] Ibid, Part 30th, p. 197.

[3] Encyclopaedia of Islam, I, 838.

[4] Balādhurī, Buldān, 435.

(1) To begin with, the legend of Adam's alighting on the mountain of Sarandīp may be said to be, in a way, a contribution of India to Arabic literature. When Ceylon was for the first time visited by the Muslims, they, having heard the local traditions about the depression in the peak, might have remoulded them to suit their own faith ; and in order to give them authority they put them in the mouth of the Prophet.

(2) The commercial intercourse between these two countries introduced many Indian words into the Arabic language. The merchandise imported from India into Arabia consisted of perfumes, spices, cloths etc. Arabs naturally borrowed words for these articles from Indian languages. Thus words such as ṣandal, misk (musk), kāfūr (camphor), qaranful (cloves), filfil (pepper), hail (cardamon), zanjabīl (ginger), jā'ifal (nutmeg), nārjīl (cocoanut); mawz (banana), limūn (lemon), tanbūl (betel) etc. are Arabicised forms of the Indian words. In some cases the word 'Hindi' was added to the words which already existed in Arabic, e. g. 'ūd Hindī, qusṭ Hindī, tamr Hindī, etc. The last word became 'tamarind' in English.

Indian cloths also used to go to Yaman and thence to the Ḥijāz. The Arabic words shās (muslim), shīt (calico) and fūṭah (striped cloth) come under this category[1].

Arabian navigation to the Indian coast introduced half a dozen words of Indian origin into Arabic travels and geographical works, e. g. the word "bārijah" (plu. bawārij) meanig 'pirates' is the Arabicised form of the Indian word "bēṛa," and the word "dawnīj" (plu.

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[1] i Tāj -al-'rūs, under the word 'fūṭah',

ii Muḥammad Sulaymān, Arḍ-al-Qur'ān II. Chapter on "Arabic Language."

dawānīj) meaning 'small boat' owes its origin to the Indian word "ḍongī"[1]

Jurjī Zaydān, the well known modern Arabic scholar of Egypt, says that the words "subḥ" (dawn), "ḍaw" (light) and "bahā" (light) seem to be of Sanskrit origin, as these words are not found in the sister languages of Arabic.[2]

The word "ṭūbā" that occurs in the Qur'ān is said by some Arabic scholars to be the name of a paradise, in some Indian language.[3]

An Indian sword was very much valued in Arabia; the Arabs called it "muhannad," "Hindī" and "Hindawānī," which words frequently occur in Arabic literature. The very word "Hind" has fascinated Arabs a good deal. They have used it as a lovely name for their woman.

(3) Another debt which Arabic literature owes to India is the introduction of her numerals into Arabic, in which language they are still called AL RUQŪM-AL HINDIYYAH. In Arabic writing letters only were used in place of numerals up to the eighth century A.D., when this Indian system passed to the Arabians, probably along with the astronomical tables, brought to Baghdād by an Indian ambassador in 773 A. D. The system was explained in Arabic in the early part of the ninth century by the famous scholar Muḥammad b. Mūsā Alkhwārizmī and from that time continued, though at first slowly, to be used throughout the Arabian world.[4] Al Bīrūnī

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[1] For the word "bārijah" see Al-Bīrūnī, Kitāb al-Hind, p. 102 and the 'Ajā'ib al-Hind, ed. Paris, p. 114.

For the next word see Yāqūt al-Ḥamawi, Mu'jam al-Buldān, under the word "qays" Vol. VII. (Taken from Sayyid Muḥammad Sulaymān, "Arab-o-Hind ke ta'alluqāt", p. 63, where the remaining four words are also mentioned.)

[2] His Ādāb al-lughat-al 'Arabiyyah, Vol. I. 41.

[3] Qāmūs and Tāj al-'arūs, under the word "ṭūba"

[4] Encycl. Brit. (11th ed.) XIX. 867.

acknowledges that the Muslim system of numerals is derived from the best of their (the Hindus') systems.[1] It is a well known fact that this system passed from the Arabians to the West, where these numerals were known as "Arabic Numerals."

(4) Another contribution of India to Arabic literature is astronomical material. Undoubtedly the Arabs had their own science of astronomy, probably taken from the Chaldaeans, but during the second century of the Hijra, when the 'Abbāsid caliphate was at its zenith and when extraordinary efforts were made to translate foreign books into Arabic, we find much evidence of the influence of Indian culture on Arabian civilisation. Many books were translated from Sanskrit into Arabic. Of the astronomical works, the Sindhind was the first book to attract the attention of the Arabs. It was first translated by Al-Fazārī (d. 154 A. H.) and a second time by the already mentioned Muḥammad b. Mūsā of Khwārzm. Lastly Al Bīrunī wrote a book on the Sindhind with the title of جوامع الموجود لخواطر الهنود فى حساب التنجيم[2]

(5) Another equally important contribution of India to Arabic literature is medicine.

Charaka and Suśruta occupy the highest position as the medical authorities in the Sanskrit language[3]. Their works were rendered into Arabic at the close of the eighth century A.D., and quoted as authorities by the celebrated Abū Bakr Al Rāzī (d. 932 A. D.)[4]. Ibn Nadīm gives not less than fifteen names of those Indian authors whose works had been translated into Arabic by the time of the composition of his FIHRIST.[5] None

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[1] Al Birūnī, Kitāb al Hind, p. 82.

[2] Al Birūnī, Chronology of Ancient Nations. (Notes by the Editor, p. 370,)

[3] Macdonell's History of Sanskrit Literature, p. 434.

[4] Ibid. p. 427.

[5] Ibn Nadim, p. 271.

[6] Berlin Catalogue, No. 6411.

of these renderings are known to exist except a small book of Shānaq on poisons. The Berlin Library contains a MS of it.[1] The original text was, as stated in the preface of the work, first translated into Persian by Abu Ḥātim al Balkhī for Khālid al-Barmakī in 200 A. H. and was afterwards rendered into Arabic by Al-'Abbas b. Sa'īd al Jawharī in 210 A. H. Ḥajjī Khalifah has also mentioned it under the title of the Kitāb al Sumūm.[1] The MS. is small and contains only 84 pages. It is divided into four sections (Maqālāt). The first maqālah is an introduction in which the author says how doctors have invented various compounds of deadly poisons to save the sacred lives of kings. To him, the usage of these poisons is not allowed for anybody except kings. The second chapter deals with the symptoms of the effects of various poisons. The third chapter describes various methods of preparing deadly poisons. For instance, he says that a baby swallow should be devoured by a poisonous snake ; then both of them should be shut up in a copper kettle and buried under a cow-dung hill. After a certain number of days, when they are thoroughly decomposed and fermented, the mixture is to be dried up in the sun. A very small quantity of it is sure to kill any man who happens to eat it. The last chapter contains the remedies and antidotes. The author has also given a prescription of an antidote which renders any man that eats it poison-proof.

On the last page the scribe has written that at the instance of the Caliph, the device of bringing up a girl in such a way that whosoever happens to cohabit with her is sure to die at once, has been omitted on account of its being an act of barbarism. The work is of interest

[1] Khalīfah, V., 96.

as showing the various methods of destroying human life in ancient times.

(6) Two story books, one "Kalīlah wa Dimnah" and the other "Alf laylah wa laylah," enjoy an unrivalled position in the domain of light literature. The former is an Indian story which was first translated from Persian into Arabic by Ibn Al-Muqaffā in the eighth century A. D. The subject matter of the latter was also, for the greater part, of Indian origin.[1] Ibn Nadīm has given several names of story books translated from Sanskrit into Arabic.[2] All such books may be regarded as a part of the contribution of India to Arabic literature.

(7) The game of chess which plays no mean part in Arabic literature is also a contribution of India. " The best authorities agree that Chess existed in India before it was known to have been played anywhere else. The word Shatranj is a foreign word among Persians and Arabians while its natural derivation from the Sanskrit word CHATURAÑGA is obvious."[3] Many metaphors and similes have been taken from chess in both Arabic and Persian literatures.

(8) Al-Bīrūnī's *Kitāb al Hind* is one of the most important contributions of India to Arabic literature, not because the author is regarded by some Arabic writers of repute as a resident of Sind, but because the whole subject matter has been taken from India. The name of the author is so associated with India that we can hardly think of Arabic literature produced in that country without thinking of him. Whatever reputation he enjoys as a great scholar of astronomy and mathematics is due

[1] i. Encycl. of Islam. under "Alf layla wa layla."
ii. Prof. Macdonald, J R A S. 1924. 353.

[2] Ibn Nadīm. p. 305.

[3] Encycl. Brit. under "Chess"

largely to the benefits he derived from the writings and works of Indian scholars. Apart from the patronage that he received from the first Sulṭān of Muslim India and his son, and apart from the facilities given to him by the Ghaznawids, it is impossible to ignore his great obligation to Indian scholars and teachers, at least as far as his knowledge of Indian sciences is concerned.

(9) Abū Ḥafṣ Rabī' b. Ṣubayḥ was what is called in the language of Islamic learning, Tab' Tubi'īn (i.e. one of the companions of the companions of the Prophet's companions). He is, according to an authority, said to be the first Muslim to write a book[1]. He was a reliable transmitter of Ḥadīth. He migrated in his later days to Sind where he died in 160 A. H.[2] He is mentioned by Ghulām 'Alī Āzād, Raḥmān 'Alī and Nawwāb Ṣiddīq Ḥasan as the first Muslim scholar who lived in India.[3]

Sind was, during the first three centuries of the Hijra, an Arab colony where people of more than one tribe settled. These domiciled Arabs must have maintained Arabic as their mother tongue for a long time, and there must have sprung up many a poet among them. But it is a matter of great regret that no accounts whatever of such intellectual actvities of Sindian Arabs and of those natives who must have learnt the language of their rulers, have come down to us. The *Futūḥ al Buldān* and other similar books do not throw any light upon this matter. But it may be conjectured that some migrating Arabs must have written some books in Arabic. Ḥājjī Khalīfah mentions "*Ta'rīkh Sind*" among the

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[1] Khalifah. I., 80.

[2] Āzād Subḥah; P. 26.

[3] Ibid. 26; Raḥmān 'Ali Tadhkira, 3; Ṣiddīq Ḥasan, Abjad al 'Ulūm, 889.

histories written by the Muslims, but does not give the name of its author[1]. Perhaps it was written by some Sindī Arab. The author of *Chāch Nāmah* says that he has taken the material for his book from an Arabic History written by the ancestor of the man who asked him to render it into Persian. Perhaps this Arabic history of Sind is the same as that to which Khalīfah refers. In the absence of any positive evidence and authority it is impossible to say anything definite.

Just as some Arabs settled in Sind, similarly many Sindians were domiciled in Arabia, either as slaves or free men. Of them also very little is known. Sam'ānī gives only two names under the *nisbah* "Sindī": one is Abū Ma'shar and the other is the poet Abū 'Aṭā Aflaḥ Sindī[2]. The former was a *muḥaddith* (traditionist) and was regarded as an authority on the history of the Prophet. The high position that he held as a scholar may be judged from this fact that when he died, the Caliph Hārūn al-Rashīd accompanied his funeral procession and led the prayers himself. Abū 'Aṭā Aflaḥ will be spoken of at some length later on in connexion with the contribution of India to Arabic poetry.

Sam'ānī also gives several names under the *nisbah* "Manṣūrī," (of Manṣūrah, Bhakkar), "Daybulī" (of Daybul, Thath) "Lahorī" and "Hindī".[3] All these men are said by

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[1] Khalīfah, I, 133.

[2] Sam'ānī, Kitāb-al-ansāb, p. 313b.

N.B. Jurjī Zaydān has given the name of another Sindī poet Kushājim. He definitely says that he was an Indian by origin (*Vide* his History of Arabic Literature, Vol. II 251). But this statement of his seems to be wrong, on the authority of Sam'ānī, who says that "Sindī" is both an adjective (Al-ism-al-mansūb) and a name and gives the names of Kushājim and Rajā'al-Hindī, the traditionist, as examples of the latter case, (Sam'ānī, Ansāb, 314a)

[3] Ibid. 543, 236b. 497 and 592.

Sam'ānī to be scholars and traditionists who transmitted *ḥadīth* to others.

When Abu'l-Qāsim al-Maqdisī visited India during the latter part of the tenth century, he also found many traditionists in Sind. He specially makes mention of a certain Abū Muḥammad Manṣūrī who was a *muḥaddith* and an author of several good books[1].

Now all these *aḥādīth* that the above mentioned Indians and those who settled in India transmitted to others, and their works on *ḥadīth* may be taken as the first contribution of India to Arabic literature as far as the science of *ḥadīth* is concerned.

Abū 'Aṭā Aflaḥ Sindī, mentioned above along with Kushājim, the traditionist, was a MAWLA (client) of Banū Asad and was a good poet, which may be judged from this fact that Abū Tammām Ḥabīb thought fit to quote three lines of his in the beginning of the first chapter of his Ḥamāsah.

The author of *Kitāb Al Aghānī* has devoted no less than five pages to him.[2] He was one of those poets who sang in the praise of the Umayyads. He flourished during the latter part of the Umayyad period and outlived his patrons to see the time of the first two 'Abbāsid Caliphs. He died in the reign of Manṣūr. He tried to sing equally enthusiastically in the praise of his new masters, but they would not accept any poem from him after his having lavishly praised their past enemies. Aflaḥ was his name and Abū 'Aṭā his *Kunyah*. There was something wrong with his tongue. He could not pronounce such letters as *Sh*, *J*, etc. His poems were

[1] Maqdisi, Aḥsan-al-taqāsim, 451.

[2] Aghānī XVI, 81-87.

admired, but as his tongue was defective he could not recite them well. Once a certain Sulaymān was so pleased with him that he gave him a good-looking boy named 'Aṭā to recite his poems for him. This boy proved of great help to him, and the poet was so satisfied with his services that he adopted him as a son and took his *kunyah* from him. People used to enjoy the defect of his tongue, but he was very sensitive about it, and did not allow them to ask him to pronounce any particular word. The story of the device of Ḥammād, the famous narrator, by which he could succeed in making him pronounce some particular words need not be mentioned here.

The poems of Abū 'Aṭā Aflaḥ Sindī may be taken as the contribution of India to Arabic poetry during the pre-Ghaznawid period.

THE NĀRAYAṆĪYA IN TAMIL LITERATURE.

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Among the collections of poems known to Tamil scholars as the Śangam collection, one by name Paripāḍal, so named from the character of the compositon, contains a number of poems, five[1] in all, among those that have so far been recovered, bearing on Vishṇu. They are poems of laudation composed in honour of Vishṇu. They are all of them, however, cast in a form which may be regarded as generally usual, but which show characteristic features which connect them rather intimately with what is known as the *Pāñcharātra*. In a contribution made to the Winternitz Commemoration Volume, I compared the substance of the poems with some of the well-known *Pāñcharātra* works, such as the recently published Jayākhya in the Gaekwad's Oriental Series, the Padma Saṁhitā, the Ahirbudhnya Saṁhitā and one or two others. The comparison was more or less of a general character, and did not go into the details very minutely. The comparison showed that these poems differed in essential features from the text books of the *Pāñcharātra*, such as the ones noted above. These text books are of the character of manuals of ritual for the *Pāñcharātrin*, and as such concern themselves more or less directly

[1] Poems 2, 3, 4, 13, and 15.

with what regulates the life procedure of the believer in the Pāñcharātra concerning the practice of his religion. These therefore lay themselves out deliberately to describe the four sections of this religious practice elaborately. They are *Charyā*, the conduct of a believer in *Pāñcharātra*, *Kriyā*, the deeds or works commended of a *Pāñcharātrin*, involving the construction of temples and institutions connected with temple-worship. The first has reference more or less to the personal conduct of a worshipper; the second may be regarded as perhaps public acts of charity and religion by a devoted *Pāñcharātrin*. Then follows the *Yoga*, the discipline through which one has to pass to realise the *Tattva* or the truth; and ultimately comes *Jñāna* or the knowledge which leads to ultimate salvation. Whatever else of the *Pāñcharātra* is brought into the scheme of these works, they are as preliminaries leading to this ultimate prescription for regulating the life of a *Pāñcharātrin*.

The Tamil poems are found to be cast in a more general mould, and say comparatively little of these particular sections. They seem more intended to give an idea of the *Tattva*, or the truth in regard to God, and his connection with all that exists in more general terms. But they give unmistakable evidence of association with the Pāñcharātra in that they describe the features of the system in other departments. They fall into five sections generally, and relate first to *Para*, or the ultimate truth, the highest knowledge, the knowledge *sui generis*; then comes His emanations or *Vyūhas*; and then the *Vibhava* or His greatness as exhibited in His many manifestations; then comes in the idea of His *antaryāmitva*, immanence in all things; and then the forms in which he could be worshipped for the benefit of the uninitiated, the *Archā*. From this, of course, naturally would follow

what exactly should be the discipline of a man to perform worship, in what particular forms the worship should be conducted and with what appurtenances, and then naturally how real knowledge of God himself in His relation to creation can be attained by the practice of the *yogic* discipline. It is the former part of the scheme that finds exposition either in full or in part, according to the choice of the author and the purpose of his poem, whatever that be. Of course, being poems composed on occasions, they do not exhibit, nor need we expect that they should exhibit, the special features usually found, and appropriately, in set treatises on the subject. Even so, it would be an interesting question to enquire whence came the notion, and why the idea itself is expressed in the form in which it happens to be, in these five poems by four different authors, two poems being by one and the same poet.

A source that might have inspired these poets is the Nārāyaṇīya section of the Mahābhārata.[1] One of the poems, other than the five relating to Vishṇu in this collection, happens to be by one Perundēvan who composed the poems in invocation of each one of the eight classical collections made from the works of ancient authors generally described all together as 'Śangam poets'. The selection probably was made from a comparatively large number of poems, and possibly the selection contains only those that were regarded as the most excellent in each particular mode of composition. While this author who composed the poems in invocation has sung in praise of different Gods for the different collections, the poem prefixed to this collection happens to be one on Vishṇu. The poem in invocation, however, is very much mutilated, and has been recovered but imperfectly. But from what is avail-

[1] Bk XII. Ch. 344-361, Kumbhakonam, Edn.

able, it is fairly clear that it follows the method of composition of the other five poems, which are very much more completely recovered than this one. This author is the celebrity known by his name Perundēvanār, but with a distinguishing epithet, "who made the Tamil poem Bhāratam"; that is, his achievement in the field of literature was a Tamil version of the Mahābhārata, and this it is that gave him the name *Bhāratam Pāḍiya Perundēvan*, among a number of Perundēvanārs, whose names and a few poems have come down to us.

Taking up the Nārāyaṇīya for comparison, we find that the similarity of subject-matter is striking notwithstanding the fact that the purpose of composition of the two works is entirely different. The Nārāyaṇīya in the Mahābhārata is a narrative which expounds what *Pāñcharātra* is, and how it came to be given to the world through Ṛishi Nārada, and is of an expositary character thrown in the narrative form. The Tamil poems on the contrary are poems in laudation of Vishṇu; but in the lauds composed, the authors have described Vishṇu according to the *Pāñcharātra* conception of God.

The Nārāyaṇīya is expounded in 17 chapters of the Mokshadharma section of the Śānti Parvan of the Mahābhārata. It begins with chapter 344, according to the Kumbhakonam edition, and comes to an end with chapter 361. The first two chapters of these 17 are devoted to the introduction of the subject as usual in the Mahābhārata. It comes in as a result of Bṛihaspati's anger in the matter of the acceptance of the *havis*, or the sacrificial offering, by Mahāvishṇu in a sacrifice that he celebrated for king Uparichara Vasu. The next chapter 346 is in praise of Śvētadvīpa, the residence of the Primeval One, according to the Pāñcharātra. Ch. 347 begins an account of what Vishṇu in Śvētadvīpa told Nārada about the manner in which

he set about the work of creation. Chapter 348 is devoted to a description of the ten well-known *Avatāras*. There are one or two points worth noting about these. As these are generally recited, there are a few lines which introduce the *Buddha Avatāra* of Vishṇu. It must be noted here that, in this chapter, the Buddha is not brought in as a separate *Avatāra* of God, taking the place of Krishṇa, the ninth regular *Avatāra*, which is the form in which it is usually brought in. This chapter of the Mahābhārata, however, represents the Buddha and his religious teaching as only one of the acts of Krishṇa himself. The way that it is introduced seems to indicate the possibility of interpolation, as, in the short recital of the *Avatāras* which follows, in Śloka 55, the *Buddha Avatāra* does not find mention. Instead, the name Sātvata occurs; and Sātvata is but a synonym of Krishṇa, not of Buddha. The *Pāñcharātra* that Nārada thus learnt is described as the Mahopanishad[1], following the four Vedas, and adopting in it the principles of Sāṅkhya and Yoga. Nārada is said to have recited what he heard, in the court of Brahma in the presence of all assembled there. Chapters 349-50 are two chapters not directly connected with the exposition of the *Pāñcharātra*, although ideas of the *Pāñcharātra* are scattered all through. But they do relate to questions other than a mere exposition. Chapter 351 contains the recounting of creation by Krishṇa to Arjuna, and includes in it a portion of the praise of the Brahmans as such. The next following chapter, 352, is again a parenthesis, in which Krishṇa explains to Arjuna how he acquired the various names of his, and what their import is. With chapter 353 begins again Nārada's recital of what took place in Śvētadvīpa between him

[1] M Bh. XII. 358 Ś 62.

and Vishṇu to Nārāyaṇa in Badari Āśrama, at whose instance he went to Śvētadvīpa. The next chapter is similarly an account of Nārada's stay there in Badari.

With chapter 353 ends practically the Nārāyaṇīya, which is referred to as such in the course of this narrative in that term (chapter 356, śloka 14 and ch. 348 ś. 62). Other terms of a similar import such as the *Nārāyaṇaridhi*[1], *Bhāgavata*[2], *Pāñcharātra*[3], *Aikāntikamata*[4] also occur. The chapters following 354 to 361 consist of matter connected with the story, but not forming part of it. There is also a reference to the *Sāṅkhya*, *Yoga*, *Vēda*, *Pāśupata* and *Pāñcharātra matas*[5].

Leaving these details aside for the moment, we return to the Tamil poems. They are all of a different purpose, cast in a different form, but deal practically with the same sudject-matter. As I stated already, they are composed in praise of Vishṇu, and, therefore, they are concerned primarily with giving us an idea of the poets' conception of Vishṇu as such. Therefore it is by the characteristic qualities of Vishṇu as the Supreme Deity that the poets feel concerned to describe Him. In a plan like that, the ritualistic details with which the *Agamas* are primarily concerned, the topics treated of in the *Agamas*, need hardly find a place except perhaps indirectly. While the poets therefore concern themselves merely with describing Vishṇu as the Supreme Being, they find occasion to give us not merely His character as the creator of all, as immanent in all, as the absorber of all, in fact, as the be-all and end-all of all creation, but also make allusion to those special features which are implied in those general attributes

[1] Ch. 355, 7.
[2] 354, 17.
[3] 348, 62; 359, 64.
[4] 348, 59; 354.19.
[5] 359, 64.

of His, as for exanple, those of His *Vyūhas*, and *Vibhavas* or *Avatāras*. They also sometimes refer broadly to His character of immanence in all, and there is at least one reference to the form in which He is worshipped as the images of Kṛishṇa and Saṅkarshaṇa [1] as such, almost in the same manner as they are found mentioned in some of the Andhra and earlier inscriptions[2]. Thus we see that while the different form in which these are thrown is characteristic of the purpose for which each one of the poems was composed, there is a remarkable similarity of subject-matter and of the treatment of topic between them and the Nārāyaṇīya. The inference, therefore, seems tenable that the authors of the Tamil classics probably drew their ideas in this particular from the Mahābhārata, and it may be that they did so in other particulars as well.

With this we reach a condition in our knowledge of the *Pāñcharātra* which distinctly implies (1) that the formal text books of the *Pāñcharātra* were written and got into vogue perhaps later than the age of the Tamil classics. After an elaborate examination of the question, Professor Schrader came to the conclusion that perhaps the earliest of these are referable to about A.D. 300. We seem to have here in these Tamil classics a view of the *Pāñcharātra*, perhaps less formal, but none the less distinctly *Pāñcharātraic* in character, assimilable to the exposition of the *Pāñcharātra* as found in the Nārāyaṇīya section of the Mahābhārata. Perhaps with this will have to be taken such evidence of temple-worship of which we get glimpses in the Andhra and some of the pre-Andhra inscriptions of Northern and Middle India. There is besides the Bud-

[1] Poem 15, ll. 13, 28 and 66 in particular: also poem 2, ll. 23-24; and Pураru. 56 and 58.

[2] Nanaghat, Ghasundi and Besnagar Inscriptions.

dhist reference to the school of the Bhāgavatas,[1] which would take us perhaps safely to the age of Aśoka—perhaps the fourth century B.C.—and may therefore be regarded as perhaps about the age of the Nārāyaṇīya, as the late Sir R.G.Bhandarkar held. But the *Pāñcharātra* notion seems to have reached back to times much earlier. Readers of the *Chāndogya Upanishad* know that at the outset of this Upanishad, *Rishi* Nārada is found stating to Sanatkumāra the qualifications that he was already possessed of to fit him to acquire further knowledge of the Supreme, and in stating his accomplishments categorically, he is found to mention (1) Ṛig-Veda, (2) Yajur-Veda, (3) Sāma-Veda (4) Atharva-Veda, then the (5) *Itihāsa-Purāṇa*, (6) the Veda of the Vedas (grammar), then (7) *Pitryam* (that which relates to manes), (8) *Daivam* (Science of the Gods), (9) *Nidhi* (the lore of the treasure trove), (10) *Vāko-Vākyam* (generally rendered logic), and (11) *Ekāyanam*. Here *Ekāyanam* has been rendered as the equivalent of the *Arthaśāstra* polity. Whatever *Ekāyanam* is, it is rather hard to guess how exactly the meaning has been arrived at except perhaps the mention of logic and the Artha Śāstra together in certain well-known connections. But it could hardly have any justification either on the etymology of the word, or even with respect to its allusion. *Ekāyanam* seems distinctly to mean the one and the only path to salvation[2]. There is a tradition supported by the authority of the work Śrī Praśna Saṁhitā[3] that it constituted an Upanishad, rather the head and crown of Upanishads. We find the Mahābhārata refer to the *Pāñcharātra* as a *Mahā-Upanishad*. Such a work, how-

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[1] Bhandarkar's Vaishṇavism etc., p. 10.

[2] In the sense of a single course it seems to be used in the subsequent passages of the same Upd.

[3] J. R. A. S. 1911, 937. n. 1.

ever, has not come down to us, like the other Upanishads; but it must be noted here that the Tamil classics under reference refer repeatedly to those ideas being the sum and substance ultimately of the teaching of the Upanishads *(Marai)*, and even of the Veda *(Vāy-Moḻi)*. There seems warrant, therefore, for the belief that either as a separate and special Upanishad, or, what is far more likely, in the sense of a generally accepted truth by one section of those who study Veda and Vaidic literature, *Pāñcharātra* had come to be recognised by the Vaidic schools as the Ekāyana-Śākhā of the Śukla Yajurveda. The *Pāñcharātra* seems to have had an early vogue and a provenance of its own, even in the days of the early Upanishads. The *Iśvara Saṁhitā*, the *Pāñcharātra* text quoted by Yāmunāchārya and Rāmānuja, distinctly refers to the Supreme Character of the Śāstra. It is referable in its origin to Vāsudēva, not Vāsudēva-Krishṇa, but distinctly the anterior Vāsudēva, another name for Vishṇu as the one Supreme Being immanent in all.[1] There is support for this contention even in the Bhagavat Gītā[2]. I am informed that Madhvāchārya, in his Bhāshya on the Brahmasūtras uniformly uses the term *Ekāyana* in the sense of *Pāñcharātra*, and it is nothing surprising that he so uses it with the series of authorities before him. One statement in regard to it, in an attempt to explain the name, is worth noting here. It is said to be called *Pāñcharātra* for the reason that it threw into the dark five other systems,[3] and the five are stated to be Yoga, Sāṅkhya, Veda, Bauddha and *Pāśupata*, with which five this is joined to constitute the sixth. The Nārāyaṇīya section of the Mahābhārata again contains reference to the other four excluding the Bauddha, and places, of

[1] Ibid 935-37.

[2] vii. 19.

[3] Padma Tantra quoted on pp. 940-1. J. R. A. S. 1911.

course, *Pāñcharātra*[1] above the rest of them. Thus there is room for belief in the antiquity of the *Pāñcharātra.* It has had a continuous following, and is at the root of the Bhakti school. The *Pāñcharātra* itself refers certainly to *Vishṇu-bhakti,* while *Pāśupata* takes corresponding rank for Śiva *Bhakti.* The history of the *Pāñcharātra* is, therefore, bound up with that of the *Bhakti* cult from the very beginning to which we are able at present to carry our investigations,[2] and the two are associated together in the development of *Bhakti.* We shall have to reserve a more elaborate treatment of the subject for another occasion.

[1] MBh. XII. 359 '64.

[2] For the whole of this part reference may be made to a learned article by my late friend Mr. A. Govinda Acharya Svamin in J. R. A. S. 1911, pp. 935-961.

A MARSIYA WRITER OF THE LUCKNOW SCHOOL OF POETRY

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Mirzā Salāmat Alī, "Dabīr", son of Mirzā Ghulām Husain, was born in Muhalla Ballīmārān, Delhi, in 1213 A. H. He was descended from a very respectable family of Shiraz that had earned a world wide reputation. Mullā Hāshim Shīrāzī, a renowned Persian prose writer and the brother of Mullā Ahlī, an equally noted Persian poet, was his great-grandfather. His mother belonged to a well-known Lucknow family.

At the age of seven the Mirzā accompained his parents who had decided to migrate from Delhi and settle down in Lucknow. Here he was trained in the traditional manner in Persian and Arabic. He was barely 12 years of age when he began to lisp in numbers. His father finding in him an extraordinary talent for poetry took him to Mīr Zamīr, the best marsiya writer of the age, who asked Mirza to read out some of his compositions. Mirza recited the following Qiṭ'a:—

کسی کا کندہ نگینے پہ نام ہوتا ہے
کسی کی عمر کا لبریز جام ہوتا ہے
عجب سرا ہے یہ دنیا کہ جس میں شام و سحر
کسی کا کوچ کسی کا مقام ہوتا ہے

Mīr Zamīr was much impressed and undertook to guide him as his pupil. He also asked him to adopt "Dabīr" as his poetic name.

Mirzā Dabīr continued on the one hand his studies in Arabic and Persian with Mirzā Kāzim 'Alī, Maulavi Fidā 'Alī and Mullā Mahdī Māzindarānī, who were regarded as the best scholars of the age in Oriental languages, and on the other he proceeded with his Urdu compositions under the guidance of Mīr Zamīr.

He used to compose in Persian and Bhāshā also. For his Persian verses he became the pupil of Mullā Mahdī Māzindarānī, while in Bhāshā he composed 'Thumrī' and other forms of verse at the instance of Shāh Nasīr-uddīn Haider, the King of Oudh. He used to compose ghazals also and it is said that the number of his ghazals was so large that three Dīwāns could have easily been compiled. But he never attended a mushaira except on one occasion when at the request of his friend Mirzā Muhammad, 'Barq', he recited his ghazal, the opening line (مطلع) of which ran as follows:—

دفن کرنا مجھکو کوے یار میں   قبر بلبل کی بنے گلزار میں

Besides ghazals he tried other forms of Poetry as well but nowhere else does he reach the heights attained by him in his marsiyas. It is by reason of his achievment in this form that he enjoys his present position as a poet of the first magnitude.

It is very difficult to give a correct number of his marsiyas as he used to give away his compositions sometimes to his friends and sometimes to needy people who recited them as their own. His work as published by the Neval Kishor Press, Lucknow, comprises in 20 volumes of Daftar-i-mātam; 14 of which contain 366

marsiyas and the remaining 6 contain Salāms(سلام) Rubā'īs, (رباعی) Masnavīs (مثنوی) Nauḥas (نوحه) Mukhammas (مخمس) etc.

Besides these there is a good number of marsiyas which have not been published at all and are found in manuscript with the reciters of marsiyas.

He has composed a portion of some of his marsiyas in صنعت منقوطه *i.e.* in words where every letter has dot (نقطه) He has also composed two marsias from beginning to the end in صنعت غیر منقوطه *i. e.* in words every letter of which is without a dot.

The recitation of marsiya is no lesser an art than its composition. Unlike other contemporary reciters of marsiya Mirzā Dabīr used to read it out to the audience in a graceful tone and simple manner without any gesture. In the act of recitation he laid stress only on articulation, elocution, and modulation of voice. With these his graceful appearance succeeded in producing the desired effect on the minds of the audience.

He was of a swarthy complexion, medium stature, well built, but inclined to be corpulent; he had large eyes, a high forehead and a short beard. He used to wear loose trousers, a half sleeved Jacket under a loose Kurta (shirt) and a Changōshiā Topi (cap), (چوگوشیه توپی) ; the old type Lucknow shoe called *Ghētlā* was his usual foot-wear.

So long as Lucknow continued under the prosperous rule of the King of Oudh, Mirzā Dabīr, in spite of numerous pressing invitations from outside to recite marsiyas, declined to leave Lucknow.

Wājid 'Alī Shāh, the last King of Oudh was a great admirer of Mirzā Dabīr. He expressed his appreciation of his work in the following couplet;

بچپن سے ان کے دام سخن میں اسیر ہوں
میں کم سنی سے عاشق نظم دبیر ہوں

He was very pious and generous. He used to spend almost all his income in secret charity. His acts of charity came to light after his death.

On several occasions he gave away his marsiyas to others who made money out of them. He died at the age of 74 in 1292 A.H. and was buried in his own house in Muhalla Nakhkhās at Lucknow.

The scholarly style, the choice diction, the creative imagination, the classical allusions and the fresh imagery of Mirzā Dabīr make him a poet worthy of the most careful study. In order to appreciate his work fully it is necessary that the mind of the reader should adapt and adjust itself to the workings of the artist's mind, and attune itself to the proper mood. Thus prepared, no reader can fail to be moved and charmed. Even the most blasé will find something to attract, to surprise, and to charm them. Religion, history, classical literature, philosophy, are all made to contribute their share; but above and beyond them are his own shaping imagination, his own gift of vision, the marvel of his rhythm, and the capacity to rouse or depress, to exalt the reader into a mood of ecstasy or at will to dissolve him into tears. But even a great poet is not without blemishes. He gets so deeply absorbed in his lofty thoughts and so borne aloft by his imagination that at times he loses sight of uniformity and proportion and becomes careless in linking the incidents together. His style then becomes uneven and now and then there is a flagging of his wings.

Here are some specimens of his compositions:

کس شیر کی آمد ہے کہ رن کانپ رہا ہے
رن ایک طرف چرخ کہن کانپ رہا ہے
رستم! کا بدن زیر کفن کانپ رہا ہے
ہر قصر سلاطین زمن کانپ رہا ہے
شمشیر بکف دیکھ کے حیدر کے پسر کو
جبریل لرزتے ہیں سمیٹے ہوے پر کو

ہیبت سے ہیں نہ قلعۂ افلاک کے در بند
جلاد فلک بھی نظر آتا ہے نظربند
وا ہے کمر چرخ سے جوزا کا کمربند
سیارے ہیں غلطاں صفت طائر پربند
انگشت عطارد سے قلم چھوٹ پڑا ہے
خورشید کے پنجے سے علم چھوٹ پڑا ہے

Here are other specimens of his classical composition. He does not forget that he is a writer of marsiya even when he has to describe the sweet refreshing morning or the spring season. His imagination has transfigured even the beauties of nature into something that forebodes the martyrdom of Husain.

جب سرنگوں ہوا علم کہکشان شب
خورشید کے نشاں نے مٹایا نشان شب
تیر شہاب سے ہوئی خالی کمان شب
تانی نہ پھر شعاع قمر نے سنان شب
آئی جو صبح زیور جنگی سنوار کے
شب نے زرہ ستاروںکی رکھدی اُتار کے

شمشیر مشرقی جو چڑھی چرخ پر شتاب
پھر تیغ مغربی نے دکھائی نہ آب‌وتاب
تھا بسکہ گرم خنجر بیضاے آفتاب
باقی رہا نہ چشمۂ نیلوفری میں آب

محتاج ماهتاب هوا آفتاب کا
باغ جہاں میں پھول کھلا آفتاب کا

تھی جوش خوں کے عارضه میں مبتلا شفق
فصاد صبح آیا لیے نشتر و طبق
کھولی شفق کی فصد تو رنگ اُفق تھا فق
گلرنگ تھا صحیفۂ گردوں ورق ورق
خون شفق میں سرخ قضا نے قلم کیا
اور خط و خال روز شہادت رقم کیا

-:O:-

کوفه میں بہار آئی جو گلگشت چمن کو
شرمانے لگا رنگ زمین چرخ کہن کو
رگ رگ سے ملی نبض رواں گل کے بدن کو
لالے نے کیا ڈھل کے سبک لعل یمن کو
هر سرو بنا شکل زباں شوق سخن میں
فوارے در افشاں هوے تعریف چمن میں

وه جشن وه سبزے کا نیا فرش لب نہر
تھا صحن گلستاں که حسینوں کا بسا شہر
وه حسن زمین جس پہ فلک کھائے هوئے زهر
وه جوش گلوں کا وه بہار چمن دهر
پیدا نه زمیں تھی نه کہیں چرخ عیاں تھا
سبزے میں وه پنہاں تھی شفق میں یه نہاں تھا

وه مشک بدوش ابر کا هر باغ میں آنا
وه نہر چمن کا کہیں آنا کہیں جانا
قمری کا ادهر سرو کے منبر پہ ترانا
بلبل کا اُدهر مصحف گل پڑھ کے سنانا
کس رنگ کا مضمون ضیابار لکھا هے
قدرت کے قلم نے خط گلزار لکھا هے

وہ موسم گل رنگ یہ کوفے کے چمن میں
شبنم تھی کہ تھے موتیوں کے ڈھیر عدن میں
دنداں نظر آنے لگے غنچے کے دھن میں
بلبل کیطرح جان پڑی گل کے بدن میں
پر بلبل بستان نجف مرثیہ خواں تھا
زہرا کا چمن فصل بہاری میں خزاں تھا

—:O:-

یونس دھاں ماھی شب میں نہاں ھوا
کنعان بامداد سے یوسف عیاں ھوا
لیلاے شب کے حسن کا گلشن خزاں ھوا
عالم تپ فراق سے گرم فغاں ھوا
مجنوں کے رنگ رخ کی طرح دھوپ زرد تھی
تھی صبح یا زمانے کی اک آہ سرد تھی

Here is another instance of his lofty thoughts and poetic description:

پرچم ھے کس علم کا شعاع آفتاب کی
پانی ھے کس پھریرے سے ھمت سحاب کی
یہ شان ھے نشان رسالتمآب کی
چوب علم کلید ھے جنت کے باب کی
نقشہ علم کے پنجے میں اللہ کا ملا
بندوں کو اِس نشاں سے نشانِ خدا ملا

طوبیٰ کی شاخ تیشۂ قدرت نے کی قلم
اور نور نخل طور بھرا اُس میں یک قلم
کی صادقوں کی راستی قول اُس میں ضم
بے پردہ ھوکے عضو بنی پوشش علم
جب باندہ کر پھریرے کو سیدھا علم کیا
صانع نے پردے میں ید طولا علم کیا

———:O:———

سرمہ لگایا مد نگہ کی سلائی سے
ظلمت کو روشناس کیا روشنائی سے
بھاگی ہزار میل کدورت صفائی سے
کم تھی نہ میل کلک قدر کی صفائی سے
سرمے کے خط سے ترجمہ پورا نظر پڑا
مردم کو عین صاد کا سورا نظر پڑا

———:O:———

گلگونۂ رخسار فلک گرد ہے رن کی
ہر خار میں خوشبو ہے بہشتوں کے چمن کی
خورشید نقیبانہ لیے چوب کرن کی
کہتا ہے کہ آمد ہے شہنشاہ زمن کی
مانند براق نبوی رخش ہے رو میں
روح القدس آتے ہیں خوزادے کے جلو میں

رخشندہ ہے رن مہر درخشاں کی ہے آمد
ایمن ہوا بن موسی عمران کی ہے آمد
جن پڑھتے ہیں کلمہ کہ سلیمان کی ہے آمد
سجدے میں ہیں سب قبلۂ ایماں کی ہے آمد
پریوں کے پرے قاف میں بیہوش پڑے ہیں
پر خوف سے بالائے بدن بال کھڑے ہیں

———:O:———

اطلس کے بچھونے پہ فلک کو نہیں آرام
اس مرتبہ لوٹتا ہے کہ نیلا ہے سب اندام
سیاروں پہ ثابت ہوئی اب گردش ایام
خورشید سحر کے لیے اب حشر کی ہے شام
اک دم قدم گو زمیں جم نہیں سکتے
گردش میں ہیں قطبین فلک تھم نہیں سکتے

———:O:———

In order to draw a contrast and comparison between Milton, Firdausī and Mirzā Dabīr the following pieces are quoted:

Milton:-

"To Sun, who scarce uprisen
With wheels yet hovering over the ocean,
Shot parallel to the earth his dewy ray
Discovering in wild landscape all the east
Of Paradise and Eden's happy plains"

Firdausī:—

چو خورشید زد پنجه بر پشت گاو
زهامون بر آمد خروش چکاو
چو خورشید رخشان بگسترد پر
سیه زاغ پران فرو برد سر

Mirzā Dabīr:—

گلگونۂ شفق جو ملا حور صبح نے
اسپند مشک شب کو کیا نور صبح نے
گرمی دکھائی روشني طور صبح نے
ٹھنڈے چراغ کردیے کافور صبح نے
لیلائے شب کی رات کو دولت جو لٹ گئی
افشاں جبیں سے مہر درخشاں کے چھٹ گئي

or

پیدا شعاع مہر کی مقراض جب ہوئی
پنہاں درازی پر طاؤس شب ہوئي
اور قطع زلف ليلي زہرہ لقب ہوئی
مجنوں صفت قبائے سحر چاک سب ہوئی
فکر رفو تھی چرخ ہنرمند کے لیے
دن چار ٹکڑے ہوگیا پیوند کے لیے

Here are some instances of his creative imagination and the use of new similes and metaphors:

(۱) قرطاس پر رواں خط تقدیر دیکھ لو
آؤ خدا کے هاتھ کی تحریر دیکھ لو

(۲) طے هر قدم په ایک مہینے کی راہ ہے
اسپر هلال نعل کی رویت گواہ ہے

(۳) اس رخش کے منھ پر کبھی دن چڑھ نہیں سکتا
صورت کا یہ عالم ہے کہ سن بڑھ نہیں سکتا

(۴) صرصر سے ہے ایمن یہ چراغ رخ تاباں
عارض کو کیا خط نے چراغ تہ داماں

(۵) اکبر نشان سجدہ جبیں پر دکھاتے ہیں
یا سر نوشت نیر اکبر دکھاتے ہیں

(۶) شہزادے نے جو مہد کے اندر قدم رکھا
جھولے نے ناز سے نہ زمیں پر قدم رکھا

(۷) ناگاہ بے فروغ ہوا مشرق خیام
زینب کے آفتاب چلے سوے فوج شام

(۸) هیکل کا عکس دھوپ میں ہے کہکشاں نما
کاسہ هر ایک سم کا ہے جام جہاں نما

(۹) واں شور تھا پیدا مہ نو سے مہ نو ہے
یاں غل تھا جدا شمع سے یہ شمع کی لو ہے

(۱۰) عکس رخ جاں بخش سے آتا ہے یہ باور
آئینے میں ہے نبض رواں هر رگ جوهر

(۱۱) ناوک ہیں مژہ زخم پہ زخم اسکو دیا ہے
جوهر نے دل آئنہ کو بخیہ کیا ہے

The following is one of the instances where his lofty imagination has soared so high as to make him obscure:

شمشیر نے جل تھل جو بھرے قاف سے تا قاف
پریاں ہوئیں مرغابیاں گرداب بنا قاف

چھپلے کے لئے خوف سے اِسدرجہ کھٹا قاف
جو پلنچے میں سیمرغ کی منقار کے تھا قاف
کیا جانے کدھر لے کے خزانہ وہ بہا تھا
قاروں کو عذاب ابدی ڈھونڈ رہا تھا

Here are some instances of his poetic description and figurative language:

Description of sword—

کاٹا پلک میں آنکھ کو پتلی میں نور کو
پانؤں میں کجروی کو سروں میں غرور کو
سینے میں بغض و کینہ کو دل میں فتور کو
نیت میں معصیت کو طبیعت میں زور کو
ذات اِک طرف کہ متادیا بالکل صفات کو
کیسی زباں-زباں میں یہ کاٹ آئی بات کو

——:o:——

چیونٹی کی یہ اندھیرے میں رفتار دیکھ لیں
آنکھوں میں نبض مردم بیمار دیکھ لیں

——:o:——

عقبیٰ کے جو درجے ہیں وہ پانؤں کے تلے ہوں
دنیا صفت نقش قدم چھوڑ چلے ہوں

——:o:——

جس مورچے میں لیلی تیغ دوسر گئی
چمکی بہلوں کو سائے سے دیوانہ کر گئی
ہر صف میں خاک اڑائی اِدھر سے اُدھر گئی
پھر یہ نہا نہا کے لہو میں نکھر گئی
عالم نہ پوچھو قطرہ فشانی کے حسن کا
جوبن ٹپک رہا تھا جوانی کے حسن کا

سب کے گلوں سے ملتي تھي ليکن رکي ہوئي
جوہر يہ تھا کہ بوجھ سے خود تھي جھکي ہوئي

——:o:——

دریاے خوں تھا تیغ سبک‌رو کي ناؤ پر
پر یوں رواں تھي جيسے کہ کشتي بہاؤ پر

——:o:——

اُٹھي ، گري ، بلند ہوئی ، پست ہوگئي
پي پي کے میکشوں کا لہو مست ہوگئي

-:o:-

نیزے تلے تو اس نے کہا دیکھے بھالے ہیں
بچتي نہ خنجروں سے کہ گودي کے پالے ہیں

——:o:

قبضہ تو رہا دست جناب شہ دیں میں
پھل جاکے لگا شاخ سر گاو زمیں میں

بے جرم معرکے میں رہ خارا شگاف تھي
لشکر کا خون کیا تھا مگر پاک صاف تھی

——:o:——

تھی راست‌گو وہ تیغ یہ روشن جہاں پہ تھا
جتنا لہو پیا تھا وہ جاري زباں پہ تھا

——:o:——

رک رک کے قدم رکھتی تھی ہر سر پہ ادب سے
جھک جھک کے مثال شرفا ملتی تھي سب سے

Here is another metaphorical description of the rising of the sun;

یوسف غریق چاہ سیہ ناگہاں ہوا
یعنی غروب ماہ تجلی نشاں ہوا
یونس دہاں ماہی شب سے عیاں ہوا
یعنی طلوع نیر مشرق‌ستاں ہوا
فرعون شب سے معرکہ آرا تھا آفتاب
دن تھا کلیم اور ید بیضا تھا آفتاب
روے سفید یوسف آفاق شب نقاب
مغرب کی چاہ میں جو نہاں تھا وہ زیر آب
سقاے آسماں نے لیا دلو آفتاب
اور ریسماں شعاع کی باندھی بہ آب‌وتاب
یوسف کو دلو مہر میں بٹھلاکے چاہ سے
کھینچا نواح شرق میں مغرب کی راہ سے

Here is a description of the scorching heat of the day:

مٹی خراب چرخ پہ ہے ماہتاب کی
رنگت ہے برج حوت میں ماہی کباب کی
دریا میں آنکھ بیٹھ گئی ہے حباب کی
حدت ہے موج موج میں تیر شہاب کی
فوارے کو نہ حوض میں گرمی سے کل پڑی
پانی کی بھی زبان دہن سے نکل پڑی

Here are a few instances of his pathetic composition:

بانو پچھلے پہر اصغر کے لیے روتی ہے ایک رہ جاگتی ہے خالق خدا سوتی ہے

سوگ کا فرش ہے اور سامنے جلتا ہے چراغ
شانے میں داغ رسن سینے میں اولاد کا داغ
جان اندوہ میں دل رنج میں آشفتہ دماغ
نہ وہ گل ہیں نہ وہ غنچے نہ وہ زہرا کا باغ

گوشہ چادر کا اگر سر سے سرک جاتا ھے
ننگے سر کوفے میں پھرنا اُسے یاد آتا ھے

———:o:———

تم نے بیٹا مری گودی کو کیا کیا خالی
بخدا میرے حسابوں ھوئي دنیا خالي

—:o:———

ھوں وہ بے خود کہ نہیں مجھکو خبر ھوتي ھے
شام کب ھوتي ھے کس وقت سحر ھوتي ھے

—:o:———

بانو کے شیر خوار کو ھفتم سے پیاس ھے
بچے کي نبض دیکھ کے ماں بے حواس ھے
نے دودھ ھے نہ پاني کے ملنے کي آس ھے
پھرتي ھے آس پاس یہ جینے سے یاس ھے
کہتي ھے کیا کروں میں دھائي حسین کي
پتلي پھري ھے آج میرے نور عین کي

These specimens, though few in number, will, I trust, demonstrate the justice of the claim that I have made on behalf of Mirzā Dabīr.

DANDAKARANYA

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The question that we want to discuss here is, which is the Daṇḍakāraṇya of Vālmīki's Rāmāyaṇa ? A Hindu of Mahārāshṭra has no doubt on this point. At the commencement of a religious ceremony a pious Hindu has to make mention of the country where and of the time when he is performing that ceremony. In accordance with this practice a Hindu of Mahārāshṭra begins his ceremony with the words, *asmin Daṇḍakāraṇya-deśe*. From this it is clear that to a native of Mahārāshṭra Daṇḍakāraṇya can be no other than the country where he lives. In support of this belief other arguments are advanced by him. In those sections of the Rāmāyaṇa where the life of Rāma, Lakshmaṇa and Sītā in the forest is described, places like Pañchavaṭī or Janasthāna, Godāvarī, Daṇḍakāraṇya and so forth are frequently mentioned. This shows that these places were not far distant from one another. Now, people point to a place near Nasik which is called Pañchavaṭī. Near this Pañchavaṭī flows the Godāvarī. This is known to every native of Mahārāshṭra, who is thus convinced as to the identity of Daṇḍakāraṇya with Mahārāshṭra. Evidence of a literary nature is also forthcoming in favour of this belief. We have

thus a work of Hemādri called *Vratakhaṇḍa*. Hemādri was the Prime minister of the Yādava family of Devagiri in the time of its princes, Mahādeva and Rāmachandra, and flourished in the second half of the 13th century A. D. Now, the Introduction to his *Vratakhaṇḍa* contains a *rāja-praśasti*, where it is stated that the capital of these Yādavas was Devagiri situated in Seuṇa-deśa and that this Seuṇa-deśa was on the confines of Daṇḍaka[1]. Devagiri is the modern Daulatabad in Nizam's dominions. And as this Devagiri was in Seuṇa-deśa and Seuṇa-deśa was contiguous with Daṇḍaka, the conclusion is irresistible that Daṇḍaka is identical with Mahārāshṭra which is contiguous with the province round about Daulatabad. Another piece of evidence in confirmation of this is furnished by the Purāṇas, such as, the Vāyu, Matsya and Mārkaṇḍeya. In these Purāṇas it is stated that "the region about the northern part of the Sahyādri through which flowed the river Godāvarī and in which Govardhana was situated was the most charming on earth; and there, to please Rāma, the sage Bhāradvāja caused heavenly trees and herbs to spring up for his wife's enjoyment, and thus a lovely garden came into existence."[2] Now this Govardhana which was not far from Godāvarī cannot but be the Govardhana which is in the neighbourhood of Nāsik. This also points to the conclusion that Rāma was residing in the forest round about Nāsik, where the Godāvarī flowed and Govardhana was situated, that in other words, Daṇḍakāraṇya was in no way different from Mahārāshṭra.

Let us now consider the views of one or two scholars who have given some thought to this subject.

[1] *Bom. Gazet.*, Vol. I. Pt. II. p. 275, v. 19.
[2] *Ibid.* p. 186.

In *J. R. A. S.*, 1894, p. 231 ff. may be seen an article by F. E. Pargiter on "The Geography of Rāma's Exile". There on pp. 241-242 he expresses the view that "Daṇḍaka...appears to have been a general name which comprised all the forests from Bundelkhand to the river Krishṇā". This is a mere expression of opinion in support of which, however, he has adduced no evidence. It is well-known that from the hermitage of Bhāradvāja near Prayāga, Rāma went to Mount Chitrakūṭa and from there traversed through the forests of Nīla, Daṇḍaka, Madhuka, Pañchavaṭī, Krauñchālaya, and so on. Of these, Chitrakūṭa is doubtless "the range of hills stretching from the river Ken to about 20 miles of Allahabad" in the district of Bāndā as has been pointed out by Pargiter[1]. Bundelkhaṇḍ is no doubt immediately to the south of Bāndā. The view of Pargiter that Daṇḍakāraṇya had spread from Bundelkhaṇḍ down to the Krishṇā is thus not at all impossible, but he has not supported it with any evidence as was expected of him. This evidence certainly was not available in 1894 when he published his view. Twenty years later, however, one stone inscription and one copper-plate were published in *Ep. Ind.*, Vol. XII., which confirm the inference drawn by Pargiter. The first of these records was published by the late Rai Bahadur Hiralal and speaks of a certain prince in the following words: *Daṇḍakāraṇya-nikaṭa-Vastaradeśe rājyaṁ chakāra*, 'he ruled over the country of Vastara in the vicinity of Daṇḍakāraṇya'[2]. The country of Vastara referred to in this inscription is obviously the State of Bastar which is in Orissa and which is immediately to the south-east of the Central Provinces. It is thus evident

[1] *J.R.A.S.* 1894, p. 231.

[2] *Ep. Ind.*, Vol XII. p. 246, ll. 6-7.

that Daṇḍakāraṇya was in close proximity with Bastar, no doubt, immediately on the west of it, as the Godāvarī flows through that part of the country. It may, however, be contended that this inscription is dated Saṁvat 1760 = 1703 A. D., and is thus of a late period. Nevertheless, the other record, which is of the tenth century at the latest, was found in the Sonpur State in Orissa and has been edited by Mr. B. C. Mazumdar. It is a charter issued from Suvarṇapura (Sonpur) by Someśvara of the Gupta family and speaks of the king as *Paśchima-Laṅk-ādhipati*, 'Lord of western Laṅkā'[1]. From this one may reasonably infer that the district round about Sonpur was in the tenth century known as Western Laṅkā. Bastar and Sonpur are both in Orissa and are conterminous with each other. This shows that the Daṇḍakāraṇya of the stone inscription and the Laṅkā of the copper-plate were not far distant one from the other. We thus have one district actually named Daṇḍakāraṇya and another, Laṅkā, and both were comprised in the forest region. This was really the evidence which was wanting when Pargiter wrote his paper but which confirms his inference that Daṇḍakāraṇya was the name of that stretch of forest land which extended from Bundelkhaṇḍ to the Krishṇā.

Another scholar who has made a special study of this subject is Rao Bahadur Sardar Kibe, who has contributed a thought-provoking article to the *Indian Historical Quarterly*, 1928 (p. 694 ff.), entitled *Rāvaṇa's Laṅkā located in Central India*. He identifies Laṅkā with Amarkaṇṭak from which the Narmadā springs. If Laṅkā was thus situated in the southern part of the Vindhyas, the Godāvarī, Pañchavaṭī or Janasthāna, Kishkindhā, Pampā and so forth must have

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[1] *Ibid.*, p. 240, ll.6-7; also p.230 for the remarks of Mr. Majumdar.

been either in the northern part of or to the north of the Vindhyas. But Sardar Kibe was unable to locate these places and explained away these names, not as proper names, but as common nouns. Thus he makes Rai Bahadur Hiralal responsible for the statement that Godā 'is a common name for rivers in that part of the country', i. e. in the C. P. we suppose. Then he relies upon Mr. G. Ramdas Iyar who says that in the Śabarī dialect 'Jaitan' (=Janasthāna) means a place below the mountains just as Laṅkā means 'the high mountain' and that similarly 'Daṇḍaka' means 'a place full of water'. He has not, however, explained away the term Kishkindhā; nor was he able to locate it except vaguely by saying that it was to the north of the Vindhyas. Though this line of argument may not commend itself to everybody, his conclusion is by no means worthy of rejection. Some years ago Pandit Ramkrishna Kavi published a historical drama called *Kaumudīmahotsava*. Any scholar who reads this drama will notice that most of these places which Sardar Kibe was unable to locate were situated either in the Range or to the north of the Vindhyas. The hero of this drama was Kumāra Kalyāṇavarman, who, in consequence of the evil times on which he had fallen, was hiding himself in an inaccessible place, on the Vindhyas, called Vyādha-Kishkindhā[1], near the lake Pampā[2] and not far from the temple of Vindhyavāsinī. These places are not far distant from Mount Chitrakūṭa

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[1] *Kaumudī-mahotsava*, p. 3 f. Even in the Purāṇas Kishkindhaka is said to be *Vindhya-prishṭhanivāsin*, dweller of a country situated on the surface of the Vindhyas (Vāyu-P., Chap. 45, vs. 132 and 134; *Mārkaṇḍeya-P.* translated by Pargiter, pp. 342 and 360).

[2] Compare Pampāpura which is another name of Vindhyāchala-town, five miles to the west of Mirzapur in the United Provinces, where the celebrated temple of Vindhyavāsinī is situated (Nundolal Dey's *Geographical Dictionary of Ancient and Mediaeval India*, p. 144),

in the Bāndā District. And it was Cunningham, who, more than fifty years ago, expressed the opinion that the Godāvarī of the Rāmāyaṇa was the holy Gupta Godāvarī, or "hidden Godāvarī" which rushes forth from a cave in the hill nine miles south-south-west of Chitrakūṭa.[1] It is thus plain that the sites associated with the exile of Rāma have been pointed out as being in the neighbourhood of Chitrakūṭa in accordance with the view of Sardar Kibe though he was not able to locate them.

There is another part of India where the people say that these places connected with Rāma's exile were situated. This will be manifest to any body who has travelled in the Jodhpur State in Rājputānā. Thus six miles north of Jodhpur is Maṇḍor which was an old capital. On the outskirts of this village a place is pointed out which is called *Rāvaṇ-ki-Chauri* 'the marriage hall of Rāvaṇa'; in other words, it was the place where was staying the father of Mandodarī, wife of Rāvaṇa, after whom, they say, the village was named Maṇḍor. A rivulet flows by this hamlet, and a site on its bank is still shown where Rāma is said to have shaved his pate on receiving the news of his father's demise. If the father-in-law of Rāvaṇa stayed in Maṇḍor, Rāvaṇa himself was born, they say, at a place called Rāvaṇia after him in the Bilāḍā District of the Jodhpur State. Not far from Rāvaṇia is Chokḍi where in a small natural cavern Rāvaṇa is said to have pleased Śiva and secured from him a kingdom of fourteen *Chokḍis*. About fifty miles from Chokḍi is Kekind which is locally believed to be the Kishkindhā of the Rāmāyaṇa. And this popular belief is supported by two inscriptions, one found in a Śaiva temple and dated Saṁvat 1176 and the other in a Jaina and dated

[1] *A.S.I.R.* Vol. XXI, pp. 11-3.

Saṁvat 1230, but both giving Kishkindhā as the old name of the place[1].

One point which is worthy of note in regard to the places connected with Rāma's exile is that to whatever province we go that is not far removed from the Vindhyas, we find some of them located by the people there. Whether we go to the Nāsik District of Mahārāshṭra, or to the Bastar and Sonpur States in Orissa, or to the Jodhpur State in Rajputana or whether we confine ourselves to the Vindhya range itself, the people there are always ready to point to the sites of Rāma's exile which are situated there. The question therefore naturally arises: where were those sites then existing originally and in reality according to the Rāmāyaṇa? It will not be possible to give any satisfactory reply to this question, unless we bear two things in mind. The first is that there were real sites bearing those names. Thus Godā (i. e. Godāvarī) cannot be understood as common noun denoting any 'river,' or Laṅkā a 'high mountain,' but they must be taken as proper nouns denoting particular objects bearing these names. The second thing that we have to remember is: where can all the principal sites be identified without doing violence to any text from the Rāmāyaṇa? The text that has proved a stumbling block to some scholars is a verse from the Kishkindhā-kāṇḍa, which says that Kishkindhā was to the north of the Vindhya range. We will consider this matter before long, but here we shall concentrate our attention on the principal sites of Rāma's exile. They are the Godāvarī, Janasthāna or Pañchavaṭī and and Kishkindhā. Now, where can this Godāvarī be? Obviously, it must be the celebrated Godāvarī of South India. It cannot reasonably be the' Gupta-Godāvarī,

[1] *P.R.A.S. WC.*, 1910-11, pp. 35-8.

the small stream which issues from a cave in the hill a few miles to the south of Chitrakūṭa. First, because the Rāmāyaṇa describes this Godāvarī as a big river, and not a streamlet gurgling out of a cavern. Secondly Godāvarī cannot be the proper name of this stream. It must have been so called figuratively on account of its sacred water which is drunk by the pilgrims. The Godāvarī of the Rāmāyaṇa must therefore be either the Godāvarī of the Nasik District or the same river as it flows south-eastwards touching the confines of the Bastar State. It is scarcely necessary to repeat here that according to a stone inscription Daṇḍakāraṇya was immediately on the west of the Vastara (Bastar) province. But in this latter region they do not show any site called Janasthāna or Pañchavaṭī. Nor is there any evidence, epigraphic or otherwise, that it was in existence there formerly. On the other hand, we know not only that there was Daṇḍakāraṇya round about Nasik, but also that there was Pañchavaṭī near Nasik which is but another name of Janasthāna. Nor was this place known to exist in the span of the Vindhyas where Vyādha-Kishkindhā and Pampā are mentioned in the *Kaumudī-mahotsava* as being situated.

Let us now see where Kishkindhā of the Rāmāyaṇa is to be located. There are three Kishkindhās mentioned in this connection. One is the *Vyādha-Kishkindhā* of the historic play just referred to. This is the same as the Kishkindhā of the Purāṇas. The second is Kekind of the Jodhpur State, as we have also just seen. These two Kishkindhās are obviously to the north of the Vindhyas. In support of it is often quoted the following couplet:

Diśas = tasyās = tato bhūyaḥ prasthito dakshiṇāṁ diśam I
Vindhya-pādapa-saṁkīrṇāṁ chandana-druma-śobhitāṁ II
(*Kishkindhā-Kāṇḍa*, XLVI, 17)

It is true that this verse leaves no doubt as to the Vindhya mountain being to the south of Kishkindhā. But the question arises : where was this Vindhya mountain ? Is it the range that stretches all along the north of the river Narmadā, or is it some other mountain ? Pargiter long ago pointed out that just as there were two Mahendras, so there were two Vindhyas, and that one Mahendra and one Vindhya were near the extreme south of the Peninsula[1]. This agrees with the fact that Sampāti, who gives tidings of Sītā, says that when he fell from the sky on the Vindhya mountain, he looked about, and, recollecting the scenery, concluded "on the shore of the *southern ocean* this must be the Vindhya"[2]. It is quite evident from this statement that there was one Vindhya which touched the Southern Ocean. And what we have now to do is to determine where exactly this mountain was situated. Pargiter thinks that it "must be the hills and plateau of South Maisur".[3] But it is possible to propose another and more probable identification. He himself draws our attention to two passages which are important in this connection. The first is from the Rāmopākhyāna of the Mahābhārata which informs us that when the female ascetic called Prabhāvatī brought Hanūmān and his comrades out of the subterranean cavern, they saw "near them the salt sea, the Sahya, Malaya and Dardura mountains; then climbing up Malaya and seeing the sea" they became dejected.[4] The same scene is described in the Kishkindhā-kāṇḍa of the Rāmāyaṇa where the Vindhya mountain takes the place of Sahya. Now as shown by Pargiter, whereas the Malaya denotes the Travancore

[1] *J.R.A.S.* 1894, pp. 259-61.
[2] *Kishkindhā-kāṇḍa*, LVIII. 7; LX. 4-4,
[3] *J.R.A.S.* 1894, p.261.
[4] *Vanaparvan*, Chap. 261, vs. 43-4.

Hills or Cardamum Mountain, the Dardura represents the Nilgiris. That part of the Sahya which is spread over South Canara, Coorg and Malabar must therefore stand for the Southern Vindhya. Rāvaṇa's Laṅkā was thus an island which could be seen from the junction near the sea, where the Malaya, Dardura and Vindhya met.

The next question that we have to consider is: where is Kishkindhā to be located? It must be, of course, to the north of the Southern Vindhya and situated near Pampā. These conditions are fulfilled by Anegundi, on the left bank of the Tuṅgabhadrā, which is 'popularly identified with the Kishkindhā of the Rāmāyaṇa'.[1] In this locality there is a tributary of the Tuṅgabhadrā which is actually known as Pampā and which rises in the Rishyamukha mountain, eight miles from the Anegundi hills.[2] This Anegundi suits admirably the position of Kishkindhā indicated in the Rāmāyaṇa. But what we have now to find out is whether there is any evidence which is of an early period and which is of an epigraphic character in support of the modern tradition, in other words, whether there are any inscriptions which refer to Kishkindhā and Vālin's kingdom being situated in that region. Anegundi is no doubt situated in the Raichur District of the Hyderabad State. But it is situated at a point where this District meets the Dhārwāṛ District of the Bombay Presidency and the Bellary District of the Madras Presidency. Now in the Dhārwāṛ District two epigraphs have been found which are worth noticing in this discussion. The first of these was found at Ron and has been edited by J. F. Fleet. It records the grant of one Turagaveḍeṅga who sprang from the

[1] *Imp. Gazet.*, Vol. V. p. 373.

[2] Nundolal Dey's *Geographical Dictionary of Ancient and Mediaeval India*, p. 144.

race of Bālin and who was "lord of Kishkindhā, a best of towns."[1] Bālin mentioned here is obviously Vālin, elder brother of Sugrīva, who was a ruler of Kishkindhā for some time. The second inscription was discovered at Sudi and has been edited by Dr. L. D. Barnett. It refers to the administration of Daḍiga who belonged to the Bappura family and ruled over the Kisukāḍ-seventy. In regard to his origin it is stated that "when Jāmadagnya (Paraśurāma) came in the course of his wanderings, in which he destroyed the Kshatriya race, there were born, from the caves of Mount Kishkindhā, certain heroes, from whom sprang the members of the Bāli race, who are ornaments of the Bappuras".[2] This is an unmistakable piece of evidence that even as early as the thirteenth century A. D. Kishkindhā was associated with the south-eastern part of Dhārwār and there were rulers and big personages in that region who traced their descent from Vālin, king of Kishkindhā. To sum up, the evidence furnished by Vālmīki's Rāmāyaṇa tends to show that after all Daṇḍakāraṇya was no other than Mahārāshṭra.

[1] *Ep. Ind.*, Vol. XIII. pp. 186-7
[2] *Ibid.*, Vol. XV, p. 106.

MAÑJUGHOṢA

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Mañjughoṣa is one of the most popular deities of the Buddhist Pantheon and is famous as the god of Learning both in India as well as in all outlying countries where Buddhism was propagated. But the term Mañjughoṣa is somewhat loosely used and in strict iconographic parlance the application of the name is somewhat indefinite[1]. Mañjughoṣa is as much a generic name for all the different forms of Mañjuśrī as the term Mañjuśrī is. No less than forty-one[2] sādhanas in the *Sādhanamālā* are devoted to the worship of the different forms of Mañjuśrī. These forms give at least thirteen[3] distinct varieties easily distinguishable from one another. Moreover, some of the forms emanate from the Dhyāni Buddha Amitābha, some from Akṣobhya, some from the five Dhyāni Buddhas collectively, while others are regarded as independent forms because of their not being assignable to any of the Dhyāni Buddhas. These varieties have different Mantras assigned to each and the method of worship is different in

[1] See Chapter on Mañjuśrī in B. Bhattacharyya: Indian Buddhist Iconography, pp. 17ff.

[2] Sādhanamālā, Vol. I in the Gaekwad's Oriental Series, Sādhanas Nos. 44-84.

[3] In the Buddhist Iconography the number is mentioned as fourteen which is incorrect. The form named as Mañjunātha should be abandoned, as it is imaginery.

different cases. All these forms are put either under the head of Mañjughoṣa or Mañjuśrī, both being generic names. Here an endeavour will be made to find out the specific names that may be assigned to the different forms of the deity.

Mañjuśrī or Mañjughoṣa is one of the earliest deities to enter the Buddhist Pantheon. It is believed that the earliest Saṅgīti to introduce the worship, Maṇḍala and Mudrās of Mañjuśrī is the *Mañjuśrīmūlakalpa*, an edition of which has been published in the Trivandrum Sanskrit Series. This work enjoyed a great popularity in Tibet and was also translated into Chinese. When the smaller recension of the *Amitāyus Sūtra* or the *Sukhāvatī Vyūha* was composed, the worship of Mañjuśrī was a settled fact, as his name appears in this work.[1] It may be surmised therefore that the *Mañjuśrīmūlakalpa* where Mañjuśrī is first introduced must have been composed before the smaller recension of the *Amitāyus Sūtra* was written. The time of the composition of the latter work can be determined by the fact that the work was translated into Chinese between A. D. 384 and 417.[2] Moreover, the *Guhyasamāja Tantra* which is believed by the Nepalese Buddhists to be the earliest Tāntric work of the Buddhists and which must have been contemporaneous with Asaṅga, the elder brother of Vasubandhu, (280-360 A. D.) mentions the name of Mañjuśrī.[3] Under the circumstances we may place the composition of the *Mañjuśrīmūlakalpa* and the introduction of the deity Mañjuśrī somewhere in A. D. 200 before the *Guhyasamāja*

[1] *Sukhāvatīvyūha* ed. F. Max Müller in the Anecdota Oxoniensia p. 92, App. II.

[2] Ibid. Introduction, p. iii, not 4 (1).

[3] This work is published in the Gaekwad's Oriental Series. For its antiquity and probable date see Sādhanamālā, Vol. II, Introduction pp. xxviiff, xxxvff.

was delivered to an Assembly of the Faithful. Just as the *Guṇakāraṇḍavyūha* extols the virtues of the Bodhisattva Avalokiteśvara, the *Gaṇḍavyūha* likewise extols the virtues and powers of Mañjuśrī. This work is in 1400 Granthas and was taken to China in the seventh century and was translated into the Chinese language by Amoghavajra during the reign of the Tang Dynasty.[1] After the fourth century Mañjuśrī is mentioned in many Sanskrit Buddhist works and in the accounts of the Chinese travellers Fa-hien, Yuan Chwang, and I-Tsing. Images of Mañjuśrī are not to be found in the Gandhara or the Mathura schools, but they become abundant in the sculptures of Sāranāth, Magadha, Bengal, Java, Nepal and other places showing that the deity immediately after his introduction became extremely popular as the God of Learning in the Pantheon of the Northern Buddhists. The place assigned to Mañjuśrī is one of the very highest and he was considered always as a powerful rival of the most popular Bodhisattva of the Buddhists, the all-compassionate Bodhisattva Avalokiteśvara.

Many details about Mañjuśrī are met with in the *Svayambhū Purāṇa*[2] which deals with the glories of the Svayambhū Kṣettra in Nepal, popularly known as Simbhu According to the *Svayambhū Purāṇa*, the Ādi Buddha manifested himself here in the shape of a flame of fire and for that reason the place was known as the Svayambhūkṣettra or the 'place of the Self-born Lord'. It is further said in the same work that Mañjuśrī hailed from China where he was living on mount Pañcaśīrṣa;

[1] Raja Rajendra Lal Mittra: Sanskrit Buddhist Literature of Nepal p.90.

[2] An account of the story recorded in the *Svayambhū Purāṇa* with many details will be found in R. Mittra: Sanskrit Buddhist Literature, pp. 249-358; Hodgson's Essays, pp. 115ff and Oldfield: Sketches from Nepal. Vol. II. pp. 185ff.

he was a great saint with a good number of disciples including the king of China, Dharmākara by name. One day Mañjuśrī received divine intimation that Ādi Buddha had manifested himself on a lotus rising from the lake Kālīhrada in Nepal. Mañjuśrī forthwith decided to repair to Nepal to pay homage to the self-born Lord and was accompanied by large number of disciples, his two wives and king Dharmākara. But when he reached the lake he found the deity inaccessible being surrounded by a vast expanse of water. With great difficulty he approached the flame of fire and paid his homage alone. Then in order to make the god inaccessible to all he circumambulated the lake and finally with his sword cleft asunder the southern barrier of hills and the water rushed through that opening, leaving a vast stretch of land behind which is known as the Nepal Valley. Through that opening the water of the river Baghmatī still flows and the opening is known as Koṭ-bār or sword cut.

Mañjuśrī lost no time in erecting a temple over the sacred fire in order to consecrate it and very near to the temple on a hillock he made his own habitation. This is still pointed out by the priests of Nepal as the Sarasvatīsthāna. On the same hill he made a Vihāra (still known as Mañjupattana) for his disciples. Lastly he made Dharmākara the king of Nepal. These and many other pious deeds are ascribed to Mañjuśrī in the *Svayambhū Purāṇa*. Putting everything to order Mañjuśrī returned home and soon obtained the divine form of a Bodhisattva leaving his mundane body behind.

From the legendary account given in the *Svayambhū Purāṇa* it is difficult to ascertain the character of the deity Mañjuśrī as the account, to say the least, is shrouded in mystery. The account is, however, clear in giving

the deity a definitely human origin, his popularity being due to the fact that probably he colonized the valley of Nepal after making the place habitable by his excellent engineering skill by which the water could be drained off the valley.

Mañjuśrī is chiefly worshipped as the god of Learning and Knowledge, though he is worshipped also in all rites included in the Tantra; for bewitching, killing enemies, destroying houses, and so forth. Like the Mantra of Prajñāpāramitā, the female prototype of the god of Knowledge, the Mantra of Mañjuśrī is said to be most powerful inasmuch as it is able to confer mysteriously such rare qualities as perfect wisdom, retentive memory, intelligence, eloquence and the knowledge of all varieties of sciences without ever reading them.

As it has been said already, Mañjughoṣa or Mañjuśrī has as many as thirteen distinct forms, and to each of these a large number of sādhanas are assigned in the *Sādhanamālā* It is a well known fact in Buddhist Iconography that all Bodhisattvas emanate from one or the other of the Dhyāni Buddhas, and these emanations, in order to show their origin, hold on their crown a miniature figure of the parental Dhyāni Buddha. But with regard to Mañjuśrī the case is otherwise: some considered that Mañjuśrī is an emanation of Amitābha, others thought him to be an emanation of Akṣobhya or of the five Dhyāni Buddhas collectively, while in some Sādhanas he is not connected with any Dhyāni Buddha at all. The reason for this apparent anomaly is not far to seek. The Dhyāni Buddha scheme first originated with the *Guhyasamāja* which is decidedly later than the *Mañjuśrī-mūlakalpa*, and Mañjuśrī being a much older deity his precise position in the pantheon of the Northern Buddhists could not be ascertained correctly.

The different cults associated Mañjuśrī with the Dhyāni Buddha of their choice, and thus the idea of the parental Dhyāni Buddha in case of Mañjuśrī became entirely confused.

Among the different forms of Mañjuśrī the following thirteen distinct types can be recognised and it is necessary that the types[1] should be properly described and distinguished:

1. *Vajrarāga Mañjuśrī*, also known as Dharmaśaṅkhasamādhi, Vāk and Amitābha Mañjuśrī. This form is simple; it is one-faced and two-armed, and it emanates from the Dhyāni Buddha Amitābha. Like his sire Amitābha, Vajrarāga has his two hands joined on the lap in forming what is called the Samādhi or the meditative Mudrā. He can be distinguished from Amitābha only by his Bodhisattva ornaments which are absent in the case of Amitābha as he is a Dhyāni Buddha. Images of this deity are very rare and the only one that is known is preserved in the Museum and Picture Gallery at Baroda.

2. *Dharmadhātu Vāgīśvara* is another form of Mañjuśrī which emanates from the Dhyāni Buddha Amitābha. He is described as white in colour with four faces and eight arms, generally holding in the first pair of hands the bow and the arrow, in the second the noose and the goad, in the third the book and the sword and in the fourth the Ghaṇṭā and the Vajra. Sometimes he is represented with slight modifications with regard to the weapons held in his first and second pair of hands.

3. *Mañjughoṣa*, the third form of Mañjuśrī, is described as seated on a lion and as one-faced and

[1] See also Indian Buddhist Iconography, pp. 18ff and the corresponding Sadhanas in the Sadhanamāla, Vol. I.

two-armed, showing in the two hands the Vyākhyāna or the Dharmacakra Mudrā against the breast. He is decked in all Bodhisattva ornaments, is golden in colour and towards his left rises a lotus; he wears on his crown the miniature figure of his sire, Akṣobhya.

4. *Siddhaikavīra*, the fourth form of Mañjuśrī, is generally represented in either a sitting or standing posture. He is one-faced and two-armed, exhibiting in his two hands the gift-bestowing attitude in the right and the blue lotus in the left. He is either red or white.

5. *Vajrānanga*, the fifth form of Mañjuśrī is practically regarded in the Buddhist Pantheon as the God of Love, a prototype of Hindu Madana, who is worshipped in amorous Tantric rites. He is represented generally as yellow in colour, one-faced and six-armed. In the first or the principal pair of hands he draws to the full the bow of flowers charged with an arrow of red lotus; in the second the sword and the lotus; and in the third the mirror and the Aśoka bough. He also has the figure of Akṣobhya on the crown and stands in the Pratyālīḍha attitude or in the archer's pose. Vajrānanga is sometimes described as four-armed in which case the hands carrying the mirror and the Aśoka bough are dropped.

6. *Nāmasaṅgīti Mañjuśrī*, the sixth form, is described as three-faced and four-armed, the first pair of hands carries the bow and the arrow, while in the second there are the book and the sword—the two most important symbols of Mañjuśrī. He also shows the miniature figure of his parental Dhyāni Buddha, Akṣobhya, on his crown.

7. *Vāgīśvara*, the seventh form of Mañjuśrī, is generally described as of red or yellow complexion

and seated in the Ardhaparyaṅka attitude on a lion. He carries an Utpala or the blue lotus in the left hand, while the right is displayed in an artistic manner.

8. *Mañjuvara*, the eighth form, is described in the *Sādhanamālā* in several Sādhanas and his images are widely represented in several schools of art. He is usually yellow in complexion, seated on a lion in the Lalita or the Ardhaparyaṅka attitude. He is described as one-faced and two-armed, and as showing the Dharmacakra Mudrā. Under one or both armpits are seen lotuses over which are placed the Prajñāpāramitā scripture in the form of a book.

9. *Mañjuvajra*, the ninth form of Mañjuśrī, is very rarely represented, but this form is well described in the *Sādhanamālā*. There he is represented as of red complexion with three faces and six hands. The two principal hands are engaged in embracing his female counterpart (Śakti) with one hand touching her chin. The remaining four hands carry the sword, the arrow, the bow and the blue lotus.

10 *Mañjukumāra*, another form of Mañjuśrī, is also described in the *Sādhanamālā* though his images or paintings have not yet been found anywhere. He is, however, described as of red colour with three faces and six arms and as seated on *Sattraparyaṅka*.[1] In the three left hands he carries the Prajñāpāramitā, the Utpala and the bow, while the three right show the sword, the arrow and the gift-bestowing attitude.

11. *Arapacana*, the eleventh form of Mañjuśrī, is so called because he and his companions Keśinī,

[1] There is a considerable controversy regarding the correct interpretation of this term. The term evidently means 'an animal seat', but sometimes it is a mere sitting posture. In the latter case the term may signify a reclining attitude.

Upakeśinī, Candraprabha and Sūryaprabha take their origin from the five letters in the word Arapacana.[1] He is described in a large number of Sādhanas in the *Sādhanamālā* and images are found in large numbers in the different schools of art including those of Java and Nepal. He is represented as of white or red complexion and as seated on an adamantine seat (Vajraparyaṅka) in the meditative attitude with the legs crossed and the soles of both feet turned upwards. He carries the book against the breast in the left hand, while the right brandishes the sword. He is accompanied by his four attendants named above, who are represented in exactly the same way as the principal deity Arapacana. When actually represented in stone or metal the companions take the miniature form or the replica of the original deity.

12. *Sthiracakra*, the twelfth form of Mañjuśrī is described in only one Sādhana in the *Sādhanamālā* and is very rarely represented. The only figure representing this deity is in the Museum of the Vaṅgīya Sāhitya Pariṣad of Calcutta. He is described as of white complexion with one face and two hands. The left hand shows the sword while the right exhibits the gift-bestowing attitude. He is accompanied by his female counterpart or the Śakti, who is beautiful in appearance and displays the sentiment of passionate love with her face covered with smiles.

13. *Vādirāṭ*, the thirteenth form of Mañjuśrī, is also described in only one Sādhana in the *Sādhanamālā*, and his images are also very rarely met with. He is

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[1] Cf. Sādhanamālā, Vol. I, p. 118, from which extracts are given below: Śubhrākāra-niṣpannam Arapacanākhyaṃ - tasya purataḥ śukla-Rephodbhava-Jālinīprabhaṃ...tadanu pṛṣṭhataḥ, sita-Pakāra-niṣpannaṃ Candraprabhaṃ... tato dakṣiṇe śubhra-Cakāraniṣpannāṃ Keśinīṃ ..evaṃ uttareṇa śubhra-Nakāraniṣpannāṃ Upakeśinīm.

described as seated on a tiger in the Ardhaparyaṅka attitude. He wears all the Bodhisattva ornaments and is one-faced and two-armed, the two hands showing the Vyākhyāna Mudrā against the breast.

The above list exhausts all the different forms of Mañjuśrī so far known from literature.

SPACE, TIME AND BRAHMA

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The problem of time and eternity does not appear to have attracted the same degree of attention in Indian thought as in western Philosophy. In some of the recent Philosophies of the west, the problem of space and time in general and of time in particular has acquired a distinctive significance. Among the Indian systems, the Vaiśeṣika looks upon space and time as ultimate and objective realities. They are real objectively in the same sense and in the same manner as earth, water, fire and air (Vaiśeṣika-Sūtra i. 1. 5). In a corresponding *sūtra*, the Nyāya enumerates space among the elements (Nyāyasūtra i. 1. 13). Time is not included in this list; but in view of the close relation that admittedly existed between the two systems, the view of the Vaiśeṣika in this matter was obviously the view of the Nyāya also.[1]

We are here taking space for आकाश and time for काल. So far as काल is concerned, there can be no doubt that it means time. Of आकाश, however, the essential attribute, according to Indian thought, is sound which, according to modern Physics, is conveyed by air. But this is only a matter of detail; and inspite of this defect in the theory, it is clear that the Indian Thinkers used the word आकाश for what we call space.

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1 Cf Annambhaatta's *Tarka Saṅgraha* (3).

The view that the Nyāya-Viśeṣika put forward about the nature of space and time is after all the ordinary man's view. The man of common sense regards the world as *in* space and *in* time. And according to this way of thinking, space and time are more real and more fundamental than anything else. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika also affirms that space and time are substances (द्रव्य). And, so far as earth or air etc. are also substances, they also belong to the same category (पदार्थ) as space and time. Yet it is obvious to common sense that earth, water or air exist in and occupy space, and all changes belonging to them constitute a succession in time; and in that sense and to that extent, they are in space and in time. There is one substance, e.g. the soul, which strictly speaking, does not exist in space; but even it lives in time.

For common sense, therefore, the world is in space and time. Space contains the extended material things. And the changes that take place in the world constitute a temporal series. In space, the elements of the world co-exist; in time, we have a succession-series. This is how the world constitutes a spatio-temporal series.

But this idea of space and time as vacant containers which are filled by contents from outside, into the constitution of which they do not enter, is open to serious objection. We cannot really think of matter away from its space-quality or extendedness. Space as the empty container, therefore, is at best an abstraction. In the same way time as the empty possibility of succession is also an abstraction.

The difficulty of conceiving space and time as objectively real and at the same time different from the contents of the world led Kant and his followers to hold that both space and time were only subjectively

real. They were forms of perception—forms which the mind supplied from within. The things-in-themselves as they existed outside the mind, we did not and could not know. But when they acted on the mind and the mind came in contact with them, the mind perceived them as here and now or there and then. Space and time, according to this way of thinking, are quite different from what popular thought takes them to be.

As distinguished from these two views about time and space, we have in Bergson and Alexander a third and profoundly interesting view. With them space and time are not otherwise empty containers, which are filled by things and events into the constitution of which they do not enter. Nor are they mere subjective forms of knowledge. They are real objectively—and what is more, they are the essence of other existences.

With Bergson, time is a force—a force that creates and transforms. It is the stuff things even minds—are made of. We ordinarily think that there is an ego which has the psychic states. "But, as regards the psychical life unfolding beneath the symbols which conceal it, we readily perceive that time is just the stuff it is made of"[1]. And properly understood, material objects also will be found to be made of the same stuff. "The world the mathematician deals with is a world that dies and is reborn at every instant,—the world which Descartes was thinking of when he spoke of continued creation."[2]

Again, elsewhere: "If succession, in so far as distinct from mere juxtaposition, has no real efficacy, if time is not a kind of force, why does the universe unfold its successive states with a velocity which, in

[1] Creative Evolution Mitchell's translation, p. 4.

[2] *Ibid.* p. 23.

regard to my consciousness, is a veritable absolute? Why this particular velocity rather than any other? Why not with an infinite velocity? Why, in other words, is not everything given at once, as on the film of the cinematograph? The more I consider this point, the more it seems to me that, if the future is bound to *succeed* the present instead of being given alongside of it, it is because the future is not altogether determined at the present moment, and that if the time taken up by this succession is something other than a number, if it has for the consciousness that is installed in it absolute value and reality, it is because there is unceasingly being created in it, not indeed in any such artificially isolated system as a glass of sugared water, but in the concrete whole of which every such system forms part, something unforeseeable and new."[1].

Time is thus the stuff psychical life is made of. It is also the stuff of so-called material things. It is indeed the very essence of the universe. "The flux of time is the reality itself, and the things which we study are the things which flow. It is true that of this flowing reality we are limited to taking instantaneous views. But just because of this, scientific knowledge must appeal to another knowledge to complete it"[2]. To the ancient mind, change and becoming were a degradation of eternity, which was conceived as changeless and motionless. But "we should come to see in time a progressive growth of the absolute, and in the evolution of things a continual invention of forms ever new."[3].

Now, if time is thus the essence of reality, what about space? "The more consciousness is intellectualised, the more is matter spatialised" (p. 199). Kant showed

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[1] *Ibid.* pp. 358-359.
[2] *Ibid.* p. 363.
[3] *Ibid.* p. 364.

space to be a form of intuition : Bergson would accept in a general way the same conclusion about it, with this difference that, according to him, "the mind finds space in things, but could have got it without them if it had imagination strong enough to push the inversion of its own natural movement to the end" (p. 213). Again, we are told that the idea that mind forms of pure space 'is only the *schema* of the limit' at which the movement of mind down the incline of matter would end. And he tells us elsewhere (p. 218) that 'as regards space, we must, by an effort of mind *sui generis,* follow the progression or rather the regression of the extra-spatial degrading itself into spatiality.' And matter, although it stretches itself out in the direction of space, 'does not completely attain it' (p.219). In other words, matter is not completely material, just as space is a degradation of something extra-spatial. And when the philosopher takes a proper perspective, " he will see the material world melt back into a simple flux, a continuity of flowing, a becoming". Put in plain language, it would appear that spatiality, materiality and intellectuality are but sediments left by the life-current which is essentially time. Space, according to Bergson, is not, therefore, as fundamental as time.

With Alexander, however, space and time are not separable entities. The element of which the world is made, is neither time nor space, but it is Space-Time. 'Space and Time are not two things but one and there is no Space without Time nor Time without Space'[1]. We are also told that the relation between them is the same as between mind and body—Time being the mind of Space and space the body of Time. This Space-Time

[1] *Space, Time and Deity* Vol. II., Ch. II. p.29.

is the stuff of which all existents are composed"[1]. And out of this stuff gradually emerges a whole hierarchy of qualities, including mind. And in this hierarchy of qualities, 'the next higher quality to the highest attained is deity'. And 'God is the whole universe engaged in process towards the emergence of this new quality' (p.429).

The difference between Bergson and Alexander lies in the degree of importance attached to Space. So far as Time is concerned, their views converge: both regard it as the stuff of which 'all existents are composed'. Bergson would incline to think that it is the sole stuff which constitutes the world including perhaps Space also, which can thus be explained in terms of Time; whereas with Alexander, the stuff of which the world is made, is not Time only, but Time with Space as its body.

But how does the Vedānta view Space-Time? In the Vedānta-Syamantaka of Rādhādāmodara,[2] we have a brief statement of what professedly is the Vaiṣṇava-Vedānta position with regard to Time. Time, we are told, is all-powerful; it regulates the course of the world; and it existed even before creation. But nevertheless it in its turn is regulated and controlled by Brahma. Nothing is said here about Space. And the account must be regarded as very scanty and elementary.

In the Gītā which is oftener than not regarded as a Vedānta book, we find expressions like 'time, the killer of the world' (xi. 32). But these expressions, which, again, have been differently interpreted, cannot be taken as the basis of a philosophical theory of time.

If we turn to the Vedānta-texts, however, or the *śrutis* of the Upaniṣads, we meet with attempts at

[1] *Ibid.* p.428.

[2] *Vide* my Edition, published by the Punjab Sanskrit Book Depot, (Lahore), p. 29.

constructing a philosophical theory on the subject. But the relation stated there to exist between Brahma on the one hand and Space and Time on the other is far from quite clear and definite. With regard to Time, we have texts like Bṛhadāraṇyaka i.2.1., i.4.1., Chāndogya vi. 2. 1, &c., which speak of Brahma as existing in the *beginning* (अग्रे), i. e., *before* creation. Literally speaking, this is equivalent to saying that He existed *in* time. Such passages abound in the Upaniṣads. That Brahma was the beginning—the Alpha of things, that He existed before the world and would continue to exist even after it is dissolved, is the leading idea about Brahma. Obviously by ascribing temporal priority to Brahma, the Upaniṣadic thinker places both Brahma and the world in a chronological chain of which Brahma is at one end and the world at the other. And we have no clear reason to think that in passages like the above, the idea was to ascribe to Brahma only *logical* priority and not chronological priority in relation to the world.

With regard to Space, however, the Upaniṣadic theory is more definite. Taittirīya ii. 1. clearly says that Space (आकाश) arose out of Brahma. It was created. Brahma, therefore, cannot be conceived as *in* Space. But Space rather is in him; it arose out of him, or, was created by him, as the first of the things in the world-series, all other things containing it as one of their ingredients.

Instead of depending on the scattered statements of the Upaniṣads, if we turn to the system of the Vedānta-sūtras, we do not fare very much better. The cruder ideas of the Upaniṣads are no doubt clarified and rendered more definite; but the problem as such does not recevie a systematic and careful handling.

For, the Vedānta-sūtras could not possibly go beyond the *śrutis* of the Upaniṣads. The *sūtras* were, by profession and in reality, only an exegesis of these *śrutis*. Still, without pretending or admitting to improve these texts, the *sūtras* do, to a considerable extent, make the nascent ideas clearer and more definite than the original texts on which they are admittedly based.

In Vedānta-sūtra ii. 3-4., we have a somewhat elaborate attempt made to explain the order of creation. The chief Upaniṣadic text on which this account is based is Taitt. ii. 1., referred to above, coupled with Ch. vi. 2. The order of creation as given in Taitt. ii. 1., and as accepted by the *sūtras*, is: Space is the first to be created and it is followed by Air, Fire, Water and Earth respectively. From each preceding thing the next in order arises, not spontaneously but through the causality of Brahma. The causality of Brahma does not cease with the creation of the first of the series, but continues to be operative at each successive stage. In other words, it is not that Brahma is only the First Cause which produces Space and Space as a Secondary Cause produces Air, and so on. Though there are some passages in the Upaniṣads which would suggest such an order of causation, yet, when read with other passages equally authoritative, they can have but one meaning; and that meaning is that Brahma is the sole cause and he is the cause of everything and is also the direct cause at every stage of the creative process. This is the conclusion of the Vedānta and is embodied in *sūtra* ii. 3. 13.

According to the Vedānta, the created world, as we see it, is not premanent. It lasts for a time—and only for a time; after which it is dissolved or re-absorbed

in Brahma from whom it sprang. This dissolution also is not the final stage after which nothing happens; for the world is re-created, in exactly the same order as previously and that, again, is followed by another dissolution, and so on. In dissolution, the order is reversed (*Sūtra*, ii. 3. 14). That is, earth is first absorbed in water, water is then absorbed in fire, fire in air; and air in space, and this list is then wound up, so to say, in Brahma, who alone remains to bring the world back into existence. This process of creation and dissolution is interminable. It had no beginning either.

Taking the two ends of the world-process together—its creation and its dissolution—we find that, according to the Vedānta, there is a fixed scheme or order in which the world, as we see it, repeats itself at more or less regular intervals. It is very much like breathing—inspiration and expiration that goes on in the human organism. In fact, the simile of breathing has also been actually employed to describe the process of creation (cf. Br. U. ii. 4.).

This rhythmic cycle of creation, according to the Vedānta, as also according to the Sāṅkhya, follows a dual course of evolution. On the one hand, there is the material world the world of sense-perception which is object to us. On the other hand, there is the inner world of the soul and its senses through which it comes into contact with the world outside. Both these inner and outer worlds have their origin in Brahma and follow a parallel course of development. The soul, of course, is uncreated ; but the senses with which it functions as a self are created. And their creation is a process parallel to the creation of the world of space and matter.

Now, in this scheme of creation, in which space and matter form only one part, the other being the senses

which are presided over by appropriate deities, space cannot be all-pervasive; for, mind, obviously, with its senses, is above or beyond space. Space is only the substratum of the physical world. And so far as material things are concerned, space, according to the quintuple combination of elements (पंचीकरण), is an ingredient in each one of them.

But what about Time? Time does not appear to be accounted for in any way. None of the *śrutis* on which the Vedāntic theory of creation is based make any direct reference to it. It does not appear to have struck the Vedāntist as any serious problem at all. On the contrary, the conception of an endless and beginningless cycle of worlds, seems to imply that Time was regarded as uncreated and fundamental like the finite soul. Further, the statement that Brahma existed *before* the world, would also suggest the same conclusion.

Time certainly is not subjective for the Vedāntist. It is real beyond the mind. The question that we have to face, therefore, is: What exactly is the relation between Time and the world on the one hand and Time and Brahma on the other?

That the world is in time is apparent from the stages indicated of its unfolding. The essence of Time is succession and sequence. The world is a process from stage to stage, from space to air, from air to fire, and so on. And this is a succession and must be in time. Besides, not being eternal but created, the world comes into existence at a point of time. Because Brahma precedes the world, creation is an event in time. And whatever has a beginning has an end also; and so the world comes to an end–again an event in time–to be renewed at a later time. The creation, the destruction and the renewal

of the world, as also its existence, this whole series is temporal.

Alongside of this, we may consider the migration of the finite soul. Until it attains final emancipation, the soul migrates from body to body. Each birth and each death that it experiences is an event in time. The soul had no beginning; it is uncreated. But its experiences are all in time. Like the world-process, this series of experiences of the finite self also had no beginning: but unlike the world-series, it may come to an end, if emancipation is attained. When a finite soul is liberated, it is no longer in the temporal world. The nature of its existence after liberation from the bondage of this existence, is a question on which the different schools of Vedānta are divided. But on one thing they seem to be all agreed, viz., that in the condition of liberation or *mukti*, the soul is beyond the vicissitudes of this temporal world.

Now, whether any individual finite soul continues to be in this world or not, the world as such does not stop; there are other souls to be affected by it. The finite world and the finite selves in it thus live, move and have their being in time. But what about Brahma? Is he also in time? The epithets usually applied to him would suggest that he is not. According to the school of Śaṅkara, no doubt, he has no attributes. But so far as qualities can be ascribed to him, he is always and by all Vedāntists described as eternal (नित्य). And he is changeless, though the changing world is caused by him; and even though he is the ground and the material (उपादान कारण) of the universe, he does not suffer any change. Now, a being that is changeless and eternal cannot be in time. The essence of time is change and succession.

What, then, becomes of the *śrutis* which speak of Brahma as preceding the world? Precedence is a time-relation. If Brahma precedes the world and brings it into existence at a point of time, how can he be above time and eternal?

The word 'eternal' and its corresponding words in other languages also, are employed in various senses.[1] Sometimes, 'eternal' means existing for an unending extent of time; and sometimes it means timeless or above time. It is also used to mean transcending time, yet somehow including it. In which of these senses, can Brahma be regarded as eternal (or नित्य), if he is eternal at all?

Some texts of the Upaniṣads and some Vedāntist writers also would draw a distinction between two aspects of Brahma: Brahma as self-subsisting and Brahma as the cause of the world. So far as Brahma in himself is concerned, he is supposed to be devoid of all limitations and also incapable of change and alteration. And as such he is above time and eternal. But as originating the world, Brahma places himself at the further end of the time-series which is the world. Now, how far this bisection of the Brahma-idea is possible and how far this is justified by the *śruti* texts themselves, is a matter of dispute among scholars. But we may note one thing in this theory, viz., an attempt to reconcile the eternal character of Brahma with the temporal nature of the world around us. So understood, Brahma would appear to be eternal in the third sense of the term as indicated above. Brahma would then be above time and yet would *somehow* be including in it himself. This *somehow* would no doubt be a great mystery. And it was perhaps, among other causes, a recognition

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[1] Cf. Pringle-Pattison, *The Idea of God*, p. 343.

of this element of mystery in the relation between Brahma and the finite world that led to the theory of Inscrutable Difference-non-difference (अचिन्त्य भेदाभेद).

But whether such a distinction between the twofold character of Brahma and eventually a distinction between Brahma and the world—is admissible or not is itself a question. According to the extreme wing Vedāntists who refuse to admit any ultimate difference between Brahma and the world, the only conclusion that is logically possible is the denial of the reality of the world of time and space. *Māyā* or illusion would then account for both time and space as also of the rest of the world. In that case, Brahma would be simply timeless.

But the fact of the world cannot be dismissed with ease. Besides, the conception of the soul's migration (संसार) is there. This presses upon the mind the need for recognising time as a fact. And so far as Brahma as the sole cause of the world sustains this beginningless time-series, he must be conceived as existing for *all* time: i.e., he is eternal in the sense that he is existing for a boundless extent of time.

The Vedānta has not made any definite choice regarding the sense in which Brahma is eternal. With regard to Space, the Vedāntist's position is clearly and unambiguously enunciated in the *sūtras*. Not so with regard to Time. The conclusion to which, however, the Vedānta tends may briefly be indicated as follows.

Brahma is above Time and Space. Space is created by him and has the degree of reality that belongs to other created things. It forms the substratum of the physical world. It enters into the composition of all other material things according to the principle of quintuple combination. The gross elements, space, air,

fire, water and earth, are but compounds containing one-half corresponding pure (subtle) element, another half being made up of one-eighth fraction of each of the other (pure) elements. That is, one unit of gross space is equal to one-half pure space *plus* one-eighth of pure air *plus* one-eighth of pure fire, *plus* one-eighth of pure water and one-eighth of pure earth. The same is true of each one of the other gross elements also. This is called quintuple combination (पंचीकरण), because, in the composition of each element, all the five elements enter. And, as all things are but modifications of these five elements, all these elements are found in each one of them. Necessarily, space also enters into the constitution of each one of them, barring of course the spiritual things.

But time does not enter into the composition of these elements or of any other thing of the world. On the contrary, the whole world of which space is an ingredient is a process *in* time. And the temporal order of the world with space as an ingredient in it is in Brahma. Brahma transcends time and yet somehow includes it.

We do not pause to criticise this position. But there is one thing which may be noted in passing. If the Vedānta does not give a quite satisfactory and up-to-date account of Time, it was perhaps due to the fact that, unlike space which was an element (भूत) and, therefore, a substance in character, Time was regarded as *un*-substantial. Whatever its real nature may have been, the fact that it was not believed to enter into the composition of physical things nor did it affect the existence of Brahma, would incline one to think that it was either subjective or illusory. But for this conclusion also we have no definite warrant.

In Bergson, Time is the very stuff of which the world is made. It is also the force that makes the world. And in Alexander, Time with its body, Space, is the whole of reality in its beginning; we say *in its beginning*, because reality is not static; it grows and grows from less to more. Both according to Bergson and Alexander, new forms and new qualities are emerging out of this original reality. But what about a God, or highest spiritual reality? That, according to Alexander is yet to come. "Deity is a nisus and not an accomplishment".[1]

According to the Vedānta, Brahma is not only the first but also the highest reality. According to Alexander, the first and ultimate reality is Space-Time, out of which eventually the quality of deity will emerge. For the Vedānta, Brahma is the beginning and the end of the world—its Alpha and its Omega. But according to Alexander, Brahma, if that name could stand for the highest reality, would only be the unattained end of the world—its Omega, but not its beginning which was only Space-Time. Brahma may eventually emerge out of this original Space-Time, but he was yet to emerge. For the Vedānta, however, Brahma is all; he subsumes Space and Time. He alone is really real. The rest is his attribute or his creation and cannot claim a prior reality.

[1] *Loc. cit.* Vol. ii, p. 364.

CATUṢKOṬI

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In Buddhism there are two middle-paths (*majjhimā paṭipadā—madhyamā pratipad*) and both of them are expounded by the Blessed One himself. The first of them is the Noble Eightfold Way (*Ārya aṣṭāṅgika mārga*) which avoids the two *antas* or *koṭis*, extremities of excessive attachment to worldly enjoyments and to extreme self-mortification. And the second is the one that avoids the opposite views, such as *asti, nāsti; nitya, anitya; ātman, anātman; sukha, duḥkha; śūnya, aśūnya* etc. Of the latter, Nāgārjuna says in his *Mūla-madhyamaka-kārikā* XV, 7:

kātyāyanāvavāde ca asti nāstīti cobhayam |

pratiṣiddhaṃ bhagavatā bhāvābhāvavibhāvinā ||

"In the discourse to Kātyāyana, the Blessed One having thoroughly thought over existence and non-existence, has denied both, 'it exists' and 'it does not exist'."

This is based on the following or similar texts: astīti kāśyapa ayam eko'ntaḥ, nāstīty ayaṃ dvitīyo'ntaḥ. yad anayor dvayor antayor madhyam iyam ucyate kāśyapa madhyamā pratipad bhūtapratyavekṣā. *Kāśyapaparivarta*, ed. Staël Holstein, §. 60, see also §§ 52-59.

" 'It exists', this is, O Kāśyapa, one *anta*; 'It does not exist', this is the other *anta*. That which is the middle of those two *antas* is the Middle Path by which is reached true understanding of facts".

The Pali text runs:

Sabbam atthīti kho kaccāyana, ayam eko anto, sabbam natthīti ayam dutiyo anto, ete te kaccāyana

ubho ante anupagamma majjhimena tathāgato dhammaṃ deseti. *Saṃyutta Nikāya*, II, 17.

" 'All exists', this, O Kaccāyana, is one *anta*, 'All does not exist', this, O Kaccāyana, is the other *anta*. But the Tathāgata having accepted neither of them instructs the truth by the mean."

Because the doctrine systematised by Nāgārjuna is based on this second Middle Path it is called *mādhyamaka* and its followers are named thereafter *mādhyamikas*.

Nāgārjuna says about these two *antas* in his *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā* (V. 8.):

astitvaṃ ye tu paśyanti
nāstitvaṃ cālpabuddhayaḥ ।
bhāvānāṃ te na paśyanti
draṣṭvyopaśamaṃ śivam. ॥

"Those unwise who see the existence and non-existence of things do not see the cessation of the visibles which is blissful."

There is a work called *Jñānasāra Samuccaya*. Its original Sanskrit has not yet been found. But there is a Tibetan translation in Tanjur Mdo, Tsha; Cordier, III p. 297. It is called there: *Ye śes sñiṅ po kun las btus pa*.

The original work is attributed to Āryadeva. The following couplet (no. 28) occurs in it:

yod min med min yod med min ।
gñis k'i bdag ñid kyaṅ min pas ।
mtha' bži las grol dbu ma pa ।
mkhas pa rnams kyi[s] de kho n'o ॥

Its Sanskrit runs as follows:—

na san nāsan na sadasan
na cāpy anubhayātmakam ।

catuṣkoṭivinirmuktaṃ
tattvaṃ mādhyamikā viduḥ ||

"The Mādhyamikas know that the truth is free from the following four *antas*: (i) existent, (ii) non-existent (iii) both and (iv) not both".[1]

This is widely quoted in Buddhist and non-Buddhist works alike.

Instead of the two *antas* owing to which we have the name *madhyama* or *madhyamaka*, here are four *antas*. This very fact shows that originally only two *antas* were considered, and the other two were gradually added. This is quite natural.

This idea of denial of two opposite *antas* of which *asti* and *nāsti* or *sad* and *asad* are well-known and the most important, has found its first expression in the *nāsad-āsīya sūkta* of the Rigveda (X. 129.1) which begins with

nāsad āsīn nó sád āsīt tadā́nīm

"There was neither the non-existent nor the existent then."

Compare also the following in the same hymn (2):

ná mṛtyúr āsīd, amṛ́taṃ ná tárhi.

"There was neither death nor immortality then."

Naturally it is then found in the Upaniṣads. For instance, we read in the *Śvetāśvatara Up.* IV 18:
na san na cāsañ chiva eva kevalaḥ

"Neither existent nor non-existent, only Śiva alone."[1]
The following occurs in the *Bhagavadgītā* XIII, 12:

na sat tan nāsad ucyate

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[1] Cf. *Māṇḍukyakārikā* VI, 83:
asti nāsty asti-nāstīti
nāsti nāstīti vā punaḥ.

[2] Tripādvibhūtimahānārāyaṇopaniṣad (a minor Upaniṣad) in the *One Hundred and Eight Upaniṣads*, Nirṇayasāgara, 1917, p. 308:
tvam eva sad-asad-vilakṣaṇaḥ
"Only you are different from existent and non-existent."

"He is called neither existent nor non-existent."

In Buddhism, in the canonical works themselves, we come across the two *antas* mainly:

astīti nāstīti ubho'pi antā
śuddhi aśuddhīti ime'pi antā ।
tasmād ubhe anta vivarjayitvā
madhye'pi sthānaṃ na karoti paṇḍitaḥ ॥[1]

"Both 'it exists' and 'it does not exist' are *antas*. Purity and impurity—these are also *antas*. Therefore, having abandoned both, a wise man does not stand even in the middle."

astīti nāstīti vivāda eṣa
śuddhī aśuddhīti ayam vivādaḥ ।
vivādaprāptyā na dukhaṃ praśāmyate
avivādaprāptyā ca dukhaṃ nirudhyate ॥

" 'It exists' and 'it does not exist' this is a dispute. Purity and impurity this is (also) a dispute. Owing to the approach of a dispute sorrow does not cease, but it is suppressed on account of non-approach of a dispute."

Here there is a fact to be noted. In the first of the two kārikās cited above, it is said that a wise man does not stand even on the middle of two *antas* or extremities. It implies that the middle of the two *antas* is not to be regarded as an *anta*. Yet, Maitreyanātha, the first ācārya of the Yogācāra School, appears to have regarded it as an *anta*, for one of his most important works is named *Madhyāntavibhāga*[2]. It is

[1] This and the following stanza are from *Samādhirājasūtra*, Calcutta, p. 30, and are quoted in the *Madhyamakavṛtti*, p. 135.

[2] This is translated into Tibetan and Chinese. The Sanskrit original is not yet found. There is a bhāṣya on it by the great Vasubandhu and Sthiramati has written a *ṭīkā* on the *bhāṣya*. These two works are translated into Tibetan. From Nepal only a mutilated Ms. of the *ṭīkā* in Sanskrit was secured and it is now being edited comparing with the materials from the Tibetan sources by the present writer jointly with Prof. G. Tucci. The first chapter is already out. In this *ṭīkā* Maitreyanātha's original Sanskrit Kārikās are being restored.

to be noted that, like the Mādhyamikas, the Yogācāras, too, are the followers of the Middle Path, though they are not called thereafter[1].

The consideration of the three *antas* came in gradually. And the following passages from the Brahmanical works (*Minor Upaniṣads*) may be cited in this connection:

na san nāsan na sadasat.

Mahopaniṣad, loc. cit., p. 372.

"Not existent, not non-existent, nor existent-and-non-existent."

na san nāsan na sadasad,
bhinnābhinnaṃ na cobhayam.

Parabrahmopaniṣad, op. cit., p. 457.

"Not existent, not non-existent, nor existent-and-non-existent. Not different, not non-different, nor both of them."

As regards the Buddhist works we may quote the following :

vilagnadṛṣṭigahaneṣu nityaṃ
astīti nāstīti tathāsti nāsti

Saddharmapuṇḍarīka, II, 65 (p. 48).

"They are always entangled in the thickets of theories: 'it exists', 'it does not exist' and 'it exists-and-does-not-exist.' "

asan na jāyate loko na san na sadasan kvacit ।
pratyayaiḥ kāraṇaiś cāpi yathā bālair vikalpyate ॥
na san nāsan na sadasad yadā lokaṃ prāpsyati ।
tadā vyāvartate cittaṃ nairātmyaṃ cādhigacchati ॥

Laṅkāvatāra, ed. Nanjio, 1923, p. 156.

"As the foolish imagine, the world, owing to cause and conditions, comes into being not as existent, not as non-existent nor as existent-and-non-existent.

[1] See *Madhyamakavṛtti*, p. 274 ; Poussin, *Indian Historical Quarterly*, Vol. IV. p. 164.

When one sees the world as not existent, not non-existent, nor existent-and-non-existent, one's mind turns back and one understands what *nairātmya* is."

The following kārikā is by Nāgārjuna:

na sann utpadyate bhāvo nāpy asan sadasan na ca I
na svato nāpi parato na dvābhyāṃ jāyate katham II[1]

Lokātītastava, 13; *Acintyastava*, 9.

"A thing that comes into being is not existent, nor non-existent, nor existent-and-non-existent, and it comes into being not from itself, nor from the other, nor from both of them. How does it then come into being?".

Āryadeva, a staunch follower of Nāgārjuna, writes:

sad asat-sad-asac cāpi yasya pakṣo na vidyate I
upālambhaś cireṇāpi tasya vaktuṃ na śakyate II

Catuḥśataka, XII, 25.

"Even within a long time one cannot find fault with the man who does not subscribe to any one of the following views: 'existent,' 'non-existent' and 'existent-and-non-existent'."

It must be noted that it does not follow from what is shown above from the *Laṅkāvatāra*, Nāgārjuna and Āryadeva, that during their time the theory of four *antas* did not arise: for all these are often referred to by each of them. As regards the *Laṅkāvatāra*, we find there (pp. 122, 152.) the very word *catuṣkoṭika* used several times in the sense of the method related to the *catuṣkoṭi* 'four *koṭis*=*antas*=extremities '.

As for Nāgārjuna and Āryadeva, readers are referred, among many others, to *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā*, XXII, 11, *Catuḥśataka*, VIII. 20. XIV, 21.

It follows, therefore, from the above that though the theory of the three as well as of the four *antas* was fully developed during their time, they used to employ either of

1 See *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā*, I.7; VIII. 2a with 9.

them, the theory of the two *antas* having always occupied the first place.

We have seen that the theory of the two *koṭis* or *antas* originated first in the Veda, and the Buddha accepted it afterwards. As regards the theory of the four *koṭis*, its real author is neither he nor his followers, but of the very well-known six heretic teachers, Sañjaya Velaṭṭhiputta, as is evident from the *Brahmajālasutta* (41). Both Buddhism and Jainism were much influenced by the views held by Sañjaya Velaṭṭhiputta.

The *syādvāda* or *saptabhaṅgī* theory of Jainism seems to have had originally two *antas* or *bhaṅgas*, *asti* and *nāsti*, the remaining five *antas* having been developed afterwards. In regard to the above two *antas* dealt with in Buddhism and Jainism, it is to be noted that while Jainism proceeds with the aspect of affirmation of both the *antas*, Buddhism concerns itself only with that of negation. And there lies the difference between them.

PHILOSOPHY OF THE TANTRAS

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This is an attempt to show how intimately Tāntric religion is connected with that of the Vedas and how particularly the philosophical and mystical speculations of the *Tantras* rest upon the solid foundation of the Upaniṣads. The expression 'Philosophy of the *Tantras*' has its sufficient justification. We can really pride ourselves on possessing a popular system of philosophy developed by the *Tantras* on the lofty and sublime model of Advaitism. The *Tantras* have not only set forth a widespread religion but have contributed a scheme of religious discipline that runs parallel to the speculative philosophy of the Upaniṣads. The philosophy of the *Tantras* is a system of thought which forms the metaphysical background of the Tantric religion, and is a genuine expression of the mind seized with religious fervour and longing for liberation from the bondage of *saṃsāra*. In India, as in other ancient lands, philosophy got mingled to a great extent with theology; and every religious faith in India has to its credit a system of philosophy with its particular tenets and doctrines.

The *Tantras* in their items of faith did not make any noteworthy departure from the well-marked track of the Vedic religion, nor did they speculate anything about life and its final motive that goes

directly against the teaching of the Vedas. The influence of *Brahmavidyā* over the entire fabric of Tāntric worship is exceedingly clear. So far as the religious ideal is concerned, the *Tantras* have scrupulously followed in the wake of the Vedas[1]. The performance of many Tāntric rites is accompanied by the recitation of the Vedic hymns, and a large number of Vedic rites has been incorporated into the practical side of the Tāntric religion. In short, the whole range of Tāntric religion teems with Vedic rituals. Apart from theological considerations, the *Tantras* have another aspect which one cannot pass over without being conscious of its profundity. Although the *Tantras* generally deserve to be ranked with the *Smṛti* texts by virtue of their religious tone and exegetical aspects, it might be said in all fairness that they come nearer the *Brahmakāṇḍa*[2] or, in other words, represent the last phase

[1] Kulācāra derives its authoritativeness from the fact that it stands on the foundation supplied by the Vedas. In course of enumerating the special features of Kulācāra, the Kulārṇava has, for instance, alluded to the following Vedic passages as are often recited by the *Kaulas* in their religious practices:—

देवताभ्यः पितृभ्यश्च मधु वाता ऋतायते ।
स्वाधिष्ठानमधिष्ठानं चीरं सर्पिर्मधूदकम् ॥
हिरण्यगात्रं स्वादिश्च अबध्नन् पुरुषं पशुम् ।
दीक्षामुपेयाद्दिव्याद्याः प्रमाणं श्रुतयः प्रिये ॥ Kulārṇava, 2. 140-1.

Vedic hymns in parts are generally recited at the time of Tāntric *abhiṣeka*, *sandhyā* and other rituals. The Gandharva Tantra has given us the following specimen:—

ओम् आपो देवी रसोऽमृतं पूतं ब्रह्म पुनीमहे ।
जलाञ्जलित्रयं भूमौ मार्त्तण्डभैरवाय च ॥
ऊर्ध्वबाहुस्ततो मन्त्री मार्त्तण्डं समुपाश्रयेत् ।
ओम् उदुत्यं जातवेदसं देवं वहन्ति केतवः ॥
दृशे, विश्वाय मार्त्तण्ड शेषे भैरवमीडयेत् ।

[2] तन्त्राणां स्मृतित्वाविशेषेऽपि मन्वादिस्मृतीनां कर्मकाण्डशेषत्वं तन्त्राणां तु ब्रह्मकाण्डशेषत्वमिति विशेषः—Bhāskararāya.

of Vedic epistemology, elaborating and reinterpreting the mystic religion of the Upaniṣads.

The real object of Philosophy is to find out the Reality that lies behind the phenomenal world, to distinguish the permanent from the passing, and to appease the age-long craving of the human mind. It is interesting to see how the *Tantras* have either partly or wholly fulfilled these purposes by giving a truly philosophical interpretation of life. A system of thought, whether religious or social, may be consistent and good enough within its own scope, but it would deserve the name 'philosophy', at least in its Indian conception, only when it gives a solution of the vital problem, and provides food for both intellectual and spiritual aspiration of mankind. The *Tantras* have living touch with the religious instinct of India and have offered a spiritual interpretation of life whence one would draw fresh inspiration for all ages to come.

The philosophy established by the *Tantras* is not really an innovation, but it is a well-adapted reinterpretation of the time-honoured doctrines expounded by the Upaniṣads. The system of philosophy developed by the *Tantras* in general is highly monistic in tone. The dual aspects of Śiva and Śakti merge ultimately in the Inscrutable Unity. The *Tantras* have, to speak the truth, echoed the same truth and adopted the same view as were preached by the ancient *ṛṣis*. 'An identity in difference' or 'Unity in diversity' has been the last word of the *Tantras*. The *Tantras* have ultimately made no difference between *Jīva* and *Śiva*[1]. *Ātman*, it is said, conditioned by *upādhis* or *māyā*, comes to be called *Jīva*, but it becomes the same as *Śiva*

[1] जीवः शिवः शिवो जीवः स जीवः केवलः शिवः—Kulārṇava, 9. 42.

the moment it is freed from those accidental attributes. In the words of *Śiva* himself, a *jīva* is entitled to eternal emancipation when he is liberated from the bondage of *saṃsāra* by the force of self-realisation[1].

The *Tantras* have touched the keynote of the the *Advaita* philosophy by accepting identity between *jīva* and *Brahman*, and have repeatedly stated in clear terms that the highest form of *yoga* is the attainment of unity of *jīva* with the supreme soul[2]

The *Tantras* have always insisted upon the supreme importance of *jñāna*. Knowledge in its purest form is said to be the only way that leads to final emancipation. It has emphatically been asserted that *mukti* is attainable only by *jñāna* and not by any other means.[3] The *Tantrarāja* has only voiced the eternal truth of the Upaniṣads (*na ca punarāvartate*) when it says that *jīva* once liberated is not born again.[4] Most of the *Tantras* have exalted the supremacy of *Brahmajñāna* in unequivocal terms. The *Tantras* have recognised two kinds of knowledge: one derived from the *āgamas* (*āgamottha*), and the other obtained from spiritual experience (*vivekottha*).[5] The *Rudrayāmala* maintains that a Tāntric worshipper ultimately becomes the same as *Brahman* through the help of *Brahma-jñāna*, and that there is no self-elevating religion like *Brahma-jñāna*.[6]

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1 देहान्ते शाश्वती मुक्तिरिति शङ्करभाषितम् ।—op. cit. 14. 7.

2 ऐक्यं जीवात्मनोराहुर्योगं योगविशारदाः—Kulārṇava, IX. 30.
परात्मजीवयोरैक्यं मयात्र प्रतिपाद्यते ।—Gandharvatantra.
ऐक्यं सम्भावयेद्धीमान् जीवस्य ब्रह्मणोऽपि च ।—op. cit.

3 न वेदाध्ययनान्मुक्तिर्न शास्त्रपठनादपि ।
ज्ञानादेव हि मुक्तिः स्यान्नान्यथा वीरवन्दिते ॥—Kulārṇava, I. 105.

4 मुक्तास्तु जीवा न कदाप्याविर्भवेयुः कुतश्चन ।—Tantrarāja, 36.

5 Kulārṇava, I. 109.

6 साधको ब्रह्मरूपी स्यात् ब्रह्मज्ञानप्रसादतः ।
ब्रह्मज्ञानसमो धर्मो नान्यधर्मो विधीयते ॥—Rudrayāmala.

True to the remark which we have already made, we are again inclined to say that the *Tantras* coalesce with the Upaniṣads, particularly as regards the doctrines relating to *jñāna* and *mukti*. Some of the Upaniṣads have not only mentioned such names as Kālī, Karālī, Umā Haimavatī, Ambikā and Śiva, but have referred to the cardinal point around which clusters the whole framework of the *śakti* cult. The *Śvetāśvataropaniṣad* has spoken about the worderful part played by *Śakti* in the evolution of the manifold world.[1] The *Tantras* affiliated to the śākta school have explained the association of *śakti* with *puruṣa* (śiva) as the basic principle of creation.[2] The same truth has been revealed by Śaṅkara just in the beginning of his Ānandalaharī :—

'Sivaḥ śaktyā yukto yadi bhavati śaktaḥ prabhavitum,
Nacedevaṃ devo na khalu kuśalaḥ spanditumapi.'

The mysticism of *yoga*, which is said to have emanated from Hiraṇyagarbha or Dattātreya, has also been dealt with elaborately in the *Tantras*. The object of practising *yoga*, as conceived by the Tāntrikas, is to acquire the power of visualising the Supreme Soul within the limitations of the individual soul.[3] One who longs for *mukti* is directed to think himself completely lost in the all-pervading soul.[4] To a *yogin* the world of perception vanishes into the Absolute.[5]

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[1] य एको वर्णो बहुदा शक्तियोगाद्वर्णाननेकान्निहितार्थो दधाति—Śvetāśva. IV. 1

[2] शक्तो यया स शम्भुर्भुक्तौ मुक्तौ च पशुगणस्य ।
तामेकां चिद्रूपामाद्यां सर्वात्मनास्मि नतः ॥—Tattvaprakāśa.
परोऽपि शक्तिरहितः शक्त्या शक्तो भवेद् यदि ।
सृष्टिस्थितिलयान् कर्तुमशक्तः शक्त एव हि ॥Vāmakeśvara Tantra.

[3] ऐक्यं जीवात्मनोराहुर्योगं योगविशारदाः—Kulārṇava IX 30.

[4] मुमुक्षुश्चिन्तयेल्लीनां प्रकृतिं परमात्मनि ।—Gandharva Tantra.

[5] The definition of *yoga*, as given by Śaṅkara in his *Prapañcasāra*, is quite in agreement with that of the Tantras:–
'यमिहात्मनि पश्यति तत्त्वविदस्तमिमं किल योगमिति ब्रुवते ।—Prapañcasara.

Quite in agreement with the Vedānta standpoint, the *Tantras* have maintained dual aspects of Śiva, namely, *saguṇa* and *nirguṇa*. It is said further that from *saguṇa* Śiva, characterised by *sat*, *cit* and *ānanda*, arises *śakti* and from it evolves *nāda* and from *nāda* comes out *bindu*.

Next we turn to the Śaiva *Tantras* which are said to have streamed forth from the mouths of Śiva. The class of *Tantras*, specially originating in Kashmir, is popularly known as *Trika Siddhānta*, because it is based on the trinity of categories, viz., *pati*, *paśu* and *pāśa*.[1] The fundamental tenet of these *Tantras* is as follows:—"The eternal Being, free from all impurities, and, at the same time, All-knowing and All-doing, severs the fetters of bondage whereby *jīvas* are enchained and turned dissimilar to Śiva".[2]

Śiva-jñāna or *Śaiva-dṛṣṭi* is unique in character. It is of no human origin but has come down directly from Śiva, the repository of all learning. This *pārameśvara-jñāna* is said to dawn upon the *jīva* through the influence of initiation (*dīkṣā*) and practice enunciated in the *Tantras*. It may be expressed in terms of supreme wisdom that permits a *jīva* either to attain similarity with, or to gain unity with, Śiva.

The *Tantras* have shown a sublime ideal of spiritual experience which is in a sense different from all other forms of *sādhanā*. The Vedānta and other systems of Indian thought have in their own way dealt with *mukti* and the various means for attaining it. But nothing has solved the real problem in so authoritative a way as the *Tantras*. Wherein lies the outstanding

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[1] The southern school of Tantras has also recognised three elements, viz. Śiva, Śakti and Bindu.

[2] अथानादिमलापेतः सर्ववित् सर्वकृच्छिवः ।
पूर्वंव्यत्यासितस्याणोः पाशजालमपोहति ॥—Mṛgendra Tantra, 2. 1

feature of the *Tantras*?[1] Whereas all systems of philosophy are but creations of fallible men, the *Tantras*, which are regarded as an embodiment of *Śiva-jñāna*, trace their origin to the positive revelations from Śiva.[2] What is human naturally runs the risk of being mistaken, but what comes directly from the supreme personality remains an unassailable fact for ever. Divine wisdom is far above all limitations and imperfections.

The *Tantras* belonging to the dualistic class have emphatically denounced the *Advaita* standpoint as advocated by the Vedāntin.[3] Objection is raised against *Advaitism* on account of the fact that its exponents have supported the monistic nature of the soul by means of evidence that is far from being real and adequate.[4] Moreover, the *Advaita* doctrine cannot stand, since the recognition of two categories, such as *pramāṇa* and *prameya*, is in direct opposition to the strict interpretation of non-dualism maintained by the Vedāntin.[5] Aghora Śivācārya, a Tāntrik teacher of great reputation, advanced arguments to show the hollowness of *Advaitism*, while commenting on the *Ratnatraya Kārikās*.[6]

The Sāṃkhya doctrine of *prakṛti* has also met with similar refutation at the hands of the Tāntrikas. To

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[1] वेदान्तसांख्यसदसत्पादार्थिकमतादिषु ।
ससाधना मुक्तिरस्ति को विशेषः शिवागमे ॥—*op. cit.*

[2] प्रणेत्रसर्वदर्शित्वान्न स्फुटो वस्तुसंग्रहः ।
उपायाः सकलास्तद्वच्छैवे सर्वमिदं परम् ॥—Mṛgendra Tantra, 2.11.

[3] वेदान्तेष्वेक एवात्मा चिदचिद्व्यक्तिलक्षितः ।
प्रतिज्ञामात्रमेवेदं निश्चयः किंनिबन्धनः ॥—*op. cit.*

[4] अथ प्रमाणं तत्रात्मा प्रमेयत्वं प्रपद्यते ।
यत्रैतदुभयं तत्र चतुष्टयमपि स्थितम् ॥—*op. cit.*

[5] अद्वैतहानिरेवं स्यान्निष्प्रमाणकृतान्यथा ।—*op. cit.*

[6] वेदान्तैश्च कुलाम्नायैस्तथान्यैः प्रतिपाद्यते ।
आनन्दविप्रलब्धानामानन्दोपहिता चितिः ॥—Ratnatraya, 14.

the Tāntrikas *prakṛti* is not an eternal entity but evolves out of *Kalā*. To regard the same as the ultimate cause of the world[1] (*pradhānāt sarvamajāyata*) is a huge falsity[2].

We have given here only a brief account of the monistic and dualistic schools of the *Tantras*, without dwelling upon any specific points. There are other contents of the *Tantras* (such as *nāda*, *bindu* and *kalā*) which have deeper significance. But this is not the proper place to deal with them with the thoroughness they deserve. The *Tantras* have developed the doctrine of *Śabda-Brahman* to the highest degree of perfection, laying particular stress on the supreme value of *Vāc*. The mystic process of devotion inculcated in the *Tantras*, by way of emphasising the potency of the *mantras* and the necessity of concentrating the mind on the deity behind *bīja*, gives rise to a kind of spiritual consciousness in which the worshipper finds himself ultimately united with the Supreme Being, and thus gets all his inner cravings fully satisfied.

[1] To confound *Kārya* with *Kāraṇa*.

[2] सांख्यज्ञानेऽपि मिथ्यात्वं कार्ये कारणबुद्धितः ।—Mṛgendra Tantra

TWO INSCRIPTIONS FROM KOSAM.

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In the month of January 1928 I went out from Allahabad on a historical trip, accompanied by my students of Ancient Indian History, to the village Kosam, the site of Kauśāmbī, famous in history and legend.

While at Kosam I discovered one inscribed stone in the hut of a local *mallah* or boatman who, ignorant of its value, had been using it as a support for his water jars. Another large inscribed stone was found near the entrance to the house of a village Brahmin who was using it as a paving to a raised platform near his house intended for visitors. The inscription in the latter stone was somewhat mutilated as a result, I think, of the utilitarian purpose it was being made to serve. The other inscription in the possession of the *mallah* was also somewhat damaged, two or three letters being worn off.

In the absence of proper conveyance facilities, I could not immediately bring the stones to Allahabad. I made imperfect eye copies of the two inscriptions but could not decipher them properly.

Nearly a couple of months later I made another trip to Kosam accompanied by Prof. Parmanand of the Allahabad University. On this occasion I purchased the stone that was in the possession of the *mallah* and succeeded in bringing it to Allahabad with the assistance of the professor. The other stone was too large to be brought to Allahabad without special arrangements and

so I made a careful eye copy of the inscription recorded on it.[1] I now intend to edit the two inscriptions that were thus rendered available in this article. I have to acknowledge with thanks the suggestions I received from my esteemed colleague Pandit Kshetreśachandra Chaṭṭopādhyāya of the Sanskrit Department of the Allahabad University and the profit I derived from a discussion about the readings of one of the inscriptions with Rai Bahadur Daya Ram Sahni, the late Director-general of Archæology. It was gratifying to find that he generally agreed with my interpretations of some difficult words in the inscription.

Kosam is a village situated on the river Jumna about forty miles from Allahabad by the usual route, in Pargana Karari, Tahsil Manjhanpur, Dist. Allahabad. It is the site of ancient Kauśāmbī of hoary antiquity as was first pointed out by Cunningham.[2] The indentification as is well known was doubted by Dr. Vincent A. Smith who, relying on certain topographical bearings given by the Chinese pilgrim Hiuen-tsang, located it in the Rewah District[3]. The identification, however, has been placed beyond the vestige of a doubt by the happy discoveries of Rai Bahadur Daya Ram Sahni who has conclusively proved in the Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society for 1927[4] on the strength of two inscriptions that the vast ruins of Kosam represent

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1 Recently the stone was acquired and brought to Allahabad by Pandit Braj Mohan Vyas, the indefatigable collector of antiquities, for the Museum attached to the Allahabad Municipal Board of which he is the Executive officer. A very accurate estampage of the inscription recorded on it was supplied to me by him. The other stone, acquired by me, has been lent at his request to the Museum. Mr. Vyās was good enough to supply me with an estampage of this inscription as well.

2 Cunningham, Archæological Survey Report, Vol. 1, pp. 303-308.

3 Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society, 1898, pp. 503-519.

4 Pp. 689-698.

the ancient city of Kauśāmbī, the headquarters of a provincial administration during several succeeding dynasties and an important trading centre lying on the main commercial route from Bhṛgukacchha or Broach to Pāṭalīputra, modern Patna.

Of the two inscribed stones discovered at Kosam, the one acquired by me is irregularly broken on one side and is evidently only a fragment of the original. Fortunately, however, the inscription recorded on it, to be described hearafter as Inscription no. A., is complete. The portion broken off and lost did not contain any further record. It is not possible to say exactly what the original size of the stone was. It was rectangular in shape 1′ 9″ broad and probably 1′ 10½″ long. The stone, as it stands at present, measures 1′9″ along the top. The two sides of its length measure respectively 1′ 10½″ and 1′ 4″, approxmiately, the extremities of these being joined together by the irregular line forming the broken edge of the stone.

The inscription engraved on the stone covers roughly a space of 1′9″ by 1′4″. It consists of six full lines engraved along the full breadth of the stone and two letters in the seventh line. There is no space left unoccupied at the top. A portion of the stone only from the 7th line up to the broken extremity is left blank. The last letter of the 2nd line is smaller in size than the rest evidently because there was want of space. The last letters of the third and fourth lines have been effaced.

The inscription is well preserved. The execution is neat. The characters are large and bold, the length of some of the letters, including ligatures, being more than 2″.

The other inscribed stone, acquired by Mr. Vyas, is perfectly intact. It is rectangular in shape but rounded off at the top neatly, evidently by the stone-cutter. The length and breadth of the rectangular portion are 2'8" and 2'5" respectivly. The height of the arc is 11¾". The inscription, to be described hereafter as Inscription No. B, occupies the rounded space at the top. It consists of fine lines and has suffered some considerable damage, probably owing to the fact that the stone on which it is recorded was used for a long time as a kind of bench for sitting on. The proper name *Māṅgaṇī* occurring in the third line can be read with considerable difficulty. Indeed, but for the occurrence of the name in a clear legible form in Inscription No. A, it could not be read at all. Similarly the ligature *ttra* of the word '*pattra*' occurring in the same line is blurred. Finally, in the 5th line there are at least three letters which have been completely obliterated owing to the stone being broken off at the particular place.

The standard of Brāhmī characters which the two records present refers them in my opinion to a period not later than the 3rd century A. D. In other words, the characters of the records belong to the northern class of alphabets of the Kushan period. Among the Brāhmī letters of these two records one may observe all the salient features of Kushan palæography, though it must be admitted that at first sight one may notice many resemblances in the characters with those of the Gupta period. Mr. Daya Ram Sahni discovered in the cold weather of 1921-22, when he was engaged in the preliminary operations connected with the re-erection of the ancient pillar in the ruined fort of Kosam, three inscriptions in a

village in the vicinity of Kosam. Inscription No. 2 is a record of Śivamagha engraved on the 1st day of the 2nd fortnight of a certain year which is lost. Inscription No. 3 is a record of prince Bhadramagha of year 87. These two records discovered by Mr. Sahni being fragmentary and mutilated, he could not assign them definitely to any period though he conjectured that they belonged to the Gupta period. It is, however, now possible to refer all these records, including the two under discussion, to the era in which the inscriptions of the Kanishka Group of kings are recorded and that for the following reasons.

In the dated Kushan records in the Brāhmī script from the Mathura region and in the inscription of Friar Bala at Sarnath we meet with two modes of dating, viz. (1) giving the year, season, number of month within the season and day, (2) giving year, month and day[1]. A third mode of dating is found in the inscription of king Aśvaghoṣa of the year 40 recorded on the Sarnath pillar. The fragmentary inscription of Aśvaghoṣa's reign discovered by Mr. Oertel also contains seasonal date, though the date itself has been lost[2]. The same mode of dating is found in the Nāsik inscriptions of Gautamīputra Śātakarṇi and Vāsiṣṭhīputra Pulumāyi[3]. This mode gives the year, season, number of Pakṣa within the season and day. All the four records found at Kauśāmbī follow this mode of dating. It appears that in the Kauśāmbī and Sarnath regions this mode of dating was prevalent. It is not met with in the Brāhmī

[1] For examples of both the modes see Lüders' List of Brahmi Inscriptions, Epigraphica Indica, Vol. X, Appendix, pp. 3-15

[2] See inscriptions No. 922 and 924, Lüders' List, p. 93: also Epigraphica Indica, Vol. VIII, pp. 171-172.

[3] *Vide* inscriptions No. 1122, 1123, 1125, 1126 and others in Lüders' List,

records from Mathurā. The Gupta dates are the ordinary lunar month dates. To this there is only one exception and that too doubtfully so, viz., the inscription of the year 114 of the reign of Kumāragupta which is a compromise between season dates and lunar month dates, because it mentions both the season Hemanta and the lunar month Kārttika.

Secondly, the language of the inscription is mixed Sanskrit and Prakrit. As in Kushan inscriptions, the only two purely verbal forms are *vardhatu* and *prīyatām*. The long *ā* is ommitted; cf. the word *mahārajasya*. The form *elāya pūrvāya* resembles very closely the various mutilated and barbarous forms of the Sanskrit *etasyām pūrvāyām*. Such features are characterstic of the inscriptions of the Kushan period but not of the Gupta period. It may be noticed here that the Sanskrit used in both the inscriptions is incorrect.

Thirdly, the palæography of the inscriptions creates no difficulty in assigning them to the Kushan period. The exact epoch of the Kushans is yet an unsettled fact of Ancient Indian History. "But the substantial controversy is between the scholars who place the accession of Kanishka in A. D. 78 and those who date it later in about 120 A. D." Sir John Marshall made out a fairly convincing case for a date in the earlier half of the 2nd century A. D.[1] and Sten Konow's latest article on the subject[2] tries to make out a case for a much later date. On the view that Kanishka's accession took place in 78 A.D., the inscriptions under discussion have to be referred to about 165 A. D. (87, the year mentioned in the inscriptions, + 78). If,

[1] Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society, 1914, p. 273 ff.

[2] Kalawan Copper Plate Inscription. J. R. A. S., 1932. pp 910 ff.

however, the later dates are adopted, the inscriptions have to be referred to the 3rd century A. D. In either case we are not faced with any palæographical difficulty at all.

The characters of the inscriptions generally resemble those of the inscriptions of the year 3 of Kanishka and those of Rājan Aśvaghosha found at Sarnath, though it has to be admitted that they exhibit in certain letters later forms current in the Gupta period in the fifth century A. D.

Now, Kauśāmbī was an important centre of Jainism and it is very likely that the inscriptions themselves are Jaina. They end with the benedictory formula common to such inscriptions, viz., *dharma puṇya vardhatu* (Inscription A) or *puṇya vardhatu* (Inscription B). Moreover, Inscription No. B begins with the invocation *siddham*, also a Jaina formula. According to the late lamented Rakhal Das Banerji, "it is very difficult to distinguish between the Jaina inscriptions of the Kushān period and those of the Gupta period"[1]. Prof. Bhandarkar seems to hold the same view. "There seems to be" says he, "no palæographical peculiarity of any kind which demarcates the early Gupta from the Kushān script."[2] The Jaina inscriptions were in a script which was much in advance even of the current script. The cause of this is not far to seek. The merchants and traders, which the Jaina donors usually were, used an extremely cursive script in their daily transactions. The script which was in advance even of the current hand of the period was copied in the records of the

[1] R. D. Banerji. Scythian Period of Indian History. *Indian Antiquary*, Feb. 1908, p. 52.

[2] D. R. Bhandarkar. Mathura Pillar Inscription of Chandragupta II, Gupta year 61. *Epigraphica Indica* XXI, p. 2.

religious donations by the engraver. That explains the advanced forms of the characters of the present inscriptions as well.

The inscriptions present the following advanced forms of letters and later peculiarities:—

(1) The letter *sa* is looped; but in the Kushan inscriptions also it is occasionally so.

(2) The letter *ma*, which resembles the form in Harisena's inscription and Gupta inscriptions generally.

(3) The subscript *ya* is always bipartite, whereas generally in the Kushan inscriptions whenever the subscript *ya* is bipartite the tripartite form also occurs with it. But in the Jaina inscriptions from Mathura the subscript *ya* is generally bipartite.

On the other hand the forms of the majority of the letters distinctly belong to the later variety of the Kushan script and are even earlier:—

(1) The form of the subscript lingual *ṣa* as found in *pakṣa* is archaic and is found in the inscription of Soḍāsa and the older Maurya alphabet.

(2) The hooked from of *ha* which is found in the Kushan inscriptions and is a development of the form which appears in the Jaugaḍa Separate Edict of Aśoka.

(3) The form of the letter *ya* which has a loop to the left while the right limb is angular is characteristic of the Kushan inscriptions.

(4) The broad-backed *śa* with a small slanting central stroke is archaic in form and appears in some Kushan inscriptions.

(5) The forms of the letters *na*, *ta*, *cha*, those of the vowels *e* and *ā* are the usual ones appearing in the Kushan inscriptions.

(6) The vowel marks also exhibit the usual Kushan forms.

As regards the subject matter of the two inscriptions, both of them are records of a religious benefaction, viz., the setting up of an *āsanapaṭṭā* at a tank, by the sons of a certain person named Śapara, in the reign of a certain king Bhadramagha in the year 87. A *paṭṭā* (*paṭṭa* in Sanskrit) is a slab [cf. the Bengali word *pāṭā*]. An *āsanapaṭṭā* would mean a slab for sitting on. Any body walking along the bathing ghats of Benares would not fail to find numerous wooden planks and stone slabs as well intended for bathers who can sit upon them and perform *sandhyā*, *pūjā* and other religious acts after their bath. It would appear that the persons named in the inscriptions set up such slabs at the different bathing ghats. It may be that the inscribed slabs themselves were intended as seats for bathers. They were fixed to the bathing ghats at the water's edge, so that persons could stoop a little and take water from the tank for various purposes connected with a religious act.

As regards King Bhadramagha nothing is known about him except that he flourished in the year 87 of an unspecified era which, we have shown, was the Kanishka era. He is known to us so far only from these two inscriptions and inscription no. III discovered by Mr. Sahni in the cold season of 1921-22.[1] Mr. Sahni also discovered a record of Prince Śivamagha[2] (Inscription No. III). It is to be noted here that we have records of a certain Rājan Aśvaghosa found at Sarnath. It seems that these were feudatory dynasties ruling at Kauśāmbī and Sarnath under the suzerainty of the Kushan overlord.

The name of the Prince in my inscriptions is clearly Bhadramagha. The name Bhadramagha is a queer one

[1] Epigraphica India, Vol XVIII, p. 160.

[2] Ibid. p. 159.

and one feels tempted to read it as Bhadramegha. It is unlikely however that the engraver committed an error in recording the name of the Prince.

I now proceed to give the reading and translation of the two inscriptions with notes.

INSCRIPTION A

Text:

Line 1. Mahārajasya Śrī Bhadramaghasya savatsara sa-

Line 2 ptāśīti 80 7 varṣapakṣa tṛtīya 3 divasa pa-

Line 3 ñchama 5 etaya purūvāya pattanakarasya Śa[pa]-

Line 4 rasya puttrahi saudāryyehi bhrātla[ra]hi Māṅganīpu[ttra]-

Line 5 hi Śanikāya Ṣaṇḍhakana cha puṣkiriṇyāṃ ā[sa]-

Line 6 napattā pratischāpitā prīyatām dharmma puṇyaṃ va

Line 7 rdhatu.

Notes:

Line 3. *Pattanakarasya*. The word *pattana* in Sanskrit means, 'a town', 'a city'. This meaning does not suit here, for the word qualifies the proper noun *Śaparasya* (name of a person) and there is hardly any sense in describing a person as 'maker of a city'. The word also means a musical instrument, a *mṛdaṅga*, a sense which fits in quite well here. Moreover the word *pattana* may also be taken as the Prakrit form of the Sanskrit word *patraṇa*, an arrowhead. This meaning also is not inappropriate, though the former meaning may be more suitable.

Line 4. *Saudāryyehi*. If the word *saudāryya* is taken as a pure Sanskrit word it has to be interpreted as follows:—*udārasya bhāraḥ=audāryyam* (*udāra + syañ*),

INSCRIPTION A

[FACING P. 130.

meaning 'greatness', 'excellence', 'generosity' etc. *Audāryyeṇa saha vartāmānaḥ = saudāryyaḥ* i. e. 'one endowed with generosity, greatness etc'. Now, though this meaning is not impossible, it is hardly likely that persons who were making such ordinary religious benefactions used such an uncommon expression hardly intelligible to persons who would happen to read the record. Moreover, *saudāryya* being a learned Sanskrit expression worthy of a pandit, it is a little odd that the Prakrit case-ending *-hi*, instead of the Sanskrit one should be used. I am inclined to think that the stem is a barbarous, incorrect form of the Sanskrit word *sodarya*, meaning 'uterine brother'. *Saudaryyehi* would thus stand for the Sanskrit word *sodaryyaiḥ* by 'uterine brothers', 'by brothers of whole blood'.

Line 1. *Bhrātlahi* a mistake for *bhrātrahi*= *bhrātṛbhiḥ* [=*bhrātṛbhyām*?].

Line 5 *Sanikāya Saṇḍhakana cha*. These two are obviously proper names, either those of persons mentioned immediately before or of two persons different from them. In order to determine this we have to study the construction of the entire expression, '*Saparsya*......*Saṇḍhakana cha*'. This whole expression can be possibly interpreted in three different ways :

Firstly, (*a*) *Śaparasya puttrahi saudāryyehi bhrātrahi* may be taken to refer to a certain number of persons who are sons of Śapara and uterine brothers,

(*b*) *Māṅganīputtrahi* may be taken to refer to some other persons different from (*a*),

(*c*) *Śanikāya, Saṇḍhakana cha* may be taken to mean two other persons, the first being a female Śanikā.

Secondly, (*a*) the expression *Śaparasya puttrahi* and *Māṅganīputtrahi* may be taken to refer to the same

individuals, the meaning of the whole expression being —by uterine brothers, sons of Śapara and Māṅganī.

(*b*) Śanikāya and Ṣaṇḍhakana meaning the same as in (*c*) above.

Thirdly, the two names *Śanikāya* and *Ṣaṇḍhakana* may be taken as the names of persons described by the expression—"*Śaparasya puttrahi......Māṅganīputtrahi.* i.e. Śanikā and Ṣaṇḍhaka are the names of two brothers, sons of Śapara and Māṅganī. As a matter of fact, the third meaning seems to be natural except for the fact that Śanikā does not exactly seem like the name of an individual. In the translation of the text I have adopted the third interpretation.

Translation:

In the year eighty-seven, 80 7, on the fifth day 5, of the third 3 fortnight of the rainy season, in the reign of Māhārāja Bhadramagha, on the day specified as above, [this] [stone] slab for sitting on, was set up, near the tank, by Śanikā and Ṣaṇḍhaka, the uterine brothers, sons of Śapara, the maker of arrow-heads, and Māṅganī. May [their] moral and religious merit increase.

INSCRIPTION B.

Text:

Line 1. Siddham. Mahārajasya Bhadrama-

Line 2. ghasya saṁvatsara saptaśīti 80 7 varṣa-pakṣa tṛtī-

Line 3 ya, divasa 5 etāya purūvāya pattanakarasya Śapa-

Line 4. rasya puttrahi [Mā]ṅganīpu[ttra]hi Śanikāya Ṣaṇḍhakana cha bhagava-

Line 5 tu ayyaya[yā?]dava [xx] āsanapaṭṭā sthapita puṇya vardhatu.

INSCRIPTION B

[FACING P. 112.

Notes:

Saparasya puttrahi Māṅganīputtrahi. The expression leaves little room for doubt that the sons of Māṅganī are the same persons as the sons of Śapara. In other words, Śapara was the husband of Māṅganī. The practice of specifying individuals with reference to their mother was widely prevalent in ancient India. It was due to the fact that one person sometimes had several wives which necessitated the specification of their offspring by a particular reference to the mother of whom they were born.

Ayyaya(yā)dava... Two letters after '*va*' have been peeled off. It is difficult to make out the meaning of the expression. Mr. Daya Ram Sahni suggests in the Epigraphica Indica, Vol. XIII (Article. Three Brahmi Inscriptions from Kosam), that the expression may be *Ayyayādavadāra* equivalent to Sanskrit *Āryyayādavadārāḥ*, i.e. the wife of the noble Yādava. I think that persons dedicating the stone near the bank of the tank intended it to be specially used by the noble lady. It is not uncommon to find such stones near the bank of the river Ganges at Benares specially dedicated for the use of distinguished persons. *Ayyayādavadārā* would incorrectly stand for *Āryyayādavadārāṇām*. The genitive would be *sambandha-sāmānya-vivakṣayā*.

I recognise, however, that the explanation suggested of *Ayyayādava*[xx] is not entirely convincing.

Bhagavatā incorrectly stands for *bhagavatām*.

Sthapita. Incorrect for *sthāpitā*.

Translation:

Benediction. In the year 80 7, on the day 5 of the third fortnight of the rainy season in the reign of

Mahārāja Bhadramagha, on the day specified as above, [this] [stone] slab for sitting on was set up [near the tank] by the uterine brothers, sons of Śapara, the maker of arrow-heads, and Māṅganī, for use of the revered lady, the wife of the noble Yādava. May [their] religious and moral merit increase.

REFERENCES TO BUDDHIST PHILOSOPHY IN THE *VṚTTIKĀRAGRANTHA* OF *ŚABARABHĀṢYA* ON THE *MĪMĀṀSĀ SŪTRAS* OF JAIMINI.

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गङ्गाधरं शिवं ध्यात्वा शबरत्वेन योऽदधात् ।
दिव्यमस्त्रं पृथापुत्रे कुर्वे शास्त्रविवेचनम् ॥
वृत्तिकारकृतो ग्रन्थः शबरस्वामिनोदितः ।
विज्ञानमात्रताक्षेपी शून्यवादं न बाधते ॥
"विज्ञप्तिमात्रतावादाच् शून्यवादः पुरातनः" ।
इति या प्रायिकी ख्यातिस्तत्र हेतुर्न विद्यते ॥
वेदान्तभाष्यग्रन्थादावाकरत्वेन स्वीकृते ।
विज्ञानवादबाधेऽपि प्राचीनत्वं न हीयते ॥
श्रीगङ्गानाथशर्माणो गुरवः शास्त्रपारगाः ।
प्रसादामलया दृष्ट्या वीक्षन्तां चेष्टितं मम ॥

It is generally assumed that the well-known *vṛttikāra-grantha* in Śabara's *bhāṣya* on *Mīmāṁsā-Sūtra* I. 1.5 makes reference to two schools of Buddhist philosophy, the *Vijñāna-vāda* (Bibliotheca Indica edition[1], p. 8, l. 21 to p. 9, l. 11) and the Mādhyamika *Śūnya-vāda* (p. 9, ll. 12 ff.). Professor Jacobi in his comprehensive paper on Buddhist references in the earlier texts of Hindu philosophy in *J.A.O.S.*, Vol. 31, pp. 1-29, has expressed

[1] The references throughout are to this edition.

the opinion that we have here refutation of only Mādhyamika philosophy (pp. 15-22). He takes the same view of the *Vedānta-Sūtras* II.2. 28-32,[1] which have been taken by all others as giving a refutation of the Vijñāna-vāda.

When I was studying Śabara's commentary on the *Mīmāṁsā-Sūtras* under Dr. Jhā, some years ago, it occurred to me that the views of only one school of Buddhist thought were discussed on pages 8 to 10 of the *vṛttikāra-grantha* and that this school was the Vijñāna-vāda and not the Śūnya-vāda. I felt that this was in the fitness of things, in view of the fact that the other early texts on Hindu philosophy refuted the Vijñāna-vāda and showed no knowledge of the Śūnya-vāda. The question is very important from the historical point of view and it can be settled only by a careful study of the texts. I shall here essay a solution of this problem, so far as it affects the text of Śabara.

After explaining *Sūtras* 3-5 of the first *pāda* of the first *Adhyāya* of Jaimini in a natural manner, Śabara introduces a different interpretation of these Sūtras with the words वृत्तिकारस्तु अन्यथेमं ग्रन्थं वर्णयाञ्चकार. तस्य निमित्तपरीष्टिरित्येवमादिम् (p. 7). This is the *vṛttikāra-grantha*, which seems to continue to the end of Śabara's comment on the fifth Sūtra[2] and not conclude with p. 18, l. 6 of the Bibliotheca text as was supposed by the editor, whom Jacobi follows (p. 15); for the discussion continues without any break and some of the objections urged before p. 18, l. 6 are answered in the following portion. There is another misconception commonly prevalent about the *vṛttikāra-grantha* that the whole is an actual quotation from the Vṛttikāra[3]. We have no reason to

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[1] *Op. cit.*, pp. 13-15, 22-24.

[2] See Dr. Jhā's translation of the *Śabara-bhāṣya* (*G.O.S.*), Vol. I, p. 9 n.

[3] Jacobi, *op. cit.*, p. 15.

believe that Śabara quotes the actual words of the Vṛttikāra; he seems to have given an extended paraphrase in his own words. So far as I am aware, no instance can be shown of any of our ancient writers actually quoting such lengthy passages: they quote only *sūtras* or a few verses or a few sentences. The question is settled by the words of Maṇḍana Miśra who, in his very brief account of the *adhikaraṇas* of the *Mīmāṁsā Sūtras*, gives a rather long summary of the *vṛttikāra-grantha*, beginning with the words बह्वर्थं वक्तुकामेन तमर्थं सौत्रमिच्छता । वृत्तिकारमतेनेयं त्रिसूत्री वर्ण्यतेऽन्यथा ॥[1] '(The bhāṣyakāra), desiring to say a lot and wanting to suggest that all that is intended by the Sūtra, explains the three Sūtras (3-5) differently in accordance with the view of the Vṛttikāra.' That *varṇyate* is to be connected with *bhāṣykṛtā* (to be supplied) and not *mayā* is proved by the fact that in the very next verse Maṇḍana quotes a word of the *bhāṣya*: सत्यमिथ्याविभागो यो वृत्तिकारनिरूपित: । बौद्धस्तं सहते नेति नन्वित्येतेन कथ्यते ॥ *Nanviti* clearly means the whole passage of the *bhāṣya* beginning with ननु सर्व एव निरालम्बन: स्वप्नवत्प्रत्यय: etc. (p. 8, l. 21). Consequently Śabara gives only the *views* of the Vṛttikāra and not his very *words*[2].

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1 Chowkhamba edition of *Mīmāṁsānukramaṇikā* with Dr. Jhā's *ṭikā*, p. 8.

2 That much of what is given in the *vṛttikāra-grantha* is Śabara's own material, brought in just in connection with the Vṛttikāra's special interpretation of *Sūtras* 3-5, is shown by Śaṅkarācārya's reference to this passage in his own comments on *V. S.* III. 3. 53: ननु शास्त्रप्रमुख एव प्रथमे पादे शास्त्रफलोपभोगयोग्यस्य देहव्यतिरिक्तस्यात्मनोऽस्तित्वमुक्तम् । सत्यमुक्तं भाष्यकृता न तु तत्रात्मास्तित्वे सूत्रमस्ति । इह तु स्वयमेव सूत्रकृता तदस्तित्वमाक्षेपपुर:सरं प्रतिष्ठापितम् । इत एव चाकृष्याचार्येण शबरस्वामिना प्रमाणलक्षणे वर्णितम् । The next sentence अत एव च भगवतोपवर्षेण प्रथमे तन्त्रे आत्मास्तित्वाभिधानप्रसक्तौ शारीरके वक्ष्याम इत्युद्धार: कृत: seems to point to the brief remarks of the Vṛttikāra about the continuity of the soul which have given an opportunity to Śabara to discuss the question at some length. It also shows that the

It seems that according to the Vṛttikāra the fourth Sūtra is to be broken up into two parts (a) तत्सम्प्रयोगे पुरूषस्येन्द्रियाणां बुद्धिजन्म सत् प्रत्यक्षम् (with सत् and तत् transposed) and (b) तदनिमित्तं विद्यमानोपलम्भनत्वात्[1]. The former means, 'That cognition is *real sense-perception* (*satpratyakṣam*) which appears when there is contact of the sense-organs *with the object perceived* (*tatsamprayoge*)[2]. This view of Pratyakṣa enables the Vṛttikāra and Śabara to introduce the Mīmāṁsā doctrine of the *svatastva* (self-dependence) of *prāmāṇya* (validity) and *partatastva* (dependence on experience) of *aprāmāṇya* (falsity). Śabara here brings in an objection against the Mīmāṁsā view of *Pratyakṣa*, that it corresponds to objects as they actually exist, from a Buddhist point of view (ननु सर्व एव निरालम्बनः स्वप्नवत्प्रत्ययः etc., p. 8, ll. 21 ff.) The Buddhist denies that there can ever be any external object corresponding to our ideas. The position that is taken up by the objector is that of the idealist and the arguments that are urged all point that way. It is contended that there are no objects corresponding to the ideas of our waking cosnciousness, as there are none in dream. The Mīmāṁsaka replies that there is difference in the ideas in the two states: the ideas in dream are sublated immediately we wake up and we realize that we were having mistaken notion but there is no such contradiction of the ideas in the waking state. All mistaken notions are due to some defect somewhere. In dream, the mind is overpowered by sleep and that is responsible for our having ideas

Vṛttikāra is none other than Upavarṣa (an equation accepted by Dr. Jhā in *Prabhākara System of Pūrva Mīmāṁsā*, p. 113 and Translation of *Ślokavārtika, Introduction*, p. iii , *contra* P. V. Kane in *J.B.B.R.A.S.*, Vol. 26, p. 84). Unfortunately I have no space here to discuss this latter problem. Keith also agrees (*Karma Mīmāṁsā*, p 8) 'that the citation from the Vṛttikāra is only a résumé.'

1 See *Bhāṣya*, p. 8, ll. 2-4.

2 Dr. Jhā's translation of *Śabara-bhāṣya*, Vol. I, p. 10.

without real objects behind them. But in the waking state, we do not normally have any defect in the mental equipment and we get ideas corresponding to facts.

Here occurs the expression शून्यस्तु (p. 9, l. 12) which has given rise to a lot of misunderstanding. The Buddhist now gives up the analogy of dream and attacks the ideas of waking consciousness themselves. He says that we do not realize any difference between the form of the object and the idea, that we have direct apprehension of our ideas and that consequently they alone are real (अर्थज्ञानयोराकारभेदं नोपलभामहे। प्रत्यक्षा च नो बुद्धिः, अतस्तद्भिन्नमर्थस्वरूपं नाम न किञ्चिदस्तीति पश्यामः). The Mīmāṁsaka replies that the psychology of *pratyakṣa* is quite different: the *form* belongs to the *objects* and not to our *ideas* and that we directly apprehend the objects and only have inference about the ideas. Consequently objects cannot be denied. This discussion shows that Śabara is refuting from p.8, l. 21 to p. 10, l. 10 only one doctrine, *viz.*, the *Vijñānavāda*. His concluding words अतो न निरालम्बनः प्रत्ययः, अतो न व्यभिचरति प्रत्यक्षम् (p. 10, ll. 9-10), 'therefore ideas are not without objective substratum, consequently *pratyakṣa* is not non-corresponding of objects', clinch the problem. शून्यस्तु of p.9, l. 12 must, therefore, mean बाह्यार्थशून्यता[1] and does not refer to the *śūnyavāda* of the Mādhyamika. The argument अर्थज्ञानयोराकारभेदं नोपलभामहे etc. of the Buddhists assumes the reality of *ideas*[2]. Prabhākara in his *Bṛhatī* (Chowkhamba Edition p. 57) introduces शून्यस्तु thus, ननु च शून्यस्त्विति सैव निरालम्बनतोपन्यस्ता प्रत्ययस्यार्थशून्यतां वदता, and his commentator Śālikanātha specifically says in the *Ṛjuvimalā* that it would be wrong to suppose that there

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[1] See Dr. Jhā's translation of *Śabara bhāṣya*, 1, p. 13, ll. 7-30.

[2] Cf. Dr. Belvalkar's remarks in his *Brahma Sūtras of Bādarāyaṇa* (II, 1-2), 2nd ed., *Notes*, pp. 170-1, with reference to the corresponding portion in the Vedānta Sūtras.

is any reference to Mādhyamika doctrine here (न चैवमाशङ्कनीयं–पूर्वत्र बाह्यालम्बनाभाव आशङ्क्य निरस्तः, सम्प्रति ज्ञानस्याप्यभाव इति माध्यमिकदर्शनमुपन्यस्य निराक्रियत इति —यस्मात्प्रत्ययस्यैवेयमर्थशून्यतो न्यस्ता, न पुनः प्रत्ययोऽपि नास्तीति । तस्माद् बाह्यालम्बनशून्यतैवेयमुच्यते *ibid.*). It is really a wonder that p.9, l. 12 to p. 10, l. 10 should ever have been taken to refer to Mādhyamika doctrines[1]. Jacobi is also wrong. when he claims that according to Kumārila (pp. 268 351 of the Chowkhamba text and pp. 148-182 of Dr. Jhā's translation of the *Ślokavārtika*) we have refutation of Mādhyamika nihilism here[2]. Kumārila says nothing of the kind. The so-called *Śūnyavāda* section of the *Ślokavārtika* is nothing but a continuation of the *nirālambanavāda* section. Kumārila there discusses the view that our ideas cannot apprehend any external objects. It is after he has finished, that he makes a reference to the Mādhyamika doctrine in a very summary manner in the last verse (no. 263, p. 194, of the Trivandrum text, part 2): इति वहिर्विषयप्रतिपादनान्न तदभावकृता मतिसंवृतिः । उभयतत्त्वविदां परमार्थतः क्षममिदं धुरि धर्मविचारणे ॥[3], which may be translated thus, 'As the reality of external objects has been thus established, one cannot contend that the very ideas are illusory for want of corresponding facts; consequently the Mīmāṁsakas who believe in the reality of both ideas and objects, can yoke both in the service of a discussion on *dharma*.'

Professor Jacobi is, however, right when he says (p. 21) "The division of the whole passage into two parts

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[1] The mistake in wrongly dividing the *vṛttikāra-grantha* of the *Ślokavārtika* into *vṛttikāra-grantha*. *nirālambana-vāda*, *śūnyavāda* and other sections seems to go back to the manuscripts. It is certainly so with the mss. in the Government Sanskrit College Library at Benares, as I learn from the Librarian, Mr. S. N. Jharkhandi and Professor P.P.S. Shastri of the Presidency College, Madras, informs me that the same is the case with the manuscripts in Madras (Government Oriental Manuscripts Library and Adyar Library).

[2] P. 21. Keith (*Karma-Mīmāṁsā*, p. 7) has been misled by Jacobi.

[3] See Dr. Jhā in *Modi Memorial Volume*, pp. 311-2.

of which the first combats the Nirālambana-vāda and the second the Śūnya-vāda, is quite arbitrary.' But the inference that he has drawn from this, *viz.*, that the whole gives a refutation of the Śūnya-vāda is wrong. We have here *vijñānavāda*, pure and simple, and not the slightest trace of Mādhyamika nihilism. The characteristic method of the Mādhyamika is to show the inherent contradictions in the nature of things and thence deduce the illusory character of everything. A Śūnyavādin would not for a moment care to establish the reality of *vijñāna* even though without any corresponding objects.

We have reference to Buddhist doctrines in two other places of the *vṛttikāragrantha* (1) p. 14, l. 18 to p. 15, l. 12 and (2) p. 19, l. 3. to p. 24, l. 9. The fifth Sūtra, even according to the Vṛttikāra, shows how *Śabda* is a valid source of knowledge for *dharma*, because its connexion with objects is natural. In this connexion arises the question, what is the connotation of the term *gauḥ* ? The Mīmāṁsaka replies that it means the *universal cow* which is eternal and not any individual cow (p. 14, ll. 18ff.), because then alone can he support his doctrine of the eternity of *śabda*. Here an objector says that the class notion is mistaken, like the notion of a single entity, *forest*, when we really know of individual *trees* only. Śabara replies that the very notion of the 'forest' is a guarantee of its reality and if it be held that we can have the notion of the forest, though it does not exist apart from the trees, one may as well say that we have notion of trees though they do not exist. That is the position of the Buddhist idealist, which, the author says, he has already refuted. The words that he uses are प्रत्युक्तः स माहायानिकः[1] पक्षः, showing that he was referring to idealism as a

[1] The right reading in most manuscripts wrongly rejected by Pt. Maheshchandra Nyāyaratna for माहाजानिकः.

(characteristic ?) Mahāyāna doctrine. It is not clear whose is the view referred to here, that the *whole* is unreal and the *parts* alone are real. This is certainly not a doctrine of the Buddhist idealist for he does not believe in the reality of even the part. If Śabara meant it as a Buddhist doctrine at all, it must be ascribed to the Hīnayānists. The Sautrāntika, for example, rejects both the *universal* and the *whole*, though he accepts the reality of the external world. That is because one of the four cardinal doctrines ascribed by Buddhist philosophers to the Buddha was सर्वः स्वलक्षणम् and that, logically pressed, made the reality of the *positive universal* or of the *whole* impossible. Śabara seems to differentiate his opponent in p. 14, ll. 18 ff. from the Buddhist idealist whom he claims to have silenced earlier.

The last reference to Budhist doctrines arises in this way. According to the Vṛttikāra, as I have mentioned already, the fourth *sūtra* is to be split up into two. The second half अनिमित्तं विद्यमानोपलम्भनत्वात् gives, according to him, an objection against the validity of the Vedas. It means that the Vedas cannot teach us anything valid because they speak of things that do not exist (p. 10, ll. 22 ff.). There are also impossible statements like the sacrificer going to heaven along with his sarificial implements, when we actually find him burnt and reduced to ashes. Śabara sets about to show (p. 18, ll. 16 ff.) that this Vedic statement is quite all right, because it refers to the self of the sacrificer as opposed to his body. The body is destroyed, but the soul is not, which can go to heaven. Here a materialist claims that the body is the sacrificer himself and Śabara shows how it is not. He says that the body has colour etc. which others can see but the soul has ideas of pleasure. pain etc., which none else can realize

and this shows that the soul is distinct from the body. Here a Buddhist objects that there can be no *person possessing* those *ideas* of pleasure etc., that there is no *vijñātṛ* beyond the *vijñānas* (p. 19, ll. 3ff.). Our author gives a very elaborate refutation of the *non-ego* doctrine and establishes a 'soul', quite distinct from consciousness (तस्मादस्ति सुखादिभ्योऽन्यो नित्यः पुरुष इति p. 24, l. 2). Here also it is not clear to what specific school, if any, the Buddhist opponent belongs. All Buddhist schools are practically agreed on rejecting an ego distinct from the *vijñāna-skandhas* and it is therefore likely that Śabara was demolishing the common notion of all Buddhist schools[1].

Let us now take stock of the facts learnt above. Śabara makes no mention of *Śūnyavāda*. He knows of the Buddhist rejection of the *whole*, as opposed to the *parts*, but not of the Mādhyamika inference therefrom that everything is void, for his opponent seems to accept the reality of the parts. Śabara knows also of the practically universal Buddhist view of non-ego. Above all, he shows himself as conversant with some kind of Buddhist idealism. I have purposely used the word 'some kind', because all the doctrines of the classical Vijñāna-vādins are not found here. According to the classical Yogācāra system, *vijñāna* has got a subjective aspect, called the *ālaya-vijñāna* or *āśaya*, which is a series of momentary ego-notions, each moment in which inherits completely the experiences of the preceding moments[2]. Śabara seems quite ignorant of any

[1] It is interesting to note that the chief argument that is used by Śabara to establish a continuous soul, viz. it is the same person who has enjoyed some object in the past and has remembrance of it that can strive for it again, has got a parallel in the Vedānta Sūtra II. 2. 25, अनुस्मृतेश्च, seemingly refuting *Sarvāstivāda* doctrine.

[2] See Yamakami Sogen, *Systems of Buddhistic Thought*, pp. 216 ff.

such doctrine. If he knew, he could not have so complacently believed that he had demolished the *anātman* theory of the Buddhist by urging: 'one cannot have desire for an object which another being has experienced' (नो खल्वन्येन पुरुषेणोपलब्धेऽपि विषयेऽन्यस्य उपलब्धुरिच्छा भवति, p. 20) and such like arguments. The *vijñānavāda* that he knows of seems to be of a very primitive type. Consequently he seems to belong to a date prior to that of Asaṅga and Vasubandhu and, as he shows no knowledge of the Śūnyavāda, possibly before Nāgārjuna too. The same is the position with the *Vedāntasūtras*. *V.S.* II.2.18-17 give a refutation of the views of the Buddhist realists and Sūtras 28-32 of the Buddhist idealists[1]. The arguments in the latter *adhikaraṇa* are, as Jacobi has rightly observed, the same as in Śabara. "नाभाव उपलब्धेः" ('objects are not non-existent, because we cognise them') cannot be meant against Śūnyavādins for *upalabdhi* itself is rejected by them. Unfortunately, I have no space here to discuss the *Nyāya* and *Yoga* passages believed to refute Buddhist doctrines and I must reserve their discussion for a different paper. The *Vedānta Sūtras* and Śabara seem to belong to a period before the time of Nāgārjuna but after some kind of *vijñāna-vāda* had been evolved.

But this seems to launch us in a chronological difficulty. It is almost universally believed that Vijñāna-vāda is later than Śūnya-vāda[2]. But is there any justification for such a view? We know that the

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[1] The colourless Sūtra सर्वथानुपपत्तेश्च (32) sums up all that has gone before and does not refute the Mādhyamika doctrines, as Rāmānuja and Śrikaṇṭha suppose.

[2] Yamakami Sogen, *op. cit.*, p. 186, Keith, *Buddhist Philosophy*, pp. 228, 230-1, Stcherbatsky, quoted by Jacobi in *J.A.O.S.*, *op. cit.*, p. 4. Keith, however, is not categorical in his view. Compare also Belvalkar's remarks on this question in his *Brahmasūtras*, 2nd. ed., *Notes*, p. 155.

Mahāyānaśraddhotpāda, ascribed to Aśvaghoṣa, who is two generations earlier than Nāgārjuna,[1] teaches the *vijñāna-vāda*[2]. People often reject the tradition of Aśvaghoṣa's authorship of the work on the ground of the alleged impossibility of *vijñānavāda* doctrines before Asaṅga and Vasubandhu[3]. But this impossibility is a mere assumption. A more cogent ground for doubting Aśvaghoṣa's authorship of this idealistic book would be the tradition that he helped in the redaction of the great *Vibhāṣā* on the Sūtras of the realistic Sarvāstivāda school[4]. But there is no inherent difficulty in believing that Aśvaghoṣa, once a sturdy Sarvāstivādin, later developed idealistic doctrines. The case of the conversion to Mahāyāna (of the Yogācāra school) of the (Sarvāstivādin) Hīnayānist brothers, Asaṅga and Vasubandhu, will be recalled by scholars[5]. We should note that Paramārtha in his *Life of Vasubandhu* does not say that Asaṅga or Vasubandhu were the *founders* of the Vijñāna-vāda, nor does Bu-ston say any such thing in his *History of of Buddhism in India and Tibet*[6]. Besides the *Mahāyānaśraddhotpāda*, we have enough of idealism in

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[1] Yamakami Sogen, *op. cit.*, p. 187.

[2] Keith, *op. cit.*, p. 228, Suzuki's translation, pp. 57, 61 etc.

[3] Anesaki also doubts the ascription of this work to the author of the *Buddhacarita* (*ERE*, II 159 *b* and 160*a*), though he does not state any grounds. Can it be the same work on *mokṣa*, which, Aśvaghoṣa says, he composed before the *Saundarananda* (Bib. Ind., p. 126)'?

[4] See Paramārtha's *Life of Vasubandhu*, translated by J. Takakusu, *T'oung-pao*, 1904, pp. 12-13. Rev. Rāhula Sāṅkṛtyāyana notes in *JBORS*, Vol. XXI, 1935, p. 8, that the colophon of a Palm Leaf Sanskrit Manuscript in Tibet, containing a commentary by Aśvaghoṣa on some Sūtra of the Sarvāstivāda, mentions the author as *sarvāstivādī*.

[5] Paramārtha's *Life of Vasubandhu*, pp. 7-9 and 24-26.

[6] *Ibid.*, pp. 24 ff, Bu-ston, *History of Buddhism in India and Tibet*, Obermiller's translation, part 2, pp. 136-147. Anesaki admits that Asaṅga was *converted* to idealism (*ERE* II 62*a*). That means, 'idealism' existed before him.

the *Laṅkāvatāra*[1], which may be earlier than even Aśvaghoṣa, for all that we know. The *Laṅkāvatāra* and the *Mahāyānaśraddhotpāda*, both mention the *ālaya-vijñāna*[2], of which Śabara seems quite innocent. Lastly, we find in Vasumitra's *Treatise on the Points of Contention by the Different Schools of Buddhism*, a book that was translated into Chinese sometime between 351 and 431 A.D.[3] and whose author is believed to have been a contemporary of Aśvaghoṣa of c. 100 A.D.[4], actually mentions a *Prajñapti-vāda* school which issued from the Mahāsaṅghika sect in the second century after Buddha's Nirvāṇa[5]. The text says that according to this Prajñaptivāda school, 'The twelve *āyatanas* are not real (entities)'[6]. The twelve *āyatanas* are, as Masuda points out, 'the six organs of sense and the six objects of sense.'[7] We have thus *Vijñāna-vāda* doctrines several centuries before Asaṅga and Vasubandhu, even if we do not take as strictly correct the date given by Vasumitra (2nd century after Buddha). The doctrine of *ālaya-vijñāna* of which Vasubandhu gives very effective exposition seems also to have been borrowed from the old Mahāsaṅghika and Vātsīputrīya schools[8]. Consequently the current notion that there was no Buddhist *vijñāna-vāda* before Asaṅga and Vasubandhu is without any foundation. They seem to have inaugurated only the

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[1] Edition of the Buddhist Text Society, pp. 44-5 and elsewhere.

[2] *Ibid.*, pp. 44-5 etc , *Mahāyānaśraddhotpāda* (Suzuki's translation) p. 6.

[3] See translation of the book from Hsuan-Chwang's version by J. Masuda under the title, *Origin and Doctrines of Early Indian Schools*, Leipzig 1925, Introduction, p. 6

[4] *Ibid.*, pp. 7-9.

[5] *Ibid.*, p. 15.

[6] *Ibid.*, p. 36.

[7] *Ibid.*, p. 36, n. 4; see Yamakami Sogen, *op. cit.*, p. 231.

[8] See Masuda, *op. cit.*, pp. 25 n. and 68 n. I have already emphasized that Śabara is unaware of the *ālaya-vijñāna*.

classical period of the Vijñānavāda school. There was also a school of *sarvāśūnya-vāda* in the Hīnayāna before the Mādhyamikas, viz., the Satyasiddhi school[1].

All this shows that the common practice of dating any work of Hindu philosophy which mentions any sort of *vijñāna-vāda* as necessarily later than the time of Asaṅga or Vasubandhu[2], simply on that account, is based on very wrong notions and the sooner we abandon it, the better for a correct view of Indian chronology.



[1] Yamakami Sogen, *op. cit.*, pp. 172-185.

[2] Fourth century or fifth century A.D., according as Péri's view is accepted or Takakusu's.

THE NAKṢATRAS OR THE CONSTELLATIONS

IN JAINA ASTRONOMY

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The Jaina astronomers throughout employ twenty-eight nakṣatras of unequal extent, while the Vedāṅga, as well as the bulk of the later astronomical literature, makes use of twenty-seven nakṣatras of equal extent. With the Jainas the nakṣatras begin with Abhijit. The nakṣatras or constellations are divided into four classes. Firstly, there are those with which the moon is in conjunction during one ahorātra or thirty muhūrtas; to this class belong (1) Revatī, Aśvinī, Kṛttikā, Mṛgaśiras, Puṣya, Maghā, Pūrvaphalgunī, Hasta, Citrā, Anurādhā, Mūlā, Pūrvāṣāḍhā, Śravaṇa, Śraviṣṭhā and Pūrvabhādrapada. The one ahorātra for which the conjunction lasts may be expressed as $\frac{2010}{67}$ muhūrtas. The second class comprises those nakṣatras which are in conjunction with the moon for half an ahorātra = fifteen muhūrtas = $\frac{1005}{67}$ muhūrtas ; to this class belong Śatabhiṣaj, Aśleṣā, Bharaṇī, Jyeṣṭhā, Ārdrā and Svātī. To the third division belong these nakṣatras with which the moon is in conjunction for one and a half ahorātra = forty-five muhūrtas = $\frac{3015}{67}$ muhūrtas ; these nakṣatras are Uttarāṣāḍhā, Uttaraphalgunī, Uttarabhādrapada, Punarvasu, Viśākhā and Rohiṇī. The fourth division comprises one nakṣatra only, *viz.*, Abhijit with which the moon is in conjunction for $9\frac{27}{67} = \frac{630}{67}$ muhūrtas. The reason for this is as follows :—The sīmā-viṣkambha or the diameter of the Abhijit circle is 630 in terms of muhūrta. This when divided by sixty-seven nakṣatra

months of a yuga is equal to $\frac{630}{67} = 9\frac{27}{67}$. Accordingly it is stated that the Abhijit remains with the moon $\frac{630}{67} \div 30$ or $\frac{21}{67}$ parts of a day.

The nakṣatras are either "pūrvabhāga" *i.e.*, such as enter into conjunction with the moon during the forenoon; or "paścādbhāga" *i.e.*, such as enter into conjunction during the afternoon, or "naktambhāga" *i.e.*, such as enter into conjunction during the night, or "ubhayabhāga". The nakṣatras of the two first classes are called samakṣetras, those of the third class the apārdhakṣetras, those of the fourth class, the dvyardhakṣetras. Sūryaprajñapti says that Abhijit and Śravaṇa are paścādbhāga samakṣetra. To this the commentator, Malayagiri, objects that Abhijit is neither samakṣetra, since it occupies only $9\frac{27}{67}$ muhūrtas of the moon's periodical revolution, nor paścādbhāga, since at the beginning of the yuga the moon enters into conjunction with it in the early morning. However, the commentator goes on to explain that Abhijit and Śravaṇa, after having finished their conjunction with the moon, hand her over to Dhaniṣṭhā at evening—Abhijit-śravaṇau dve nakṣatre sāyaṃ samayād ārabhya ekāṃ rātrim ekaṃca sātirekaṃ divasaṃ candreṇa sārdhaṃ yogaṃ yuṅktaḥ, etāvantaṃ kālaṃ yogaṃ yuktvā tadanantaraṃ yogamanuparivartayataḥ ātmanaś cyavayataḥ, yogaṃ cānuparivartya sāyaṃ divasasya katitame paścād-bhāge candraṃ dhaniṣṭhāyāḥ, samarpayataḥ. For this reason Dhaniṣṭhā is also paścādbhāga. After having been in conjunction with it for thirty muhūrtas the moon enters Śatabhiṣaj at the time when the stars have already become visible (parisphuṭanakṣatramaṇḍalāvaloke); Śatabhisaj is, therefore, naktambhāga. Śatabhiṣaj being apārdhakṣetra, the moon remains in conjunction with it for fifteen muhūrtas only and enters on the next morning with Pūrva-proṣṭhapada, which being samakṣetra remains in conjunction during one ahorātra. On the following morning the moon

enters Uttaraproṣṭhapada, which, therefore, would be pūrvabhāga. But the matter is looked at in a different light. Uttaraproṣṭhapada is dvyardhakṣetra, *i.e.*, remains in conjunction for forty-five muhūrtas. If we now deduct from this duration the fifteen first muhūrtas and imagine Uttaraproṣṭhapada to be samakṣetra, the conjunction of the moon with it may be said to take place at night and in consequence, the real one conjunction takes place during the day and the other fictitious conjunction takes place at night; therefore the nakṣatra is called ubhayabhāga: idaṃ kilottarabhādrapadākhyaṃ nakṣatram uktaprakāreṇa prātas candreṇa saha yogam adhigacchati, kevalam prathamān pañcadaśa muhūrtān adhikān apanīya samakṣetraṃ kalpayitvā yadā yogaś cintyate tadā naktam api yogo'stītyubhayabhāgam avaseyam. Uttarabhādrapada remains in conjunction for one day, one night and again one day, on the evening of which the moon enters Revatī; Revatī is therefore paścādbhāga. After it has remained in conjunction for one ahorātra the moon passes into Aśvinī at evening time. Aśvinī is therefore also paścādbhāga. From it the moon passes on the next evening into Bharaṇī, at the time, however, when the stars have become visible and when night may be said to have begun; Bharaṇī is therefore naktambhāga. Being at the same time apārdhakṣetra, the moon leaves it on the next morning to enter Kṛttikā, which, therefore, is pūrvabhāga. On the next morning the moon enters Rohiṇī which is dvyardhakṣetra and, on account of that, ubhayabhāga. As the moon enters Mṛgaśiras forty-five muhūrtas later at evening that nakṣatra is paścādbhāga; Ārdrā which enters into conjunction thirty muhūrtas later when the stars have come out, is naktambhāga. Punarvasu into which the moon enters on the next morning, being dvyardha, is ubhayabhāga. Puṣya comes into conjunction on the evening of the following day and is paścādbhāga; Aśleṣā comes into con-

junction thirty muhūrtas later, when the stars have come out, and is naktambhāga; Maghā and Pūrvaphalgunī into which the moon enters into conjunction on the mornings of the two following days are pūrvabhāga ; on the morning after that Uttaraphalgunī comes into conjunction and is ubhayabhāga, because it is dvyardhakṣetra; Hasta and Citrā enter into conjunction on the evenings of the two following days, before night has set in, and are therefore Paścādbhāga. Then again follows one naktambhāga nakṣatra, *viz.*, Svātī which enters into conjunction after nightfall, and upon this a dvyardhakṣetra and consequently ubhayabhāga nakṣatra, *viz.*, Viśākhā. Then comes Anurādhā which is paścādbhāga, after this Jyeṣṭhā, apārdhakṣetra and naktambhāga, remaining in conjunction from nightfall to the morning only; after this two samakṣetra and pūrvabhāga nakṣatras, *viz.*, Mūla and Pūrvāṣāḍhā. Finally Uttarāṣāḍhā, which enters into conjunction on the morning, is, as a dvyardhakṣetra, reckoned among the uhhayabhāga. It remains in conjunction for one ahorātra and the following day, in whose evening the moon arrives at Abhijit whence she had started a periodical month ago.

Again the nakṣatras or constellations are divided into four classes according to their union with the sun. Firstly, there is one constellation, viz., Abhijit, which lasts in union with the sun for four days and six muhūrtas. The rule regulating the combination of the constellations with the sun is as follows :—" Jaṃ rikhaṃ javayiye vajjayi chandena bhaga sattatthi tam paṇa bhage rāyindivassa sūrena tavayiye "—"That constellation which unites with the moon for a number of sixtyseventh divisions of a whole day, the same constellation unites with the sun for one-fifth of so many days and nights". For instance, Abhijit combines with the moon for twenty-one times of one-sixtyseventh division of a whole day, therefore Abhijit remains with the sun for one-fifth of twenty-one days or four days and six

muhūrtas. Secondly, there are six constellations which remain in union with the sun for six days and twentyone muhūrtas, for each of them remains with the moon for $\frac{33\frac{1}{2}}{67}$ part of a day and night. Hence one-fifth of $33\frac{1}{2} = \frac{67}{2} \div 5$ = six days and twentyone muhūrtas. These are Śatabhiṣaj, Bharaṇī, Ārdrā, Aślesā, Svāti and Jyeṣṭhā. The third division comprises those nakṣatras which combine with the moon for complete 67 parts and therefore combine with the sun for one-fifth of sixtyseven parts, i. e., thirteen days and twelve muhūrtas. To the fourth class belong those which unite with the moon for fortyfive muhūrtas or $\frac{3015}{67 \times 30}$ parts of a day and therefore unite with the sun for $\frac{1}{5}$ of $\frac{3015}{30} = \frac{603}{30}$ days or 20 days and three muhūrtas.

The nakṣatras are again divided into kulas (houses), upakulas (apparent houses), and kulopakulas (petty apparent houses). There are twelve kula constellations, twelve upakulas and four kulopakulas. Those like Śraviṣṭhā, Bhādrapada, Aśvinī, etc., which complete a lunar month are kulas ; those which nearly complete the month are upakulas ; and those, like Abhijit, Pūrvabhādrapada, Śatabhiṣaj and Anurādhā, which are far removed from the moon at the close of corresponding months, are kulopakulas.

The names of months terminating with full moons (and also new moons) in particular constellations are derived from corresponding constellations. There are twelve full moons and twelve new moons, as Śraviṣṭhī, Prauṣṭhapadī, etc. Śraviṣṭhī is that which takes place in Śrāvaṇa month and Prauṣṭhapadī is that which takes place in Bhādrapada month. Likewise Āśvayujī is that which occurs in the month of Āśvayuk. It is to be noted that as many as three constellations may alternately unite with the moon to make a full or new moon ; for example, Abhijit, Śravaṇa, Dhaniṣṭhā may come in contact with the

moon to make the full moon of Śraviṣṭhī month. Abhijit, however, does not at all combine with the moon ; still, because it is so near the Śravaṇa star, it is also considered as making that particular full or new moon.

Now, to determine the constellation in which a particular new moon takes place, it is necessary to ascertain the Parva constant called Parva Dhruva rāśi. Since in the course of 62 synodical months or 124 parvas — one synodical month being equal to 2 parvas — the sun performs five sidereal circuits, i. e., there are five sidereal years in one yuga, then in two parvas, i. e., in one synodical month, the sun performs $\frac{5 \times 2}{124}$ circuits. Now $27\frac{21}{67}$ is the duration in ahorātras of the periodical month, or the extent of the nakṣatras, 27 entire nakṣatras plus the fractional nakṣatra Abhijit which is $\frac{1}{67}$ part of each nakṣatra. Therefore $\frac{5 \times 2}{124}$ circuits $= \frac{10}{124} \times 27\frac{21}{67}$ day circuits $= \frac{10}{124} \times 1830$ day circuits $= \frac{9150}{62} \times 30$ muhūrtas $= 66$ muhūrtas $+ \frac{5}{62} + \frac{1}{62 \times 67}$ muhūrtas. This is the Parva constant.

If now the place of the moon at any new moon or full moon (amāvasyā or pūrṇamāsī) is wanted, the above quantity has to be multiplied by the number of the parva : for instance, by one if the moon's place at the first full moon after the beginning of the yuga is wanted. The product shows how far the moon at the time has advanced beyond the place she had occupied at the beginning of the yuga, if full moons are concerned, beyond the place she had occupied at the new moon preceding the beginning of the yuga, if new moons are concerned (the new moon immediately antecedent to the beginning of the yuga having been selected as the starting point for all calculations concerning new moons). So far the place of the moon is expressed in muhūrtas only ; now in order to find from these the nakṣatra in which the moon stands at the time, we should have to deduct from the muhūrtas found

the extent of all the nakṣatras through which the moon has passed one after the other, until the sum would be exhausted.

The nakṣatra corrections vary with each nakṣatra. They are as follows :—

For Punarvasu it is 22 muhūrtas and $\frac{46}{62}$ of a muhūrta.

For constellations from Punarvasu to Uttaraphalgunī it is 172 muhūrtas + $\frac{46}{62}$ of a muhūrta.

For constellations from Uttaraphalgunī to Viśākhā it is 292 muhūrtas + $\frac{46}{62}$ of a muhūrta.

For constellations from Viśākhā to Uttarāṣāḍhā it is 442 muhūrtas $+\frac{46}{62}$ of a muhūrta.

The correction is thus obtained :

If in 124 parvas the sun completes five sidereal circuits, then in one parva there will be $\frac{5}{124} \times 1830$ day circuits $= \frac{4575}{62}$ day circuits $= \frac{4575}{62 \times 67}$ day sidereal circuits. Now $\frac{23}{67}$ of muhūrta parts of Puṣyā unite with the sun in the final parva of the previous yuga. This is to be deducted from the above. That is $\frac{4575}{62 \times 67} - \frac{23}{67} = \frac{3149}{62 \times 67}$ day sidereal circuits $= \frac{3149}{62 \times 67} \times 30 = \frac{94470}{62 \times 67}$ muhūrta sidereal circuits = 22 muhūrtas and $\frac{46}{62}$ of a muhūrta. This is the correction (or Śodhanaka) for Punarvasu constellation. Then for Abhijit it is 9 muhūrtas and $\frac{24}{62}$ of a muhūrta and $\frac{66}{67}$ of 62nd of a muhūrta, for Proṣṭhapada 159 muhūrtas, for Uttarabhādrapada 159 muhūrtas. Then for stars up to the end of Rohiṇī it is 309 muhūrtas, for stars up to the end of Punarvasu 399 muhūrtas, for stars up to the end of Uttaraphalgunī 519 muhūrtas, for stars up to the end of Viśākhā 669 muhūrtas, for stars up to the end of Mūlā 744 muhūrtas, and for stars up to the end of Uttarāṣāḍhā 819 muhūrtas. In all these, $\frac{24}{62}$ of a muhūrta and $\frac{66}{67}$ of 62nd part of a muhūrta are also to

be included. Thus the constant (parva dhruva-rāśi), *viz.*, 66 muhūrtas, 5 sixty-secondths of a muhūrta and $\frac{1}{67}$ of sixty-secondth of a muhūrta, multiplied by the number of the new moon in question minus the two corrections will give the particular constellation from Abhijit, in which the new moon happens.

Likewise to ascertain the constellation making a full moon, the same constant is to be multiplied by the number of the full moon and the correction from Abhijit to the end of Uttarāṣāḍhā snould be applied but not the correction from Punarvasu and onward (*i. e.*, the first correction).

If it is questioned where the first Śraviṣṭhī new moon happens, the procedure is as follows:—

The constant is $66+\frac{5}{62}+\frac{1}{67\times62}$, which multiplied by one is the same. Then de·luct from it Punarvasu correction $22+\frac{45}{62}$ m. The remainder is $43+\frac{21}{62}+\frac{1}{67\times62}$ m. Then deduct 30 muhūrtas of Puṣyā. The remainder is $13+\frac{21}{62}+\frac{1}{67\times62}$ m. Aśleṣā being of half union area its space comes to 15 muhūrtas. Hence when $1+\frac{40}{62}+\frac{66}{67}+\frac{1}{62}$ remain in Aśleṣā, the first Amāvāsyā is completed.

For the second Śraviṣṭhī new moon, the constant is multiplied by 13. (The constant is multiplied by 13 since the second Śraviṣṭhī moon is the thirteenth from the first.)

Then the corrections are made as follows :-

$(66+\frac{5}{66}+\frac{1}{67\times62})\times13=858+\frac{65}{62}+\frac{13}{67\times62}$. Then deduct $442+\frac{46}{52}$ being the correction up to Uttarāṣāḍhā. The remainder is $416+\frac{19}{62}+\frac{13}{67\times62}$. Then deduct $399+\frac{24}{62}+\frac{66}{67\times62}$, being the correction up to Punarvasu from the above. Then remain $16+\frac{56}{62}+\frac{14}{67\times62}$. Hence in Puṣyā the new moon occurs when there remains 16 muhūrtas and $\frac{56}{62}+\frac{14}{67\times62}$ of a muhūrta in that constellation,

For the third new moon in Śraviṣṭhā multiply the constant by 25. The result is $1650 + \frac{125}{62} + \frac{25}{67 \times 62}$. Deduct $442 + \frac{46}{62}$, being the correction up to Uttarāṣāḍhā from the above. The remainder is $1208 + \frac{79}{62} + \frac{25}{67 \times 62}$. Deduct again $819 + \frac{24}{62} + \frac{66}{67 \times 62}$, being one sidereal circuit. The remainder is $389 + \frac{54}{62} + \frac{26}{67 \times 62}$. Then deduct $309 + \frac{24}{62} + \frac{66}{67 \times 62}$, being the circuit correction from Abhijit to Rohiṇī. Then deduct 30 muhūrtas for Mṛgaśiras and 15 for Ārdrā. Then when $35 + \frac{29}{62} + \frac{27}{67 \times 62}$ muhūrtas are elapsed in Punarvasu, the third Śraviṣṭhī new moon happens.

Likewise the fourth new moon occurs when $\frac{7}{62} + \frac{41}{67 \times 62}$ muhūrtas have elapsed in Āśleṣā and the fifth new moon when $3 + \frac{42}{62} + \frac{54}{67 \times 62}$ muhūrtas have passed in Puṣyā.

Prauṣṭhapadī new moon happens in Maghā, Pūrvaphalgunī or Uttaraphalgunī. The first occurs when $4 + \frac{26}{62} + \frac{2}{67 \times 62}$ have elapsed in Uttaraphalgunī. The second occurs when $7 + \frac{61}{62} + \frac{15}{67 \times 62}$ have elapsed in Pūrvaphalgunī and the third when $11 + \frac{34}{62} + \frac{28}{67 \times 62}$ have elapsed in Maghā.

The Āśvayujī new moon occurs in Uttaraphalgunī, Hastā, or Citrā. The first occurs when $25 + \frac{31}{62} + \frac{3}{67 \times 62}$ have elapsed in Hastā, the second when $44 + \frac{4}{62} + \frac{15}{67 \times 62}$ have elapsed in Uttaraphalgunī and the third when $17 + \frac{39}{62} + \frac{29}{67 \times 62}$ have passed in Hastā. And so on for the new moons.

Now in what nakṣatra does the first full moon Śraviṣṭhī get completion ? The constant is $66 + \frac{5}{62} + \frac{1}{67 \times 62}$. Multiplied by one it is the same. Deduct from it $9 + \frac{24}{62} + \frac{66}{67 \times 62}$, being the correction for Abhijit. The remainder is $56 + \frac{42}{62} + \frac{2}{67 \times 62}$. Then deduct the 30 muhūrtas of Śravaṇā. This will give $56 + \frac{42}{62} + \frac{2}{67 \times 62} - 30 = 26 + \frac{42}{62} + \frac{2}{67 \times 62}$. This again when deducted from 30 muhūrtas of Dhaniṣṭhā will give $\{30 - (26 + \frac{42}{62} + \frac{2}{67 \times 62})\} = 3 + \frac{19}{62} + \frac{65}{67 \times 62}$. That is, when 3 muhūrtas, $\frac{59}{62}$ of a muhūrta and $\frac{65}{67}$ of the 62nd part of a muhūrta remain in Śravaṇā, then the full moon happens.

Now, if the question is where the second Śraviṣṭhī full

moon gets completion, the answer is this : The constant is $66+\frac{5}{62}+\frac{1}{67\times62}$. Multiply this by 13. (The constant is multiplied by 13 since the second full moon in Śraviṣṭhā is the thirteenth from the first). The result is $858+\frac{65}{62}+\frac{13}{67\times62}$. Now deduct from this $819+\frac{24}{62}+\frac{66}{67\times62}$, which is equal to one sidereal circuit. The remainder is $39+\frac{40}{62}+\frac{14}{67\times62}$. Deduct from this the correction for Abhijit which is equal to $9+\frac{24}{62}+\frac{66}{67\times62}$. The result is $30+\frac{15}{62}+\frac{15}{67\times62}$. From this deduct 30 muhūrtas of Śravaṇā. This gives $\frac{15}{62}+\frac{15}{67\times62}$. Then when $30-(\frac{15}{62}+\frac{15}{67\times62})=29+\frac{46}{62}+\frac{52}{67\times62}$ muhūrtas remain in Dhaniṣṭhā, the second full moon is completed. Likewise for the third Śraviṣṭhī full moon. It is the twetyfifth full moon from the first one. Hence multiply the constant $66+\frac{5}{62}+\frac{1}{67\times62}$ by 25. This gives $1650+\frac{125}{62}+\frac{25}{67\times62}$. Deduct from this $(819+\frac{24}{62}+\frac{66}{67\times62})\times 2$, being two sidereal circuits. Then the remainder is $12+\frac{75}{62}+\frac{27}{67\times62}$. Then apply Abhijit correction, which is $9+\frac{24}{62}+\frac{66}{67\times62}$. The result is $(12+\frac{75}{62}+\frac{27}{67\times62})-(9+\frac{24}{62}+\frac{66}{67\times62})=3+\frac{50}{62}+\frac{28}{67\times62}$, *i.e.*, when $30-(3+\frac{52}{60}+\frac{28}{67\times62})$ or $26+\frac{11}{62}+\frac{39}{67\times62}$ muhūrtas remain in Śravaṇā the third full moon is completed. Likewise, the fourth full moon happens when $16+\frac{33}{62}+\frac{25}{67\times62}$ muhūrtas remain in Dhaniṣṭhā.Thus Śraviṣṭhī full moon happens either in Śravaṇā or in Dhaniṣṭhā.

Likewise, Bhādrapadī full moon happens in Śatabhiṣaj, Proṣṭhapada, or in Uttaraproṣṭhapada. The first full moon happens either when $27+\frac{14}{62}+\frac{64}{67\times62}$ remain in Uttarabhādrapada, the second when $8+\frac{41}{62}+\frac{51}{67\times62}$ remain in Pūrvabhādrapada and the third when $5+\frac{6}{62}+\frac{28}{67\times62}$ remain in Śatabhiṣaj.

Likewise, the first Āśvayujī full moon happens when $21+\frac{63}{67\times62}$ remain in Aśvinī, the second full moon when $17+\frac{36}{62}+\frac{50}{67\times62}$ remain in Revatī and the third when $14+\frac{1}{62}+\frac{37}{67\times62}$ remain in Uttarbhādrapada. And so on.

A REFERENCE TO THE MAHĀNĀṬAKA

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In the recently published *Bhāva-prakāśana* of Śāradātanaya (Gaekwad's Oriential Series, No. xlv, Baroda 1930), there is an interesting reference to a somewhat peculiar classification of the Nāṭaka said to have been given by an older writer on Dramaturgy named Subandhu ; and in this connexion the *Mahānāṭaka* is cited as an illustration of one of the varieties of the Nāṭaka. As Śāradātanaya belonged in all probability to the first half of the 13th century, it would be interesting to draw attention to this reference to the *Mahānāṭaka* in connexion with my previous studies on the subject in the *IHQ*, vii (1931), pp. 537f.

Śāradātanaya informs us that Subandhu classified the Nāṭaka type of Sanskrit drama into five kinds ; and from his account it seems that the distinctions rested chiefly upon the Vṛttis and Rasas employed and the peculiar Sandhis or dramatic junctures adopted in each. These Sandhis correspond to the five generally recognised Sandhis of Mukha (Opening or Protasis), Pratimukha (Progression or Epitasis), Garbha (Development or Catastasis), Vimarśa (Pause or Peripateia) and Nirvahaṇa (Conclusion or Catastrophe) ; but they are differently designated and sometimes differently defined in each case. As Śāradātanaya's summary of Subandhu's classification is merely incidental and necessarily brief, and as some of the plays which are cited as examples of the different kinds are no longer existing, it is not easy to make out the

distinctions fully and clearly; but there is enough to indicate generally Subandhu's notion of the character of the different types of the Nāṭaka.

The five classes of the Nāṭaka, in Subandhu's opinion, are respectively called Pūrṇa (Complete), Praśānta (Tranquil), Bhāsvara (Brilliant), Lalita (Sportive) and Samagra (Entire), these names being obviously meant to be descriptive. The Pūrṇa or Complete kind contains all the five orthodox Sandhis of Mukha etc., and it is possibly meant to include the usual or normal type of the Nāṭaka. A drama entitled the *Kṛtyārāvaṇa*, which is known to us only from such incidental references in dramaturgic and rhetorical works, is given as an example of the Pūrṇa type. The chief characteristic of the Praśānta is that the Quietistic Sentiment or the Praśānta Rasa is abundant (*bhūyiṣṭha*) in it, and the dramatic Vṛtti here, according to Drauhiṇi, is Sātvatī. The *Svapnavāsavadatta* is taken as representing this type. Although the predominant sentiment in such a theme as the story of Udayana and Vāsavadattā would be the Erotic or Śṛṅgāra, the Nirveda-Vyabhicārin involved in it is obviously regarded as important enough, being often raised to the relish of the corresponding Praśānta Rasa. This type of the Nāṭaka also contains five Sandhis, respectively called Nyāsa, Nyāsa-samudbheda, Bījokti, Bīja-darśana and Anuddiṣṭa-saṃhāra. These are not clearly defined, but they are illustrated by means of the different episodes of the play which is cited as a typical specimen. The Nyāsa and Nyāsa-samudbheda apparently correspond to Mukha and Pratimukha, but the idea as well as the designation is obviously deduced from the opening episodes of the *nyāsa* or deposit of Vāsavadattā and its consequence in the illustrative play itself. The Bījokti appears to consist of the episode of the hero's anxious repetition of the heroine's name on half-recognition (*utkaṇṭhitena sodvegaṃ bījoktir nāma-kīrtanam*), like

"Come, O Vāsavadattā, where, where are you going" (*ehi vāsavadatte kva kva yāsītyādi dṛśyate*). The Bījadarśana is the natural development of this episode and consists of the mutual search of the hero and the heroine, who are indeed thrown together but who are still without access to each other (*sahāvasthitayor eka-prāptyānyasya gaveṣaṇam*). But the last Sandhi, the Anuddiṣṭa-saṃhāra, seems to consist of nothing more than the mere non-mention, at the end of the drama, of the usual prefatory words to the Bharata-vākya viz., *kiṃ te bhūyaḥ priyaṃ kuryām.*

In the Bhāsvara Nāṭaka, of which the *Bāla-rāmāyaṇa* is taken as typical, the dramatic Vṛtti is Bhāratī and the sentiments precribed are the Heroic (Vīra) and Wonderful (Adbhuta). The five Sandhis in it are called respectively Mālā, Nāyaka-siddhāṅga, Glāni, Parikṣaya and Mātrāvaśiṣṭa-saṃhāra, all of which again are deduced from an analysis of the particular illustrative play. The Mālā consists of the opposing of the well reputed hero by an equally powerful rival (Pratipakṣa), but the example cited is not that of Rāma and Rāvaṇa, but, curiously enough, that of Candragupta and Candana. The next Sandhi occurs when the object of the rival hero is for the time being fulfilled by practising deception on the hero, as in the case of Rāvaṇa's employment of Mārīca. The description of the Glāni Sandhi is not clear, but it appears to consist of the attainment of partial success by the hero, for the illustration given is the episode of the surrounding of Laṅkā by the Monkey-host after crossing the ocean. The Parikṣaya occurs when there is a partial setback through the temporary overpowering of the hero, such as the episode of the binding of Rāma and Lakṣmaṇa by Nāga-pāśa. The somewhat clumsily named last Sandhi of the Bhāsvara type of the Nāṭaka is also not defined, but it is described, with the example of the fire-ordeal of Sītā, as the testing of the

heroine who had been imprisoned by the enemy after the denouement of the enemy's destruction.

The dramatic Vṛtti in the Lalita type of the Nāṭaka is Kaiśikī, and the only permissible sentiment is the Erotic or Śṛṅgāra. An unknown *Urvaśī-vipralambha*, which probably closely followed Kālidāsa's well known Troṭaka on the same theme, is cited an example of this kind. The five Sandhis are respectively named Vilāsa, Vipralambha, Viprayoga, Viśodhana and Uddiṣṭārthopasaṃhāra, the nomenclature being obviously derived from that of the different stages or aspects of the course of Love as a sentiment. The Vilāsa is the episode of the erotic enjoyment of the hero suitable to the various seasons (e.g., Vasantotsava). The Vipralambha is separation of the young couple, which may be either voluntary or may occur through jealousy. The Viprayoga consists of involuntary separation, through curse etc., of a temporary character. The Pariśodhana is the removal of a stain or obloquy, such as Rāma's purification of Sītā by the fire-ordeal. It is curious to note, however, that the illustrations of these four kinds of Saudhis in the Lalita Nāṭaka are drawn not from the illustrative play, *Urvaśī-vipralambha*, but by a reference to some incidents in the stories of Vatsarāja, Yayāti and Rāma. The last Sandhi, Utsṛṣṭārthopasaṃhāra, however, refers directly to the story of Urvaśī, and is said to consist of such happy conclusion as indicated by the message of Indra to Urvaśī permitting her to remain on earth as a wife to Purūravas.

The fifth kind of the Nāṭaka, *viz.* the Samagra, is rather vaguely defined. It is said to possess all the dramatic Vṛttis fully developed (*sarva-vṛtti-viniṣpannam*) and all the technical Nāṭaka-lakṣaṇas (*sarva-lakṣaṇa-saṃyutam*), but there are formal requirements of a somewhat conventional nature. The *Mahānāṭaka* is cited as an example of this

kind, but it is not shown how far this play conforms to the requirements of the definition. As a matter of fact, Śāradātanaya does not think it necessary to devote more than one short stanza or two lines to this type of the Nāṭaka, and it is not clear in what way the *Mahānāṭaka* can be regarded as a representative of this indefinitely defined type of the Nāṭaka. But he adds at the conclusion of his treatment that in the Samagra Nāṭaka are to be found the various characteristics of all the types of the Nāṭaka (*sarveṣāṃ yatra rūpāṇi dṛśyante vividhāni ca*). This remark, no doubt, applies in a general way to the *Mahānāṭaka* as we know it, which is chiefly a compilation from different known and unknown Rāma-dramas; but it does not bring out the essential character of the play itself. It is also difficult from the meagre account to conclude with confidence that the present *Mahānāṭaka* was at all meant by Śaradātanaya or Subandhu. A further remark is added: *nāṭakaṃ nṛttacārākhyaṃ* (v. l. *nṛttavārākhyam*) *tat samagram itīritam*; but it is not clear whether this sentence means that the Samagra type of the Nāṭaka was also known by the name of Nṛttacāra Nāṭaka, or, as the editor of the *Bhāva-prakāśana* takes it, Nṛttacāra was the name of a specific play which is also given as an example of the Samagra Nāṭaka. At any rate, if the latter interpretation is correct, it does not help us very much, for we have unfortunately no information, here or elsewhere, about this play.

It is clear from the above account that Subandhu's classification has the merit of distinguishing Nāṭakas on the basis of their underlying sentiments and employment of dramatic modes; but it can hardly be taken as possessing any great interest or importance from the point of view of Sanskrit dramatic theory. Subandhu is also peculiar in inventing special Sandhis for his different types; but it

appears that these Sandhis consist of nothing more than certain characteristics deduced from the episodes of some well known dramas, and as such can scarcely be generalised into clearly marked differentiating principles of the employment of dramatic junctures in the Nāṭaka. It is also a pity that Śāradātanaya could not say more about the Samagra type and illustrate it in connexion with the *Mahānāṭaka* which he cites as a typical specimen of this variety. What he actually says is too indefinite to be of any use for conclusions regarding his views about this play. But it is highly probable, even from his meagre account, that the *Mahānāṭaka* known to him was probably different from the drama of the same name which now exists; and even if it be conceded that it were the same, the drama probably existed in a different form in his time, for there is nothing to warrant our taking the extant play as representative of what is conceived to be the Samagra variety of the Nāṭaka.

ARE THE SĀṀKHYA AND THE NYĀYA-VAIŚEṢIKA REALISTIC?

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It is usual to characterize the Sāṁkhya and the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika—two of the most influential schools of Indian metaphysics—as '*realistic*.' But are they so? A categorical answer to this question it may be hazardous to give without first defining what we mean by "realistic." This, however, would be a long process worthy of an elaborately worked-out thesis, rather than of a short article designed for a Commemoration Volume. I shall, therefore, start with the assumption that we all have a fairly correct idea of what is "real" as opposed to the "ideal"; and so I go straight to the problem—how far is the external world a creation of, or dependent upon, me or my mind, in the two systems of Indian Philosophy mentioned above?

I

That the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika should have been regarded as 'realistic' is not surprising, although this view, too, on careful scrutiny, will be found to be in certain respects erroneous. But it is difficult to understand why the Sāṁkhya should be described as 'realistic' and set in opposition to Vedānta which is described as 'idealistic.'

The 'Puruṣa' of the Sāṁkhya is, in truth, transcendental; that is to say, he stands or rather ought to stand, aloof from the stream of Prakṛti, with which he confounds himself and thereby makes himself, apparently at any rate, an empirical entity. Prakṛti is the fountainhead of cosmic evolution, the root-cause of the empirical

world which in the Sāṁkhya system includes much more than the world of external reality. The first emergent evolute of Prakṛti, which is the active or dynamic principle of the evolution of all empirical reality, is "Mahat" —the Great Principle, *viz.*, Intelligence, which is at the root of the Universe, but is still unindividualised. The next step in the emergent evolution is 'Ahaṁkāra' or Egoism. From Ahaṁkāra there springs the 'group of the Sixteen,' *viz.*, the five senses of perception, the five organs of bodily activity, 'manas' or mind, and the five 'tanmātras' or pure and unmixed principles (what others call "qualities"— śabda, sparśa, rūpa, rasa and gandha) which when combined in different proportions give rise to Pañca-Mahābhūtas, the five 'great kinds of matter.'

Here observe: The whole world of empirical reality proceeds from Prakṛti. Now, whatever be the original sense of Prakṛti—it may well be root-nature—there is no doubt that when the earlier speculations became crystallized in the Sāṁkhya system as sketched in the later chapters of the Mahā-Bhārata and in Sāṁkhya Kārikās, Prakṛti was understood as the permanent possibility of 'sukha,' 'duḥkha' and 'moha', also of 'jñāna,' 'kriyā' and 'jāḍya.' Thus the whole world of experience is an outcome of Puruṣa confounding himself with this permanent possibility of pleasure, pain and dulness, of knowledge, action and inertness. While the ordinary "idealist," whether intellectual or spiritual, regards the so-called world of reality not as the cause but as the product of the 'Idea,' the Sāṁkhya regards it as the product of Passion, taking the word in its widest sense, · that of being affected by the permanent possibility and ever-changing activity of the empirical world, which in its ultimate analysis, consists of sukha, duḥkha and moha. or jñāna, kriyā and jāḍya. Be it noted that the empirical

world is here conceived not as the source of sukha etc., or the object of jñāna etc., but as the expression or embodiment of those very realities which in other systems are regarded as its effects. If this is "adharottaram" (no idealist will admit that it is so), it is no more so than in those other systems which are universally recognized as "idealistic", such as those of Plato, Vasiṣtha, Śaṅkara, etc.

"Mahat-Tattva" or the Great Principle of Intelligence unindividualized, which contains the possibility of the nexa evolute, *viz.*, Ahaṁkāra or Egoism, *i.e.*, the sense of personal individuality, and personal individuality itself are made the precursors of man's empirical life which consists of the working of his senses and his mind, which in their turn demand the world of matter and have it.

Thus, the evolution of the Sāṁkhya system proceeds from *within* to *without*. It is hardly correct to characterize such a system as "realistic." It may be argued against this view, that the Sāṁkhya system is not materialistic, yet it is realistic, inasmuch as it posits Prakṛti not as a creation of Puruṣa, but as an independent reality. This is no doubt true, and it is precisely this that gives the Sāṁkhya doctrine the semblance of Realism. But a deeper scrutiny will show that this involves a misapprehension. We should have felt justified in regarding the Sāṁkhya as a system of Realism, had its Prakṛti been connected *directly* with external reality. But it is not so. Here the whole ideal world consisting of Intelligence, Personality and Mind is interposed between Prakṛti and the external world, which necessitates the conclusion that it is more correctly described as Idealism than as Realism. Secondly, the Prakṛti, too, is conceived not as a permanent possibility of the external world, but first and foremost, as that of sukha, duḥkha and moha

or jñāna, kriyā and jāḍya—which unmistakably marks it off as a type, though a unique type, of Idealism.

II

What about the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika? It is no doubt realistic, so far as its first three padārthas, Dravya, Guṇa and Karman are concerned.

But the same can hardly be said, without a certain qualification, about the remaining categories, *viz.*, Sāmānya, Viśeṣa and Samavāya. One crucial question should suffice to clear up the position: How is it that "Sattā" which must mean existence, real existence and nothing else, is predicated of dravya, guṇa and karman only? Later Naiyāyikas will glibly quote:

(१) व्यक्तेरभेदस्तुल्यत्वं सङ्करोऽथानवस्थितिः ।
रूपहानिरसम्बन्धो जातिबाधकसंग्रहः ॥
(२) द्रव्यादित्रिकवृत्तिस्तु सत्ता परतयोच्यते ।

But how do the quotations help? Let us go behind the quotations, and try to understand the position. Three stages in the history of Vaiśeṣika thought are here clearly discernible. In the first stage, only three categories were recognized as objectively real, Sāmānya and Viśeṣa being regarded as *logical* categories only. This is evident from the fact that what was Sāmānya with reference to the individuals of a group was at the same time understood to be Viśeṣa with reference to the individuals of a different group. Moreover, it is distinctly stated by the author of the Vaiśeṣika Sūtras that the idea is logical (बुद्ध्यपेक्षम्), that is, to use the nomenclature of Mediæval European Philosophy, it possesses "conceptual" as distinguished from "real" existence. In the next stage of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school, the "conceptual existence" of Sāmānya and Viśeṣa was elevated to the position of "real" existence, provided certain conditions were

fulfilled. These are summed up, in the case of Sāmānya, in the famous verse व्यक्तेरभेद: etc. It is easy to see how these are just those conditions which Sāmānya must fulfil if it is to obtain a place in the world of objective reality. Similarly, every Viśeṣa is not objectively real, but only those which cannot be explained except by assuming that they possess objective reality. Sāmānya, similarly, is a hypothetical category assumed to explain the peculiar relation of Guṇa, Karman, Sāmānya, Viśeṣa and Avayavin with their substratum. Similarly, Abhāva, too, like Sāmānya, Viśeṣa and Samavāya, does not possess "Sattā" or full reality, but only an upādhi. In the third stage of the history of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school, distinction between the reality of Dravya, Guṇa and Karman, and the ideality of Sāmānya, Viśeṣa, etc., is discarded and conceptual and hypothetical reality is treated on a par with objective and categorical reality, so that all the padārthas are regarded as equally real. The peculiar doctrine of 'Sattā' residing in Dravya, Guṇa and Karman, which was at first not a dogma but a thoroughly intelligible proposition, is the sole survivor of the original partial Idealism, or if you prefer, the more correct characterization, Conceptualism.

THE SITUATION OF RĀVAṆA'S LAṄKĀ

THE LATE RAI BAHADUR DR. HIRALAL, B.A., D.LITT.

It is a somewhat curious event that Ceylon should have been credited with the seat of Rāvaṇa's capital for centuries together, in spite of the clear indications of its situation, which the Vālmīki Rāmāyaṇa and the Purāṇas afford. The point attracted the attention of various scholars years ago with the result that they with cogent reasons discredited the popular belief so deeply rooted and endeavoured to lay the scene of Rāvaṇa's activities in places so far apart as Assam, Maldives and Malaya Peninsula. All these have however presented difficulties, which cannot be easily explained. A new theory, however, started about 15 years ago locating Laṅkā on the Amarakaṇṭaka peak of the Mekala range of the Vindhya mountains in Central India appears to be the most natural one and shows that Rāma who was banished for 14 years to live in jungles spent the whole of that time in Chitrakūṭa and the adjoining Daṇḍaka forests without going out of it during the whole period of his exile. It was in that forest that his wife Sītā was abducted by Rāvaṇa and it was within its limits that the great battle between him and Rāma took place, with the help of the leading aboriginal tribes inhabiting that wild region. Apparently the latter was divided into several *Janapadas*, a glimpse of which may be obtained from the Matsya[1] and Vāyu Purāṇas. Amongst the dwellers

[1] मालवाश्च करूषाश्च मेकलाश्चोत्कलैः सह ।
औण्ड्रा माषा दशार्णाश्च भोजाः किष्किन्धकैः सह ॥५२॥
स्तोशला कोसलाश्चैव त्रैपुरा वैदिशास्तथा ।
तुमुरास्तुम्बराश्चैव पद्गमा नैषधैः सह ॥५३॥

of the Vindhya mountains (विन्ध्यपृष्ठनिवासिनः) the mention of the Mekalas and the Kishkindhakas is very important in view of the part they played in the Rāmāyaṇa. The identification of these *Janapadas* was never critically examined, especially that of the latter, which in fact furnished the key to the location of Rāvaṇa's habitat. The cue was taken not from the Purāṇas referred to above, but from the statement of the Vālmīki Rāmāyaṇa itself, which Rao Bahadur Sardar Madhava Rao Kibe of Indore was the first to detect. He pointed out that Sugrīva, the Lord of Kishkindhā, while giving instructions to his Vānaras to go in all directions in search of Sītā after her abduction ordered the party going to the south to look well into the Narmadā, the Godāvarī, Mekhala, Utkala and a host of other rivers, mountains and countries.[2] From this the conclusion was unavoidable that Kishkindhā, the residence of Sugrīva, whence the order was delivered, lay to the north of the Narmadā. The Matsya and Vāyu Purāṇas corroborate this location, in that Kishkindhā was associated with Mekhala or Mekala, still going by that name and described in the latest Imperial Gazetteer as ' a range of hills in the Central Provinces and Central India. It is the connecting hill between the great hill system of the Vindhyas

अरूपाःशौण्डिकेराश्च वीतिहोत्रा अवन्तयः ।
एते जनपदाः ख्याता विन्ध्यपृष्ठनिवासिनः ॥५४॥

—Matsya Purāṇa, Chapter 113.

These very ślokas are found in Chapter 45 of the Vāyu Purāṇa (see verses 132 to 134) with slight variations due to misreading of the text.

[2] सहस्रशिरसं विन्ध्यं नानाद्रुमलतायुतम् ।
नर्मदां च नदीं रम्यां महोरगनिषेविताम् ॥८॥
ततो गोदावरीं रम्यां कृष्णां वेणीं महानदीम् ।
मेखलानुत्कलांश्चैव दशार्णनगराण्यपि ॥९॥

—Vālmīki Rāmāyaṇa, Kishkindhā Kāṇḍa, Sarga 41.

and Satpuras forming respectively the northern and southern walls of the Narmadā valley. Starting in the Khairāgaṛh state of the Central Provinces, the range runs in a general south-easterly direction for the first 46 miles in the British territory and then entering the Sohagpur pargana of Rewah state, terminates 84 miles farther at Amarakaṇṭaka, one of the most sacred places in India, where the source of the Narmadā river is situated. Unlike the two great ranges which it connects, the Mekala forms a broad plateau of 880 square miles in extent, mostly forest country inhabited by Gonds.' 'Local tradition relates that in the 4th and 5th centuries A.D., during the Gupta rule, this plateau was highly populated and the Rāmāyaṇa and the Purāṇas mention the Mekalas as a tribe of the Vindhya range.' With the Mekalas thus identified it is now easy to find out the position of Kishkindhā somewhere in the Bilaspur district, as it was almost contiguous to the former. This explodes the popular belief that Kishkindhā lay on the banks of the Tungabhadrā near the famous Vijayanagara, bordering on the southern-most corner of the Nizam's dominions, some 500 miles away to the south of the Narmadā. The whole of the Vindhya mountains and forests, in fact the whole of the Daṇḍakāraṇya which covered a major part of the present Central Provinces was inhabited by aboriginal tribes, chief of whom were the Goṇḍs, the Oraons and the Śabaras, of which the last find mention even in the Vedic literature. Goṇḍs exceed 20 lakhs in the Central Provinces alone and are closely connected with Rāvaṇa, to whom they trace their origin. In the Census of 1891, when sub-castes were ordered to be recorded, several lakhs of Goṇḍs returned themselves as Rāvaṇa-vaṁśis and the greatest Goṇḍ king who ruled about 400 years ago inscribed his name on gold coins as "Śri Sangrāma Shāh, Paulastya-vaṁśa," thus mention-

ing prominently his connection with Rāvaṇa, as Paulastya-vaṁśa is an alternative name for Rāvaṇa-vaṁśa. Eaters of offal of almost every kind including kine, which they even up to day kill by way of an offering to the manes of their dead and do not hesitate to use cows for ploughing, which is extremely repugnant to the Hindus, combined with shocking uncleanliness, as they still in certain wild tracts continue to clean with a stone without using any water after easing themselves, there is nothing to wonder at the Aryans calling Goṇḍs as Rākshasas or demons. This was accentuated by their personal deformity, which was aggravated by their ornaments of horns, which they still use by way of decoration in the Bastar state on occasions of rejoicings, dances, etc. So it is clear that Rāvaṇa was the king of these Rākshasas, which attendant circumstances confirm. For instance, Rāvaṇa had his armies stationed in the Daṇḍakāraṇya under Khara and Dūshaṇa and even his female relative like Śūrpaṇakhā and Tāḍakā were found wandering in that jungle, whose audacity compelled Rāma to engage with them. If Rāvaṇa had no connection with Daṇḍakāraṇya and lived in Ceylon why should the royal ladies and armies have been found tramping a forest like this? Daṇḍakāraṇya was not the frontier of his kingdom, which, if it was Ceylon according to the popular belief, was over 800 miles away from the island and there is absolutely no proof that the intervening Madras Presidency and Nizam's dominions were ever under his sway.

The fact that he was called king of Laṅkā has been the source of all the confusion in locating his capital and country. Laṅkā really means a high place, an elevated ground and as such an island. It is still found used in this sense in the Uriya and Telugu countries. The peak of a mountain is as much a *laṅkā* as an island in the sea.

Therefore there is nothing inappropriate in calling the highest peak of the Mekala range, *viz.*, Amarakaṇṭaka as Laṅkā, which finds a mention even in aboriginal songs.[3] For instance, the Korkus found only in the Betul and adjoining Amraoti districts, speaking a Muṇḍāri language, sing a song the purport of which is :—" Rāvaṇa has come from Laṅkā and is standing on the village wrestling ground, ' Mothers and sisters! come out and see.' ' We have no proper ornaments and clothes, how are we to come out '?" The implication is that Rāvaṇa being their king, they could not appear before him without proper dress and ornaments. Had he been a foreigner, they would not have cared to observe such an etiquette. It is curious that in these tracts an annual ceremony called Meghanāda, after the name of Rāvaṇa's son, is still performed and is reminiscent of the cruelties of the Crown Prince. " It consists in swinging a man in the air. A high pole is erected and a cross-bar turning in a socket is secured to the top of it . . . The Bhumkā (village priest) is tied to the cross-bar and ropes are secured to it and held by the people, who pull the cross-bar round five times in a circle in its socket. In former times the Bhumkā was swung round suspended by a hook fixed in his back and the ceremony is supposed to exercise an important influence in the direction of securing the success of the crops.[4] Many persons who wish to get issues or similar other objects undergo a similar ordeal, which is now toned down to a mockery and of which the underlying idea was the performance of a penance whose efficacy increased in proportion of its severity. Hook-swinging seems to have originated from Meghanāda,

[3] For the actual song and its translation see Linguistic Survey of India: Gramophone records of Languages and Dialects spoken in the Central Provinces and Berar, supplied by the Central Provinces and Berar Administration, 1920, pp. 24-25.

[4] Russell's Betul District Gazetteer, pp. 56-57.

whose name it continues to bear. Close to the Betul district where Korkus fo Muṇḍā origin (and as such predecessors of the Dravidian people like Goṇḍs) live, lies the district of Nimar with a sacred place Māndhātā on the banks of the Narmadā, which has been identified with Māhishmatī, the capital of Sahasrārjuna Kārtavīrya, who was a contemporary of Rāvaṇa. The former had once captured the latter and kept him bound for a considerable period. He finally let him go on the intervention of others. This points to quarrels which usually arise between neighbouring states and incidentally indicates the western limit of Rāvaṇa's kingdom.

Now let us examine the question with reference to the wanderings of Rāma and their indications. On leaving Ayodhyā Rāma went to Chitrakūṭa and stayed there for some time before entering the Daṇḍaka forest, which lay to the south of Chitrakūṭa. He proceeded from one Ṛishi's *āśrama* to another Ṛishi's, until he reached Sutīkshṇa's hermitage where he stayed for some time, as apparently he had a liking for it, in as much as he returned to it once more after an absence of several years. On leaving it a second time he proceeded to Agastya's *āśrama*, which was only 5 or 6 *Yojanas* away. There he was shown a suitable place for dwelling at Pañchavaṭī on the Godāvarī, only about two *Yojanas* from Agastya's hermitage. Rāma's party built a hut at Pañchavaṭī, from where Sītā was later on abducted by Rāvaṇa. From the distances and indications given in the Rāmāyaṇa it is clear that Sutīkshṇa's *āśrama* lay about 30 miles from Chitrakūṭa and Pañchavaṭī was 48 miles further on. Kishkindhā was situated 18 miles still further. Thus the distance from Chitrakūṭa to Kishkindhā could not have been more than a hundred miles. This tallies well with the description given in

the Rāmāyaṇa, that Sītā was carried by air route weeping and throwing out ornaments and clothes which were picked up at Kishkindhā and shown to Rāma, when he reached there in search of his wife. The one difficulty which presents itself in this connection is the absence of the Godāvarī, in the tract where Pañchavaṭī stood, 18 miles to the north of Kishkindhā. It is this which led to its location at Nasik or Parṇaśālā in the Bastar state, the latter situated just on the bank of the Godāvarī, separating it from the Nizam's dominions. With this location Kishkindhā had to be placed at the southern end of the Haidarābād state in order to justify the course of events, which followed the abduction of Sītā as narrated in the Rāmāyaṇa. But this was all unnecessary in view of the fact, that there is still a Godāvarī, 11 miles from Chitrakūṭa, which has now lost itself in a well, like the Sarasvatī which originally flowed up to Allahabad joining the Ganges and Jammā at the Triveṇī, but has now lost itself in the sands of Rajputana. It is very probable that the Godāvarī of Chitrakūṭa flowed past the Pañchavaṭī or a grove of five banyan trees where Rāma built his hut and subsequently changed its course and accidentally fell into a pit or well. It thus carried its waters through some sub-terranean passage to some unknown place. Its former channel during the march of centuries of course disappeared and the river thus became *gupta* (hidden), which its present name "Gupta Godāvarī" most appropriately represents. The great Godāvarī passing through Nasik and Parṇaśālā is situated about 400 miles away from Agastya's *āśrama*, which was within 10 miles of Pañchavaṭī.

Another difficulty which oppresses the minds of the diehards is the absence of a *Sāgara* over which Rāma built a bridge to reach Laṅkā. The nearest *Sāgara* in the sense of a sea to the south is the Indian Ocean which

necessitated Laṅkā to be placed on the Ceylon or Siṁhala island, though Varāha-mihira and others clearly mention them as two distinct *dvīpas*. The last designation seems to them to further confirm their notion as they think a *dvīpa* cannot exist out of the sea. But both these ideas are incorrect. A *sāgara* does not necessarily mean a sea. It is also applied to any big reservoir of water, tank or lake, for instance, the *Kirāta-sāgara* of Mahobā, a tank built by Chandellās, the *Lachhamana-sāgara* of Bilahri, excavated by a Kalachari Rājā, whose name it bears, the *Sāgara* or tank which has given its name to a town and district in the northern-most corner of the Central Provinces and so on. Amarakaṇṭaka even at the present day retains a big marsh on its southern scarp, while on the northern side there are marks of ripples formed on the rocks showing the existence of long standing water contact there. Geological investigations show that formerly a sea existed separating Northern India from the southern peninsula, of which the Rajputana desert is shown to be a remnant. But whether this sea existed or not during Rāma's time there can be no doubt about the existence of a large collection of water on the northern side of Amarakaṇṭaka peak, while the southern side, was protected by marshes, etc., and the eastern by the sea-like expanse of the Son river which rises from the peak it protected. Any of these apparently could not be crossed over without the help of a bridge. Rāma was compelled to build one in order to reach Laṅkā. It is worthy of note that Amarakaṇṭaka abuts on the Chhattisgarh Division of the Central Provinces. The latter is a land of water, full of tanks of which, 1400 existed in its former capital. Many have disappeared, but they have left names which are significant, like Mahāsamunda (Head-quarters of a tahsil of that name in the Raipur district). Nearer to Amara-

kaṇṭaka than Mahāsamunda lies the Lavana *parganā* with low lands suggesting its reclamation from water-logged area, which may have been a part of the traditional Lavaṇa Sāgara, within which Laṅkā was traditionally situated. Again a *dvīpa* in the Indian sense did not connote land surrounded on all sides by water, for instance, Śaka-dvīpa was an inland tract, the Jambu-dvīpa was bounded on its north side by a mountain, and so on. *Dvīpa* used for Laṅkā on the Amarakaṇṭaka derived as it is from a source meaning anything surrounded by water on two sides, would thus satisfy the susceptibilities of even a scrupulous Sanskritist, though it is not necessary to do so, in view of the explanation given before.

Having now explained the main difficulties which one has to face at the out-set, and having shown that Laṅkā was really "कुमध्ये" or in the centre of land as stated by Varāha-mihira and not in the sea, I will now proceed to identify the local tribes that took part in the fight between Rāma and Rāvaṇa. These as I have indicated before were Rākshasas or Goṇḍs on the one side and Oraons and Śabaras on the other, whom Rāma took into his confidence. The whole country belonged to the Goṇḍs, once called Goṇḍwānā after them. Their number exceeds 20 lakhs in the Central Provinces alone. To these must be added those living in the Rewa state in which Amarakaṇṭaka is situated. The Vānaras are the present day Oraons who inhabit the neighbouring Bilaspur district and adjoining states and number about 9 lakhs. They are apparently the Bandarwas, who were described by Sir Richard Jenkins, Resident at the Court of the Rājā of Nagpur in 1827 A.D., as residing in the hilly and woody country near Ratanpur (in the Bilaspur district). Says Sir Richard "They go entirely naked, are armed with bows and arrows, never build any huts,

or seek other shelter than that afforded by the jungles." Sir Charles Grant in his Gazetteer of the Central Provinces 1872 (see p. 108) wrote that "a sub-division of them was addicted to living up the trees and to wandering about, both men and women, in a state of nature." The renowned anthropologist Rai Bahadur Sarat Chandra Roy of Ranchi who has written a big monograph on Oraons also holds the same view that their ancestors were the Vānaras of the Rāmāyaṇa. Their language shows that they are a Dravidian people like Goṇḍs. But they had a very strong reason to join Rāma's forces in view of the fact that Rāma had helped their chief Sugrīva in getting the Kishkindhā throne. Śabaras numbering about 6 lakhs belong to the Muṇḍā stock and were ascendant before the Dravidians. They were apparently ousted by the Goṇḍs and were looking forward for an opportunity to wreak vengeance on their old enemies. This was afforded by Rāma's visit to Daṇḍaka, for which they eagerly waited, as is evident from the devotion displayed by Śabarī, a woman of their tribe, who made preparations to welcome Rāma long before he reached her place, and received him with a warmth which secured for her the high honour of a Bhakta.

We have seen why the Oraons were classed as monkeys, but it is not known why Śabaras were put down as Ṛikshas or bears, unless it was due to the comparative darkness of their colour accompanied with a comparative exuberance of hair on their bodies. It may be noted here that horns and tails assigned to the tribal people were not totally a myth. They really formed a part of the equipment of soldiers or warriors, as is still found to be the case amongst the Nāgās of Assam. Mr. Hodson's account of the latter will convince any sceptic on these points. He writes "On gala days the costume of a warrior is most handsome. The cane helmet which is sometimes

covered with tiger or leopard skin bears a brass disc in front and thin crescents of buffalo horn tipped with red hair are fastened to it in front. I have seen a red and yellow painted structure made of thin lath worn on the helmet rising at least 2 feet above the peak of the cane helmet. This looks like a pair of horns which it may be intended to imitate. From the sides hang solid wooden discs decorated with red seeds, with the wings of the green beetle and with pendants of hair which also fringe the helmet at the back . . . . The most curious ornament on these occasions is the caudal appendage with its curve upwards and a long hair fringe of the usual colours . . . The "tail" serves as a useful purpose, for it has a space hollowed out in which *pangis* (sharpened bamboo spikes) are kept by the warriors."[5]

[5] The Naga Tribes of Manipur, p. 23.

ÆSTHETIC "SATKĀRYAVĀDA"

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While studying Alaṅkāraśāstra, one often forms the impression that the śāstra is mainly concerned with the creation of the parts of a literary composition and has only stray and casual remarks to offer regarding the unification of these parts into a whole. One gets the impression that the critic, whether he be an ālaṅkārika or a mere commentator, is mainly conscious of the individual stanza, which is the unit of a literary composition. The alaṅkāraśāstra, from its beginning till almost the present day, has much to say about the individual stanza. It has tried to set up a high standard of beauty for its workmanship. To the question: when is a stanza beautiful? different answers can be given from the point of view of the different schools of alaṅkāraśāstra. The sounds which go to make up a stanza, the meanings of the words entering into its composition, the sentiments which it evokes in us, the metres in which it can be composed, all this has been minutely analysed and definite opinions have been expressed as to what is good and what is bad, what is beautiful and what is ugly.

But a literary work only begins with the stanza or, if it is in prose, with the paragraph. Until the stanzas or paragraphs have been knit together into a whole, forming a Mahākāvya or Khaṇḍakāvya or Kathā or Campū or Nāṭaka, as the case may be, the creation of the work is not over. It is obvious that unless this unification is carried out well, the work will be spoiled. Parts, in

themselves beautiful, cannot form a beautiful whole, unless they are strung together beautifully. It is only natural therefore that literary criticism should take up the question: when can the unification, the stringing together of the parts be said to be beautiful? It would be wrong to say that the alaṅkāraśāstra, using the word in its widest sense, so as to include Nāṭyaśāstra also, does not contain any ideas on the subject. It would be strange indeed if it did not. It can, however, be maintained without fear of contradiction that this question did not occupy such a large place in the critical consciousness of our ālaṅkārikas, as that of the creation of the parts.

Ideas on the subject are, however, found either explicitly stated or implied in the rules and remarks made by the ālaṅkārikas or commentators. The object of this paper is *not* to put all such ideas together and build up a system out of them. All that I wish to do is to draw the attention of the reader to *one* such idea, which is sometimes explicitly stated, but much more often implied in the practice of the authors and in the remarks of critics. I believe that the value of this idea for the understanding and appreciation of Sanskrit literary works has not yet been sufficiently stressed.

The question might be stated as follows: The history of Sanskrit literature reveals the development of different species of literature: Popular Epics, Court Epics, Drama, Prose Romance, Historical Romance, Fables, Hymns, etc. All these different varieties of literature imply putting together of parts, in other words, composition. What is the principle which is considered essential or at least important in this art of the unification of the parts, the principle which, if not observed, would make the work defective?

The earliest answer to this question is found in the Nāṭyaśāstra of Bharata, in the theory of the five Sandhis

and their aṅgas. The theory is set forth rather elaborately in Bharata's work, which the later writers follow. Bharata had chiefly, if not exclusively, the drama in mind. The details of the theory are not of a very great interest. The main principle underlying the whole theory is that of *unity of action*. The hero wants to achieve a definite purpose (ārambha) and makes a determined effort (prayatna). Success seems, at first, possible (prāptyāśā) and then becomes certain (niyatāpti) and finally the object is attained (phalāgama). Corresponding to these five states of mind of the hero, the drama should have five divisions or junctures, mukha (opening), pratimukha (progression), garbha (development), vimarśa (pause), and nirvahaṇa (conclusion). The drama should reflect, in the development of its plot, the stages through which the human mind naturally passes in the achievement of an object and herein lies the unity of action. Everything must be subordinate to the "*dénouement*" of the drama. Whether the details of this theory relate to the essentials of a drama or only to its accidental features may be disputed; but it cannot be denied that the main principle is based on truth.

Though Bharata had only the drama in mind when he propounded this principle of unity, it was very soon extended to other kinds of literature also. Dhvanyāloka III, 10—14 enunciate the principles by following which a composition taken as a whole (prabandha) can be made suggestive of the sentiments (rasa) and no distinction is there made between a drama and other kinds of literature. One of these principles is the judicious combination of the Sandhis and their aṅgas, with a view to evoke the right kind of sentiment in the minds of readers or spectators.

संधिसंध्यङ्गघटनं रसाभिव्यक्त्यपेक्षया ।
न तु केवलया शास्त्रस्थितिसंपादनेच्छया ॥

Similarly, while defining a *Sargabandha*, Viśvanātha, the author of the Sāhityadarpaṇa, explicitly extends the principle of the Sandhis to this kind of literature. He says :—

शृङ्गारवीरशान्तानामेकोऽङ्गी रस उच्यते ।
अङ्गानि सर्वेऽपि रसाः सर्वे नाटकसंधयः ॥

Kuntaka also, while discussing *prabandhavakratā* refers to the Śiśupālavadha in connection with the use of the Sandhis.[1]

In addition to this main principle of the Sandhis, certain dramatic devices, required by theory and used by all writers, are also connected with unity of action. I have chiefly the *Patākāsthānaka* of a drama in mind. Bharata recognises four varieties of it, all of which are mentioned in such a late work as Sāhityadarpaṇa.[2] Each one is an indication, by means of an ambiguous speech or situation, of what is coming. It is recognised that such a device can be made use of at any stage in the development of a drama. In other words, the theory provides that, at different stages in the development of a drama, the spectator's interest must be aroused and kept alive by giving him an indication of what is coming. Sometimes this is done by an equivocal speech. Words having more than one meaning are used, one meaning being applicable to the context and the other giving an indication of what is coming. When, in Veṇīsaṁhāra II, Duryodhana is told that the fierce (bhīma) wind has broken his standard, it is an indication of the breaking of his thigh by Bhīma. When in Act III of the Śākuntala, Priyaṁvadā tells the female Cakravāka to bid farewell to her spouse, it is an indication of the coming separation of the king and Śakuntalā. Sometimes it is

[1] Vakroktijīvita, p. 238 (Calcutta Oriental Series No. 8).

[2] Bharata-Nāṭyaśāstra, XXI, 31—35 (Benares Edition).

an ambiguous situation that foreshadows the future. When in Ratnāvalī, Act III, the king hastens to save Vāsavadattā, as he thinks, from committing suicide and finds, to his joy and surprise, that he has saved none other than Sāgarikā, it is an indication of the coming anger of the queen.[3]

But Patākāsthānaka, with its varieties, is not the only device recognised by theory for giving indications to the spectator of what is coming. There is the Aṅkamukha or anticipatory scene in which, at the close of one act, a character alludes to the subject of the following act. At the end of Act II of the Mahāvīracarita, Sumantra announces the arrival of Vasiṣṭha, Viśvāmitra and Paraśurāma and these three open Act III. Still more indicative of this desire to foreshadow future events is the practice of mentioning the important characters or the subject-matter of the drama in the opening verse or *maṅgala-śloka* often by means of a play on words. The definition of *Nāndī* as अर्थतः शब्दतो वापि मनाक्काव्यार्थसूचनम्, often quoted in commentaries, refers to this characteristic of the opening verse. Practically all the plays attributed to Bhāsa mention the names of the characters in the opening verse, of course, with the help of a play on words. Even in the straightforward opening verse of the Uttararāmacarita, the commentator Ghanaśyāma sees a reference to Sītā and Rāma, the main characters of the drama, in the words *kalā* and *ātman*.

It is not merely in a drama that theory provides devices for the indication of coming events. Viśvanātha mentions this point in his definitions of Sargabandha and Ākhyāyikā. In his definition of Sargabandha he says :—

सर्गान्ते भाविसर्गस्य कथायाः सूचनं भवेत् ।

Sāhityadarpaṇa, p. 208 (Cal. ed.)

[3] Rasārṇavasudhākara (Trivandrum Sanskrit Series) III, p. 211.

This is often the actual practice of the poets. Similarly, while defining Akhyāyikā, he says :—

अन्यापदेशेनाश्वासमुखे भाव्यर्थसूचनम् ।

Sāhityadarpaṇa, p. 210 (Cal. ed.)

In the Harṣacarita, the well-known Ākhyāyikā of Bāṇa, this is actually done. At the beginning of each *ucchāsa*, there are some verses which give an indication of what is coming.

So far we have been considering the devices provided by the theory itself for the foreshadowing of coming events in the course of the development of a literary work. But when we study the works themselves, we find that authors have not contented themselves with merely observing these devices provided by theory, nor do commentators think they have done their duty when they have pointed out such formal respect for theory on the part of writers. There seems to have been a strong tendency on the part of writers not to limit themselves in this matter. They seem to have cultivated the art of indicating coming events even when demands of theory or the exigencies of plot development did not require it. Commentators also point out such indications, even where we least expect to find them. We may not always be able to agree with them when they credit the authors with a desire to foreshadow coming events in particular passages; but their very eagerness to see such indications and to point them out with evident approval and appreciation is significant to us. It is a proof that they consider it a point of beauty in the art of developing a plot or of telling a story. And if we do not *always* agree with the commentators, we have to agree with them *sometimes*. A few examples will make our point clear.

Act I of the Uttararāmacarita ends in the banishment of Sītā, after Rāma has heard from Durmukha the

scandal about her in the country. But long before the arrival of Durmukha, the poet gives an indication of what is coming. The very first verse which Rāma utters in Act I is as follows :—

किंत्वनुष्ठाननित्यत्वं स्वातन्त्र्यमपकर्षति ।
संकटा ह्याहिताग्नीनां प्रत्यवायैर्गृहस्थता ॥

This verse, which is an explanation of the absence of Janaka and others and of their departure from Ayodhyā, is also supposed to contain an apology for Rāma's banishment of Sītā. It is supposed to suggest that in abandoning Sītā, Rāma was obeying the call of duty which had to be obeyed. If it be said that the allusion here to the coming banishment of Sītā is rather farfetched, the same cannot be said about the next sentence uttered by Sītā :— जाणामि अज्जउत्त, किन्दु सन्दावआरिणो बन्धुअणविप्पओआ होन्ति । Not much subtlety is required to see that this sentence foreshadows the coming abandonment of Sītā. Nor have the commentators failed to point this out. Nārāyaṇa says in his Bhāvārthadīpikā :—अत्र गुरुबन्धुविप्रयोगा इति मातृणामरुन्धत्याश्च गमनमभिप्रेत्य कथितमिति द्रष्टव्यम् । एतञ्च भाविनो विरहस्य बीजम् । Though he points out that there is here an indication of what is coming, he does not attempt to bring it under *Patākāsthānaka*.

As another illustration of this principle from the same drama might be taken the last remark of the Naṭa in the *Prastāvanā* सर्वथा ऋषयो देवताश्च श्रेयो विधास्यन्ति । In the context where it is found, it cannot be an open reference to incidents in the development of the drama, but there can be no doubt that the poet had in mind the part which Vālmīki, the Ṛṣi, and the goddesses, Pṛthivī and Bhāgīrathī are going to play in bringing together Rāma and Sītā at the end of the drama.

We may now take a few examples from the Śākuntala of Kālidāsa. It is not possible to assert positively whether

Kālidāsa was familiar with the theory of Dhvani, as it is propounded in the Dhvanyāloka and later works. One thing is, however, certain: Kālidāsa's verses have, as a matter of fact, a remarkable power of suggestion. Even if we cannot follow some commentators in seeing all kinds of suggested meanings in some passages of the Śākuntala, it would be a mistake not to recognise that for a full understanding of Kālidāsa, it is necessary to peep behind the explicit meaning of words. When we do so, we find that the suggested meaning is often in the nature of *an anticipation of coming events*. That the power of suggestion of words can be used for foreshadowing coming events is well recognised in the definition and illustrations of *Patākāsthānaka* but when Kālidāsa uses suggestion, he not only goes beyond the needs of theory, he is also very subtle. Let us take a few examples. There are five verses in the Prastāvanā of Śākuntala, including the Nāndī-śloka. The first one या सृष्टिः etc., has been explained not merely as a prayer and benediction, but also as containing a reference to the principal events and characters of the drama. One commentator[1] writes:—

अत्र काव्यार्थसूचनमपि व्याचक्षते। तथा हि पंचभूतात्मिकया यजमानरूपया तेजोविशेषात् सूर्यचन्द्ररूपया अष्टाभिरित्यष्टदिक् पालमात्रात्मिकया तन्वा प्रपन्न ईशो राजेति कथानायकः। तथा तस्य भरतवंशादित्वं यथावत् करादानं यज्ञाद्यनुष्ठानं राजा कालस्य कारणमिति नास्यवेदादिप्रतिपादितगुणसमग्रतया लोकप्रसिद्धिः प्रजानां भरणविनयाधानादिकं तासां संरक्षणं च सप्तभिर्वाक्यैः सूच्यन्ते। अथ च येत्यादिना युवतिविषये सृष्टिराद्येव धातुरितिवत् लोकोत्तरस्त्रीरत्नत्वेन नायिका। विधिना गान्धर्वेण हुतं निषिक्तं हविस्तत्तुल्यं रेतो वहतीति तस्या गान्धर्वो गर्भश्च। होत्रीति कण्वः। ये द्वे स्त्रियौ कालं शापान्तकालं विधत्तः संपादयत इति सख्यौ, दुर्वासःशापमोक्षौ च। श्रुतिविषयाः प्रसिद्धा यद्वा वेदाश्रयाः श्रुतिविषयस्य कण्वस्य वा गुणा अप्रधानभूताः शिष्या इति यावत्। ते सहायतया यस्याः सा विश्वं विश्वा-

[4] K. Rama Pisharoti, author of Sārārthadīpikā on Śākuntala (Mangalodayam Press, Trichur—Cochin).

धिपं राजानं प्राप्य स्थितेत्यन्तर्वर्त्या नायिकायाः शार्ङ्गरवादिभिः सह राज-सन्निधिगमनम्। यामाहुरित्यादिना चक्रवर्ती भरतः। यया यत्प्राप्त्या जनाः प्राणवन्तः इति राज्ञः सपुत्रायाः प्रियाया लाभः। तनुभिः प्रकृत्यादिभिः प्रपन्न इति तत्सम्बन्धः अवधातोः प्रीत्यर्थकतया नायकादेरन्ततः परमानन्द-प्राप्तिश्च व्यज्यन्ते इति।

I find it difficult to agree with the commentator that Kālidāsa meant to convey all this; but, as I pointed out above, that does not really matter as far as the point I want to establish is concerned. What is significant is that critics and commentators *expect* the poet to use the power of suggestion of words to foreshadow coming events. It was considered an essential principle in the art of writing, in the art of unifying the different parts of a literary composition.

The second verse is: आ परितोषात् etc. The first meaning is quite obvious: the poet expresses the hope that the spectators would appreciate his work. The same commentator, however, adds: अत्रापि विदुषां कण्वस्य प्रयोगो राज्ञो गान्धर्व इति काव्यार्थसूचनम्। Here again, I am not able to follow the commentator, but his remarks only confirm the point which I am trying to make. He assumes in the poet a constant desire to anticipate the future.

The next verse is: सुलभसलिलावगाहाः etc. The avowed purpose of this verse is to describe the summer season. After explaining it in that sense, the commentator adds: किं च कृताभिषेकस्य प्राप्ततपोवनस्य गान्धर्वसुलभशकुन्तलस्य स्वसंसर्गतदाहितशुभगर्भस्य शापमूलतद्विस्मरणस्य शापावसानप्रतिलब्ध-पुत्रकलत्रस्य नायकस्य प्रतीत्या काव्यार्थोऽप्यासूच्यते।

This suggested meaning, if it was really intended by the author, is a very subtle one and here I am *not* prepared to say that the poet did not intend it. Why not?

The next verse is: इसिचुंबिआइं etc. This is also a description of summer and here also, the commentator adds:— अत्रापि विश्वामित्रकामितमेनकाजनितसमुज्झितायाः शकुन्तैः

किंचिल्लालितायाः पुनः संजातसुभगयौवनाया मुनिकन्यकाभिरादृतायाः शकुन्तलायाः प्रतीत्या काव्यार्थः सूच्यते ।

The final remark of the Sutradhāra in the *Prastāvanā* is :—

आर्ये सम्यगनुबोधितोऽस्मि । नन्वस्मिन् क्षणे विस्मृतं खलु मया तत् etc. The commentator remarks :— अत्रानेन शकुन्तलाविस्मरणं पश्चादंगुलीयदर्शनेन तत्स्मरणं चेति वक्ष्यमाणः काव्यार्थः सूच्यते ।

It is not merely in the *Prastāvanā*, *i.e.*, at the beginning of a drama, that this takes place. It goes on right through the work.

We are now in a position to give an answer to the question which I raised at the beginning of this paper: What is the principle which is considered essential or, at least, important in this art of the unification of the parts, the principle which, if not observed, would make the work defective? The answer is: The parts must be so unified that, at every stage the poet gives the reader an idea of what is coming. The development of the story must be a progressive unfolding of what is already latent in the earlier stages. The opening must contain the climax and the '*dénouement*.' The later stage must be present in the earlier stage. *The effect must be present in the cause.* This is not stated as a principle in so many words in the Śāstra, but seems to be implied in the creative activity of the authors and the critical activity of the ālaṅkārikas and the commentators. Will it be improper to give this principle the name: Æsthetic "Satkāryavāda"?

SOME URDU LYRICS OF TODAY

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Urdu poetry has had a curiously chequered career. In many ways its progress reminds one of the stages through which English poetry had passed. It is of course possible to push parallelism too far; but does not Wali represent Chaucer, and does not Meer correspond to the free and generous Elizabethans? Ghalib may be said to stand for Milton, and the Augustan poets bear a resemblance to the mechanical, correct and formal school of Atish and Nasikh. Mainly as a revolt against convention a school of Urdu poets grew up, who sought inspiration from nature and familiar matter of today. Simplicity was their Keynote, and the ideal that they set before themselves was that of plain language, unadorned verse, contact with reality, absence of hyperbole, and freedom from the shackles of artificial rules. The only law is that which is capable of universal and eternal application—that which directly moves the heart and worthily animates it is good poetry. This law was recognised by the poets of Urdu once they had discovered the futility and danger and corroding influence of rules and conventions. Critics averred that a change was inevitable—according to the old scholars, a change for the worse. Gone was the glory of Urdu poetry, they said. The charm, the melody, the symbolism of poetry was all disappearing, and it would be bold, bare and base. It had fallen from its high state.

If by this kind of observation they implied that traditional Urdu poetry was to be written no more, their fears were groundless. Change of form was inevitable, was a sign of advance. But there are not wanting, today,

poets who in essentials belong to the old guard, and preserve its continuity. Even while Akbar was busy harnessing English and Hindi words into the service of Urdu, and modernising in many ways the outlook of the Urdu-reading public, he did not altogether discard the traditional methods, but used them when he found them most serviceable. He could write a verse like:

جو ذبح کرتا ھے، پر کھول دے مرے صیاد
کہ رہ نہ جائے تڑپنے کي آرزو باقي

or like:

حیا سے سر جھکا لینا، ادا سے مسکرا دینا
حسینوں کے لئے کیا سہل ھے بجلي گرا دینا

Then there were the lyrists—Chakbast, Hasrat, Iqbal, two of them still happily in the land of the living. I attempt in this paper to translate a few Urdu verses to demonstrate that the lyric fervour has not abated and pure poetry continues to be written. I have selected them from the published works of some poets, the name of one of whom will be familiar to my father as that of an old friend and colleague of his, now, alas, gathered to his fathers. I make no attempt to include all the leading poets of today, nor do I claim that those mentioned in the following lines are all stars of the first magnitude, judged by their work as a whole. But that at their best they have the accent of authentic poetry cannot be disputed.

Nāṣiri

ھر کس و ناکس پہ اب تم مہرباں ھونے لگے
کیا خبر تھي آہ کا ایسا اثر ھو جائے گا

Little did I anticipate how effective my sighs were to become. You have already started being kind to all and sundry.

جو کچھ آپس میں شب بھر شمع اور پروانہ کہتے ھیں
اکیلے آپ کے عاشق وھي افسانہ کہتے ھیں

What the moth and the candle say to each other the whole night long, that your lover keeps muttering to himself.

مجھکو میرا هي دل ستاتا هے ✽ امتحاں بارها کیا میں نے

I have tested again and again; it's my own heart troubles me, none else.

آپ نے پروا نه کي میں قید هستي سے چھٹا
مهرباني هو گئي نامهرباني آپ کي

You took no notice of me, and so I was freed from the prison-house of life. Your cruelty proved in truth a blessing, and your indifference makes me grateful.

دنیا کو حسینوں کا دیدار مبارك هو
هم کو تو جہاں دل هو، اُس سمت نظر کرنا

Let the world enjoy the panorama of beauty and loveliness. For me a generous heart is worth all the beauty of the world.

اپنے بندوں په ظلم کرتے هیں ✽ اِن بتوں نے نئي خدائي کي

The idols exercise a novel sort of divine right—they are cruel to their worshippers.

تجھ تك آنا هے حرم هو یا که دیر
یه فقط سب راستے کا پھیر هے

You are the ultimate goal. Temple and tavern are different pathways leading to the journey's end.

هر چمن سے یوں گل و بلبل گئے
پتیوں کا اور پروں کا ڈهیر هے

Flowers and nightingales departing left behind in the garden a heap of leaves and feathers.

سیر دریا کرنے والے ! هم بھي یاد آئے کہیں
کوئي ٹکرا یا سفینه کیا لب ساحل نه تھا

Oh, yoc that stroll along the river bank, do you ever remember me? Do you ever see a straggling wave breaking against the bank?

عبرت ہے شب غم میں تاروں پہ نظر کرنا
جل جل کے فنا ہونا ، مر مر کے سحر کرنا

How wonderful is a sight of the stars during the night of separation? They burn themselves to death, they die many a time ere the approach of dawn.

برسات ختم ہوگئي ، بادل برس گئے
روجائے جس طرح سے کوئی دل بھرا ہوا

The rains are over, the clouds have burst—a full heart has cried itself out.

مر کے آنکھیں ہوئیں روشن ، ترے جلوے دیکھے
زندگي نام تھا شاید شب تنہائي کا

After death I saw the light. Life was perhaps another name for the night of dark separation.

موت کے پردے میں پنہاں ، زیست کا انجام تھا
کچھ اندھیرا بیچ میں ، آگے خدا کا نام تھا

Under cover of death was hidden the goal of life: darkness for a while and then the name of God.

کبھي ترچھي نگاہیں ہیں ، کبھي نیچي نگاہیں ہیں
یہی وہ تیر ہیں کرتے ہیں جو گھائل خطا ہوکر

The glance is sidelong, and then the glance is low. This dart alone can hit even when it is not straight.

نہ پوچھو کس نے مارا بے خطا یارو اِدھر آؤ
دکھائیں تم کو اِک تصویر اپني چشم حیراں میں

Ask me not, my friends, who has wounded me. Come and find the answer in my eyes.

کبھي مسجد میں پکارا ، کبھي بتخانے میں
ہوش کي باتیں ہیں ساري ترے دیوانے میں

Now he shouted for you in the mosque, and again in the temple. How wise is he who has turned insane for you?

هم تو سمجھے تھے کہ دنیا سیر گاہ حسن ہے
عشق نے مارا ' دھائی مالك تقدیر کی!

I had thought the world was a pleasure-ground of beauty. May Heaven protect me, Love has changed my world.

صدا لگانے ترے در پہ تو گئے تھے مگر
هم اپنے هی دل بیتاب کو پکار آئے

I went to your gates to cry for mercy: I only cried aloud for my own lost heart.

Jigar

واعظ نہ ڈرا مجکو قیامت کے بیاں سے
دیکھی ہے اِن آنکھوں نے قیامت کی سحر بھی

I am not frightened, oh preacher, at your account of Doomsday; for these eyes have even seen the morning after the Day of Judgment.

چمن دور' آشیاں برباد' یہ ٹوٹے ہوئے بازو
مرا کیا حال ہو' صیاد اگر مجکو رہا کر دے

The groves are distant, my nest is destroyed, and my wings are broken; of what avail will my freedom be to me?

سب ہو گئے اُٹھ اُٹھ کر اك بار نثار شمع
پروانوں نے کیا جانے کیا وقت سحر دیکھا

I wonder what the moths saw at dawn; one by one they all threw themselves at the feet of the lamp.

عشق میں سیر گل و لالہ ہے تمہید جنوں
چاهیے ایك بیاباں بھی گلستاں کے قریب

For a lover wandering near flowers marks the beginning of insanity: it is meet that there should be an asylum near a flower-garden.

پکڑ کے لے تو چلا ہے' مگر مرا ذمہ
بنا نہ دوں جو قفس کو بھی آشیاں' صیاد

You are taking me captive, but depend on my making my cage as pleasant as my nest.

صیاد اگر ہو سننا شوخی مری زباں کی

رکھ دے قفس میں لا کر اک شاخ آشیاں کی

If you desire, oh hunter, to listen to my best notes, bring, oh bring a twig from my nest and place it near my cage.

Asghar

کیا مستیاں چمن میں ہیں جوش بہار سے

ہر شاخ گل ہے ہاتھ میں ساغر لیے ہوئے

Oh, see the intoxicating effects of the spring! Each twig has a wine-cup in its hands.

مری نگاہوں نے جھک جھک کے کر دیے سجدے

جہاں جہاں سے تقاضائے حسن یار ہوا

Whencesoever beauty demanded worship my eyes bent low in adoration.

بہت لطیف اشارے تھے چشم ساقی کے

نہ میں ہوا کبھی بیخود نہ ہوشیار ہوا

How glorious were the messages from the Cup-bearer's eyes. I neither lost nor retained my full senses.

کیا درد ہجر اور یہ کیا لذت وصال

اس سے بھی کچھ بلند ملی ہے نظر مجھے

Oh, talk not of the pain of separation and the pleasures of union. The glances vouchsafed to me transcend both.

خاک پروانے کی برباد نہ کر باد صبا

یہی ممکن ہے کہ کل تک مرا افسانہ بنے

Oh spring breeze, destroy not the ashes of the moth. Who knows by tomorrow these alone may tell the world my story.

روداد چمن سنتا ہوں اس طرح قفس میں

جیسے کبھی آنکھوں سے گلستاں نہیں دیکھا

In my captivity I listen to the happenings in the garden as though I had never set my eyes on it.

سنتا هوں بڑے غور سے افسانۂ هستي
کچھ خواب هے' کچھ اصل هے' کچھ طرز ادا هے

How intently I listen to the story of life: It is part dream, part reality, and part a flourish in the telling.

Chakbast

مقدر دیکھنا شبنم کا: پھولوں میں هوئي پیدا
پیام آیا فنا کا جلوۂ نور سحر هو کر

How enviable is the destiny of the dewdrop!—born among flowers and facing death in the form of the beauty of the morn.

Majid

دل میں میرے هے ذوق فنا بعد مرگ بھي
کرتے وہ کاش گل مري شمع مزار کو

I have an ambition for annihilation even after I am dead. How happy would I be if my beloved should put out the light on my tomb!

THE RELIGIOUS ASPECT OF THE SEA-VOYAGE

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The subject of 'sea-voyage' has aroused some controversy among Sanskrit scholars of India, the orthodox section clinging to the popular belief that such voyage tends to the loss of caste. The liberal view, however, does not place it in the category of sins of such consequence. It would, therefore, be interesting to examine the texts available and see what conclusions are logical.

Before dealing with the scriptures that have a direct bearing on the subject a critic would naturally ask himself if sea-voyage was undertaken in ancient times. The first thing that occurs to him is the following stanza from the Raghuvaṁśa which certainly derives its authority from the Purāṇas :—

संग्रामनिर्विष्टसहस्रबाहुरष्टादशद्वीपनिखातयूपः ।
अनन्यसाधारणराजशब्दो बभूव योगी किल कार्तवीर्यः ॥

It is clear from the above that the well-known Kārtavīrya established sacrificial posts in eighteen islands and it would indeed be wrong to say that he got this done through his employees not necessarily belonging to high castes, because the function of fixing such posts devolves on the Yajamāna (the performer of the sacrifice) himself and cannot be delegated. The epithet 'अष्टादशद्वीपनिखातयूपः' is significant of the fact that the act of fixing such posts was performed by none other than himself. We know that an island is surrounded on all sides by water and it could not, therefore, have been possible to

land in any island without crossing the sea not to speak of going from island to island.

This in itself may not be fully convincing for the reason that it leaves room for supposing that Kārtavīrya might have got there by air route, but the following stanza from such a reliable authority as the Veda itself cannot fail to establish beyond doubt that sea-voyage was undertaken by the high caste people :—

तुग्रो ह भुज्युमश्विनोदमेघे रयिं न कश्चिन् ममृवाँ अवाहाः ।
तमूहथुर्नौभिरात्मन्वतीभिरन्तरिक्षप्रुद्भिरपोदकाभिः ॥१॥

तिस्रः क्षपस्त्रिरहाति व्रजद्भिर्नासत्या भुज्युमूहथुः पतङ्गैः ।
समुद्रस्य धन्वन्नार्द्रस्य पारे त्रिभी रथैः शतपद्भिः षळश्वैः ॥२॥

अनारम्भणे तदवीरयेथामनास्थाने अग्रभणे समुद्रे ।
यदश्विना ऊहथुर्भुज्युमस्तं शतारित्रां नावमातस्थिवांसम् ॥३॥

(ऋक्संहिता)

There was a certain Rājarshi (Royal Sage) named Tugra. When he was greatly disturbed by his enemies residing in other islands he sent his son Bhujyu in a boat with his army to conquer them. The boat, however, capsized on account of storm in the midst of the sea. Bhujyu then readily prayed to the two Aśvins. They were pleased and took Bhujyu in their own boats to his father in three days. Does it not mean that Bhujyu undertook sea-voyage?

Here are yet other stanzas from the Veda :—

आ यद् रुहाव वरुणश्च नावं प्र यत् समुद्रमीरयाव मध्यम् ।
अधि यदपां स्नुभिश्चराव प्रेङ्ख ईङ्खयावहै शुभे कम् ॥१॥

वसिष्ठं ह वरुणो नाव्याधादृषिं चकार स्वपामवोभिः ।
स्तोतारं विप्रः सुदिनत्वे अह्नां यान्नु द्यावस्ततनन्यादुषासः ॥२॥

The above lays down in unambiguous terms that the sage Vasiṣṭha himself crossed the sea.

The Mahābhārata abounds in references to the Pāṇḍavas' visiting islands, while the Rājataraṅgiṇī mentions that the king Jayāpīḍa undertook sea-voyage :—

सान्धिविग्रहिकः सोऽथ गच्छन् पोतच्युतोऽम्बुधौ ।
प्राप पारं तिमिग्रासात् तिमिमुत्पाठ्य निर्गतः ॥

It would be interesting to observe that the instances quoted above appertain to all the four ages from Kṛita Yuga down to Kali Yuga. There is at the same time absolutely no mention made by any one of these persons having fallen from caste, or having had to undergo expiation. This being so, it cannot but be admitted that sea-voyage was undertaken in all times. In other words, it was warranted by tradition and was an approved practice. Nor is it necessary to emphasise that such practice (*sadāchāra*) has been enumerated to be one of the sources of Dharma.

It remains for us now to consider the import of texts which, as has been mentioned in the beginning, are directly related to the subject, but which being misinterpreted have caused a wide-spread misunderstanding. These are :—

समुद्रयात्रास्वीकारः कमण्डलुविधारणम् ।
द्विजानामसवर्णासु कन्यासूपयमस्तथा ॥१॥
देवराच्च सुतोत्पत्तिः मधुपर्के पशोर्वधः ।
मांसदानं तथा श्राद्धे वानप्रस्थाश्रमस्तथा ॥२॥
दत्ताक्षतायाः कन्यायाः पुनर्दानं परस्य च ।
दीर्घकालं ब्रह्मचर्यं नरमेधाश्वमेधकौ ॥३॥
महाप्रस्थानगमनं गोमेधश्च तथा मखः ।
इमान् धर्मान् कलियुगे वर्ज्यानाहुर्मनीषिणः ॥४॥

The clear meaning is that the acts enumerated—and sea-voyage is one of them—have ceased to be treated in

Kali Yuga as religious performances. That this is the right interpretation can be easily grasped in the light of the following :—

चातुर्विद्योपपन्नस्तु विधिवद् ब्रह्मघातके ।
समुद्रसेतुगमनं प्रायश्चित्तं विनिर्दिशेत् ॥१॥
दशयोजनविस्तीर्णं शतयोजनमायतम् ।
रामचन्द्रसमादिष्टं नलसञ्चयसञ्चितम् ॥२॥

This means that one who has committed the sin of *brahmahatyā* (Brahmanical homicide) should undertake to go to sea by way of atonement. If so, it is not difficult to understand that sea-voyage which was supposed to wipe off the heinous sin of Brahmanical homicide in other ages has been denounced as an act of expiation in this Kali Yuga. But for this the word धर्मान् in the last line (*vide* इमान् धर्मान् कलियुगे etc.,) would lose its significance. So the text "समुद्रयात्रास्वीकारः" etc., does not mean simply that sea-voyage is forbidden, but that it is forbidden to be held as a prescribed remedy.

It will not only be far from truth but seriously misleading to take this text to mean that sea-voyage has been condemned as a general rule. If an act prescribed under special circumstances has been prohibited under other peculiar conditions, surely it does not mean that general prohibition of the act does follow. For that inference will be most illogical and verily against all rules of interpretation. This is why Nandanāchārya, the learned commentator on Manusmṛiti, explains it in the following terms :—

> " Sea-voyage should not be practised ' by way of religious performance.' "

This is further corroborated by the following text of Āditya Purāṇa :—

विधवायां प्रजोत्पत्तौ देवरस्य नियोजनम् ।
द्विजस्याब्धौ तु नौयातुः शोधितस्यापि संग्रहः ॥१॥

एतानि लोकगुप्त्यर्थं कलेरादौ महात्मभिः ।
निवर्तितानि कर्म्माणि व्यवस्थापूर्वकं बुधैः ॥

Here again the sea-voyage mentioned has been specified to be one undertaken as an atonement for sin.

(2) Let us now pass to another prohibitive text :—

समुद्रयायी वन्दी च तैलिकः कूटकारकः ।
एतान् विगर्हिताचारानुभयत्र विवर्जयेत् ॥१॥

समुद्रयायी कृतहा रथ्यासमयभेदकः ।
द्विजनिन्दारतश्चैव ते वर्ज्याः श्राद्धकर्मसु ॥२॥

श्रुतिविक्रयिणो ये च परपूर्वाः समुद्रगाः ।
असमानान् याजयन्ति पतितास्ते प्रकीर्तिताः ॥३॥

The above in the first place enumerates what people ought not to be invited to the Śrāddha (offer of oblations to the Manes). And then again the expression समुद्रयाय which grammatically has been formed by the suffix णिनि means one who goes to sea very often, that is to say, by profession and as it occurs along with वन्दी and तैलिकः (bard and oil-man) it is obvious that समुद्रयायी in this text cannot but mean one who is a sea-man by profession, say a sailor or a pearl-fisher and so forth. So this text again has a restricted meaning and cannot be quoted as an authority for prohibiting sea-voyage in general.

(3) We may now examine yet another text which is still more direct, *e.g.*,

समुद्रयानगमनं ब्राह्मणस्य न शस्यते ।
संभवेद् यदि मोहेन पुनः संस्कारमर्हति ॥

अथ पतनीयानि—समुद्रसंयानं ब्रह्मस्वन्यासापहरणं भूम्यनृतवदनं सर्वपण्यैर्व्यवहरणं शूद्रसेवनं यश्च शूद्रायामभिजायते तदपत्यञ्च भवति। तेषाञ्च निर्देशः एषामन्यतमं कृत्वा—

चतुर्थकालं मितभोजिनः स्युरपोऽभ्युपेयुः सवनानुकल्पम् । स्थानासनाभ्यां विहरन्त एते त्रिभिर्वर्षैस्तदपहन्ति पापम् ॥ इति ।

The meaning is obvious. Parāśara enjoins *punaḥ-saṁskāra* (repetition of the sacramental ceremonies) to a Brahman by way of expiation, while Baudhāyana lays down certain other penances to be observed for three years for wiping off the sin of sea-voyage. The inference is apparent that sea-voyage is a sin and must be avoided. But that is not all. We have yet to reconcile the above with the other pertinent texts which are quoted below :—

पंचधा विप्रतिपत्तिर्दक्षिणतस्तथोत्तरतः। यानि दक्षिणतस्तान्यनुव्याख्यास्यामः। तथैतदनुपनीतेन सह भोजनं स्त्रिया सह भोजनं पर्युषितभोजनं मातुलसुतागमनं पितृस्वसृदुहितृगमनमिति। अथोत्तरतः ऊर्णाविक्रयः सीधुपानं उभयतोदद्भिर्व्यवहारः आयुधीयकं समुद्रसंयानमिति। तदितर इतरस्मिन् कुर्वन् दुष्यति देशप्रामाण्यात्।

अब्रह्मचारिदाराद्यैः सार्धं भोजनकर्म च।
मातुलादिसुतायाश्च विवाहः शिष्टसंमतः।
एतानि दाक्षिणात्यानामविगीतानि धर्मतः ॥१॥
समुद्रयानं मांसस्य भक्षणं शस्त्रजीविका।
सीधुपानमुदीच्यानामविगीतानि धर्मतः ॥२॥

Are not these clear enough to point out that the restrictions regarding sea-voyage are confined to the Dākshiṇātyās (residents of Southern India) alone?

Apparently, therefore, we have two views, *viz.*, one of Parāśara and Baudhāyana who point out the sea-voyage to be sinful, and the other of Vyāsa and Marīchi who have pointed out in unequivocal terms that those living in the North would not be contaminated with a sin by undertaking the voyage; and in the act of reconciling these statements we are to be guided by the rules of interpretation as laid down in the Mīmāṁsā.

Prohibition according to the same is six-fold, *viz.*,

(i) सामान्यप्रतिषेध (ii) विशेषप्रतिषेध
(iii) प्रतिप्रसवप्रतिषेध (iv) अभ्यनुज्ञाप्रतिषेध
(v) उपसंहारप्रतिषेध (vi) व्यवस्थाप्रतिषेध,

and without going into the details of all these, I may only point out that the prohibition of sea-voyage comes under the category of अभ्यनुज्ञाप्रतिषेध.. The following may be quoted as a popular instance of this class of prohibition:

(काले एव दद्यात्), "काले न दद्यात्"

This means that one reduced to poverty should not give alms. Now inspite of the fact that charity has been prohibited during indigency no giver of alms during his poverty would make himself a sinner by violating this rule of conduct in the face of yet another maxim to the contrary where it has been said that no alms can stand in comparison with a handful of saktu (fried grain powdered), "सक्तुप्रस्थस्य वो विप्रा न यज्ञः सदृशो मत: ", which form of charity is certainly recommended to one in the most indigent circumstances. So the apparently contradictory statements are reconciled if our interpretation of the prohibition काले न दद्यात् is not literal, but liberal and in keeping with the spirit of the other rule सक्तुप्रस्थस्य etc.

Similarly, then we have to understand the spirit of Parāśara and Baudhāyana in conjunction with that of Vyāsa and Marīchi and arrive at the conclusion that it is only the Southerners who have been debarred from undertaking the sea-voyage and not the Northerners. This will leave no room for doubt if we understand that the statements of Vyāsa and Marīchi serve only as supplementary and not as contradictory to those of Parāśara and Baudhāyana.

The question as to why the residents of Southern India alone were debarred from crossing the sea is natural enough. But it is not difficult to answer. We cannot shut our eyes to the hard fact that the law-givers never failed to attach proper importance to the needs of time and laid down rules of conduct that were calculated to keep the society in peaceful harmony. They knew

how to weigh the advantages and the disadvantages of a particular action and allowed or disallowed the same according as it was ultimately beneficial or detrimental. Instances are not wanting where they have made sacrifices to any extent and the fact that the marrying of a maternal uncle's daughter has been allowed as an approved custom among the Dākshiṇātyas (residents of Southern India) may be quoted as one. There was a time when these people with the high and insurmountable barrier of the Vindhyas and without the facilities of communication had to choose between two evils, *viz.*, either to marry within the prohibited degrees or to die out as a race. The law-givers, however, saw the danger of the latter and came to their rescue by countenancing the matrimonial alliance which is certainly not only repugnant but outrageous from the stand-point of Dharma in its general aspect.

It is, therefore, just common sense to conclude that unless the residents of Southern India had some risk from which the North Indians were free in crossing the seas the scriptures could not have made this distinction; and if the geographical conditions be not lost sight of one would not hesitate in believing that in the absence of restrictions imposed the people of Southern India could have emigrated very freely to East and South Africa and the islands Sumatra, Java, etc., that were so close, and with what disastrous results it is not difficult to imagine. The temptation to pay frequent visits to these lands inhabited by the Mlechchas would have been too strong to resist and our people would have by constant association with them certainly degenerated spiritually, and what wonder if they would have become one with them, and been ultimately lost to us. The present day emigration to Africa is a concrete instance. The menace to the North Indians on the other hand was not so grave. Their visits, if any,

would have been short and the object not likely to be beyond conquering the foes, if any, and returning home. There was no apprehension of their emigration to and settlement in those lands, and that made all the difference.

The staunchest believer in Dharma would not hold that the injunctions of the Śāstras have got no principles underlying them. They are on the other hand strictly scientific and can always stand unfallacious reasoning. What is wanted is earnest application as also an unprejudiced mind, and it is not difficult to find a solution which in the present case is that sea-voyage in itself is no sin and has not been forbidden.

Note.—The writer is greatly indebted to Vidyāvāchaspati Śrīmān Pandit Madhusudanji Ojha whose *Pratyantaprasthāna-mīmāṁsā* has furnished materials for this article.

THE MARRIAGEABLE AGE OF GIRLS IN ANCIENT INDIA

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The Child Marriage Restraint Act (Act XIX of 1929), popularly known as the Sarda Act, has excited the minds of orthodox Hindus and even of Musalmans. One may question the advisability and propriety of bringing such a piece of legislation before the composite Legislatures of our times. The present paper is not concerned with that aspect of the opposition to this Act. The principal argument of orthodox Hindus is that the Act is a serious interference with their time-honoured religious practices which are hallowed by the backing of ancient and revealed texts. Dispassionate examination of this claim is necessary in the interests of all concerned. Every brāhmaṇa is supposed to belong to one or other of the Śākhās of the four Vedas and the foundations of all his religious ceremonies are to be seen in the Śrauta and Gṛhya Sūtras of his sūtra-caraṇa. In the following an attempt is made to bring together the passages of the gṛhya and dharma sūtras and of some of the smṛtis bearing on the age of marriage for girls.

All the gṛhya and dharma sūtras prescribe that *upanayana* for a brāhmaṇa or kṣatriya should be performed at a certain definite age (*viz.*, eight and eleven respectively) and the maximum age up to which *upanayana* may be performed is also generally prescribed (*viz.*, sixteen and twenty-two respectively). It is a remarkable fact that as regards the marriage of women no such minimum and maximum limits of age are prescribed by the gṛhya and dharma sūtras. Some of them no

doubt vaguely say that they (women) should be married before puberty and others say that a girl should be married while she is '*nagnikā*.' For example, Hiraṇyakeśi-gṛ. I. 19·2 "One should take as wife a girl of the same caste, but of a different gotra, who is continent and a *nagnikā*.[1]" The commentator Mātṛdatta explains '*nagnikā*' as 'one who is near puberty' (āsannārtavā) and also as 'one who is fit for sexual intercourse.' The Gobhilagṛhya III. 4.6 says "a girl that is '*nagnikā*' is the best of all" (as a bride). The Gṛhyāsaṁgraha which is much later than the Gobhilagṛhya explains '*nagnikā*' as one who has not yet reached puberty.[2] The Mānavagṛhya I. 7·8 says "One should marry a maiden who had no sexual connection with another, who has a brother, who is of the same caste and of a different *pravara*, who is younger than himself, who is a *nagnikā* and is very beautiful."[3] The commentator Aṣṭāvakra gives two explanations as 'one who has not yet reached the impulses and emotions of youth' or as 'one who looks pretty even without clothes' (joining the word to *śreṣṭhām*).

There are indications in the ancient gṛhya-sūtras that girls were married generally at the time of puberty or after it. The Pāraskaragṛhya-sūtra says "The married pair should (after marriage) not eat *kṣāra*[4] (certain cereals like Māṣa, mudga etc.,) and salt for three

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[1] ताभ्यामनुज्ञातो भार्यामुपयच्छेत्सजातां नग्निकां ब्रह्मचारिणीमसगोत्राम् । Mātṛdatta says 'नग्निकामासन्नार्तवाम् ।...तस्माद्वस्त्रविक्षेपणार्हा नग्निका मैथुनार्हेत्यर्थः ।'

[2] नग्निकां तु वरेत्कन्यां यावन्नर्तुमती भवेत् । ऋतुमती त्वनग्निका तां प्रयच्छेत्तु नग्निकाम् ॥...कुचहीना च नग्निका ॥

[3] बन्धुमतीं कन्यामस्पृष्टमैथुनामुपयच्छेत समानवर्णामसमानप्रवरां यवीयसीं नग्निकां श्रेष्ठाम् ।

[4] '*Akṣārā-lavaṇāśinau*' has been explained in various ways which it is not necessary to set out here.

nights, should sleep on the ground (and not on a cot) and should not have sexual intercourse for a year, twelve nights, six nights, three nights in the last resort."[5] The Gobhilīya-gṛhya II. 3·15 says "The two (newly married couple) from that day (of marriage) should for three nights not partake of *kṣāra* and *lavaṇa*, should be continent and should sleep on the ground together." Similar prescriptions occur in Āśvalāyana-gṛ. I. 8·10, Āpastamba-gṛ. III. 8·89, Śāṅkhāyana-gṛ. I. 17, Mānavagṛhya I. 14·14, Kāṭhakagṛhya 30·1, Khādira-gṛ. I. 4·9. and others. It is worthy of note that the celebrated commentator Haradatta on Āśvalāyana-gṛhya I. 5·2 '*yat-tu samānaṁ tad-vakṣyāmaḥ*' remarks "This sūtra indicates that when there is a conflict between the rules that will be declared (by Āśvalāyana) hereafter and the practices of the common people, then what will be declared by the Ācārya (will be the dharma to be followed). For example, in certain countries sexual intercourse is begun immediately (after marriage) which is opposed to the prescription of *brahmacarya* for twelve or three nights that will be declared (by the Ācārya in I. 8·10)." This shows that even so late as the times of Haradatta (about 1200 A.D.) the age of girls in certain countries at the time of marriage must have been at least fourteen. The same conclusion is forced upon us by the rule about observing at least three days' brahmacarya after marriage.

This is another matter which leads us to the same conclusion. In most of the dharmasūtras there is a certain rite called *caturthīkarma* which corresponds to the Garbhādhāna of other treatises like Yājñavalkya (I. 11). This rite was performed after three nights from marriage

[5] त्रिरात्रमक्षारालवणाशिनौ स्यातामधः शयीयातां संवत्सरं न मिथुनमुपेयातां द्वादशरात्रं...त्रिरात्रमन्ततः ।

and hence was called *cathurthīkarma*. The Gobhilagṛhya (II. 5. 1, 7, 8.) says, " Now therefore (is stated) the rite of the fourth (night after marriage). Some (ācāryas) hold that sexual intercourse is allowed after three nights (from marriage). The proper time for (first) sexual intercourse (after marriage) is when the woman becomes free from the flow of blood after menses."[6] To the same effect are Śāṅkhāyana-gṛhya I. 17-19, Pāraskara-gṛhya I. 11, Āp.-gṛhya III. 8·10-11, Hiraṇyakeśī-gṛhya I. 23·11.

In some of the gṛhyasūtras a slight *prāyaścitta* is prescribed if the bride has menstruation during the progress of the marriage ceremonies. *Vide* Baudhāyana-gṛhya IV. 1·10, Kauśikasūtra 79·16, Vaikhānasa-smārtasūtra VI. 13.

There are passages in the dharmasūtras and the Manusmṛti which recommend that a girl should wait for three years or three months after attaining puberty and then seek her husband for herself. The Gautama-dharma-sūtra (18. 20—23) says " A maiden, after passing three menstruation periods, should herself unite (in marriage) with a man who has estimable virtues and should restore the ornaments that the father put on her (when a maiden). Marriage (of maidens) should (ordinarily) take place before menstruation. (A father) not giving her away (at that time) incurs blame (or sin). Some (ācāryas) say that a girl (should be given away in marriage) before she begins to put on a garment."[7] This passage shows that even so early as Gautama there were ācāryas who advocated child marriages, but Gautama disapproved of their views and fixed puberty as the upper

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[6] अथातश्चतुर्थीकर्म...ऊर्ध्वं त्रिरात्रात्संभव इत्येके। यदर्तुमती भवति उपरत-शोणिता तदा संभवकालः।

[7] त्रीन् कुमारी ऋतूनतीत्य स्वयं युज्येतानिन्दितेनोत्सृज्य पित्र्यानलङ्कारान्। प्रदानं प्रागृतोः। प्राग्वाससः प्रतिपत्तेरित्येके।

limit as a general rule, though he was not horror-struck if a marriage took place some time after puberty. The Baudhāyana-dharmasūtra IV. 1·12—16 is to the same effect. Manu (IX. 89-90) goes further and says "A maiden may indeed stay in (her father's) house even till her death, though she may have attained puberty; but (the father) should never give her away to one who is devoid of good qualities. A maiden after attaining puberty should wait for three years; but after this period elapses, she should seek a husband who is similar to her (by caste and qualities)." Anuśāsanaparva 44·16 is to the same effect.

We perceive, however, that gradually the age limit for the marriage of women was brought down lower and lower. Laugākṣigṛhya (19·2) says '*brahmacarya* for girls lasts till the 10th or 12th year.'[8] The Vaikhānasa-smārta (VI. 12) says that a brāhmaṇa should marry a nagnikā or a gaurī and then defines 'nagnikā' as a girl beyond eight years and less than ten and *gaurī* as one who is between 10 and 12 and has not yet had menstruation.[9] In spite of Manu IX. 89-90 quoted above we are told in the code (IX. 94) "A man of thirty should marry a charming maiden of twelve or a man of twenty-four, if he is in a hurry (to become a householder) because religious rites (in his family) are being cut off, should marry a girl of eight."

The culmination of this tendency towards bringing down the age is seen in certain verses of Parāśara, Yama and Saṁvarta. Parāśara, (Chap. VII) says, "A girl eight years old is called *gaurī*, but one who is nine years old is *rohiṇī*, one who is ten years old is a *kanyā*; beyond

[8] दशवार्षिकं ब्रह्मचर्यं कुमारीणां द्वादशवार्षिकं वा ।

[9] ब्राह्मणो ब्राह्मणीं नग्निकां गौरीं वा कन्यां...वरयेत् । अष्टवर्षादादशमान्नग्निका । रजस्यप्राप्ते दशवर्षादाद्वादशाद्गौरीत्यामनन्ति ।

this (*i.e.*, after tenth year) she is a *rajasvalā*. If one does not give away a maiden when she has reached her twelfth year, his *pitṛs* have to drink every month her *rajas* (menstrual discharge). The mother, the father and also the eldest brother—these three go to hell on seeing an (unmarried) girl reaching the state of a *rajasvalā*. That brāhmaṇa who deluded by ignorance marries such a girl should not be spoken to, should not be admitted to the same row at the time of dinner; he becomes the husband of a vṛṣalī." Saṁvarta (Ānandāśrama edition, verses 65-66) has the same two verses (*viz.* Parāśara VII. 6 and 8) and proceeds (verse 67) "Therefore one should give away in marriage a girl before she has menses; for the marriage of a girl of eight is highly commended." Yama (Jīvānanda's edition of smṛtis, part I, page 562, verses 22—24) has the same three verses that are found in Parāśara VII. 7—9. In the Rāmāyaṇa (Araṇyakāṇḍa 47.10-11) the ages of Rāma and Sītā are said to have been respectively thirteen and six at the time of marriage. It will be noticed that the definition of *gaurī* in Parāśara is different from that of Vaikhānasa-smārta-sūtra. Further the three smṛtis last mentioned make the marriage of a girl after puberty an extremely sinful act, while earlier writers like Baudhāyana were content with a light prāyaścitta even if there was menstruation during marriage ceremonies.

The foregoing brief discussion shows that in the times of the early sūtras, no marriageable age was fixed, that generally marriages took place about the time of puberty or after it, that early sages contemplated with equanimity the marriage of a girl several months or years after puberty and that no blame attached to the parents, the girl or husband by reason of a post-puberty marriage. It must however be said that even in early times there were people who advocated infant marriages as Gautama

testifies. Gradually the age of marriage for girls was brought down so that marriage of a girl at eight years was recommended as the best and marriage after twelve became unthinkable and dire consequences awaited those who dared to run counter to these dicta. This change in the attitude of the sages must have been due to some urgent and pressing needs of society at that time. What the causes of this change might have been it is beyond the the scope of the present paper to investigate.

NEW THEORIES AS TO BRAHMAN

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The *Ṛgveda* affords to us a very interesting glimpse of a highly developed religion, representing no doubt the results achieved by intensive cultivation of worship by a priesthood. It is inevitable that efforts should be made to penetrate beyond the system presented in the *Ṛgveda*, and to reconstruct the earlier form whence this elaborate religion has developed. But the task is one of the greatest difficulty. It is far from easy to understand precisely what the religion of the *Ṛgveda* was, and to assert what preceded it becomes a matter of conjecture as to whose truth no certainty is possible. It may, however, be feared that those who indulge in conjectures are seldom willing to admit the insecurity of the systems which they put forth, though it might serve as a warning against over-confidence that very distinct and inconsistent views are put forward with at least equal assurance of certainty.

I. The position is excellently illustrated by the three efforts recently made to determine in the period before the *Ṛgveda* the nature of the conception Brahman. The obscurity of the term is undeniable, and the temptation to seek aid in elucidating it from etymology is great. But it may be doubted whether it is wholly wise to expect enlightenment of value from this source. Professor Hertel,[1] however, has no hesitation in declaring that Brahman is to be understood in the light of the Greek *phlegma*, which in the *Iliad* xxi. 337 appears to mean "flame," and is held to be connected with Latin *flâmma*

[1] *Indogerm. Forsch.* xli 185 ff., *Die arische Feuerlehre* I (1925). Cf. Keith, *Religion and Philosophy of the Veda*, ii, 447—9.

and *fulgeo*. We are invited to believe that Brahman denotes primarily and properly the cosmic fire which exists beyond the stone heaven and which is revealed by breaks in that barrier as the sun, moon, constellations, and so on. This cosmic fire is present also in the microcosm, man, as the Ātman, and thus the oldest form of religion reached presents us implicitly with the identification of which the Upaniṣads make so much, that of Brahman and Ātman. The doctrine is also Indo-Iranian, for the *Avesta* has the same doctrine of the cosmic fire. It is not claimed that the sense " fire " is living in the *Ṛgveda* in its simplest meaning. The sense there is that fire which incorporates wisdom and appears in the cosmic Brahman as the power of thought, which is located in the heart, the seat of thought in the view of Indo-Europeans. These ideas Professor Hertel has developed at very considerable length, and with vigour of denunciation of those who do not know enough of things Indian and Iranian and of comparative philology to accept his dicta.

There is, of course, a serious preliminary difficulty, the acceptance of the etymology proposed for Brahman. It is impossible to ignore the fact that the comparison of the terms is far from cogent. If it were correct, it would have to be added to the list of those cases in which Indian *h* corresponds unexpectedly to Greek *g*. It is not surprising that the late Professor Johansson dismissed the comparison as the fancy of a dilettante who was not master of the principles of linguistic science.[2] It is fair to note that Professor Hirt[3] has treated the suggestion as worth notice, but it is clear that it has no probative power. If Brahman denotes " fire," then that must be

[2] Cited by Charpentier, *Brahman* (1932), p. 13, n. 1. I owe this work to the author's courtesy.

[3] *Indogerm. Gramm.* i, 248.

established from other evidence first; then and then only would it be worth while considering the validity of the proposed connection with *phlegma*. Unfortunately, when the use of Brahman in the *Ṛgveda* and later is considered, it is absolutely clear that "fire" cannot have been the root idea of the term. We have to reconstruct the meaning of the *Ṛgveda* to meet Professor Hertel's views, and the task is useless. The same consideration applies to the other terms to which in pursuance of his plan Professor Hertel has been compelled to assign meanings connected with fire. In the terms *yakṣa*, the Avestan *cithra*, the Indian *dhenā*, Avestan *daēnā*, the Indian *vasu*, Avestan *vohu*, there is no conceivable reason for seeing the sense of light or fire. *Yakṣa*, whatever its origin, plainly means something like "wonderful thing," and Varuṇa as *yakṣin* (Rv. vii. 88·6) is clearly a parallel to Varuṇa as *māyin* "master of magic." *Dhenā* presents many difficulties, but none are aided by Professor Hertel's views. It is quite possible that we must distinguish two words *dhenā*, one of which may be the Avestan *daēnā*, but I much doubt if in Rv. i. 141·1 *ṛtasya dhenā anayanta sasrutaḥ* can mean the "spirits of righteousness," that is, the righteous who honour the gods and bring them offerings. *Vasu* clearly cannot well be connected with *vas*, "to shine," but it is not at all clear that it is really akin to *vas*, "to dwell," denoting the wealth that is connected with the land as opposed to mobile things. That root seems rather to go back to *av-es*, while *vasu* seems by reason of Gothic *iusiza* to be connected with *ev-es*.[4] It is impossible to accept Professor Hertel's claim that the root *pū* is connected with Greek *pūr*, "fire," or his view that the roots *dhī* and *dī* have but one meaning "shine." It is rather unfortunate thus completely to

[4] Cf. Walde, *Vergleichendes Wörterbuch*, ii, 310.

have to reject the efforts of Professor Hertel to illumine the early history of Vedic religion, but there is no possibility of doubting that his versions of these and other terms will not stand detailed investigation.

II. There is much less that is revolutionary in the contribution of Professor Jarl Charpentier to the discussion of the meaning of Brahman. Like his predecessor, however, he is convinced of his ability to establish his thesis, though in this case it is the doctrine that Brahman is identic with Avestan *barəsman*, and that originally it meant nothing more than the bundle of grass used by the priests in the ritual. It is suggested[5] that there was an Indo-Iranian *bharẑh-man* and *bharẑh-is* which are represented in Avestan by *barəsman* and *barəziš*, while the Vedic gives us *brahman* for *barhman*, and *barhis*. There is clearly nothing very cogent regarding this conjecture; all that can be said is that it is not impossible that the words *brahman* and *barəsman* are identic. But there is no probability in the suggestion, and it is much more likely that there is no connection between *brahman* and *barhis*, and that the two go back to different roots. If the view of the identity of *brahman* and *baresman* is to be found valid, it must rest not on etymological possibilities, but on evidence that the supposed sense of Brahman explains satisfactorily its later uses, and that the explanation is more probable than others current.

It is to Haug[6] that we owe the suggestion that in the identity of Brahman and the Iranian Barsom is to be found the solution of the meaning. Brahman thus to him meant "Gewächs, Spross," then "Gedeihen"; as the prosperity of the sacrifice depends on its elements, any one of these, and in special the song of praise, may be

[5] *Brahman*, p. 62.

[6] SBBAW, 1868, ii. 80 ff; *Brahma und die Brahmanen* (1871).

styled Brahman, and that term naturally is accorded the meaning of that which lies at the base of all things. This development of thought is not by any means easy, and it is not surprising that his view has seldom been accepted. It has, however, been adopted by Professor Hillebrandt,[7] who develops the senses of Brahman as follows: the bundle of plants used as a spell to secure growth or fertility; the magic power which permeates the sacrifice; the several kinds of magic, such as formula, recitation, or song; and creative power in general, which develops into Brahman as creative. The view taken by Professor Charpentier is analogous. We are to suppose that at an early period priests in India and Iran performed magic rites with bundles of plants, etc., accompanying their performance with magic formulae; these were the Brahman rites, and their performers were the Brahmans. As the ceremonial developed, the connection between the idea of Brahman and the grass, etc., relaxed, and the term came to mean magic rite of any kind, which is the sense found primarily in the *Ṛgveda*. It may there also denote the magic spell or song. It will be seen that in this formulation the idea is far more defensible, for it operates with real meanings found in the *Ṛgveda*. But on the other hand there is no proof that the term Brahman originally denoted the "Opferstreu"; that becomes a mere matter of conjecture, and it is open to accept another explanation of the way in which Brahman develops its meaning.

It is, therefore, of great importance to see if there is in the *Ṛgveda* anything to indicate that the sense "Opferstreu" clung to Brahman, for, if it did not, the probability that this was the real sense is very slight.

[7] *Festgabe Jacobi*, pp. 265 ff. At one time he held that Brahman was "das magische Fluidum ritueller Zauberkraft": *Vedische Mythologie* (1910), p. 61.

The passages adduced in this regard are far from supporting the idea that at one time *brahman*, *veda* and *barhis* meant very much the same thing. In Ṛv. ii. 18·7 *mama brahmendra yāhy achā* the suggestion that *brahman* might be the same as *barhis* is sufficiently disproved by the next line *purutrā hi vihavyo babhūtha*. Clearly *brahma* denotes the prayer of the singer, which is to bring to his offering Indra as against the claims of other devotees. It is indeed admitted that the sense may be "Zauberlied," an admission which is based on the conviction[8] that in the *Ṛgveda* all sacrifice is magic, all prayers are spells. This view of religion is doubtless common, but perhaps rather old fashioned. The conception that man originally was a magician, whose conversion to a sense of dependence on external powers, and therefore to religious reverence, was due to proof that magic might fail, is rather naive. Magic and religion may be inextricably combined in any man's belief, but there is no reason to suppose that either springs from the other, and the belief that the priests of the *Ṛgveda* were magic workers, instigated by craving for Dakṣiṇās, is probably a wholly one-sided way of looking on their activities. There is at present a certain inability among disillusioned modern thinkers to envisage the nature of prayer and the relation of him who prays to the object of prayer. It seems unreal and irrational, and it is tempting to replace it by the simple formula of magic, but the tendency is due to a false and narrow psychology which ignores the higher elements in thought.

Other passages adduced equally lend no aid to the theory that Brahman has ever the sense of *barhis*. In Ṛv. vii. 28·1 we have again the invitation to come to our Brahman, followed by the quite decisive words *viçve cid dhi tvā vihavanta martāh*, showing that what is meant is

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[8] *Brahman*, pp. 83—5.

prayer, not strew. In Rv. iii. 8·2 the sacrificial post is described as *brahma vanvāno ajaraṁ suvīram*, and it is an impossible *tour de force* to imagine that here the grass wound round the post is meant. More interesting is the suggestion[9] that *brahmacārin* is to be explained as *brahmaṇā saha carati*, the reference being to the girdle of *muñja* grass, which is the characteristic sign of the initiated youth. It is an ingenious, but no doubt untenable, suggestion, for a more plausible sense and construction can be easily worked out. When in Rv. vii. 35·7 *soma* and *brahma* are combined, it is the most natural thing in the world, the one is the material offering, the other the prayer. So in Rv. i. 10·4 the combination of *brahma* and *yajñam* is not "spell" and "sacrifice," but "prayer" and "sacrifice." The meaning is seen clearly in such a passage as Rv. i. 47·2 *Kaṇvāso vāṁ brahma kṛṇvanty adhvare teṣāṁ su çṛṇutaṁ havam*. The sense is not "magic rite," but, as *havam* shows, simply "prayer," the sound of which is to be heard. When we find *brahmaṇā vandamānaḥ* Rv. i. 24·11 the plain sense is "praise" including prayer, not "spell." It is a complete misunderstanding of early thought to ignore the fact that prayers can strengthen the gods; when in Rv. viii. 62·4 we have *ā yāhi kṛṇavāma ta Indra brahmāṇi vardhanā*, there is no need to suppose that magic rites are meant rather than prayers. If Atri (Rv. v. 40·6) frees the sun from the darkness of eclipse it may as well be by prayer as any spell, and Vasiṣṭha's deeds (Rv. vii. 18·4; 33·3) like those of Viçvāmitra (Rv. iii, 53, 12 and 13), in favour of his patrons may just as well have been accomplished by the efficacy of his prayers as by spells. Neither, in the view of modern science, could have any effective result, and we have not the slightest reason to

[9] *Ibid.*, p. 76, n. 5.

suppose that the Indian mind was devoted to spells, to the exclusion of prayer. There were doubtless then as now two types of mind, those who believed that the divine could be affected by elaborate ritual of magic type, and those who upheld the power of supplication not to compel but to persuade the divine grace.

It would serve no purpose to go over all the passages adduced; when *brahma kṛ* is found, it may well mean "offering prayer" and not "performing magic rites," and in many passages the choice of the rendering must remain doubtful, for it is not disputed that there is magic beside religion in the *Ṛgveda*, while in the *Atharva-veda* we may often render Brahman simply by "charm." Nor is it doubtful that the Brāhmaṇa texts indicate that the magic view of religion was prevailing among those responsible for these works. But that helps us little to determine the earlier sense of Brahman. Dogmatism in face of the counter dogmatisms above discussed is unwise, but there seems much to be said for the old fashioned idea that the essential meaning of Brahman in the *Ṛgveda* is drawn from the higher side of man's nature, and that it denotes the devotion in man which expresses itself in prayer. Brahman then denotes these subjective and objective sides of one idea, the feeling and its expression. Hence it is easily used for the holy texts, a meaning which Dr. Griswold[10] and Professor Oldenberg[11] recognise as fundamental in the *Ṛgveda*.

From this personal sense, how are we to pass to the cosmic force of the term?[12] It is natural to base this upon the importance of the sacred text or in its lower sense the spell; what accomplishes divine grace, or compels the

[10] *Brahman: a Study in the History of Indian Philosophy* 1900).

[11] GN. 1916 pp. 715 ff.

[12] Keith, *Religion, and Philosophy of the Veda*, ii, 441—5.

gods, can be regarded by the priestly mind as the vital element in the world, and becomes the term to express the cosmic essence. But it is not improbable that a psychological element of the highest importance is also operative. It must be remembered that in devotion the experience of mystics points unmistakably to the sense of unity with the divine, however difficult it is to formulate this conception. It is possible, therefore, that the term for devotion should come to be applied to that essence with which the devotee is united in the devotion, and that Brahman should acquire the sense of "holy power," which appears to me to be very common in the Brāhmaṇas. That explains also simply the employment of the term in these texts for the Brahman class. They are the living embodiments of the holy power, just as the Kṣatriyas embody the Kṣatra, "ruling power."

Professor Charpentier[13] is well aware of the difficulty of developing from the use of Brahman as "spell" the cosmic sense. He suggests that there is a transition in the use of Brahman occasionally as "Zauberwesen." But the evidence for such a use is minimal, and far from cogent. When we are told in Rv. x, 61·7 of the incest of Prajāpati, the text continues *svādhyo 'janayan brahma devā vāstoṣ patiṁ vratapāṁ nir atakṣan.* It is suggested that the gods are described as producing a magic being, namely the dread Rudra, here described as Vāstoṣpati. But the point of the verse is lost in this rendering; the word *svādhyo* is significant; the gods applied the holy power that is within them, and so created Vāstoṣpati; whether Rudra here be thought of or not, matters little. Similarly there can be no reason to suppose that in the assertion (TS. v. 4·4·4) that the *kṛṣṇājina* is the symbol (*rūpa*) of the Brahman we have any reference to a "Zauberwesen."

[13] *Brahman*, pp. 133—7.

It is plain that the sentence merely means that the black antelope skin is a characteristic of the Brahman class, the incorporation of the holy power.

It is easy on this understanding of the term to understand the term Brahmacārin. It does not denote one who practises abstinence or celibacy, meanings which Brahman cannot have; it means one who practises holiness, one who busies himself about the holy power, or who walks in the path of holiness. Whether the compound is to be resolved *brahma* or *brahmaṇā carati* matters nothing to the sense. What is practically impossible is to suppose that this obviously far from early term maintains a meaning of Brahman which admittedly can be conjured only for other instances where the word is used.

III. Since the views above rejected were expressed a still more revolutionary doctrine has been propounded, which allows room for acceptance of the doctrine of Professor Charpentier. M. Dumézil devotes a study, *Flamen-Brahman*[14] to establishing the existence of a root *bhelgh* whence can be derived *brahman*, *barhis*, *barha*, 'tail of a peacock,' *upabarhaṇa*, 'mattress,' in Latin *flamen*, and in Greek *pharmakós*, applied to a scapegoat, *phármakon*, 'remedy.' The root in question would have a religious, magic meaning, which he does not undertake to determine. Now as regards comparison with *flamen* there is the authority of so good an authority as Kretschmer for its possibility.[15] It is, of course, objected that, if *flag-ma* gives *flamma*, then *flag-men* would not be represented by *flamen;* on the other hand Vergilian manuscripts have the form *flammen*, which would be in order. The comparison with *pharmakós*, *phármakon*, assuming that the words are the same—the Ionian poets

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[14] *Annales du Musée Guimet*, Li (1935).

[15] *Einleitung*, p. 127. Cf. Meillet, *Histoire de la langue latine*, p. 78.

have a long *a* in *pharmakós*, and the Attic short *a* may be due to the analogy of the neuter—is untenable as a matter of strict comparison. M. Dumézil[16] naturally takes refuge in the contention that we have in Indo-European unaccountable divergences in words which must be ultimately the same as in the word for 'liver,' Sanskrit *plīhā*, Greek *splēn*, Latin *lien*, Irish *selg*, Lithuanian *bluznìs*, and so on. The difficulty of this argument is obvious. Where there is essentially sameness of meaning, we may have to accept, despite difficulties, identity of origin for words; where there is no immediate sameness of meaning and divergence of form, we are not entitled to seek to reconstruct sameness of signification on the assumption of ultimate identity of the words.

M. Dumézil's effort to find sameness of signification rests on a reconstruction of religious beliefs. Fascinated by Sir J. Frazer's evidence in *The Golden Bough* of the connection between the king and vegetation and the death of the king to revive life in nature, he stresses the legend of Çunaḥçepa as suggesting the former practice of slaying the son of the king or a substitute. With this he connects the accounts of victims treated as kings before sacrifice, and so evolves the theory that the Brahmans achieved their historical position, as originally the substitutes for the royal victim, treated for a time as royal, and thus made equivalent in value to the king for sacrificial purposes. The actual sacrifice would be performed, to judge from the Çunaḥçepa legend, by other future victims of whom there would be a number, since the kingly sacrifice is needed to counter famine, epidemic among men and beasts, and perhaps periodically to strengthen the life of nature. Gradually actual sacrifices cease to claim human victims; the Brahman, however, *sacratus et*

[16] Op. cit. p. 95.

sacrans, the recognised mediator between men and supernatural powers, has secured his position and the caste is established. He had already drawn to himself concern with other sacrificial rites; he is the living aspect of those magic practices which are in some measure his equivalent, since they are called Brahman in the neuter; both are remedies to secure good. From this history we can understand the relation of the Brahmans and the Kṣatriyas in Indian history. The former claim, the latter concede, pre-eminence, but it is never carried into actuality; this is a reminiscence of the time when the real king and the fictive king, the permanent and the temporary substitute, coexisted as indispensable to each other, but the substance of authority rested with the former, while the latter was accorded in theory higher or coequal rights. Further, the original character of the Brahman explains the position assigned in the texts[17] to the Brahman priest in the narrow technical sense at the sacrifice. Thereat he neither acts nor speaks, but watches its course, prepared to intervene to remedy errors. But he obtains half the sacrificial gifts. Does this not denote that, unlike the other priests, he is consubstantial with the sacrifice which he himself once was? Moreover, in the famous Puruṣa hymn, *Ṛgveda*, x, 90, we have in mythical form a reflex of the ancient rite of the slaying of the king, transformed into a picture of the creation of the universe, and of the Brahman as the highest of the castes, from the sacrifice of Puruṣa, who is none other than the Brahman par excellence.[18]

All this is admirably ingenious, but its weakness becomes obvious when the foundation on which the structure is based is closely scrutinised. What is the evidence for the death of a royal victim to revive the life

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[17] Keith, op. cit. i, 296, 297.
[18] Op. cit. pp. 86—96.

of nature? The Çunaḥçepa legend says nothing of the kind.[19] It is simply absurd as it stands; the king anxious for a son promises to slay him in return. If the story is not a priestly imagining, it points rather to the type of legend where the death of a son is offered as the price of some greater boon. There is not the slightest trace of the idea that the king must periodically be slain or some member of his house in lieu. Rohita seeking a substitute, of course, falls into the normal pattern of substituted victims, and Varuṇa's acceptance of a Brahman as a more than worthy equivalent follows immediately from the Brahman authorship, without any need to appeal to fictive kings, of whom Vedic literature has no trace. No further evidence is afforded by the treatment in the Açvamedha of an Ātreya as a scapegoat; the suggestion that he was originally killed has no support in the texts, still less the idea that he was a representative of the king, who originally was offered to Varuṇa, the rite ultimately going back to mere slaying of the king as nature magic. The Puruṣamedha[20] is of no value as evidence; it is clearly a hypothetic rite, built by the Sūtra makers on the Açvamedha; of an actual offering of Brāhmaṇa or Kṣatriya therein the Brāhmaṇas have no hint. No value whatever attaches to the tale of Manu's proposed sacrifice of his wife, found in the *Maitrāyaṇīya Saṁhitā*[21] and elsewhere. To deduce from it the view that the king was at one time compelled to sacrifice his wife is a mere flight of imagination, as is the further suggestion that Indra's action, related in the *Kāṭhaka Saṁhitā*[22] in slaying the two Brahmans who advised Manu's evil deed, reflects the

[19] Keith, op. cit. i, 262, 263, 282, 283; *Rigveda-Brāhmaṇas*, pp. 61 ff.

[20] Keith, op. cit. i, 347-348.

[21] iv, 8, 1.

[22] ii, 30.

offering of Brahmans as substitutes. We certainly do not need this theory to explain the high rank of Brahmans or their entertainment by kings which brings the latter the profits set out in the *Ṛgveda*.[23] The position of the Brahman priest at the sacrifice is naturally explained by his later introduction into the rites, and his claims for a special share of the gifts were no doubt essentially based on his magic powers. The sacrifice of Puruṣa is of much disputed origin;[24] the theory suggested by M. Dumézil is far from being the most probable.

The effort to find a parallel development through which the Roman Flamen, originally a victim substituted for the King, became the *flamen sacrorum populi Romani* seems wholly unsuccessful. The endeavour to connect him with human sacrifice has to rest on the presence of his wife as a spectator at the festival in May when scapegoats represented by dummies were hung up and finally thrown into the Tiber.[25] The purificatory and rain-making character of the rite is plain; whether it was ever connected with human sacrifice is disputed and doubtful, but the Flamen has nothing to do with it, and it is a Vestal virgin who throws the dummies into the stream, the Flamen's wife naturally attending. The only other point adduced is the assertion of Dion Cassius[26] that in 46 B.C. Caesar sacrificed two soldiers, the sacrificers being the Pontifices and the priest of Ares, presumably the Flamen of Mars. It suffices to note that no other connection between this Flamen and human sacrifice is even hinted at, and Caesar's action, if real and not a mere rumour put about by his critics, was plainly no proper sacrifice but a wholly abnormal proceeding.

[23] iv, 50, 8.

[24] Keith, op. cit. ii, 619—21.

[25] Warde Fowler, *The Roman Festivals*, pp. 111—21.

[26] XLIII, 24.

Needless to say, activity in sacrificing, had it been proved, would not in the least have pointed to the original sacrifice of the Flamen himself.

In the relations of the Rex and the Flamen there is nothing whatever to suggest sacrifice of the latter in lieu of the former. M. Dumézil can only find it in the fact that the wife of the Flamen offers to Jupiter a ram *in regia*, 'in the royal house,' whence Jullian[27] naturally suggests that the sacrifice may originally have belonged to the Rex or his wife. This accords excellently with the traditional origin[28] of the Flamen, to share the sacrificial burden of the Rex, a fact which explains all those privileges which the Flamen shares with the historic Rex sacrificulus.

M. Dumézil's further efforts to find essential parallels between Brahman and Flamen are inconclusive. Similarities between ancient priesthoods, Indian, Latin or Jewish are numerous, and there are many significant distinctions between Brahman and Flamen pointing to divergence of ideas. A Brahman does not cease to be one, if his wife dies nor does his wife play any part similar to that of the wife of the Flamen. The Flamen must marry a virgin, a Brahman may marry a woman even if she has had ten non-Brahman spouses before.[29] The Flamen dialis may not spend a night outside the city; wherever a learned Brahman is, there is a city. There is nothing whatever to prove original identity of the Brahman and Flamen. Nor is the case improved by referring to *barhis* and Avestan *barəsman,* the bundle of leaves held by the priest, which is compared with the twigs which, tied up, appear in the coiffure, the

[27] Article *Flamen* in Daremberg and Saglio's *Dictionnaire*, i, 1163*a*.

[28] Dumézil, op. cit. pp. 50, 51.

[29] *Atharvaveda*, v, 17, 8, 9.

characteristic part of the costume of the Flamen and his spouse. This remarkable view is supported by evidence of a Celtic tale,[30] which relates the healing of the king of the Tuatha Dé Danann by the physician Dian Cecht, who supplies a silver hand to replace that lost in battle and also slays in anger his son Miach, who had been experimenting with the hand. This, we are to believe, is a relic of sacrifice of a substitute necessary to restore the vigour of the king. From Miach's grave grow herbs of all kinds. This, we are assured, helps us to understand how the vegetation *barəsman* of the Iranians can in essence be the same thing as the human Brahman of the Indians. The argument is hopelessly farfetched; the growth of herbs from the tombs of the dead is world-wide, and the link with *barhis*, the sacrificial strew, is simply non-existent. In the Pharmakoi rituals[31] of Athens, Kolophon, Abdera, and Marseilles, we have admittedly not a trace of connection with former kingship. We have simply rites of expulsion of evils and vegetation magic. Hellenic as opposed to non-Hellenic origin is wholly problematic, and we cannot say if the name used is really cognate with *phármakon*, or if it is a case of an Asianic word altered by folk etymology to accord with the well-known *phármakon*. That word itself seems to have absolutely nothing to do with Brahman, but to be cognate to Lithuanian *burìù*, 'to practise magic.'[32]

The new attempt, therefore, seems to fail as completely as those of Professors Hertel and Charpentier to throw fresh light. Brahman, whether cognate or not with Old Irish *bricht*, 'spell,' and Old Icelandic *bragr*,

[30] MacCulloch, *Myth. of All Races*, iii, 25—8.

[31] Gilbert Murray, *The Rise of the Greek Epic*, Appendix A.

[32] Walde, *Vergleichendes Wörterbuch*, ii, 161. Connection with the root seen in Sanskrit *bhar*, so that it would denote 'what the earth bears,' 'plant,' is much less plausible.

'poetic art,'[33] seems naturally to denote prayer and the mental attitude which induces prayer. In this sense we may find a solution to the question of the original meaning of the divine name, Bṛhaspati. On the whole it is improbable that he is the "lord of the high heaven";[34] the word seems a late formation, and probably denotes rather "lord of prayer,"[35] like Brahmaṇaspati, though conceivably in either case the sense might be "lord of holy power."[36] In these issues where certainty is impossible, the claim to achieve it marks a failure to recognise the bounds to our knowledge set by the nature of our materials. When these limits to our knowledge are passed, for a scholar to feel certainty is legitimate, to demand acceptance of that certainty from others is unwise.

[33] Osthoff, BB. xxiv, 113 ff. Cf. Walde, op. cit. ii, 172; Carnoy, *Les Indo-Européens*, p. 236.

[34] Charpentier, *Brahman*, p. 66.

[35] Cf. Macdonell, *Vedic Reader*, p. 84. Wackernagel, *Altind. Gramm.* ii, 246, has "Herr der Opferkraft." See Keith op. cit. ii, 438.

[36] Hopkins, *Ethics of India*, p. 85, holds that Brahman primarily denotes power, but this is on the whole improbable. Cf. his *Origin and Evolution of Religion*, pp. 308, 309.

MEDHĀ AND MAZDĀ

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Ethnographiske Museum, Oslo.

The word *medhā* is of frequent occurrence, especially in Vedic literature, and there does not seem to be much doubt about its meaning. Monier Williams translates 'mental vigour, intelligence, prudence, wisdom', eliminating the rendering 'vitality, power, vigour' given as the first one by Roth. An examination of the Rigveda passages where the word occurs shows that it is nowhere necessary to adopt the latter explanation.

Medhā was evidently considered an important asset: I. 18. 6, *sádasaḥ pátim...saním medhā́m ayāsiṣam* 'I have gone to the great Lord for gain and *medhā*'; II. 34. 7, *tám no dāta maruto...saním...medhā́m*, 'give us, O Maruts, gain and *medhā*'; V. 27. 4, *dádad ṛcā́ saním yaté dádan medhā́m ṛtāyaté*, 'giving gain to him who goes with a hymn, giving *medhā* to the pious'; IX. 32. 6, *asmé dhehi...saním medhā́m utá śrávaḥ* 'place with us gain, *medhā* and fame'. It will be seen that the word is often found together with *sani* and the two terms are also found continued in the other texts. In IX. 9. 9, *sani* is replaced by *gām aśvam* and *svar* is added: *pávamāna máhi śrávo gā́m áśvaṃ rāsi vīrávat* I *sánā medhā́ṃ sánā svàḥ* 'O Soma, thou givest great fame, cow and horse, possessed of heroes, give *medhā*, give light'. Here *gām aśvam*, with or without *śravaḥ*, looks almost like an explanation of *sani*. Wealth and *medhā* were consequently associated in the pious wishes.

In several places *medhā* is connected with designations of the hymn or used to denote the hymn itself: I. 165. 14, *ā́ yád...asmā́n cakré māṅyásya medhā́*, 'since Māṅya's *medhā* has brought us hither'; IV. 33. 10, *yé hárī*

medháyokthā́ mádanta índrāya cakrúḥ, 'who, revelling in *medhā*, in hymn, made the two bays for Indra'; V. 42. 13, *prá sū́ mahé suśaraṇā́ya medhā́ṃ gíraṃ bhare*, 'for the great well-protecting one, I bring forward my *medhā*, my song'; VII. 104. 6, *iyáṃ matíḥ...yā́ṃ vāṃ hótrāṃ parihinómi medháyā*, 'this mental product which I emit is an invocation to you with *medhā*'; VIII. 52. 9, *stotúr medhā́ asṛkṣata*, 'the worshipper's *medhās* were produced'; IX. 26. 3, *táṃ vedhā́ṃ medháyāhyan pávamānam ádhi dyávi* 'that disposer, being purified, that urged with *medhā* towards heaven'; IX. 65. 16, *rā́jā medhā́bhir īyate*, 'the king proceeds through *medhās*'; IX. 107. 25, *pávamānā asṛkṣata...medhā́m abhí prayā́ṃsi ca*, 'being purified they have been emitted towards the *medhā* and enjoyments.'

Finally *medhā* is ascribed to *ṛta* in VIII. 6. 16, *aháṃ íd dhí pitúṣ pári medhā́m ṛtásya jagrábha | aháṃ sū́rya ivājani*, 'as I have received from the father Truth's *medhā*, I was born like the sun.'

It is evident that *medhā* is a mental force, which enables its possessor to handle the hymn and turn it to account as a means of acquiring gain and wealth, and that it is as valuable as riches themselves. 'Insight', 'wisdom' and especially 'prudence' are English equivalents. It is apparently an abstract term, but such terms were generally conceived as forces with independent existence. And in an ancient pastoral society prudence would be highly valued and very important.

This conception is certainly pre-Indian, derived from the period when Indians and Iranians had not finally separated. For we apparently trace the same word with a similar original meaning on Iranian soil, where it was destined to play a great rôle. It must, so far as I can see, be identified with Avestan and Ancient Persian *mazdāh*, but known from the compound *Ahuramazda*, the highest god, *mathishta bagānām*, of the ancient Persians.

The usual translation of the designation *Ahuramazdāh* is 'the Wise Lord', *mazdāh* being explained as a base ending in *ah*, corresponding to Indian *as*, and meaning 'wise', connected with the verb *mazdā*, 'to take to heart', 'to mind'.

Such a formation is no doubt possible; cf. Skt. *vedhas*, Avestan *vazdah*, 'leader', 'disposer'. But the inflexion of the word in Iranian dialects points in another direction.

In Avestan we have nom. *mazdā̂* < **mazdāh*, acc. *mazdąm* dat. *mazdāi*, gen. *mazdāͣ*. voc. *mazdā*. They are exactly parallel to forms such as nom. *-shtā̂*, acc. *-shtąm*, dat. *shtāi*, gen. *-shtāͣ* of the *ā*-base *-shtā*, 'standing'. The natural inference is that *mazdā* is an old *ā*-base and not an *ah*-base.

In Ancient Persian, it is true, we have the genitive *mazdāha*, which points to an *ah*-base. But then the Ancient Persian form *Auramazdā* is a later development, being no more, as in Avestan, two separate words, *ahura* and *mazdā*, both inflected, and in the *Gāthās* more frequently arranged in the sequence *mazdā ahura*, but having become a single word, the name of a strongly personified god. And the long *ā* of *mazdāha* shows that we have not before us an old inherited genitive of an *ah*-base.

Moreover, the word *mazdā* is also known from another, comparatively old, Iranian dialect, where it has been developed in quite a different way. In Saka the word *urmaysda, i.e., auramazdā,* means 'Sun', and it forms the nom. *urmaysde* < **auramazdāh,* but the gen. *urmaysdānä* and the nom. pl. *urmaysdāna*. In other words, the base is treated as ending in *ān* and not in *ah*.

Within Sanskrit itself we have an exact parallel to this double modification of an old *ā*-base. In the word *panthā,* path, we seem to have a very irregular inflection. In the singular we find nom. *panthāḥ*, acc. *panthām* and *panthānam*, gen. *pathas*, etc., in the plural nom. *panthāḥ*, *panthāsaḥ* and *panthānaḥ*, acc. *pathaḥ*, instr. *pathibhiḥ*. So far as I can see, the only satisfactory explanation of this state of things

is that we have to do with a base *panthā*, with the corresponding weak form *pathi*, before vowels *path*. Forms such as *panthānam*, *panthānaḥ* are due to a contamination with the inflection of *an*-bases such as *adhvan*, while *panthāsaḥ* owes its existence to the influence of themes ending in *as*, which would coincide with *pantha* in the nom. sing.

I think that we must assume a similar development in the case of Iranian *mazdā*. It is originally an *ā*-base and if it is identical with Indian *medhā*, it must from the beginning be a feminine noun, meaning 'wisdom', 'prudence', formed in the same way as the old word *śraddhā*, 'faith'. And then the Iranian *h*-termination must be secondary.

The necessary inference is that *medhā*, *mazdā*, is an ancient Aryan term, denoting a mental form which was highly valued as an important factor in the Aryan's life. If he was filled with *medhā* he might hope to succeed in cattle-breeding and husbandry, just as 'vigour' was his support in fights and struggles.

It is a well-known fact that the ancient Aryans looked on such apparently abstract conceptions as universal forces and almost as substances, which had their own independent existence, and which could be propitiated and utilised by human beings. In the Nirukta we read: *yāca kāca balakṛtir Indrakarmaiva tat*, 'wherever there is a mighty deed, that is Indra's work'. Here we still seem to feel the original conception of Indra: he is vigour personified. And we get the same impression from the frequent association of Indra's name with words such as *narya*, from the base *nar*, which is still at the present day used as a verb meaning 'to be able', 'to be powerful' in Parachi[1]. Indra's name has long ago been explained by Professor Jacobi[2], as derived from this very base.

[1] Georg Morgenstierne, *Indo-Aryan Frontier Languages*, Vol. I. Oslo 1929, p. 276.

[2] *Kuhns Zeitschrift*, xxxi, p. 316.

In a similar way Varuṇa and Mitra are *ṛtasya gopau* 'Truth's herdsmen', divine personifications of the notion and forces constituting *ṛta*.

It is *a priori* not unlikely that 'prudence' was hypostasized in a similar way. There is, it is true, scarcely anything in the Rigveda which points to such a state of things. *Medhā* is usually spoken of more or less as a personal asset, though VIII. 6. 10 connects it with *ṛta*. But then our general impression of the conditions prevailing in the period represented by the Rigveda is that 'vigour' then played a greater rôle than 'prudence'.

The state of things seems to have been different in the pastoral and agricultural milieu to which Zarathushtra belonged. Vigour and physical power there was, but such forces were more dangerous than beneficent for the common people, whose chief aim was peaceful husbandry. Their higher ideals were apparently better covered by notions such as *ārmaiti*, or, more correctly, *aramati*, 'proper thought,' *vohu manah*, 'good mind,' *amərətāt*, 'freedom from death', *haurvatāt* 'health', etc. And here *mazdā*, 'prudence', probably also had its place.

Similar forces are also sometimes spoken of as semi-divine powers in the Rigveda: *aramati* (*Avestan ārmaiti*), *anumati* 'consent', *aditi* 'infinity', *śraddhā*, 'faith, etc. But *bala* 'vigour' and similar forces are much more prominent to the mind.

Zarathushtra's system is in full agreement with the state of things we have assumed for his surroundings. Most of his moral and religious conceptions were no doubt taken from the prevailing notions of his people. But his system bears a strongly personal stamp, and it seems probable that his own inspiration prompted him to proclaim *mazdā* as the highest principle, as the Lord Mazda, *mazdāh ahuro* or *ahuro mazdāh*. He rejected the worship of the daevas, the deified physical forces in life and the universe, and took his

stand on another conception of divinity, which also belongs to the ancient Aryan period, the conception covered by the term *asura*, 'lord', of which the eternal *ṛta* 'truth and established order', formed a prominent part.

It is probable that even in the Aryan period people had begun to believe in a single, highest, asura. We may draw that inference from a comparison of the asura Varuṇa, the great *Samrāj*, and Ahuramazda, the sole god. But we have not the slightest indication to the effect that this great god was designated as *medhas*, *mazdah*. It seems more probable that this combination is due to Zarathushtra. He singled out *mazdā*, 'prudence', among the mental and moral forces which were felt to be the surest assets in daily life, characterized it as the Lord, and so the god Ahuramazda became the only one. And this led to *mazdā* itself being conceived as a god, and the masculine nominative termination *h* was added.

If I am right, we seem to be justified in drawing the conclusion from the occurrence of the name *Mazdaka* in an Assyrian inscription of the eighth century B.C., that Zarathushtra cannot belong to the sixth.

THE DATE OF TĪVARADEVA

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The date of Tīvaradeva has till now remained an unsolved problem of ancient Indian history. While editing the Kudopali plates of Mahābhavagupta II Prof. Kielhorn remarked, "The Rajim copperplate inscription of Mahāśiva Tīvaradeva undoubtedly belongs to about the middle of the eighth century."[1] This date has been accepted by other scholars like Dr. D. R. Bhandarkar,[2] Prof. R. D. Banerjee[3] and R. B. Dr. Hiralal[4] without further examination. As the date of Tīvaradeva forms the central pivot on which turn the dates of not only the Somavaṁśī kings of Kosala (Chhattisgarh) and Orissa, but also those of Vishṇukuṇḍin, Śarabhapura and Śailodbhava Kings, who were connected with him in some way or other, it is necessary to examine the question in the light of new evidence that has recently become available.

Prof. Kielhorn assigned the above date to Tīvaradeva on the evidence of palaeography, language and style.[5] Only two charters of Tīvaradeva have been discovered till now—the Rajim plates edited by Dr. Fleet[6] and the Baloda plates edited by Dr. Hultzsch.[7] Both these

[1] Ep. Ind. IV p. 258.
[2] Ep. Ind. XVIII p. 240.
[3] History of Orissa Vol. I pp. 204 and 225.
[4] Ep. Ind. XI p. 185.
[5] Ind. Ant. XVIII p. 180.
[6] Gupta Inscriptions No. 81.
[7] Ep. Ind. VII p. 102.

charters are inscribed in box-headed characters which closely resemble those of the Vākāṭaka and Śarabhapura kings. When Prof. Kielhorn wrote the relation of Vākāṭaka and Gupta kings was not known. He, therefore, accepted Dr. Fleet's identification of Mahārājādhirāja Devagupta, the maternal grand-father of the Vākāṭaka king Pravarasena II, with Devagupta of Magadha, the son of Ādityasena, mentioned in the Deo Barnark inscription[8] and assigned the Dudia plates of Pravarasena II to the beginning of the 8th century and Balaghat plates of Pṛithvīsheṇa and the Rajim plates of Tīvaradeva to the second half of the same century.[9]

Since then the Poona and Riddhapur plates of Prabhāvatīguptā have definitely proved that Mahārājādhirāja Devagupta was none other than Chandragupta II. The Vākāṭakas were thus contemporaries of the Early Gupta Kings and their records must, therefore, be referred to the fourth and fifth centuries of the Christian Era. As stated above they are inscribed in box-headed characters. The plates of Tīvaradeva which are also incised in similar characters can no longer be referred to the 8th century on palæographic grounds.

Nor is the evidence of language and style in favour of the late date. The charters of Tīvaradeva are, indeed, composed in a style of high flourish, full of long compounds and puns,[10] but so are those of many kings of Valabhī who flourished in the sixth and seventh centuries

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
[8] Gupta Inscriptions, Introduction p. 15.

[9] Ep. Ind. IX p. 270.

[10] निशितनिस्त्रिंशघनघातपातितारिद्विरदकुम्भमण्डलगलद्बहलशोणितसटासिक्तमुक्ताफलप्रकरमण्डितरणाङ्गणविविधरत्नसम्भारलाभलोभविजृम्भमाणारित्वारवारिवाडवानलश्चन्दोदय इवाकृतकरोद्वेगः क्षीरोद इवार्विभूतानेकातिशायिरत्नसम्पत्, गरुत्मानिव भुजङ्गोद्धारचतुरः etc. in Gupta Inscr. No. 81.

A.D.[11] We must, therefore, look elsewhere for a more reliable evidence for fixing the date of Tīvaradeva.

From several inscriptions found at Bhandak and Sirpur, we get the following genealogy of the Somavaṁśī Kings of Kosala (Chhattisgarh)[12] :—



From the Sirpur stone inscription of the time of Mahāśivagupta Bālārjuna, we learn that Bālārjuna's mother Vāsaṭā was the daughter of Sūryavarman 'who was born in the spotless family of the Varman Kings great on account of their supremacy over Magadha.'[13] There is no king of this name in the dynasties of Magadha


[11] Compare for instance प्रकृतिभ्य: परं प्रत्ययमर्थवन्तमतिबहुतिथप्रयोजनानुबन्धमागमपरिपूर्णं विदधानः सन्धिविग्रहसमासनिश्चयनिपुणः स्थानेऽनुरूपमादेशं ददद् गुणवृद्धिविधानजनितसंस्कारः साधूनां राज्यशालातुरीयतन्त्रयोरुभयोरपि निष्णातः etc. in the description of Dhruvasena II of Valabhī—Boṭād Plates G. E. 310 (=629-630 A. D.).

[12] R. B. Hiralal, List of Inscriptions in C. P. and Berar, second Ed. p. 103.

[13] Cf. निष्पङ्के मगधाधिपत्यमहतां जातः कुले वर्मणाम्,
पुण्याभिः कृतिभिः कृती कृतमनःकम्पः सुधाभोजिनाम् ।
यामासाद्य सुतां हिमाचल इव श्रीसूर्य्यवर्म्मा नृपः,
प्राप प्राक् परमेश्वरश्वशुरतागर्वानिखर्वं पदम् ॥ Ep. Ind. Vol. XI, 191.

except the Maukhari prince Sūryavarman whose Haraha stone inscription, incised in the reign of his father Īśānavarman, is dated (Mālava) Saṁvat 611 (555 A.D.). The name of this prince is not known from other records of the Maukharis. As Sūryavarman is called King in Sirpur stone inscription above referred to, he may have succeeded his father and ruled for a short time, though being a collateral his name is not mentioned in the records of his brother or his descendants. Chandragupta, the grandfather of Mahāśivagupta Bālārjuna was thus a contemporary of Sūryavarman and flourished probably from 550 to 570 A.D. and his elder brother Tīvaradeva from 530 to 550 A.D.

The date thus arrived at for Tīvaradeva is corroborated by the evidence afforded by the records of Vishṇukuṇḍin Kings. After examining all the available charters of these kings Mr. Dinesh Chandra Sarcar has given the following genealogy[14] :—



Mahārāja Mādhavavarman I was the most powerful King of the dynasty. He is described in his as well as his successors' records as one who had performed a thousand (Agnishṭoma) sacrifices and eleven aśvamedhas

[14] Indian Historical Quarterly Vol. IX p. 278.

[15] Pulomburu Plates of Mādhavavarman, Journal of Andhra His. Res. Society Vol. VI p. 20.

(Horse Sacrifices). He is also described in his plates as

त्रिवरनगरभवनगतपरमयुवतीजनविहरणरतिः or

त्रिवरनगरभवनगतयुवतिहृदयनन्दनः ,

i.e., one who delighted the hearts of (or sported in company of) the best ladies in the mansions of the city of Trivara. This expression has not yet been satisfactorily explained. Dr. Hultzsch took it to mean that Mādhavavarman I lived at Trivaranagara but he could not identify the city. It seems clear, however, that Trivaranagara means the city of Trivara, *i.e.*, Tīvaradeva, King of Mahākosala. But then what does the above expression signify? It cannot mean that Mādhavavarman married a lady from the family of Tīvaradeva; for the expression refers to a number of ladies (युवतीजन) in the mansions of the city of Trivara whom he delighted. Besides Mādhavavarman is not known to have married any lady from the family of Tīvaradeva. On the other hand he is said to have married a Vākāṭaka princess, whose son Vikramendravarman is described in his son's charter as one who adorned both the families of the Vishṇukuṇḍins and Vākāṭakas. We must, therefore, take the expression to refer to Mādhavavarman's victory over Tīvaradeva. Tīvaradeva was a powerful King. He describes himself in his charters as प्राप्तसकलकोसलाधिपत्यः 'one who attained suzerainty over the whole Kosala country.' A victory over such a great king must be a source of pride to Mādhavavarman. Hence we find it referred to again and again in his inscriptions, much in the same way as Pulakeśin the Second's victory over Harsha, the lord paramount of North India, is mentioned in the records of his descendants. The idea that a victorious king

[16] Ipur Plates of Mādhavavarman, Ep. Ind. XVII p. 234.

[17] विष्णुकुण्डिवाकाटकवंशद्वयालङ्कृतजन्मनः in the Chikkulla Plates, Ep. Ind. Vol. IV p. 193. Also cf. उभयवंशात्मजालङ्कारभूतः in the Ramatirtham plates, Ep. Ind. XII p. 133.

captivates the hearts of young ladies of the enemy's city—nay even of the enemy's family—occurs sometimes in Sanskrit and Prakrit literature.[18] It would not, therefore, be wrong to suppose that Mādhavavarman I vanquished Tīvaradeva. In any case, he was his contemporary.

When did this Mādhavavarman flourish? His Pulomburu plates[19] record that when he crossed the Godāvarī to conquer the eastern region, he donated the village Pulomburu in the Guḍḍavāḍivishaya to Śivaśarman, the son of Damaśarman and grandson of Rudraśarman of the Gautama gotra and Taittirīya Śākhā on the occasion of a lunar eclipse which occurred on the full moon day of Phālguna. Again the Pulomburu plates[20] of the Eastern Chālukya King Jayasiṁha I, which were discovered along with the above plates of Mādhavavarman, record the grant of the same village to Rudraśarman, the son of Śivaśarman and grandson of Damaśarman, of the Gotama gotra and Taittirīya Śākhā. From the details given above it is quite clear that Śivaśarman, the donee of Mādhavavarman's plates, was the father of Rudraśarman who received the village from Jayasiṁha I. It seems that Rudraśarman, who is called 'pūrvāgrahārika' (former owner of the donated village)

[18] श्रीवत्सो वत्सलत्वान्मुरलजनवधूलोचनैः पीयमाने
पादद्वन्द्वारविन्दे त्वणमभिरचयत्यञ्जलिं मूर्ध्नि भक्त्या ।
Rājaśekhara's Viddhaśālabhañjikā IV, 8. The King of Murala was an opponent of Yuvarājadeva I. See my article in the Annals of the Bhandarkar Institute XI p. 369. Cf. also
इय णिव्वत्तियसेज्जापरिणयणाण पडिवक्खकुमरीण । जायन्ति जस्स पुरतो ससज्सआ वम्महवियारा ॥ v. 1069 Gauḍavaho
(=इति निर्वर्तितशय्यापरिणयनानां प्रतिपक्षकुमारीणाम् । जायन्ते यस्य पुरतः ससाध्वसा मन्मथविकाराः ॥)

[19] Journal of the Andhra Historical Society VI, p. 17.

[20] Ep. Ind. XIX p. 254.

lost possession of the village in the troublous times due to the invasions of Pulakeśin II in the beginning of the seventh century A.D. He, therefore, seems to have made representations to Jayasiṁha I some time after peace and order had been established in the Kingdom and received the Agrahāra village again from him.

If we calculate the interval between the reigns of Mādhavavarman I and Jayasiṁha I, we find that a period of about sixty years must have elapsed between these two rulers. Mādhavavarman's Pulomburu plates are dated in the 40th year of his reign.[21] They were, therefore, issued towards the close of his reign. He seems to have ruled over an extensive empire, for he performed as many as eleven aśvamedhas. Three of his sons are known from inscriptions. 1. Devavarman, 2. Mañchaṇṇabhaṭṭāraka[22] and 3. Vikramendravarman. As Mādhavavarman had a long reign of more than forty years, none of his sons seems to have succeeded him.[23] In any case we do not know of any plates issued by them. Mādhavavarman II, the grandson of Mādhavavarman I, who calls himself the lord of Trikūṭa and Malaya mountains, seems to have held possession of the western provinces after the death of Mādhavavarman I, while another grandson Indravarman seems to have succeeded him in the East. His plates are dated in the 27th regnal year. He is not likely to have reigned much longer for his son Vikramendravarman is said to have come to the throne when he was a mere boy.[24]

[21] I have accepted the view of Mr. D. C. Sarkar (I.H.Q. IX p. 275).

[22] The name of this prince occurs towards the end of the Ipur plates (First Set), Ep. XVII p. 334. None of his descendants are known.

[23] It is noteworthy that no royal titles are prefixed to their names even in the records of their sons.

[24] परममाहेश्वरस्य महाराजस्य श्रीइन्द्रभट्टारकवर्म्मणः प्रियज्येष्ठपुत्रो गरिष्ठः शैशव एव सकलगुणालङ्कृतस्य सम्यगध्यारोपितसकलराज्यभारः परममाहेश्वरो महाराजः श्रीमान् विक्रमेन्द्रवर्म्मा एवमाज्ञापति ।

Vikramendravarman's plates were issued in his tenth regnal year. The reigns of Indravarman and his son thus cover a little more than 37 years. As no successor of Vikramendravarman is known, he seems to have been dethroned by Pulakeśin II, who placed his brother Kubjavishṇuvardhana in charge of the Eastern province. He reigned for about 18 years (615—633 A.D.). As the Pulomburu plates of Jayasiṁha I referred to above are dated in the fourth regnal year, we can calculate the interval between the two sets of Pulomburu plates as follows :—

Indravarman ...	... 27	years.
Vikramendravarman	... 10	years.
Vishṇuvardhana	... 18	years.
Jayasiṁha ...	... 5*	years.
	60	years.

As Mādhavavarman I, Indravarman and Vikrmendravarman may have continued to reign for some years after their respective plates were issued, this figure may have to be increased by about ten years, *i.e.*, a period of about seventy years may have elapsed between these two gifts. It appears that Śivaśarman was a young man, say 25 to 30 years of age, when he accompanied Mādhavavarman in his expedition to the east and received his charter on the bank of the Godāvarī while his son Rudraśarman was an old man of fifty or sixty, when he regained the lost Agrahāra village from Jayasiṁha. Now Jayasiṁha issued his plates in circa 637 A.D. Deducting 70 years from this we get c. 567 A.D. as the approximate date of Mādhavavarman's plates. We find that there was a lunar eclipse in the month of Phālguna in 565 A.D. This may, therefore, be accepted as the date of Mādhava-

* Agreeing with Mr. Somaśekhara Sharma I read the numerical symbol in Jayasiṁha's Pulomburu plates as 5.

varman's plates. As these plates were issued in his 40th regnal year, we may accept 525-568 as the probable duration of Mādhavavarman's reign.[25] We have fixed above 530 to 550 A.D. as the date for Tīvaradeva on the evidence of the Sirpur inscription, which we thus find corroborated by the date of Mādhavavarman, who, as described in his charters was a contemporary of Tīvaradeva.

We must next proceed to consider the arguments advanced by some scholars to corroborate Kielhorn's date for Tīvara. (1) Rai Bahadur Dr. Hiralal places the Sirpur Laxman Temple inscription of Tīvaradeva's brother's grandson Mahāśivagupta Bālārjuna in the eighth or ninth century A.D.[26] But the characters of the inscription are decidedly earlier. R. B. Hiralal himself has drawn attention to what he calls the antiquated forms of the letters इ, ण, स, घ, थ, भ, ज. The forms of म, र, ल, ट, ड, and ह show that it must be placed earlier than the 8th century. They closely resemble the letters in the Ganjam plates of the time of Śaśāṅka (dated 619-620 A.D.). It would not therefore be wrong to refer it to the first half of the 7th century A.D.

(2) The Sanjan plates of Amoghavarsha I (Śaka Saṁvat 793) mention that Govinda III first encountered and defeated Nāgabhaṭa and Chandragupta when he

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[25] Agreeing with Mr. D. C. Sarkar I have identified Mādhavavarman of Pulomburu plates with Mādhavavarman I mentioned in the Chikkulla and Ipur plates (First set) on the ground of similarity of description. M. J. Dubreuil who distinguishes between them places Mādhavavarman about 450 A.D. The tradition in the Sthalamāhātmya of Śrī Parvata on which he relies is worthless for historical purposes (Ancient History of the Deccan p. 73). Prabhāvatīguptā was not known as Chandrāvatī and was moreover a devotee of Vishṇu and not of Śiva. See her Riddhapur plates. If Mādhavavarman I owed his throne to a Vākāṭaka prince, it must be to Harisheṇa (C. 500—530) who conquered the Andhra country. The Vākāṭaka princess whom he married was probably Harisheṇa's own daughter.

[26] Ep. Ind. XI p. 184.

started for *digvijaya* in the North.[27] Dr. D. R. Bhandarkar who has edited these plates has identified Nāgabhaṭa with the well-known prince of that name in the Gurjara Pratihāra dynasty, and Chandragupta with the brother of Tīvaradeva. As the certain dates of Govinda III vary from 794 to 814 A.D. he places Tīvara the elder brother of Chandragupta in the eighth century A.D. Prof. R. D. Banerjee also has supported this view.

The identification proposed above is, however, open to serious objections. Chandragupta is not mentioned in the Sanjan plates as King of Kosala. As he was defeated along with Nāgabhaṭa of Gujerat he was probably a king of Central India. Besides, the same plates mention later on that Govinda III, after his victories in the North, returned to the Narmadā and following its bank, acquired among others the country of Kosala, which he made his servants enjoy.[28] If Chandragupta whom he had already defeated had been a king of Kosala, it would have been redundant to mention that country again in the description of his later conquests.

(3) Many records of Śailodbhava kings mention a king named Trīvara, with whom Mādhava, a Śailodbhava prince allied himself to oust his elder relative Dharmarāja alias Mānabhīta from the throne.[29] Both of them were

[27] स नागभटचन्द्रगुप्तनृपयोर्यशोर्यं रणेष्वहार्यमपहार्यधैर्यविकलानथोन्मूलयन्। यशोर्जनपरो नृपान् स्वभुवि शालिसस्यानिव पुनः पुनरतिष्ठिपत्स्वपद एव चान्यानपि ॥ Ep. Ind. Vol. XVIII, pp. 233 f.


[28] ततः प्रतिनिवृत्य तत्प्रकृतिभृत्यकर्मेत्ययं प्रतापमिव नर्मदातटमनुप्रयातः पुनः। सकोशलकलिङ्गवेंगिडहलोड्रकान् मालवान् विलभ्य निजसेवकैः स्वयमबूभुजद्विक्रमः ॥

[29] राज्यं लब्ध्वैव दर्पाद्विगणिततया माधवो ज्येष्ठभावान्
देशादस्मादपास्तुं कृतविषममतिर्विग्रहे फासिकायाम्।
युद्धे क्षोभेण भग्नो नृपतिवरमसौ संश्रितस्त्रीवराख्यं
पश्चात्तेनापि सार्धं पुनरपि विजितो विन्ध्यपादेषु जीर्णः ॥
Kondedda, Nirvina and Puri plates of Dharmarāja

defeated by Dharmarāja. Mādhava was, thereafter, obliged to spend his last days at the foot of the Vindhya mountain, probably in the Kingdom of his ally Trīvara. R. D. Banerjee, Chakravarti and others have identified this Trīvara with King Tīvaradeva of Chhattisgarh. The dates of Śailodbhava Kings are not yet settled. Their records are generally dated in regnal years. The only exception so far known for certain,[30] is the Ganjam plates of Mādhavarāja II, which were issued when the year 300 of the Gupta era (*i.e.*, 619-20) was current. R. D. Banerjee's proposed identification of Mādhavarāja II of the Ganjam plates (619-20 A.D.) with Sainyabhīta II alias Mādhavavarman of Buguda plates is plausible.[31] Dharmarāja alias Mānabhīta, the grandson of Mādhavavarman, who issued the Kondedda and Puri plates must therefore be referred to circa 650—675 A.D.

[30] Mr. Rajaguru reads Saṁvat 512 as the date of the Puri copper plates of Dharmarāja and refers it to the Saka Saṁvat (J.B.O.R.S. June, 1930). This reading has been questioned by R. D. Banerjee (Hist. of Orissa, I p. 134). The first symbol appears to denote 300. In that case this date also would have to be referred to the Gupta era.

[31] See the following genealogies:—



The Characters of his plates support this conclusion, for they closely resemble the Aphsad stone inscription of Ādityasena which is assigned to the last quarter of the seventh century. As seen above Dharmarāja was a contemporary of Tīvaradeva of Chhattisgarh. So Tīvaradeva also must be placed in the latter half of the seventh century.

This undoubtedly conflicts with the date 535—555 A.D. proposed above for Tīvaradeva on the evidence of paleography and historical references, for there is a difference of more than 125 years which cannot be satisfactorily accounted for. This later Tīvara may have been a remote descendant of the earlier Tīvara who was a contemporary of Vishṇukuṇḍin Mādhavavarman. We know of several instances of such repetition of names in the dynasy of Somavaṁśi Kings of Kosala and Orissa, to which Tīvaradeva belonged.

The date of Tīvaradeva has also a bearing on those of Kings of Śarabhapura, but it would be better to discuss their relation in a separate article.

The difficulty presented by the palaeography of Buguda plates to which R. D. Banerjee has referred (History of Orissa I, p. 130) is not insurmountable. While editing the Buguda plates Kielhorn had drawn attention to the fact that the plates, on which the inscription is written, originally bore another inscription, the letters of which probably were beaten in to make room for the new inscription. If so, the new inscription may have been engraved on the plates later on, when the original plates were lost or destroyed.

DEOGARH IN MEDIÆVAL TIMES

(In the light of a poem by Amir Khusrau)

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Very few cities in mediæval Indian history attract our attention so forcibly and so consistently as does the fortress-city of Deogarh, or Deogīr[1] as the Mohammadan historians are fond of calling it. There was, of course, the capital of northern India, Delhi, with its kaliedoscopic career under successive dynasties and under various names, a city that conjured up before the hungry eyes of the trans-border hordes visions of palaces and gardens, of treasures untold, and of mighty kings reclining on gorgeous thrones each one of which cost the tribute of an empire. There was, too, the ancient city of Kannauj, the seat of ancient Hindu civilisation and grandeur and the home of the blue-blooded Brahmins, and several other important cities and towns that have figured more or less prominently in the history of that period.

Yet Deogarh has, to my mind, more of romance and interest about it than most of those cities. The very fact of its being situated so far away from the northern political centres and yet attracting successive waves of invasion would show the peculiar charm it exercised on the minds of kings and princes, and it was this charm that in the later part of the so-called Pathan period tempted the able, though eccentric, monarch, Moḥammad Tughlaq, to select it as the seat of his government and to try the disastrous experiment of making the whole popula-

[1] See p. 238 *infra*.

tion of the three cities of Delhi[2] move to it bag and baggage.

But what was the secret of this peculiar charm? Was it the strong and inaccessible site of the city that made it a desirable possession for launching raids further south, or the rich and precious spoils contained within the strong walls of the fortress? Mohammadan historians give glowing accounts of the immense wealth that fell into the hands of the invaders. Thus 'Alāuddīn in his first raid on the city is said to have brought back with him six hundred '*mans*'[3] of gold, seven '*mans*' of pearls, two '*mans*' of diamonds, emeralds and rubies, a thousand '*mans*' of silver, countless bundles of silk and other rich fabrics and numerous elephants and horses.[4] This, even after making due allowance for the probable exaggeration on the part of historians fired with a zeal to glorify the exploits of the heroes of Islam, is sufficient to give an idea of the extreme affluence of the Deccan cities and of Deogarh particularly. One could, therefore, reasonably surmise that lust of plunder was the main attraction that drew the Mohammadan soldiers to Deogarh.

But was that all? Did the Mohammadans just want to plunder and lay waste the rich country and found no more beauty and interest in it than does a dress-maker in the brilliant plumage of a bird of paradise or in the luxuriant coat of a silver-fox? Did they not, on the other hand, feel a genuine admiration for Deogarh and wanted to possess and guard it with the sympathetic and loving concern of a father rather than with the gluttonous

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[2] Sīrī, Jahānpanāh and Dihlī. See Ibn Baṭṭūṭa's description of the city (Defremery III, p. 146).

[3] Not 'maunds'; a '*man*' (Persian weight) was equal to 8 lbs.

[4] Firishta: Lucknow (I. 96). Barnī (p. 222 *seq.*) 1864.

greed of a cannibal? When Qutbuddīn Mubārak Shāh named the city after his own name as Qutbābād,[5] surely he was not fathering a place that had already been drained of all its wealth and despoiled of all its resources. When again Moḥammad Tughlaq, giving the city the happy title of Daulatābād (the Abode of Prosperity), adopted it as his capital, he could not have been moved to take that step by mere greed of plunder.

I think, it was more the charm of the fine culture and the high grade of economic and social development of Deogarh that captivated the hearts of the Mohammadans, and fortunately we have, in the writings of the famous poet, Amīr Khusrau, ample proof of the great admiration and genuine respect that the Mohammadans felt for the city. That poet in his voluminous compositions has given us very important and first-hand information about the political condition of India in his times, and that information has been proved to be strikingly accurate. Of Deogarh he speaks more than once and as we have reasons to believe that he visited the place himself, his narrative becomes all the more interesting, and it is the purpose especially of this paper to quote some of those interesting facts about Deogarh that one does not find in other contemporary historians but which serve to shed

[5] No historian, strangely enough, has noticed this name. But Khusrau says clearly in his poem in praise of Deogarh written after the reign of Mubārak Shāh (*Nihāyat-ul-Kamāl*, Brit. Museum Ms. No. 25,807, fol. 459 b. seq.):—

زهی مبارك شهری شه خجسته بلاد
که نام یافت ز قطب سپهر "قطب آباد"

See also Thomas' *Chronicle of the Pathan Kings*, pp, 179-180, where a gold coin of Mubārak Shāh's reign is described; the coin struck in 718 H. bears the following legend ضرب هذه السكة بقلعة قطب آباد (This coin was struck in the fortress of Qutbābād). Thomas supposes Qutbābād to be a part of Delhi, but it is clear that the coin was struck at Deogarh which was a place of mintage in the time of Qutbuddīn's predecessors as well as his successors.

more light on the old civilisation of the Deccan than does anything else.

When in 722 H. Ullugh Khān, later Moḥammad Tughlaq, led an expedition to the south with the object of punishing Rudradeva[6] of Warrangal who had shown signs of refractoriness, he selected Deogarh as the centre of his operations. Khusrau seems to have accompanied that prince, and Deogarh appears to have captured the poet's fancy. In a panegyric addressed to the prince on that occasion he describes its charms at great length, and it will not be out of place to give here translations of some of the passages.

"Wonderful and auspicious city," he says, "the queen of the blessed realm which received the name of Qutbābād from the 'Pivot of the world.'[7] When infidelity prevailed here, people were tormented by demons and that is why the ancient Deo[8] named it 'Deogīr.'[9] Now that it has become the 'egg' of Islam no bird other than the phoenix of happy augur can take its birth in it. It would be no flattery to call it 'the garden of Eden' but I do not call it that lest it be confused with the paradise of Shaddād.[10] The city was surely destined to become a paradise under Islamic rule, for why else has it been so carefully adorned? It is, perchance, due to hearing the fame of this city that Cairo has dipped her robe in indigo

[6] Called 'Luddardeo' by Khusrau and other Mohammadan historians.

[7] Qutb-i-'Ālam, *i.e.*, Quṭbuddīn Mubārak Shāh, see *supra*.

[8] '*Div-i-kuhan*,' probably Mahādeo is meant.

[9] A curious interpretation of the name. Deo or Div in Persian is a demon and gīr is from Persian 'giriftan,' to seize.

[10] Mythical king of South Arabia alluded to in the Koran and supposed to have built the 'garden of Eden,' a presumptuous act for which he had to suffer drastic punishment.

(*nīl*)[11] and Baghdād has split in two[12] . . . The air here is so pleasant that it imparts a pleasure similar to that promised to men of virtuous deeds, in the next world . . . How shall I describe its fruit? It is the envy of the fruit of the whole world. There are the bananas curved like the crescent-moon and as pleasant as the day of *'Īd*. There is again the mango the sweetness of which delights every palate and which looks like a golden casket full of milk and honey and makes the mouth of the sugar-candy water . . . . There is, then, the wonderful leaf *tambūl* (betel) that intoxicates hearts with its pleasant taste . . .

The city has so many pearls and precious stones that the ocean and the mines are now unable to produce any more.

The fineness of its cloth is difficult to describe: the skin of the moon removed by Mars would not be so fine. One could compare it to a drop of water if that drop, contrary to nature, fell from the font of the sun. A hundred yards of it can pass through the eye of a needle, so fine is its texture, and yet the point of a spear can pierce through it only with difficulty. It is so diaphanus and light that it seems as if one is wearing no dress at all but has merely smeared one's body with pure water . . . .[13]

The music is such that each stroke of the musician's plectrum makes Venus cry, in jealous anguish, like her own harp.

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[11] A pun on the word '*nīl*' that means indigo and is also the Arabic form of the Nile. Dyeing a garment in indigo would show mourning.

[12] Alluding to Baghdād being divided into two portions.

[13] This is 'divgīrī' or 'deogīrī,' a very fine cloth of which Khusrau speaks at many places. He declares it to be finer than even the '*katān*,' a Persian fabric of phenomenal lightness that is said to be too delicate to bear even the moonlight. He says in one of his mathnavis: که لطف دیوگیری از کتان به ("for *deogīrī* is finer than the *katān*").

If I depict its inhabitants on the canvas, the pen of ' the master ' would derive inspiration from my painting . . . . In point of beauty they are all divine and of houri descent."

This is how Khusrau praises Deogarh. A more lavish encomium he has not deigned to bestow even upon Delhi that was given in his times the proud title of ' Dārul-Khilāfat ' (the seat of the Caliphate). Could we doubt the genuineness of his admiration and could we still say that it was nothing more than mercenary motives that took the Mohammadans to Deogarh? I do not think so.

MAHĀMAHOPĀDHYĀYA CANDRA

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It is a fact that even now a vast literature of Indian thought is lying in the dark unknown to the literary world. Except certain references either by contemporary or by later writers we do not know of several works and scholars of name and fame. Efforts in the field of research lead us to unearth every day some fresh material, fragmentary though it may be, of almost forgotten schools of Indian thought. This is not merely true of the several schools of philosophy but of all the branches of learning some of which are practically lost to us. Of the several reasons why Indian literature suffered so much, a few are advanced here with reference to the school of Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā with an aspect of which the present paper deals.

India essentially being a country of Religion, it is but necessary that a system of thought should deal with the nature of *Dharma* in all its bearings. Here in India, every school of philosophy aims at *Mukti* either by getting rid of pain, or by the attainment of *Tattvajñāna*. Whatever may be the means of it, it is a fact that it can be realised through the *Law of Karman*. Hence, a system dealing with *Dharma* in all its aspects which includes the *Law of Karman* must have pre-eminently occupied the attention of the people. Over and above these, we know that the Buddhists had severely attacked the performances of Vedic rites and rituals and there was every danger of losing the influence of Vedic culture for ever. It was therefore, necessary that a revival should take place and the importance of the Vedic rituals and rites should be

preached against Buddhism. This was perhaps the reason why Mīmāṁsā was once so widely read and several scholars with their individual differences wrote on it.

There were two main schools of Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā, namely, the Bhaṭṭa school and the Prabhākara school. To study Mīmāṁsā was considered an essential part of study even very lately. This must have given fresh impetus to every centre of learning. But it appears that in Mithilā its study reached its zenith. We find that during the reign of Rānī Viçvāsa Devī, wife of Rājā Padma Sinha, brother of Rājā Çiva Sinha, the patron of Vidyāpati Ṭhakkura, there was a gathering of Paṇḍitas in Mithilā in which some fourteen hundred Mīmāṁsakas alone were invited.[1]

Of these two schools of thought, the school of Prabhākara Miçra became more and more popular.[2] It attracted the attention of scholars from different parts of the country. There was hardly a scholar of Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā who did not study and write on this school of thought. But several of these scholars preserved their own individuality and created several subdivisions under this school. The reason why this school became so popular seems to be that, unlike the Bhaṭṭa school, it had more scope for independent reasoning.

But as time went on, things changed. Perhaps due to the fresh impetus given to Nyāya, Vaiçeṣika, Vedānta and several Vaiṣṇava schools, the school of Pūrva-

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[1] Puruṣaparīkṣā along with Maithilī translation, (Darbhanga edition), p. 262, Ft. Note.

[2] The following verse current in Southern India also speaks of its popularity:—

गाथा ताथागतानाङ्गलति गमनिका कापिली क्वापि लीना,
क्षीणा काणादवाणी द्रुहिणहरगिरः सौरभन्नारभन्ते ।
क्षामा कौमारिलोक्तिर्जगति गुरुमतङ्गौरवाद्दूरवान्तं,
का शङ्का शङ्करादेर्भजति यतिपतौ भद्रवेदीन्त्रिवेदीम् ॥
Dr. Jhā's Prabhākara-Mīmāṁsā, p. 10.

Mīmāṁsā suffered much in later centuries of the Christian Era. The system of Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā, in fact, is not a philosophical system. It mainly deals with the consideration of the practices of Vedic rites and rituals, the regular performance of which requires a regular life full of patient activities. There is no freedom of thought and activity under this system. Hence, this sort of bondage would have been felt very much and consequently it could not continue for a long period. The zeal for the study and performance of Vedic rites and rituals gradually gave way and scholars took pleasure in concentrating their attention on the subtleties of Nyāya and Vedānta. Again, perhaps it might be due to the fact that people did not like to work under the yoke of *Authority* which Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā preached. They did not like to see reason sacrificed. Hence, the change was inevitable. The age of ***Reason*** prevailed. This should not be taken to mean that *Authority* was disregarded altogether. It occupied only a place of secondary importance later on. Due to these and several other similar reasons the regular practice of the Vedic rites and rituals and consequently the study of Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā became neglected.

Under such circumstances, there flourished one of the well-known Mīmāṁsakas of the Prabhākara school, Mahāmahopādhyāya Candra. He was the son of Mahopādhyāya Guṇarati who was well-known in the society of the learned. He belonged to the family of Poçālī(?) in Mithilā.[3] No more about his family history is known to us. That he was held in great respect by

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3 गरीयोभिर्विद्वत्परिषदि सदोद्गीतमहिमा
महोपाध्यायः श्रीमान् गुणरतिरभूद्यस्य जनकः ।
असौ चन्द्रः श्रीमानकृत नयरत्नाकरमिमं
निबन्धं पोशालीकुलकमलकेदारमिहिरः ॥

—the end of the colophon of the 11th Adhyāya of the Nyāyaratnākara.

Maithila scholars is clear from the fact that Caṇḍeçvara Ṭhakkura, the great Maithila Nibandhakāra, speaks of him as *Gurumatācārya*.[4]

Nothing can be definitely said about the exact time of this author. But references of contemporary and later writers are not wanting. Thus Murāri Miçra II[5] refers to his views and refutes them.[6] Varadarāja, son of Raṅganātha, grandson of Devarāja, great grandson of Praṇatārtihara and pupil of Sudarçana,[7] while commenting upon the *Nayaviveka* of Bhavanātha Miçra, refers to Candra.[8] Caṇḍeçvara Ṭhakkura refers to him in supporting his own statement.[9] Çaṅkara Miçra, the well-known author of the *Upaskāra*, refers to his views in his *Vādivinoda*.[10] And lastly, Jayarāma Bhaṭṭācārya also refers to his views in his Nyāya-Siddhānta-Mālā.[11]

I have already pointed out elsewhere that Murāri II cannot be later than the 12th century A.D. Varadarāja is also an old writer. Caṇḍeçvara lived in 1324 A.D.[12] Besides, the Ms. of which a transcript is with me is itself dated as 258 La. Saṁ.,[13] which comes to 1377 A.D. These

[4] आषाढादि चतुर्मासमित्यत्र कार्त्तिक्यां समापनमित्यादौ शुक्लादिमासपरिग्रहोदाहरणन्तु कार्त्तिकादितृतीयायामिति नभस्यमासस्य तमिस्रपक्षे त्रयोदशीत्यादि। अयञ्चार्थो गुरुमताचार्यचन्द्रादीनामप्यनुमतः।

—Kṛtyaratnākara, p. 82. Bibl. Edition.

[5] Vide Umesha Mishra—Murārestṛtīyaḥ panthāḥ. Proceedings, Oriental Conference, Lahore, pp. 967 ff.

[6] Tripādīnītinayanaṁ, MS. Fol. 22—24.

[7] Catalogus Catalogorum by Th. Aufrecht.

[8] P. W. S. Studies, Vol. VI, p. 169.

[9] Supra, p. 3, ft. note 2.

[10] P. 53.

[11] P. W. S. Text, No. 21, Pt. 2, p.

[12] Umesha Mishra—Caṇḍeçvara Ṭhakkura and Maithilī A. U. Studies, Vol. VI, Pt. I.

[13] ल० सं० २५८ कन्हौ ग्रामे महोपाध्यायश्रीरत्नाकरात्मजेन पठता श्रीहरिकरेण लिखितमिदं पुस्तकम्।

data show that 12th century is the *terminus ad quem* of Candra's date.

Again, when we study the fragmentary work of his available to us, we find that Candra refers to the *Vivaraṇa*, Çrīkara, the *Viveka*, and the *Pañcikā*. He also refers to the *Bhāṣya* and Guru. Of these, the *Vivaraṇa* is considered to be another name of the *Bṛhatī*, the work of Prabhākara himself.[14] About Çrīkara we know that his earliest reference is found in the *Mitākṣarā* on the *Yājñavalkya Smṛti* of the 11th century. Hence, he must have lived either in the latter half of the 10th century, or in the beginning of the 11th century, if Vijñāneçvara be placed in the latter half of the 11th century. The *Viveka* is believed to be the same as the *Nayaviveka* of Bhavanātha Miçra, who is considered to have lived about 1200 A.D., or the beginning of 1400 A.D.[15] But this date will have to be pushed back at least by one century or even more in the light of our researches that Murāri II who must have lived in the 12th century A.D. has referred to this very *Viveka* in his *Tripādīnītinayanam*. Again, we know that this very Candra who has been referred to by Murāri Miçra II, quotes the views of the *Viveka* very often. So that, either we shall have to believe that the *Viveka* referred to by Murāri Miçra II and Candra is altogether a different work written before the 11th century, or the date of the author of the *Viveka*, namely, Bhavanātha Miçra, will have to be pushed back by two centuries at least. These facts disprove the view that both the author of the *Viveka* and the father of Çaṅkara Miçra, the author of the *Vaiçeṣika-Upaskāra* are the same person. Lastly, we

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[14] Vide Proceedings of the Third Oriental Conference, pp. 477-478.

[15] Vide the Princess of Wales Saraswatibhawan Studies, Vol. VI, p. 169.

come to the *Pañcikā*, also spelt as *Pañjikā*. It is another name of the *Ṛjuvimalā*, a commentary on the *Bṛhatī* of Prabhākara Miçra by Çālikanātha Miçra who, most probably, belonged to the middle of the 10th century. Now considering all these facts, we may say that the 11th century is the *terminus a quo* for the date of Candra. We might, therefore, place him at present before 1100 A.D.

About his literary activities we know that he was a Mīmāṁsaka of the Prabhākara school and held an independent view of his own. The only work of his, so far known to us, is a commentary on the Jaiminīya Sūtras in the *Adhikaraṇa* form. Most likely, Candra wrote a complete commentary of which only a portion is found as yet. He himself in his commentary on *Adhyāya* XI seems to have made references to his commentary on the previous *Adhyāyas*. Murāri Miçra II refers to his (Candra's) views on the first *Adhyāya* of the Jaiminīya Sūtras. No more proof is available at present. This commentary is named as *Nyāyaratnākara* or *Nayaratnākara*. This is perhaps the second commentary on a work of Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā which is so named, the other being the *Nyāyaratnākara* of Pārthasārathi Miçra on the *Çlokavārtika*. There are two more works, so far known, named as *Nyāyaratnākara*—a work by Kṣemānanda Dīkṣita on Yoga and the other by Vanamālī Miçra on Mādhva School.[16]

In this portion of the commentary Candra refers to Çrīkara, the *Viveka*, the *Vivaraṇa*, Guru, the *Bhāṣya*, the Bhāṣyakāra, the *Pañcikā* and several others as *anye*, *apare*, *kecit* etc. These latter references show that after Prabhākara and before Candra there were several other independent writers on Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā of whom we

[16] Vide Cat. Catalogorum by Th. Aufrecht, Vol. I, p. 309 and Vol. III, p. 66.

have no knowledge as yet. It also proves that this school of thought was very popular amongst the scholars of those days. He also quotes a line from some Smṛti.[17] The commentary is written *Adhikaraṇa*-wise but is very lucid and complete in itself. In almost every case, the author refers to the views of others before giving his own. He sometimes differs from the old reading of some of the Sūtras and also in dividing the *Adhikaraṇas* after a particular Sūtra.[18]

In this fragmentary work of his we do not get any information as to his philosophical views. So that all our knowledge regarding this point is from other sources. Thus Çaṅkara Miçra[19] and Jayarāma Nyāyapañcānana[20] tell us that Candra holds that there are eleven *Padārthas* (categories), namely, *dravya* (substance), *guṇa* (attribute), *karman* (action), *sāmānya* (generality), *saṅkhyā* (number), *samavāya* (inherence), *sādṛçya* (resemblance), *çakti* (capacity) in common with others of the Prabhākara school, while *krama* (succession), *upakāra* (auxiliary) and *saṁskāra* (impression) as his own addition to the above mentioned eight categories.

[17] अन्त्यौपान्त्यौ त्रिभौ ज्ञेयौ फाल्गुनश्च त्रिभो मतः ।
शेषा मासास्त्रिभा ज्ञेयाः कार्त्तिकादिव्यवस्थयेति स्मृतेः—
—*Nyāyaratnākara* on II. 2. 52, MS. Fol. 55.

[18] Vide *Jaiminīya Sūtras*, II. 1. 38, 68.

[19] *Vādivinoda*, p. 53.

[20] *Nyāyasiddhāntamālā*, P. W. S. text No. 21, Pt. 2, p.

AN IRANIAN PRINCE OF THE PARTHIAN DYNASTY AS THE FIRST PROMULGATOR OF BUDDHISM IN CHINA

Late Shams-ul-Ulema DR. SIR JIVANJI JAMSHEDJI MODI.

Introduction.

Dr. Leo Wieger has recently published an excellent History of the Religious Beliefs of China in French and Mr. E. C. Werner has given us a good translation of it.[1] He has written it in the form of Lessons at the request of the Catholic Institute of Paris. The History is divided in four periods of which the third period treats of "Buddhism and Taoism," from the year 65 to the year 1000 A.C. During this period, in the second century after Christ, it was a Parthian prince, An-shihkao, who is said to have produced, for the first time, translations into Chinese of some Buddhist texts, and thus, to have been the first promulgator of Buddhism. The object of this paper is to determine who this Persian prince was and to give an account of what may have led him to Buddhism.

Early Relations between China and [Pe]rsia.

China was known to the Early Persians even of the Avesta times.[2] The relations between the two countries of those times may be taken as pre-historical. The first historical relations are said to have begun in 140 B.C. when "under the Han dynasty missions were

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[1] "A History of the Religious Beliefs and Philosophical Opinions in China from the beginning to the present time" by Dr. Leo Wieger, S. J. (1917). Translated by Edward Chalmers Werner (1927).

[2] Vide my paper "References to China in the Ancient Books of the Parsees," read at the International Congress held at Hanoi

despatched in every direction, and more than one of these penetrated as far as Parthia, which is termed An-Sih—the Chinese form of Arsaces as Kingsmill first pointed out. The Chinese description of Parthia is to the effect that rice, wheat, and the vine were cultivated, that the cities were walled and that it was a very great country."[3] Reference, moreover, is made to the use of silver coins bearing the effigy of the reigning monarch.

As said by Rev. Wigram, " The Chinese knew the Parthians, as men who coined silver money with the head of their King Al-Sak (Arsaces) upon it. They had mastered the art of writing, and so were not without some tincture of the civilization that is lawfully only the heritage of the Celestial Kingdom."[4] Again " The Parthians were received as allies by the Chinese Emperor in the East."[5]

Buddha, according to Dr. Rhys Davids, lived in the 5th Century B.C. and died, at the age of about 80 in 400 B.C. or a few years later.[6] The first pioneers of Buddhism in China were two monks. Emperor Ming of the second Han dynasty, having heard of the spread of Buddhism at Khotan and in its neighbourhood at the doors of China, wished to know something more of the religion and sent for some monks to explain the religion. Two went to China and were welcomed by the King who

The very first Pioneers of Buddhism in China.

(French China) in December 1902. *Vide* " Compte Rendus Analytique des Séances, Premier Congrès International des Études D'Extreme-Orient Hanoi (1902)," pp. 76-77. *Vide* my " Asiatic Papers," Part I, pp. 241 *et seq.*

[3] Lieut. Col. P. M. Sykes's History of Persia (1915), Vol. I, p. 265.

[4] " The Assyrians and their Neighbours " by Revd. Wigram, pp. 17-18.

[5] *Ibid.*, p. 17.

[6] Encyclopaedia Britannica, 9th Edition, Vol. IV.

caused to be built for them, in 67 A.C., " at the capital Lo-yang (now Honan Fu) the convent of the White Horse."[7] Both the Indian monks were of the Brahman caste. Both these monks died in China,—one Moteng or Matang at the end of 67 A.C., and the other Fa-lai (the Indian name, perhaps may be Dharma-araṇya) about 70 A.C. " There remains to us, from these two men, a single pamphlet, and four titles of lost works. They did not translate Indian treatises in their entirety, but set forth briefly the fundamental doctrines of Buddhism. And that, for obvious reasons. First, that was all that the emperor desired. He had caused them to come, not in order to make a thorough study of Buddhism, but to learn approximately what it was about. It is clear also that they were unable to acquire a very extensive knowledge of the Chinese language, during the short time they lived in China."[8] They, therefore, contented themselves by making a few summaries of (a) the account of the life of Buddha, (b) of the principles of Buddhism, (c) of a discourse of Buddha and (d) of the rules of ascetic life. These monks did no propaganda work. All the above summaries are said to have been lost. Only " a short exposition of Buddhist principles called ' *the Sūtra in 42 articles* ' has remained."

Then, for more than 70 years, no body went to China. Then " finally, in 148 (A.C.), there arrived at the Chinese Court a man, whose personality and work are of great interest."[9] This man was a Parthian prince, " an authentic Arsacide, who yielded the throne to his uncle, the younger brother of his father, became a Buddhist monk,

An Iranian Prince, the first promulgator of Buddhism.

[7] Dr. Wieger's History, *op. cit.*, p. 343.
[8] *Ibid.*, p. 343.
[9] *Ibid.*, p. 351.

for a long time led a wandering life, arrived at Lo-yang in 148, settled there and died there in 170. Some beings to whom he had done injury, pursued him, he said; and he predicted that he would die a violent death. In fact, one day, when he was interposing to stop a fight, a projectile thrown by chance struck his head, and killed him. He bore in China the name An-shihkao."[10] "An" in the name is a contraction of Arsace. The name means " he who had been great in the world."

Who was this Persian-Parthian prince An-shihkao?

Revd. Dr. Wieger says that this Parthian Prince An-shihkao was Parthamasiris or Psarmatossorim, the son of the Parthian King Pacorus II. He had not come to the throne of his father, but had become the king of Armenia. He had, under certain circumstances, to give up the throne of Armenia. This young prince, having met with misfortunes, seems to have renounced the world and become a monk. He came to India and thence went to China. The story of his life, as briefly described by Dr. Wieger, runs thus:—

" Pacorus II ascended the royal throne of the Parthians in A.D. 90. In 97, he had as successor, not his son, but his younger brother, whose name has been variously written by the authors, Osroes, Osdroes, Cosdroes, Chosroes (not to be confused with the Sassanide king of that name), and finally Corroes. This Corroes had as successor, in 134, his son Vologes II. Pacorus II had been the friend and ally of Decebalus, the famous king of the Dacians. He had an only son, Theodosius Minor says expressly. The name of this son was Parthamasiris according to Pausanias, Xiphilinus, Theodosius Minor, Capitolinus, S. Rufus; Psarmatossorim, according to Aelius Spartianus. Why did he

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[10] *Ibid.*

not succeed his father? Very probably, because he was too young. The times were unsettled. The enterprises of Decebalus caused Trajan to march against the Dacians in 101-102, and in 105, Corroes having afterwards made his nephew Parthamasiris King of Armenia, Trajan who considered Armenia as a dependency of Rome, marched against the Parthians and defeated them. At an interview at which he humiliated him as he pleased, he extorted from the young king the cession of Armenia, and then pretended that he wished to make him King of the Parthians in place of his uncle Corroes, but abandoned that project when he found that the Parthians held him in but slight estimation. In 114, near Susa, a Roman troop made a prisoner of Corroes's own daughter, who was sent to Rome as a hostage (Dion Cassius in Trajano). Trajan having died in 117, his successor Hadrian showed himself more tractable. Peace was at length concluded, and the daughter of Corroes, a hostage at Rome for sixteen years, was sent back to him in 130 (L. Aelius Sparthianus in Hadriano). Of Parthamasiris there is no further mention. If, as Theodosius Minor expressly states, Pacorus II had only one son, one must believe that this son Parthamasiris, and An-shihkao, are one and the same person. Where and when did he become a Buddhist and a monk? Probably after his misfortunes. It is credible that he avoided his uncle, to whom Trajan had wished to oppose him, and that he did not see his cousin who had returned from Rome. The Buddhist historians insinuate, without saying it clearly, that he went to India, and thence to China. He could have heard mention in Central India of the two monks who had formerly gone from there to the capital of China, and tried the adventure. Intelligent and a worker, he soon managed to make himself understood, and set himself to translate, with the aid of interpreters, Buddhist texts,

for the emperor. The Buddhist catalogues attribute to him 176 works, of which 55 still exist."[11]

The above identification of An-shihkao being the same as Parthamasiris is not supported by what we read in Lt. Col. Sykes's History of Persia. Sykes's account of the events in Persia is as follows:—Vologes I (Vulkhash of the Pahlavi books) had a war with the Romans, especially for the throne of Armenia, which the Romans claimed. He had appointed his brother Tiridates (Tirdad) on the throne of Armenia. The Romans under Nero (55—63 A.C.) opposed him. Vologes gave way because his hands were weakened by the rebellion of his son Vardanes. Three years later, having subdued his son, he again put Tiridates on the throne of Armenia. In the subsequent war, Tiridates was defeated, and peace was made on the term, that Tiridates may be put on the throne of Armenia which was known as the "cockpit of the Near East,"[12] as a tributary of Rome and that he was to receive the crown of Armenia at the hands of Nero in Rome. Tiridates did not go immediately to Rome, by sea-route as desired, having sacerdotal objection. But, a little later on, in 66 A.C., he went to Rome by land-route with an escort of 3000 horsemen. He was received with honour. The cost of his journey to Rome and back and the stay there, altogether a period of nine months, cost the Roman Empire £6000 a day, *i.e.*, the total expenses to the Roman Empire is said to have come to about (£6000 × 30 days × 9 months =) £1620000. Vologes died in 77 A.C. and was succeeded by his son Pacorus II. Pacorus died in 105 A.C. His reign was not a successful one. He was succeeded by Osroes, also

The story of the Prince as given by Western Historians.

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[11] Wieger's History, *op. cit.*, pp. 351—53.

[12] Sykes's History of Persia, Vol. I, p. 407.

spoken of by various authors as Osdroes, or Cosdroes or Chosroes or Corroes.[13] He ruled from 100 to 129.

Upon the death of his brother Tiridates in 100 A.C., Pacorus had placed on the throne of Armenia his son Assidares without any recognition by Rome. Emperor Trajan resented this. To win over Trajan, Osroes sent an Embassy to Rome with rich presents and a message, that Asirades, who was put on the throne of Armenia without the recognition of Rome, was recalled, and that Osroes would put on the throne of Armenia, with the recognition of Trajan, Parthamasiris, the only son of the late Parthian King Pacorus II. As Trajan "was burning to imitate the career of Alexander the Great, he declined the gifts and replied that on reaching Syria, he would do what was right."[14]

On reaching Antioch, Trajan had a letter from Parthamasiris, who wrote to him as the King of Armenia. Trajan gave no reply. So Parthamasiris (also spoken of by some writers as Psarmatossorim) wrote another submissive letter without calling himself "King of Armenia." Trajan replied to this letter, saying that he must receive the crown of Armenia at the hands of the Roman Emperor. When Trajan went to Armenia in the spring of 115, the Parthian Prince went to him and placed his crown at the feet of Trajan in expectation that he would immediately receive it back from the hands of Trajan. But no. Trajan not only deprived him of the crown, "but after his departure even stooped so low as to have him pursued and murdered. It is satisfactory to know that public opinion in Rome condemned this gross act of treachery."[15]

[13] Dr. Wieger's History of China, *op. cit.*, p. 351.

[14] Sykes's History of Persia, I, p. 411.


[15] Sykes's History of Persia, p. 411.

The above Vologes is the Vulkhash of the Pahlavi Dinkard. He is referred to in the Pahlavi Bahman Yasht.[16] There, a tree is referred to as having seven branches, which symbolized seven coming periods. They are the following:—(1) The Golden period when Zoroaster revealed his religion in the reign of Vishtasp. (2) The Silver period of Vohuman (Bahman), the son of Spenda-dad, also known as the Kayanian Ardashir. (3) The Brazen period of Ardashir Babagan the founder of the Sasanian dynasty. This includes the period of the time of King Shapur and the time of Adarbad (Marespand). (4) The Copper period in the time of the Askanian King. (5) Tin period of Behramgore. (6) The Steel period of the reign of Khosru Kobad (Noshirwan the Just). (7) Iron period ending with the millenium of Zoroaster.

The question is, why is the time of Vologes I (Vulkhash) taken by the predictionary writing of the Pahlavi Bahman Yasht as a critical time in the religious history of Iran? I think, that that was owing to the inroads of Buddhism in Iran. It was, as the result of this inroad, that the Iranian prince of his family turned a Buddhist and went even to China as a propagandist. The following table shows the relationship of Parthamasiris (the An-shihkao of the Chinese writers) to the other members of his family. The name, as we find it in Western writers, is not in its real Iranian form. It is a corruption. The proper Iranian name seemed to begin with Pahlava.

The Time of Vologes I is referred to as Critical in Parsee books possibly on account of the inroads of Buddhism.

[16] Chap. II, 19. S.B.E., Vol. V, p. 201.



The above referred to visit of Tiridates to Rome was "as a sop to Roman *amour propre*, the prince in question was allowed to pay a visit to Rome and receive a crown there :- -the sort of sham triumph that might appeal to Nero."[17]

The reference in the Chinese books to the figure of the Persian King on the Coins is significant, because the Parthians are said to have had an instinct as it were for king-worship or extreme reverence to the King. Rev. Wigram in his history of the Assyrians says "The instincts of the (Parthian) race seem to have been for king-worship, the head of the Arsacid house being regarded as personally semi-divine."[18] When the Parthians came into closer contact with the Magi, the latter led them to keep this view of king-worship within proper limits.

The significance of the Royal Head on the Coin.

From this brief survey, we see that it was a Persian prince, who first promulgated Buddhism in China. His western name was Parthamasiris. His exact Iranian

[17] The Assyrians and their Neighbours by Rev. W. A. Wigram, (1929), p. 22.

[18] The Assyrians and their Neighbours by Rev. W. A. Wigram (1929), p. 32.

name is not known but it seems to be something like Pahlavasara.

The Renaissance in the time of Vologeses (Vulkhash) requires to be explained. It seems that by the time of his reign Buddhism had arrived at the gates of Persia and had even entered it here and there. The conversion of the above referred to Parthian prince to Buddhism, seems to have been the result of this entry. So, to protect the people against its entry, the house had to be set in order, and it seems, therefore, that Vologeses or Vulkhash made such an attempt to set the house in order, and tried to help the Renaissance of Zoroastrianism begun by Ardashir Babagan.

The Iranian Renaissance in the time of Vologeses (Vulkhash), perhaps, aimed against Buddhism.

GOTAMA ON THE PROBLEM OF VALIDITY

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The problem of the ultimate basis of proof which is still in the region of unsettled controversy is undoubtedly the most basic problem of epistemology. As is well-known, it has been the subject of an age-long controversy in Indian philosophy as well where it led to the formulation of a number of warring theories that are roughly classified under four heads in the well-known verses quoted by Āchārya Mādhava, in his Sarva-Darśana-Saṅgraha. Of these, the most important logical issues are involved in the controversy between the Naiyāyika theory of *parataḥprāmāṇya* and the Mīmāṁsā doctrine of *svataḥprāmāṇya*. Yet, on a closer scrutiny, it may perhaps appear that the barrier which has obstinately separated the disputants for centuries is deplorably transparent, or it has at least lost a good part of its opacity during the battle.

Gotama formulates the problem in the form of a dilemma. The validity of a particular cognition is either self-established or it stands in need of an external justification. In either case it leads to difficulties. If the validity of the cognitions is to be established *ab extra*, we are inevitably led to the awkward *regressus ad infinitum* or *anavasthā*. On the other hand, if they are to be accepted as possessing an intuitive certainty, we are thrown on the other horn of the dilemma, and then it would be idle to insist on the need of proof even in the case of objects of cognition. In other words, the first alternative would make the process of logical justification impossible, for, that which is advanced in support of the validity of the

cognitions must itself show its logical credentials by reference to something other than itself and this process must continue *ad infinitum*. The second alternative, on the other hand, would make the logical process redundant, for, if the validity of the cognitions be accepted without a logical proof, there is no reason why the process of proof should be thought to be indispensable for establishing the reality of the objects or prameyas.

(प्रमाणतः सिद्धेः प्रमाणानां प्रमाणान्तरसिद्धिप्रसङ्गः तद्विनिवृत्तेर्वा प्रमाणसिद्धिवत् प्रमेयसिद्धिः—2. 1. 17-18)

Gotama's own reply is that the only way out of this logical *impasse* is to recognise clearly that the validity of the cognitions is established much in the same way as that of the lamp-light. (न, प्रदीप प्रकाशसिद्धिवत् तत्सिद्धेः, 2. 1. 19)

This reply, for a man unsophisticated by party prejudices and unaffected by the battle-cries of the fighting armies, would be very plain. Gotama here seeks to steer clear of the two horns of the dilemma. None can deny, and Gotama the least, the necessity of logical justification at least in certain cases, in so far as he admits the facts of erroneous perception and fallacious inferences. On the other hand, logic would render but poor service to the cause of knowledge and truth if every logical demonstration had to remain incomplete despite all that could possibly be done by the most careful logician. But these difficulties do not exist for one who could see clearly that though nothing can be accepted dogmatically without sufficient reason, yet in the ultimate analysis knowledge cannot be criticised *ab extra*, much as the lamp-light which reveals the things need not itself be revealed by something other than itself. Put thus, Gotama's position comes perilously near the Mīmāṁsā view of *svataḥ-prāmāṇya*; and in fact this plain interpretation has been accepted by a number of ancient thinkers who are referred to by Uddyotakara and Vāchaspati Miśra.

(ये तु प्रदीपप्रकाशो यथा न प्रकाशान्तरमपेक्षते, एवं प्रमाणान्तरमनपेक्षमाणान्यपि सन्ति भविष्यन्ति इत्याचार्य्यदेशीया मन्यते—Tātparyaṭīkā p. 256, Viz. ed.).

Gotama's commentators, however, for reasons best known to themselves, have found the plain interpretation to be too big to swallow. And in their zeal for the slogan of *parataḥ-prāmāṇya* they have evidently forced Gotama to say what perhaps he had never intended to say; and the consequence is that the real difficulties of the problem as stated by the original philosopher are not infrequently flung to the winds. Gotama's problem is evidently one of validity, but it is overshadowed in the commentaries by discussions on the problem of the psychological conditions of knowledge, while the real question is handled in a summary fashion that is as unsatisfactory as it is incomplete. Thus, Vātsyāyana, for instance, thinks that what Gotama actually intended to convey by his reply is that no knowledge is intuitively certain but stands in need of proof by reference to another cognition, much as the lamp-light which is the indispensable psychological condition of perceptual knowledge has itself to be perceived by the visual sense-organ.

(यथा प्रदीपप्रकाशः प्रत्यक्षाङ्गत्वात् दृश्यदर्शने प्रमाणम्, स च प्रत्यक्षान्तरेण चक्षुषः सन्निकर्षेण गृह्यते—Bhāṣya on 2. 1. 19).

Then arises a host of psychological problems about the possibility of the cognition of cognitions and about the sufficiency of a bare instance, such as the lamp-light, for establishing a conclusion without the necessity of a general proposition or *vyāpti*, and so on. And the immediate purpose of the commentators after Vātsyāyana reduces itself to patching up the gaps in the arguments of the latter rather than coming to a closer grip with the problem of Gotama. But how do they reconcile the theory of *parataḥprāmāṇya* with their anti-dogmatic attitude? Is it possible to avoid the *regressus ad infinitum* while

sticking to the belief that every thing or object must be proved by the four-fold source of knowledge and that no knowledge is intuitively certain? The real problem is only pushed back when Vātsyāyana argues that the validity of a given perception is established by another perception, and not by another type of cognition or entirely without any proof.

(सेयं प्रत्यक्षादिभिरेव प्रत्यक्षादीनां यथादर्शनमुपलब्धिर्न प्रमाणान्तरतो न च प्रमाणमन्तरेण निःसाधनेति Bhāṣya on 2. 1. 2. 1. 19)
For, even if it be granted that a given perception is established by another perception and not by a cognition belonging to a heterogeneous class, that does not show how the process of proof can be completed if the series is once started. In fact the logical difficulty arising out of an infinite series remains intact in either case. Probably the weakness of this argument is realised by the Naiyāyikas themselves, and hence they proceed at this point to give a new turn to their contentions. The *anavasthā* can be easily terminated, they contend, if we remember that though in certain cases the knowledge of pramāṇa is necessary in order to arrive at the knowledge of the prameya, yet this is not a universal rule; for the cases are not rare in which the knowledge of the prameya does not presuppose a knowledge of the pramāṇa. The fatal *regressus* would be inevitable only if the knowledge of the prameya had been always conditioned by a knowledge of the pramāṇa.

Now, this line of argument seems to be a sophistical side-tracking of the real issue. When the question at issue is how the *anavasthādoṣa* should be removed from a position that insists on the necessity of establishing the validity of a given knowledge by another knowledge, it is practically no answer to say that in some cases the validity of a knowledge is established without a consciousness of the validating reason. It must at least be granted that

even here there does not exist the validating process but as no process can *ex hypothesi* be true in its own right it must hang on another process and that on another, and so on *ad infinitum*. So the *anavasthā* is not affected by the consciousness or the unconsciousness of the pramāṇa. It is not easy to understand why even such a careful logician as Vāchaspati Miśra did not hesitate to lean upon a such a broken reed.

It is, however, interesting to note that despite the apparent ingenuity with which these arguments are developed by the Naiyāyikas, they do not stop here but proceed to explore new lines of defence. And it is only then and not before that they show signs of earnest fighters and cease to play fast and loose with their opponents. And the result is that they either admit a defeat or adopt the ways of ordinary common-sense people, *i.e.*, it is either admitted that all knowledge is not to be established externally, or they content themselves with the pragmatic answer that that knowledge is valid which leads to a successful activity. It is rather incomprehensible why such an elaborate arrangement of dialectical weapons should have been thought to be necessary if such a fate had awaited the whole fight. To admit the necessity of even a single case of intuitive knowledge is to give the doctrine of *parataḥprāmāṇya* a decent burial, yet the admission is unequivocally made by no less a logician than Vāchaspati Miśra. On the other hand, the pragmatic test of pravṛittisāmarthya is admittedly not a universal test of knowledge. Even if it be granted that the truth-value of my perception of water is established when the perceived water quenches my thirst, this pragmatic test is hopelessly inadequate to establish, for instance, the validity of the inference by which I know the reality of the sense-organs; much less does it help us when we are concerned with the validity of a scientific theory or a law

of thought. It is true that for the practical transactions of our daily life, as argued by Vātsyāyana, it is enough to have a clear consciousness of the things and the immediately preceding pramāṇa, or, as it is often put, *vyavasāya* and *anuvyavasāya*; but to think further that what is competent to regulate practical life is equally competent to remove a theoretical perplexity is to discredit philosophy in general. In fact the *anavasthā* is a purely theoretical difficulty, and this remains unsolved if it is said that न चास्ति व्यवहारान्तरमनवस्थासाधनीयं येन प्रयुक्तोऽनवस्थामुपाददीतेति.

It seems impossible to conceive of a clearer admission that the problem is insoluble and that the *anavasthā* is ingrained in the doctrine of *paratahprāmāṇya*.

Even this brief consideration of some of the outstanding arguments of Gotama's commentators should be sufficient to make one pause before reading the theory of *paratahprāmāṇya* into the Sūtras. To do so would be, to say the least, to show scant respect to the dialectical insight of Gotama. In default of any very cogent evidence to the contrary, we contend, therefore, that the theory has been wrongly foisted on him by his commentators. It follows from our contention that the so-called Sūtra, *viz.*, क्वचिन्निवृत्तिदर्शनादनिवृत्तिदर्शनाच्च क्वचिदनेकान्तः—2. 1. 20. is in reality a link in the argument of Vātsyāyana and not an aphorism of Gotama, and here Viśvanātha is right over against Vāchaspati who ascribes it to Gotama in his Nyāyasūchīnibandha. For, it is evidently inconsistent with the preceding Sūtras when the latter are interpreted plainly and directly.

YĀJÑAVALKYA AND THE PHILOSOPHY OF FICTIONS

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The propriety of the theme.

1. It is fortunate that the present writer should have found a topic, namely one dealing with the philosophy of Yājñavalkya, as a topic peculiarly fitted to go in the commemoration volume in honour of Dr. Ganganatha Jha. The life and work of Dr. Ganganatha Jha remind us of the sage Yājñavalkya at every stage. Like Yājñavalkya, Dr. Ganganatha Jha hails from Mithilā, and like Yājñavalkya, he is an Advaitin. Any one who might have read his recent lectures on Advaita philosophy delivered at Baroda might find how much justification there is in calling Dr. Jha a present-day representative of the philosophy of Yājñavalkya.

A short résumé of the philosophical teachings of Yājñavalkya.

2. It would not be improper here to go into a very short résumé of the philosophical teachings of this great ancient Maithila Philosopher, the philosopher of the Bṛihadāraṇyakopanishad, Yājñavalkya. For a full account of his personality and teachings, the reader may be referred to the present writer's "*Constructive Survey of Upanishadic Philosophy*," pp. 19—21, and 55—59. In order, however, to understand the full significance of Yājñavalkya's philosophy of Fictions, which is the topic of the present essay and which has been scarcely dealt with in that volume, it would just be well to begin by noticing a few points of his philosophy to serve as a background for the picture of his fictionalistic philosophy. We know how Yājñavalkya regards the Ātman as both

the ontological substratum of all existence, as well as the epistemological nucleus of all knowledge.[1] He is the *fons et origo* of all existence, and is also the source to whom all perceptions are to be referred. Another way of stating his ontological doctrine is his very characteristic theory of Emanations. This involves, that the only reality in the world belongs to the Ātman, everything else being merely derivative, and a fatuity (Ārta).[2] From the heights of his Advaitic philosophy, as has been pointed out in the "*Constructive Survey*," Yājñavalkya is led even to regard Transmigration as unreal; for as the Soul is eternal, from what would it transmigrate, and to what?[3] Also we know, how he regards consciousness itself, from the purely philosophic point of view, as a fleeting phenomenon.[4] This however, does not prevent him from regarding the Ātman as νόησες νοήσεως the eternal self-spectator,[5] the only reality in a world of phantoms.

Yājñavalkya's use of the word 'Iva' to enunciate a philosophy of Fictions.

3. The passage in which Yājñavalkya's philosophy of Fictions comes out particularly is the celebrated one from the second chapter of the Brihadāraṇyakopanishad, 4th *Brāhmaṇa*, which runs as follows :—

यत्र हि द्वैतमिव भवति तदितर इतरं जिघ्रति, तदितर इतरं पश्यति, तदितर इतरꣳ शृणोति, तदितर इतरमभिवदति, तदितर इतरं मनुते, तदितर इतरं जानाति, यत्र वा अस्य सर्वमात्मैवाभूत्तत्केन कं जिघ्रेत्तत्केन कं पश्येत्तत्केन कꣳ शृणुयात्तत्केन कमभिवदेत्तत्केन कं मन्वीत तत् केन कं विजानीयात्। येनेदꣳ सर्वं विजानाति तं केन विजानीयाद्विज्ञातारमरे केन विजानीयात् ॥१४॥

Yājñavalkya is telling his wife Maitreyī that it is only where there is an as-it-were duality, that one is able to

[1] Brih. II. 4. 11.

[2] Brih. III. 4. 2, and III. 5. 1.

[3] Brih. II. 4. 13.

[4] Brih. II. 4. 12.

[5] Brih. IV. 3, 1—6.

see another, to hear another, to smell another, to know another; but where, to the realiser, the whole world is the Ātman, by what and what could he perceive, by what and what could he think, by what and what could he hear? How could he know the Knower who knows all things? This passage has got an eschatological context no doubt, because Yājñavalkya is having a conversation with his wife Maitreyī in regard to departing consciousness, but it could as well be extended to the epistemological sphere. Just before this passage, Yājñavalkya had almost confounded Maitreyī by telling her that after death it seemed as if consciousness was itself lost. Maitreyī felt perplexed and asked him how this came to pass. Yājñavalkya hastily excused himself from answering the question by saying that sufficient unto the day was the wisdom thereof,[6] and then, as if by a tangent, gave out his great fictionalistic doctrine which is couched in the passage above referred to. Yājñavalkya tells us that because all perception, audition, thought, imagination, and so forth, take place only when there is as-it-were an "other," in the absence of such an "other" such acts of perception and the rest would be impossible altogether. Hence, Yājñavalkya's philosophy requires that there must be an as-it-were, a semblant duality, before any psychological act like that of perception or thinking becomes possible. But experience shows that this "other" is of an unenduring and perishable character. Hence, we have to conclude that for the epistemological act, the duality presented must be only an as-it-were duality, and not a real duality at all: it is only as-if there was an "other," pitted against the "one." The object is a non-ent, if taken away from the subject; it is only the One that exists. This is what we might call the nucleus of Yājñavalkya's philosophy of fictions.

[6] Brih. II. 4. 13.

4. In regard to the position thus reached there are two further points worthy of note. In the first place, the philosophy of fictions is connected with the impossibility of making the Knower the object of knowledge. He, who is the supreme knower of all things, how is it possible for him to be known? This is the first chief strand in Yājñavalkya's epistemological doctrine. Another is the modification which Yājñavalkya later[7] introduces in the same Upanishad, wherein he relieves his original absolutistic solipsism by granting that when it is said that we do not know any other object, in fact, we know it and yet know it not. We see and see it not; we hear and hear it not; and so forth. Hence, the original philosophy of fictions which threw a doubt upon the existence of objective reality by making it only an appearance has later to be modified by the recognition that to objective existence some sort of reality may be granted for psychological purposes; this is possible because, says Yājñavalkya, the instruments of perception, namely the organs of sense, do not cease to function. Hence, because, the energies of the senses remain in the act of perception, we must grant that there must be some sort of existence for psychological purposes; but as the only real existence for all ontological purposes could be the Ātman, the external reality that we are talking about must be of the nature of a mere fiction or an appearance.

Two further points worthy of notice.

5. This is the outcome of understanding the full implication of the particle '*iva*' in the passage of the Bṛihadāraṇyakopanishad which is the main topic of the present essay. Let us see how the passage originally quoted is interpreted by the three great commentators on the Upanishad, Śaṅkara, Raṅga-rāmānuja, and

Different interpretations of the Yājñavalkyan dictum.

[7] Bṛih. IV. 3. 23—30.

Madhva. The passage has, as we have pointed out above, an eschatological context no doubt, as it comes immediately after the exclamation of Yājñavalkya to Maitreyī that there may be no consciousness after death. But it is not necessary to restrict it to the eschatological universe of discourse. The question of Ātman, according to Yājñavalkya, could be discussed not merely from an eschatological point of view, but even legitimately from an epistemological point of view. Śaṅkara recognises this, and tells us that two states of knowledge could be conceivably imagined, one the state of Vidyā, and the other the state of Avidyā. In the state of Vidyā there is absolutely no existent outside the Ātman; but in the state of Avidyā we might suppose that there is a "heteros" apart from the perceiving subject. But this "heteros," says Śaṅkara, is only of a fictional character :—

यत्र यस्मिन्नविद्याकल्पिते कार्यकरणसंघातोपाधिजनिते विशेषात्मनि खिल्यभावे, हि यस्मात् द्वैतमिव परमार्थतोऽद्वैते ब्रह्मणि द्वैतमिव भिन्नमिव वस्त्वंतरमात्मन उपलक्ष्यते.........इतरो घ्राता इतरेण घ्राणेनेतरं घ्रातव्यं जिघ्रति तथा । सर्वं पूर्ववत् । इयमविद्यावदवस्था । यत्र तु ब्रह्मविद्ययाऽविद्या नाशमुपगमिता तत्र आत्मव्यतिरेकेणान्यस्याभावः । यत्र वा अस्य ब्रह्मविदः सर्वं नामरूपाद्यात्मन्येव प्रविलापितमात्मैव संवृत्तं, यत्र एवमात्मैवाभूत्तत्र केन करणेन कं घ्रातव्यं को जिघ्रेत् ? तथा पश्येद्विजानीयात् ।

Hence, Śaṅkara concludes that real knowledge is knowledge where the trinity of the perceived, the perceiver, and the perception vanishes :—

तस्मात्परमार्थात्मैकत्वप्रत्यये क्रियाकारकफलप्रत्ययानुपपत्तिः । अतो विरोधाद् ब्रह्मविदः क्रियाणां तत्साधनानां चात्यंतमेव निवृत्तिः ।...... ... केनचित् कथंचित्कश्चित्कथंचिन्न जिघ्रेदेवेत्यर्थः ।

Raṅga-rāmānuja agrees with Śaṅkara that the passage need not be interpreted merely from an eschatological point of view, but he tells us that the particle '*iva*' may

be understood as implying the inconceivability of the independence of external reality :—

एवं मुक्तौ देहात्मभ्रमनिवृत्तिमुक्त्वा स्वनिघ्नता भ्रमनिवृत्तिं प्रतिपादयति। यत्र हि द्वैतमिव भवति तदितर इतरं जिघ्रति। यत्र यस्यामवस्थायां द्वैतमिव भवति स्वनिघ्नतया परमात्मनः पृथगिव भवति स्वतन्त्र इव भवतीति यावत्। स्वातन्त्र्यस्याप्रामाणिकत्वद्योतनार्थं इवशब्दः।

He furthermore tells us that it is only when the individual soul receives grace from the Paramātman that he is able to know all things, or even the Paramātman himself :—

येन परमात्मना प्रसन्नेनानुगृहीतः सर्वज्ञो भवति।..... परमात्मप्रसादमन्तरेण परमात्मा दुःखबोध इत्यर्थः।

Madhva, on the other hand, restricts the passage to the eschatological sphere, substitutes the concept of positive dependence for Raṅga-rāmānuja's inconceivability of independence, and tells us that it is impossible to know God Hari, a personal Being, through whom the individual soul knows all things :—

इवशब्दः पारतन्त्र्यार्थः।.....। यत्र यदि मुक्तौ अस्य ज्ञानिनः सर्वं करणादिकमात्मैवाभूत्। स्वव्यतिरेकेण किमपि नासीत्। तर्हि केन करणेन किं जिघ्रेदित्यादि ध्येयं गन्धादिविषयभोगो न स्यादित्यर्थः। येनेश्वरेण इदं सर्वं जीवो विजानाति तं हरिं केन विजानीयात् तज्ज्ञानं च न स्यादित्यर्थः।

We thus see from a review of the different expositions of the Yājñavalkyan dictum how the particle '*iva*' has been interpreted in different senses by the three great commentators: by Śaṅkara, as implying a theory of semblance; by Raṅga-rāmānuja, as designating the inconceivability of the independence of external reality; and by Madhva, as implying the positive dependence of reality upon a personal being.

6. A justification for the way in which Śaṅkara has tried to interpret the Yājñavalkyan dictum comes from an altogether unexpected quarter, the philologico-philosophical. Vaihinger, an acute German philosopher, pointed out some years ago that exactly analogical expressions were used to designate the fictitious character of reality in the four chief European languages. We have, for example, the *quasi* in Latin, *comme si* in French, ὡς εἰ in Greek, and *als ob* in German, from which last, Vaihinger christens his philosophy. It is unfortunate that Vaihinger did not know the use of the particle '*iva*' in Sanskrit exactly on the same lines as the above usages. It would have been a matter of great interest to Vaihinger to note in the passage of Yājñavalkya, which we have above quoted, that the particle '*iva*' is used exactly in the same sense in which *als ob* is used in German. As we shall see a little later, by reference to certain passages from Kant, as well as to Vaihinger's philosophy of fictions, there is no escape from or no alternative to, interpreting Yājñavalkya's dictum in a like fictional manner.

A justification for a fictionalistic interpretation from an altogether new quarter.

7. In his work "*Die Philosophie des Als Ob*," which was first penned in 1876, but which for various reasons, could not see the light of day till some years later, Vaihinger, while illustrating his philosophy of fictions, draws upon the various works of Kant to show how he first received the inspiration for his fictionalism from Kant. Kant to Vaihinger was a great luminous orb, at which he could light his own philosophical torch. By reference to the different works of Kant, Vaihinger points out that the only real interpretation of Kant is a fictional interpretation. It is neither an idealistic, nor

The inspiration to Vaihinger's fictionalism in the philosophy of Kant.

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[8] Vaihinger, *The Philosophy of 'As If,'* P. 91.

a rational, nor an empirical, nor a properly critical interpretation, which, according to him, would give the real explanation of the philosophy of Kant. This, according to him, must be explained only from the fictional point of view. Kant's belief in the dual world of *noumena* and *phenomena* supplies us with the basis wherein to seek the roots of the fictionalistic philosophy. When Kant tells us that we must suppose " as if " there is a Creative Reason in the world,[9] when he tells us that the will must be regarded " as if " free even though we cannot say anything about it from the phenomenal point of view,[10] when he says that each man should behave " as if " he were a member of the kingdom of ends, a kingdom which represents the idea of a complete totality of ends combined in a system,[11] when he says that we should regard the Moral Law as sacred " as if " it were a Divine Commandment,[12] when, finally, in the Critique of Judgment he tells us that we must suppose " as if " there was a Perceptive Intelligence for which there would exist no contingency for adapting particular laws of nature to the understanding,[13] we see how Vaihinger wants to stress the purely fictionalistic trend running throughout the Critiques of Kant. It was this philosophy, he tells us, which was his primary inspiration for fictionalism. We may see likewise how Yājñavalkya's philosophy of '*iva*' exactly corresponds with such a fictionalistic interpretation. Though there is no actual "heteros," we have heard Yājñavalkya tell us that we must suppose " as if " there was one for the different processes of perception;

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[9] Vaihinger, *The Philosophy of 'As If,'* p. 280.

[10] *Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten*, quoted in Vaihinger, *The Philosophy of 'As If,'* p. 289.

[11] Watson, *Selections from Kant*, p. 248.

[12] Vaihinger, *The Philosophy of 'As If,'* p. 312.

[13] Watson, *Selections from Kant*, p. 339.

how, in fact, the Ātman is to be regarded as the sole reality, while all other things are merely " ficta."

The Nature and Illustrations of Fiction.

8. The question arises what is the nature of these fictions? Vaihinger has taken great pains to discriminate the nature of these fictions. He tells us that a fiction is a conscious and unreal assumption[14] made for practical purposes. It differs from a hypothesis,[15] inasmuch as a hypothesis can be verified, but a fiction can never be verified. Hence, even though a fiction is a conscious assumption like a hypothesis, it is unreal because it cannot be verified, while a hypothesis may be real because it is capable of verification. All scientific discoveries are made of hypotheses; but fictions do not enable us to make discoveries. All the human sciences are replete with illustrations of such fictions. Mathematics, Physics, Logic, Ethics, Metaphysics, Religion, in fact, all sciences are infected with ficta.[16] All the sciences take certain unreal assumptions for granted, and weave their superstructures thereon. The nature of the sciences themselves is as fictitious as the assumptions which they make. Vaihinger points out how the concept of a point in mathematics and of an atom in physics is a fiction : there is nothing in reality to correspond either to a point or to an atom. Concepts and judgments, individuals and universals, are equally fictitious. The syllogism of Logic is evidently a fiction. Matter and Mind are fictions. The monad, which is so much talked about in philosophy, is of a fictitious character. The Divine Right of Kings is a fiction. The War of All against All, upon which Hobbes dilated, is also

[14] Vaihinger, *The Philosophy of ' As If,'* Autobiographical Introduction, p. xlii.

[15] Vaihinger, *The Philosophy of ' As If,'* Autobiographical Introduction, p. xlii.

[16] Robinson, *Anthology of Recent Philosophy,* p. 588.

fictitious. The Absolute, which is regarded as the highest notion of philosophy, is of the nature of fiction. Value and End are fictions likewise. Infinites and infinitesimals equally share in the nature of fiction. All averages, all types, all symbols are fictitious in character. All categories, all concepts like Duty and God, are equally well fictions. Thus, says Vaihinger, all Logics and Epistemologies, all Metaphysics and Ethics, all Mathematics and Physics, in fact all sciences are infected with ficta. These are conscious errors made only for "practical" purposes. In the latter point he agrees with Pragmatism,[17] but he differs from Pragmatism in his conception of Double Truth,[18] about which presently.

The relation of Fictionalism with Sensationalism and Ātmanism.

9. It is needless to say that if Yājñavalkya had lived in these days, he would have given us the very expressions which Vaihinger has used as illustrations of the philosophy of fiction from the various sciences. Yājñavalkya concerned himself only with the subject-object relation in the various psychological processes, and told us that the subject alone was real, while the object was of a fictitious character. There is, however, one important difference between the fictionalism of Vaihinger and the fictionalism of Yājñavalkya. While Vaihinger's fictionalism is sensationalistic,[19] Yājñavalkya's fictionalism is Ātmanic. When Vaihinger was asked as to what remained when all his facts became fictions, and when the challenge was thrown at him that all ficta thus become facts *optimi juris*,[20] Vaihinger retorted by saying that there were two entities about the reality of which we

[17] Vaihinger, *The Philosophy of 'As If,'* Preface to the English Edition, p. viii.

[18] Robinson, *Anthology of Recent Philosophy*, p. 595.

[19] Robinson, *Anthology of Recent Philosophy*, p. 590.

[20] F. C. S. Schiller, *Mind* N. S., Vol. XXI, pp. 99-100.

might say we were certain, namely, the flux of sensations, and the laws of identity and contradiction.[21] Now, every psychologist tells us that a bare sensation[22] is a mere fiction. What, then, would prevent us from saying, when Vaihinger tells us that the "flux" of "sensations" is the ultimate reality, that he is dealing with a double instead of a single fiction? The "change" as well as the "sensations" are fictions, and hence the flux of sensations must be a double fiction. This is not so with Yājñavalkya's Ātmanic experience, where the eternal Knower is the *fons et origo* of existence, as of all experience. Thus, even though Vaihinger posits a double truth like Yājñavalkya, there is an important difference between the two. Vaihinger's double truth consists, as he elsewhere inconsistently puts it, of the world of matter and the world of consciousness.[23] It is this very conception of "double truth" in Vaihinger which the Pragmatists were concerned to refute. The Pragmatists only say that truth is successful error, and error is unsuccessful truth. Thus all truths, according to them, are some kind of error and all errors some kind of truth. To Vaihinger, there is a double reality. On the other hand, to Yājñavalkya reality consists of a lower and a higher kind, the lower being the world of human experience, and the higher the world of Ātmanic experience. This double truth of human and Ātmanic experience, of Avidyā and Vidyā, corresponds closely to the phenomenal and the noumenal of Kant. Kant has thus far greater linkage with Yājñavalkya in the matter of this doctrine of double truth than Vaihinger can ever have. Vaihinger's fic-

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[21] F. C. S. Schiller, *Mind* N. S., Vol. XXI, p. 96.

[22] Cf., *e.g.*, James, *Text-book of Psychology*, p. 13.

[23] Vaihinger, *The Philosophy of 'As If,'* Autobiographical Introduction, p. xliv.

[24] Schiller, *Mind* N. S., Vol. XXI, p. 103.

tionalism is sensationalism gone mad and become inconsistent, while Yājñavalkya's fictionalism is based upon the rock of Ātmanic experience. Both are fictionalisms no doubt, but the one is a sensationalistic fictionalism, while the other is an Ātmanic one. There is as little similarity and as much difference between the fictionalism of Vaihinger and the fictionalism of Yājñavalkya as between Dog and God, the same alphabets no doubt, but the one an absolute anti-type of the other.

HENRY LORD AND HIS DISCOVERIE OF THE BANIANS

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The Court Minutes of the East-India Company,[1] under date January 7, 1624, record: "Messrs. Lord, Benson, and Morehouse present their services as preachers into the Indies, the Court having particular recommendation of Mr. Lord from Dean White,[2] under whom he served as curate, and from Mr. Shute[3] and others; entertained him at £60 per annum; he is to give bond not to exercise any private trade,[4] and appointed to preach on Sunday sennight at Great St. Helens[5] and to take for his text, 'Have no fellowship with the works of darkness, but rather reprove them'." On January 16 there is another record: "Mr. Lord, lately entertained to go a preacher, having given testimony of his sufficiency by a sermon preached at St. Helens, to have £20 to buy him books, and two months pay by way of imprest." Again

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[1] Calendar of State Papers, Colonial, 1622—24, pp. 229—232, and 240.

[2] Francis White, Dean of Carlisle, afterwards Bishop of Carlisle, Norwich, and Ely. The record of Lord's curacy under him has not been traced. ([S.] *see* concluding footnote).

[3] Josias Shute, Rector of St. Mary's Woolnoth, Lombard Street, 1611—1643, who acted as Chaplain to the East-India Company from 1632. [S.]

[4] For an account of the early chaplains appointed as preachers into the Indies and the terms of their employment *see* the first chapter of the Rev. Frank Penny's *The Church in Madras* (3 Vols., *London*, 1904).

[5] The trial sermons were preached in this Church from 1621, when the Company's offices were moved to Crosby Hall which was in the Parish of Great St. Helen's, Bishopsgate. The church survived the fire of London; but the present pulpit, which is figured in Penny's work, is dated 1633, and is therefore not the one from which Lord preached. (Penny, *op. cit.*, p. 2.)

on January 28: 'Request of Mr. Lord, the preacher, to be allowed a boy to attend him the voyage; was told he might make choice of sundry boys already shipped, whom he shall find appareled to his hand, and when he came in the country he may take liking of some Indian boy, as others of his profession have done before him, with which answer he rested satisfied." Lord's career before he presented his services as a preacher into the Indies has not been traced,[6] but Factory records make references to him after his arrival in India. He sailed in Weddell's fleet, which left the Downs on March 28, 1624.[7] In a letter of November 1625 we read: "'Padre' Lord, Mr. Young, and Mr. Woolhouse are to return to England in the *James*." The *James* was to return to England in February, 1626. But a letter of December 23, 1625, states that "Kerridge refused Lord permission to go, saying, 'hee would not have it reported that a padre should forsake India for such slight matters'." Lord had had some difference with members of the Council, but the President, Kerridge, reconciled them, 'and so he still stayeth.' How long did he stay? In the French translation[8] of Lord's

[6] The writer in the *Dictionary of National Biography* (Vol. xxxiv, p. 134) identifies him with a Henry Lord who figures in the records of Oxford University as having been born in Oxfordshire in 1563 and having matriculated from Magdalen Hall in 1580. Magdalen Hall passed through many vicissitudes, in the course of which its records were lost, as I am informed by the courtesy of the Librarian of Hertford College, its present representative. The identification of this Lord with the author of the *Discoverie of the Banians* is very unconvincing, for the reason that he would have been sixty-one in 1624. It is improbable *a priori* that a man of this age would have been sent to India; thirty is the average age, on first appointment, of six preachers whose birth-dates are calculable, among those mentioned by Penny (*op. cit.*, chapter I) as appointed between 1607 and 1621. On this point *see* also the concluding foot-note, *infra*.

[7] For this and the references to Lord in the Factory letters I am indebted to Sir William Foster's *English Factories in India*, volume 1624—1629, pp. 103 and foot-note, and 114.

[8] *Paris*, 1667.

two tracts it is said that he applied himself to getting a thorough understanding of the beliefs of the people during his eighteen years' residence in Surat. This statement has misled a later writer[9] but is plainly wrong. Lord's book was published in 1630, five years after his first arrival in Surat. Lord himself, in the second Epistle Dedicatorie[10] prefixed to the *Discoverie*, says: "I hope it hath crost the Aequinoctiall and the Tropicks happily to come to your hands, amongst other newes from the for-raigne parts of India", which implies that the manus-cript was sent to England before he left India. But he must himself have returned to England not long after-wards,[11] for the engraved title to his publication describes him as 'sometimes resident in East India.'

In his Introduction Lord says that some of his pre-decessors had been "scrutinous to bring this religion to light" but had been deterred, and that "the Président, Mr. Thomas Kerridge, was urgent with me to redeeme their omissions." Therefore, says he, "I . . . essayed to fetch materials for the same out of their manuscripts, and by renewed accesse, with the help of Interpreters, made by collections out of a booke of theirs called the SHASTER, which is to them as their Bible, contain-ing the grounds of their Religion in a written word."

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[9] Anderson assumes that Lord was transferred from the ships to Surat in 1616 (Philip Anderson. *The English in Western India. London*, 1856, pp. 51—3). [S.]

[10] "To the Honourable and Worthy Knight, Sr. Maurice Abbot, Governor of the Companie of Merchants trading to the East Indies: Christopher Cletherow Alderman of the City of London, and Deputie of the said Company, and to all the worthy Adventurers, Members of the same Society." Sir Maurice Abbot was a brother of George Abbot, Archbishop of Canterbury (1610—1633), to whom Lord addressed the first of his two dedicatory epistles.

[11] The absence of references to Lord's return to England is explained by the loss of the *Court Minutes* from July 1629 to July 1632, and of the Surat *Consultations* and *Letters* from 1628 to 1635. [S.]

There is no reason to suppose that Lord had any knowledge of Indian languages.[12] Like Abraham Roger[13] twenty years later, he must have depended entirely upon Indian informants, who would seem (in Lord's case) to have been Nāgar Brahmans. Kerridge, he says, "interested himselfe in the worke by mediating my acquaintance with the *Bramanes*: whose eminence of place was an attractive to draw on this discovery." In other words Kerridge, as President, used his influence to induce these Brahmans to 'discover' to Lord the teachings of the *śāstras*. The introduction to the other tract which Lord published at the same time indicates a similar method. "I joyned myselfe with one of their Church men called their *Daroo*, and by the interpretation of a *Persee* whose long imployment in the Companies service had brought him to a mediocrity in the *English* tongue . . . I gained the knowledge of what hereafter I shall deliver, as it was compiled in a booke writ in the *Persian* character containing their Scripture, and in their owne language called their ZUNDAVASTAW." Whatever may be the value of the material which Lord collected it seems to have been collected by himself, and to owe nothing either to the writings included by Samuel Purchas in the collection referred to in both of Lord's dedicatory epistles,[14] or to an-

[12] The writer in the *Dictionary of National Biography* credits Lord with some knowledge of Hindustani and Persian. There seems to be no evidence that he had any such knowledge.

[13] *De open-deure tot het verborgen heydendom* (*Leyden*, 1651). Roger collected remarkably detailed information from his informant, a Brahman named Padmanābha, including translations of Bhartṛhari's *Nīti-* and *Vairāgya-śataka*, which appear to be the first translations from Sanskrit into a European language. His book was translated into German (1663) and French (1670). and has been edited by W. Caland (Linschoten-vereeniging. Vol. X, 1915).

[14] He proffers his first tract to the Archbishop as an "Inditement against the Banian, whose cause hath formerly had some reference to your Grace by the labours of Mr. Purchas, whose evidences being *nihil praeter auditum* . . . I have brought them

other contemporary whom he names in his tract on the *Persees*, namely Edward Grimstone.[15] Lord's book has a decorated general title, and separate title-pages to each of the two tracts which it contains. The general title is: "A display of two forraigne sects in the East Indies, *viz.*, the sect of the Banians the Ancient Natives of India and the sect of the *Persees* the Ancient Inhabitants of Persia together with the Religion and Manners of each sect Collected into two Bookes by Henry Lord Sometimes resident in East India and Preacher to the Hoble Company of Merchants trading thether . . . London . . . 1630." The separate title of the first tract, with which alone this paper is concerned, is as follows: "A Discoverie of the sect of the Banians. Containing their History, Law, Liturgie, Casts, Customes, and Ceremonies. Gathered from their Bramanes, Teachers of that Sect: As the particulars were comprized in the Booke of their Law, called the Shaster: Together with a display of their Manners, both in times past, and at this present. . . . London. . . . 1630."

Lord's book schematises itself into sections corresponding to the four ages, which he duly names (p. 91, Chapter XV): "the first, *Curtain;* the second, *Dwauper;* the third, *Tetraioo;* the fourth, *Kolee.*" (It may be noted in passing that the inversion in the order of the Tretā and Dvāpara yugas indicates that Lord knew enough to

to a second examination." He hopes that the tract will be welcome to the Company, instancing the Company's "forward helps and Afordments to Mr. Purchas in the producement of his Voluminous worke called the Posthumus of Hacklewite." *Purchas his Pilgrimes* was published 1624—26.

[15] In chapter II of the *Religion of the Persees* (p. 9) after a passing reference to the ancient kings of Persia he adds: "The Abridgement of which Chronicle I would have gathered from them but that I found it to agree punctually . . . with that translation of Mr. Grimstones called *Estates and Empires, etc.*" Grimstone's translation (*London*, 1615) was from a French work by d'Avity, published in 1614. [S.]

feel that Tretā had something to do with the numeral three and Dvāpara with two). His first section (Chapter I—VI) purports to be an account of the Kṛta-yuga; the next, of the Dvāpara-yuga (Chapters VII—XIII); the next, of the Tretā-yuga (Chapter XIV); and the last, of the Kali-yuga (Chapter XV, the last). But he connects with the second part what purports to be an account of the 'Shaster,' but really embodies his own observations on caste and custom in Gujarat (Chapters VIII—X and XII—XIII); and a slight history of Gujarat, brought up to date, in Chapter XI. There has been, and is to be, a destruction of the world at the end of each age: the first was by water; the second by wind; the third by earth; and the fourth shall be by fire. Whereupon Lord comments: "How Pythagorically they stand upon the number of foure; the world was formed of foure principles; divided into foure points of the Compasse; to endure for foure Ages; planted by foure men, matched to foure women; restored again by foure; and to be demolished by foure several destructions . . . ." The Pythagorical four-ness seems to be partly his own invention. He was, besides, temperamentally a romantic, and in his account of the first age gives free rein to his fancy so as to turn the first creation into four love-stories.

In the first creation God, having fashioned the world of four elements, made man, and 'seconded him with a companion, which was Woman . . . And the first mans name was *Pourous*, and the womans name was *Parcoutee*.' Puruṣa and Prakṛti had four sons: 'the first was called *Brammon*, the second *Cuttery*, the third *Shuddery*, the fourth *Wyse*.' These are *primâ facie*, the eponymous ancestors of the four *varṇas*; but if *Shuddery* stands for *Śūdra*, it seems surprising that Lord should make him the representative of the third or merchant class. "And because *Shuddery* was of a nature mild and converseable,

it was thought meete that he should be a Merchant . . . as a monitour to put him in minde of which course of life, he had a paire of Ballances put into his hand, and a bagge of weights hung at his girdle, instruments most accommadate to his profession." He makes *Wyse* the representative of the 'Mechanicke or handy-crafts man,' because he was not thinking of the *Vaiśya-varṇa* at all, but of the Vaish or carpenter sub-caste of Gujarat; which figures also in the accounts of Arab travellers to western India.[16] And so Lord connects him with Viśvakarman: his 'disposition to meditate things for mans convenience gave him the name *Viskermah*, which is as much as the Handsman, because he could do anything to be done by the hand.'

These four went respectively to the East, West, North and South, and there, after appropriate adventures, met and won the four women appointed for them: *Savatree*, *Toddicastree*,[17] *Visagundah* and *Jejunogundah*.[18] *Cut-*

[16] *See* the article "Arab References" contributed by Fazlullah Lutfullah Farīdi to the *Bombay Gazetteer*, Vol. I, Part I, (History of Gujarat), p. 530. "Khurdadbah (A.D. 1912) describes the Hindus as divided into seven classes. Of these the first are Thākarias or Thākurs . . . The second are the Barāhmas . . . the third are the Katariyas or Kshatrias . . . the fourth are the Sudaria or Shudras, husbandmen by profession; the fifth are the Baisura or Vaish, artificers and domestic; the sixth Sandalia or Chandala, menials; and the seventh the 'Lahūd,'' whose women adorn themselves . . ." Here too 'Shuddery' takes precedence of 'Wyse.'

[17] 'Toddicastree' is Lord's own contribution to Indian nomenclature. But her genesis is plain. Lord's informant was at a loss for the name of 'the woman appointed for Cuttery,' and so he called her *tad-dik-strī*, the woman of that quarter. Lord reproduced the sound with commendable accuracy. In passing it may be noted that his informant seems to have had a tendency to pronounce the vowels *a* and *ā* in the Bengal way. (Cf., for instance, '*Bremaw*').

[18] I cannot suggest equivalents for *Visagundah* and *Jejunogundah*. There is a Viṣakanyakā in chapter 61 of the Nāgarakhaṇḍa of the Skanda-purāṇa, where one is tempted to look for these legends, if Lord's informant was a Nāgar Brahman: but the tale has no connection; and Lord's *-gundah* would suggest *-gandha*. *Yajña-* seems the nearest sound to *Jejuno-*. [Is Jejuno-

tery and '*Toddicastree*,' for example, 'as desirous to make experiment of each others fortitude upon their meeting together,' fought for three days before they joined in amity: for 'in her right hand she bare a *Chuckerey*,[19] which is an instrument of a round forme, and sharp-edged in the superficies thereof, so accommodate for offence, that by a hole in the middest thereof, being whirled about the finger and flung off, in the quicknesse of his motion, it is able to deliver or convey death to a farre remote enemy.' *Shuddery* passed beyond a mountain called *Stachalla* [20] and discovered pearls and a diamond-mine before he met *Visagundah*. *Wyse* passed over seven seas, the last of which was called *Pasheurbatee* (Puṣkarāvatī), and came to the land called *Derpe*. 'There by the Sea side hee built him a faire house . . . a comely habitation, with rooms lightsome, and broad taraffes or roofes aloft, for pleasure and prospect delightfull . . .' *Jejunogundah*, the woman appointed for Wyse, came wandering by, and was drawn to satisfy her admiration with a nearer view of this new edifice. Wyse 'descended to take a fuller contemplation of her beauty, whose feature deserved his better notice; for she was of body amiably white, and her tresses were scattered with poudered Saunders,[21] and other odors, the scent of which the blasts of the winde dispersed in such manner that he became partaker of them by his approach . . ." And so the world was populated by these four pairs in the first age. But " length of time

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gundhah to be equated with Yojanagandhā, a name of Satyavatī, mother of Vyāsa? Before she received the favour of Parāśara she was Matsyagandhā or Āmisagandhā, in which may we look for the original of Lord's Visagundah?—K.C.]

[19] Lord did not invent the *cakra*, and his Toddicastree should be found as a *cakreśvarī*. There is a Jaina Vidyā-devī so named. Lord's informant may have inserted some Jaina legends in the general framework of a Hindu *purāṇa*.

[20] *Iṣṭācala*?

[21] Sandal, *candana*.

. . . began to confound all goodnesse . . . For *Brammon* grew neglective of his piety; and *Cuttery* grew cruell and full of usurpation; and *Shuddery* grew deceiptfull in the waights and ballances; and *Wyse* lost his conscience in his dealings. And so God grew angry, and " there came a Flood, that covered all nations in the depths." Thus ended the first creation.

" Seeing the first Age miscarried by their sinfulnesse . . . the Almighty determined to beginne the second Age by three persons of greater perfection and excellency than the other, called *Bremaw*, *Vystney*, and *Ruddery*.[22] The Almighty, therefore, descending . . . upon . . . *Meropurbatee*[23] . . . said, Rise up *Bremaw* . . . and by a second and third command . . . raised up *Vystney*, and *Ruddery* . . . To the first hee gave the power to make the Creatures . . . to the second . . . the charge to preserve the Creatures . . . But to the third . . . hee gave power to destroy his Creatures . . . *Bremaw* . . . grew extraordinarily afflicted in his body . . . such travaile as happeneth to women in labour seazed him . . . till the burthen . . . made two ruptures . . . when behold two Twinnes, the one male the other female, to wit, Man and Woman . . . The man was by him named *Manow*, and the woman *Ceteroupa*[24] . . . They were

[22] The spelling of Brahmā, Viṣṇu, and Rudra is characteristic. The -aw sound for -ā (compare here *Soomeraut*, etc.) has been remarked on above. The -t- between cerebral ṣ and ṇ recurs in Kystney (compare the river, Kistna). For *Ruddery*, compare *Shuddery* and *chuckery*. Lord's -u stands both for -ŭ and for ă.

[23] Meru-parvata.

[24] Manu Svayambhuva and Śatarūpā are so related in, for example, the Brahma-purāṇa (chapter II). But this purāṇa makes Vīra (a son of Śatarūpā) and Kāmyā (Lord's *Cammah*) the parents of Priyavrata and Uttānapāda (Lord's *Priauretta* and *Outanapautha*). It makes Samrāṭ (Lord's *Soomeraut*) another son of Kāmyā. It agrees in making Sūnṛtā (Lord's *Soonerettaw*) the wife of Uttānapāda, as do other *purāṇas* (*see* H. H. Wilson's

sent to the East, to a mountaine called Munderpurvool[25] . . and *Ceteroupa* brought forth three sonnes and three daughters . . . *Priauretta, Outanapautha . . . Soomeraut; . . . Cammah . . . Soonerettaw . . . Sumboo*[26] . . . They were dispersed . . . *Priauretta* and *Cammah* to the West, to the Mountaine called *Segund; Outanapautha* and *Soonerettaw* to the North, to the Mountaine *Bipōla; Soomeraut* and *Sumboo* to the Mountaine *Supars* . . ."[27]

Lord then relates how the Almighty provided for the establishment of religion in the second age by a book delivered to *Bremaw*. This book is the *Shaster*, which is represented as consisting of three 'tracts,' dealing with the moral law, the ceremonial law, and the four 'tribes.' Lord follows this threefold division of subjects in the account of the manners and customs of the 'Banians' which fills the next five chapters (VIII—XIII): but it does not seem to correspond with any possible division of the literature.[28] Lord's own 'busie observation' is the source of much of this account. And, as Jainas were very much in evidence in Surat, much of what he says is an account (apparently the earliest European account) of

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translation of the *Viṣṇu-purāṇa* I. xi, p. 86, foot-note 1). The *Viṣṇu-purāṇa* II. i agrees with Lord's account in making Samrāt a son of Priyavrata and Kāmyā.

[25] Mandara-parvata.

[26] Sambhū?

[27] In the description of Ilāvṛta, as given in, *e.g.*, the *Viṣṇu-purāṇa* (II. ii), Meru is in the centre, Mandara on the east, Gandhamādana on the south, Vipula on the west, and Supārśva on the north. *Segund* (Sagandha?) is perhaps Gandha-mādana *Bipola* and *Supars* are plainly Vipula and Supārśva.

[28] Perhaps it reflects an enumeration of the Vedas as three (omitting the *Atharva-veda*). Bernier knew of, and names, four *Beths* (*Vedas*). European ideas of the character of the Vedas were altogether vague up to the end of the 18th century. This made possible the publication of such a work as the French *Ezour-vedam* (' Yajur-veda ') in 1780. Voltaire saw it in manuscript and accepted it as a Veda: although, as Ellis pointed out in *Asiatic Researches*, it is really a criticism of Hinduism in the form of a purāṇa.

Jainism, and his 'Banian,' although to some extent a composite picture, represents on the whole a Jain merchant. Lord is himself aware that the term *baniā* is not accurately used in the title of his work as covering all classes, and he indicates the right use of the term towards the end of the book (p. 86). "Under the name of *Banians* is comprised . . . Merchants only, or Brokers for the Merchant . . ." In the latter part of the book he therefore uses *Banian* as synonymous with *Shuddery*, the merchant.[29]

There is nothing very characteristic in the eight commandments which Lord represents as comprised in the first tract, except that *ahiṁsā* takes precedence, as the first commandment, and control of the five senses is emphasised as the second. Lord himself singles these out: "The principall part of their Law admitting nothing prodigious to opinion we passe over, onely that which commeth into exception is that which is laid down in the first and the second Commandment." He discusses these two at some length, with particular reference to the doctrine of metempsychosis. Among the ceremonies spoken of by him in treating of the second tract are: bathing in rivers "whilst the *Bramane* iterateth the name of the river . . . called *Tappee*, with the name of other rivers in India celebrated for these customary washings, as *Gonga* and *Nerboda*": the use of a "certaine Unction in the forehead of red painting, that having certaine graines stucke in the glutinous matter is their testimony that God hath marked them out as his people: and the tendering of offerings and prayers under trees "so that the *Bramanes* under such greene Tree erect temples to Pagods . . . The tree peculiarized for this worshippe is called by some . . .

[29] And so he leaves himself without a generic name. His contemporaries tended to call Indians exclusive of 'Moors' by the name of Gentiles. But Lord uses this term too in a restricted sense. *See below.*

Ficus Indica . . . and by Goropius Becanus affirmed to bee the tree of life that grew in the Garden of Eden . . ." In connection with the "second tract" he gives a fairly detailed account of the naming of children, marriages, and funerals. In connection with what he calls the 'Invocation of Saints' he says: "They . . . that would bee happy in Marriage, invoke *Hurmount;* they that are to begin the workes of architecture, *Gunnez;* they that want health, *Vegenaut;* the souldier in his assault . . ., cryes, *Bimohem;* the miserable invoke *Syer;* and they that are in prosperity, give their Orisons to *Mycasser*." The names appear to stand for Hanumān, Gaṇeśa, Baijnāth, Bhīmasena, and possibly Īśvara and Maheśvara. At namings "some of the kindred . . . menaceth the point of a writing penne against the forehead of the Child, with this short prayer, That God would write good things in the front of that Child." In connection with marriage there is an account of the nuptial procession—"the Bridegroome is distinguished from the rest by a crowne on his head, decked with Jewels very rich . . . Dowry there is none given, that the drifts of Marriage might not be mercenary . . ." When a man is dying "they injoyne him to utter *Narraune*, which is one of the names of God, importing Mercy to Sinners . . . His spirits languishing, they stretch out his hand, pouring faire water into it . . . praying to *Kistneruppon** the God of the water, to present him pure to God . . ." After describing the funeral rites he adds: "Since these lawes and injunctions, there hath sprung up a Custome amongst them, that the women that survive their husbands should offer themselves up alive to be sacrificed in the flames with them, which to this day is observed in some places and for some persons

* [We must trace it to the formula *Kṛṣṇārpaṇam (astu)*.—K. C.]

of greater worth, though the examples be more rare now than in former times, of which custome Propertius thus speaketh": and he proceeds to quote and translate the eight lines of Propertius (49—15 B.C.) which speak of the custom.

Four chapters (X—XIII), concluding with the destruction of the world at the end of the second age, should be concerned with the third tract of the *Shaster*, but contain in fact Lord's own account of the four castes, as he himself admits: "If I shall somewhat digresse from their particular injunctions . . . to a more particular display of their manners, I shall better discharge the parts required in this Tract." He is not sure whether the name of the first caste is derived from *Brammon*, or from *Bremaw* "by adjection of this particle (*nes*)." He notes that "Suidas is of opinion that they are called *Bramanes* of one *Brachman* that was the first prescriber of their rites," while "Postellus affirmeth them to bee descended from Abraham by Cheturah,[30] who seated themselves in India, and that so they were called *Abrahmanes*." Brahmans are of two sorts: the more common Brahmanes, of which there are a great number in India; and the more special who "are called by the Banians, *Verteas*, by the Moores, *Serrahs*." "The common Bramane hath eighty two Casts or Tribes . . . which were so many wise men or Schollers . . . called *Augurs* or Soothsayers of such a place . . . Thus the prime of them was called *Visalnagranauger*, that is, the Augur of Visalnagra, the 2 *Vulnagranauger*, that is the Auger of Vulnagra, a towne so called . . ." Lord is of course speaking of the Nāgar Brahmans. He drops the initial N-, and proceeds to make an equation with the Latin word *augur*. But he correctly gives Vīsal-

[30] Keturah, *Genesis*, 25. i.

nagar (Visnagar) and Vaḍnagar as two chief centres or places of origin of Nāgar Brahmans. Later on he observes that the divisions of the Banians or *Shudderies* (by whom he may mean either Hindu or Jaina Vaiśyas) correspond in number to those of the *Bramanes*, "chusing either to be under their discipline that are Visalnagranaugers, or Vulnagranaugers, from the peculiar instruction of which Bramanes they are guided in matters belonging to religious worshippe." Lord's "more speciall Bramanes" are, as will be clear from the following citations, Jainas. "The more speciall Bramane . . . is some man of the Cast of Shudderies . . . who for devotion taketh this condition on him . . . weareth a woollen garment of white . . . his heade is always uncovered . . . they do not shave but pluck off all the hair save some small remainder on the crowne . . . They have a festival called *Putcheson* . . .[31] More strict they seem to be than the common *Bramanes* . . . More cautelous they are for the preservation of things animate . . . and they keep a hospital of lame and maimed flying fowle." They have several divisions: "One is called the *Soncaes*, and these go not to Church, but perform divine rites at home. Another is of the *Tuppaes*, these go to Church to pray. A third is of the *Curthurs*, and these pray by themselves, without society. A fourth is called the *Onkeleaus*, and these endure not images. A fifth called the *Pushaleaus*, the most strict of them all." These are names of *gacchas* of the Jainas: the *Tapa-gaccha* and the *Kharatara-* (*Khaḍtar-*) *gaccha* being plainly recognisable, whilst in the *Onkeleaus* we may perhaps see the *Lonka-gaccha*, which "endures not images."

Passing to the second caste, the *Cutteryes*, Lord says: "That particular of *Bremawes* booke that concerned this Cast or Tribe, contained certaine precepts of government

[31] The *Paryuṣaṇa* observed by Jainas.

and policie, the knowledge of which being but of common import I rather chuse to omit." Instead, he gives in this chapter (XI) some account of the Rajputs of Gujarat and adjacent parts. He mentions the names of five Rajput clans: *Chaurah*, *Solenkee*, *Vaggela*, *Dodepuchaes*, and *Paramars*. The 'Cutteryes' were the ancient kings of India, and were called Rajahs. "These Rajahs had principally foure men about them of eminency . . . the *Bramanes*, who by Southsaying and Augury did show the Kinges what time was most meet to begin their designs . . . the *Pardon*,[32] which was a man of policy in the State businesse . . . the *Moldar* or the Kings Chamberlain . . . (and) the Generall of the Kings Armies in the field called *Disnacke*."[33] "Now touching their declining state. One *Rannederill*[34] a vertuous woman did at her death prophecy the decline of the Banian State, in the time of *Ravisaldee*[35] chiefe Rajah, the beginning of which should be in his next Successors daies . . ." Ravisaldee's successor, *Syderaisaldee*,[36] had erected a monument in his fathers honour at *Sythepolapore*.[37] A Brahman, *Madewnauger*,[38] told him that one *Sultan Alaudin*, a *Patan*, King of *Delee*, should deface the monument and conquer *Guzzarat*. So he sent his *Pardon* to search out the youth,

[32] Pradhāna.

[33] Deśanāyaka?

[34] Rāṇī Devī, "The Queen"? Or Ranik Devi (Forbes *Ras Mala*, I. IX)?

[35] Rai Vīsaldeva, said to have founded Visnagar in 1046; or else Bisaldeo Chauhan who took Delhi in 1153? But neither comes near the time of Alāuddīn (1298), and there may be some confusion.

[36] Siddharājadeva (1094—1143. See *Ras Mala*, I. x)?

[37] Perhaps Sidhpur in Baroda State, where there is a Rudra Māla built by Mūlrāj and reconstituted by Siddharāja Jayasiṁha.

[38] Mahādeva Nāgara? Forbes, *Ras Mala* I. xv, tells a similar tale.

who was at that time with his father, a wood-gatherer of Delhi. They persuaded him to accept a sum of money and in return he gave them " an Escript that albeit the heavens had decreed that he should scatter some stones of that building yet hee would picke them out of the Corners thereof " so as to spare the building. In due course *Alaudin* invaded *Guzzarat*, but growing weary of the long war, and many Rajahs fleeing to inaccessible places, he committed the further management of the wars to one *Futtercon*, his Cupbearer. " And the said *Futtercon* did further invade *Guzzarat*, and so did the rest of the *Mahoometans* that succeeded him, to the decline of the Banian State." Lord adds that " some of the Rajahs flying to retyrements impregnable . . . could not be conquered even to this day; but, making outroades, pray on the *Caffaloes*[39] passing . . . having many resolute Souldiers . . . called ***Rashpootes***,[40] which implyeth as much as the sonnes of Kings: for being of the cast of *Cutteries* it is like they were nobly descended . . . ." Among those that remained unconquered in his time Lord mentions ***Rajah Surmulgee*** of ***Raspeeplaw***;[41] ***Rajah Berumshaw***[42] of *Molere*; ***Rajah Ramnagar***; ***Rajah Barmulgee***; and " the great ***Rannah***,[43] who hath fought many set battles with the *Moguls* forces."

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[39] Kāfilas.

[40] The word Rajput was commonly so spelled in Lord's time. But Lord at least knew what it meant.

[41] Rājpipla. Bardic chronicles make Surmalji the second successor after Jayasinghji, who was the chief of Rājpipla in the time of Akbar. (*Bombay Gazetteer*, Vol. VI, p. 109).

[42] Bairām Shāh of Mulher, which was not reduced until 1637.

[43] The Rānā of Udaipur, Amar Singh I, to whom this statement would apply, had made peace with Jahāngīr in 1614, and died in 1620. His successor, Karan Singh (1620—28) waged no wars. Lord's statement perhaps has no one Rānā particularly in view.

The next chapter (XII) relates to the *Shudderies*, or *Banians* properly so called,[44] but it contains little which has not been already noted. Chapter XIII however gives additional information about the *Wyses*. "The name Wyse implyes as much as one that is servile or instrumentary . . . these people are at this present most ordinarily called by the name of *Gentiles*. Which *Gentiles* are of two sorts (1) the purer *Gentile*, such as liveth observant of the dyet of the *Banians* . . . (2) the *Gentile Visceraun*, called the impure or uncleane . . . Such are the husbandmen or inferior sort of people called the *Coulees*."[45]

The remainder of this chapter (XIII) reverts to the original plan of the work, after this long digression about caste, and tells of the destruction of the world at the end of the second age. Chapter XIV gives an account of the third age. The *Cutteryes* were "utterly raced out," and "The Lord appointed that from the *Bramanes* the line of the Kings should be renewed . . . The chief of the *Bramanes* that was then preserved . . . was called *Ducerat*;[46] the next child that was borne after this destruction and which was the youngest of foure, was chosen to propagate the line of their Kings . . . and his name was *Ram*; who became so memorable for his worthy deeds . . . . that . . . even to this day . . . whensoever they meet and salute one another, they cry *Ram*, *Ram* . . ." Of the fourth and last age of the world, described in the following chapter (XV), Lord has not much to say: ". . . The Almighty againe commanded that the world should bee peopled by those that were reserved, amongst whom there

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[44] See p. 287 *supra*.

[45] These are apparently the Kolis, who form a quarter of the population of Gujerat. They are husbandmen in central and south Gujerat, but are said to approach nearer to Bhils in the north. The Bombay Gazetteer states that the word is sometimes used in the sense of bastard or half-breed: which may be the origin of Lord's "impure Gentile."

[46] Daśaratha.

was one *Kystney*, a famous Ruler and pious King, of whose vertues they have ample record, as being one most notable in the last Age . . . He did wonderfully promote Religion, upon which there was a reformed beginning of goodnesse.'

Lord's book comes in point of time midway between those of Edward Terry and Abraham Roger; and it is at least as superior to the former as it is inferior to the latter in the extent of its information about Hinduism. It marks therefore an interesting and very definite advance: and it is surprising that Lord is almost entirely ignored by recent historians of 'Indology.'[17] There were certainly Portuguese, and one Englishman, who knew more than Lord ever learned, and before Lord's time: but if we except the Englishman's book, there seems to be no printed book dating from before Lord's time which gives so much information. The Englishman referred to is Thomas Stephens (Padre Estevão), who arrived in India in 1579 and spent the rest of his life in Goa as a member of the Society of Jesus. He perhaps knew some Sanskrit; and, in a letter, he notes the connection between Indian and European languages. He shares, besides, with Beschi and Roberto dei Nobili, the distinction of having made a contribution of importance to the vernacular literature of India: for he wrote a long epic in the Konkani dialect of Marathi on the whole Bible-story, which was originally printed at Goa in 1615, and has not long ago (1907) been edited and published at Mangalore under the title of "*The Christian Puranam.*" But, apart from Thomas Stephens, it can be claimed that Lord was the first Englishman who made a systematic attempt to acquire knowledge of "the Banians," not to mention "the Persees." His immediate successors fully recognised the value of his publication. Thomas (afterwards Sir Thomas) Herbert included in a

[17] He is not mentioned in Windisch's *Geschichte der Sanskrit Philologie* (Grundriss I. i. B., 1917, 1920).

book first published four years after Lord's the detailed content of both Lord's tracts, with an inadequate acknowledgment which admits indebtedness only in respect of his account of the 'Persees.'[48] Yet in his account of the Banians we meet with all the personages of Lord's *Discoverie*, including 'Toddicastree' and the other 'women appointed'; and, throughout it, Herbert merely epitomises Lord. Bernier, writing in 1667, gives of course an independent account, more complete than Lord's; but he nevertheless makes generous acknowledgment. "I shall here add a few words to declare that I am no lesse obliged to Monsieur *Henry Lor* and to Monsieur *Abraham Roger* than to the Reverend Fathers *Kircher* and *Roa*. I had compiled an hundred things relating to the *Gentiles*, which I found in the Books of those Gentlemen, and which would have been a great trouble to me to range them as they have done."[49]

[48] The engraved title of the revised and enlarged edition reads: "Some yeares travels into Africa and Asia the Great. Especially describing the famous empires of Persia and Hindustant . . . By Tho: Herbert Esqre . . . London, 1638." The first edition was published in 1634. His epitome of Lord's tracts occupies pp. 40—54 of the 1638 edition. On p. 48 he begins to speak of the Persees "whose life and doctrine (as it is gathered from the *Daro* or Priests of this sect by Master *Lord* a worthy minister for some years resident in the Factory of *Surat*) I will epitomize."

Herbert began his travels on Good Friday, 1626. He reached Surat in December. The year is not very clear; but, since news of the crowning of Prince Khurram at Agra reached Surat while he was there, and since the date of Jahāngīr's death was Oct. 18, 1627, the December of 1627 must be meant. There is however a difficulty, because he says that Wylde was President when he arrived. But the Factory Records show that Wylde did not take over office from Kerridge before April, 1628. *See* Foster's *English Factories in India* 1624—1629, p. xxviii, footnote.

The presidents were: Kerridge, 1616—23; Rastell, 1623—25; Kerridge (for the second time) 1625—28; and then Wylde.

[49] I quote from the *Continuation of the Memoirs*, Vols. III and IV, "English'd out of French by H. O.," *London*, 1671. The passage will be found at p. 157 of the section entitled "The

It is a matter for regret that efforts to trace the career of this 'worthy minister' outside the short period of his service in India have not succeeded.[50] Lord himself expresses (in words which close his *Epistle Dedicatorie*, and which may serve as a fitting epilogue on the present occasion) his sense that these were his memorable years: "Accept it then Right Honourable so . . . composed as it may bee, of such materialls, and let it be as an Attestate of my Acknowledgments to you, the Achme and flourishing part of whose best being I confesse to have had beginning and growth in your imployment . . ."

Gentils of Indostan," which was written as a letter to Chapelain in 1667.

[50] I desire to express by obligation to Mr. W. T. Ottewill, M.B.E., Superintendent of Records, India Office, who very kindly searched the records himself, and brought to my notice the files of a previous enquiry relative to Henry Lord. A memorandum on the subject drawn up by Miss E. B. Sainsbury in 1920, which is included in the file, was of much assistance to me. I have indicated information derived from this source by "[S.]." I may add that Mr. Ottewill agrees that it is improbable that the East-India Company should have appointed a man of sixty-one to go to India; and that Sir William Foster, who was Superintendent of Records when the previous enquiry was made, then expressed the opinion that the writer in the *Dictionary of National Biography* had confused two persons in his account of Henry Lord.

THE QUR'ĀN ON NIMROD'S FIRE

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Of the bewilderingly enormous mass of the Jewish lore consisting of legends and stories about their prophets, sages and kings, quite a large volume has been ascribed to the great patriarch Abraham, and perhaps quite befittingly, as he was the "father of a multitude of nations." Apart from the detailed account of the life and work of Abraham supplied to us by the Mosaic scripture, there is a considerably large volume of the apocryphal superstructure and rabbinical tradition that rose up later.

Abraham claims a double greatness and importance. He is the father of the great Hebrew nation, and through his son, Ishmael, *i.e.*, a progenitor of the northern Arabs. Even in Arabia such traditions regarding Abraham were continuously handed down by word of mouth long before the era of Islam. The Muslims of Arabia were interested in the Patriarch as being the father of their progenitor Ishmael and the co-founder and builder with him of the Ka'ba, "the house" which the father and son were commanded by God to build and consecrate for His worship [1] Abraham became to the Muslims the very model of a true believer, who had advanced by slow but sure degrees to the sound and staunch belief in and devotion to the One God, and to whom Islam itself was attributed, for to him they owed the epithet *Muslim*.[2]

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[1] See the Qur'ān, II, 126—129; III, 96; XIV, 35; XXII, 26.

[2] The Qur'ān, II, 130, 135; III, 94; IV, 95; VI, 162; XII, 38; XVI, 123; XXII, 78.

The Qur'ān mentions Abraham by name in about seventy places in various connections, and a whole chapter (XIV) of the Book has been named after him. It recognises him as one of the greatest of the prophets and apostles of yore, and his works form one of the chief means of inspiration to the new nation which the great Arabian prophet was seeking to raise up. The Muslims naturally accepted as true all that was said of "the father" Abraham in the Qur'ān, which derives its material mainly, of course, from the Old Testament and also from the rabbinical tradition. The Qur'ān has characteristically given such report of him and has adopted only such details of his life and work as suited its purpose. Whatever it has to record about him is in simple and straightforward language. The omission of all useless details has surely some good reason behind it. The hearers of the Prophet would have certainly followed the purpose and intention of their Master, if only they had not supplemented this information with the knowledge they already possessed of Abraham through the oral traditions then rife in their own country. And the matter became worse still when after the death of the Prophet the Book had to be studied, understood, followed and acted upon by the non-Arab nations, especially the Persians, who were pioneers in the field of Qur'ānic exegesis. In their sincere devotion to the Book and their earnest desire to grasp the fullest significance of every iota of it, these zealous students of the Qur'ān could not but resort to the learned rabbis for the explanation of all that they clearly saw was based on the versions of the Old Testament, or of their own brotherhood of the rabbis. The exegesists of the Qur'ān meant well; and the learned rabbis and Jewish scholars too perhaps meant equally well. A whole-hearted and unflinching faith in the learning and veracity of the directors led the zealous seekers of know-

ledge to accept as true all the information they received from them, and they innocently incorporated the whole volume of it in their works. This is easily illustratable in the case of the interesting legend regarding the tyrant Nimrod who cast Abraham into the huge fiery furnace, which not only could not injure the Patriarch but turned into a veritable paradise for him. The Qur'ān records the story in Chapter XXI, entitled "The Prophets," in verses 51 to 71. It introduces the story with a mention of Abraham's protest against image worship, and eventually his practical step in demolishing all the images in the pantheon save one, the biggest of them. The whole community of the "idol-worshippers" rises against him, and they conspire to burn him. But God saves him from the calamity, and he leaves the place for another "blessed land." I quote the entire story below :

"51. And certainly we gave to Abraham his guidance before, and we knew him well.

52. When he said to his father and his people: What are these images to whose worship you cleave?

53. They said: We found our forefathers worshipping them.

54. He said: Certainly you have been, you and your forefathers, in manifest error.

55. They said: You have brought to us the truth, or are you one of the triflers?

56. He said: Nay, your Lord is the Lord of the heavens and the earth, who brought them into existence, and I am of those who bear witness to this.

57. And by Allah; I will certainly strive against your idols after you go away, turning your back.

58. So he broke them into pieces, except the chief one of them, that haply they may return to it.

59. They said: who has done this to our gods? Most surely he is one of the unjust.

60. They said: We heard of a youth called Abraham speak of them.

61. They said: Then bring him before the eyes of the people, perchance they may bear witness.

62. They said: Have you done this to our gods, O Abraham?

63. He said: Surely some doer has done it. The chief of them is this. Therefore ask his lordship if he can speak.

64. Then they turned to themselves and said: Surely you yourselves are the unjust.

65. Then they were made to hang down their heads: Certainly you know that they do not speak.

66. He said: What! do you then serve beside Allah what brings you not any benefit at all, nor does it harm you?

67 Fie on you and on what you serve beside Allah! What! do you not then understand?

68. They said: Burn him and help your gods if you are going to do anything.

69. We said: O fire, be a means of coolness and comfort and peace to Abraham.

70. And they desired a deceipt with him, but We made them the greatest of losers!

71. And We delivered him as well as Lot, (removing them) to the land we had blessed for all people!"

The commentators, however, wax more eloquent than the Book itself, and follow the legend in greater (and wholly unnecessary) details. I take up, as an example, the eminent commentator Ṭabarī, who names all the authorities for his assertions. Let us take up the last three verses (69—71) which form the material part of the whole story. The story runs, says Ṭabarī, that a Kurd,

Hayzan[3] by name, suggested to the people that Abraham should be burned alive. King Nimrod agreed with the brilliant suggestion. Abraham was accordingly bottled up in a house, and in the meantime an edifice was built up, and therein was gathered an enormous mass of wood to create a veritable hell for Abraham to burn. So much were the people excited over the matter that there was a woman who was in sick-bed, and she said, 'If God give me health I will collect timber for Abraham!' When all was ready they caught hold of Abraham and, raising him up above the edifice, lowered him into the fire that was burning furiously . . . At this juncture the learned commentator suggests that the Qur'ān has here omitted to mention the fact, which however follows from its words, that they did kindle a fire to burn Abraham and did throw him into it, whereat God intervened saying: "We said: O fire, be a cooling comfort and safety to Abraham" (v. 69). . . . He then continues the story thus. When Abraham was being lowered into the fire he raised up his head to the heavens, saying: "O Lord! Thou art the One alone in the heavens, and I am quite lonely here on the earth, where there is no one else beside me to worship Thee. God is enough for me, and He is the best one to rely on!" And the heavens, the earth, the mountains and the angels, all conjointly appealed to God for His mercy to Abraham, and God bade them help His "friend" if he called upon them to do so. When Abraham got into the furnace, Gabriel (or God) called upon it, commanding it to become all coolness and safety to Abraham. And lo, the flames got all extinguished, and with them all the fires on the earth went out too, and that huge furnace became so very intensely cold that if in the

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[3] God, however, punished this wicked man by causing him sink deep below the earth, where he is damned to bear this torture till the day of judgment. Ṭabarī, *hoc loco.*

wordings of the command the word سلام were not added to the word برد Abraham would have died of cold! And when the fire was extinguished they advanced to witness the plight of the culprit. They found him still there, all safe. And there was also seen with him the Angel of Shade (ملك الظل) who held Abraham's head in his lap and was wiping the sweat from off the face of Abraham. He was taken out, and on examination it was found that fire had failed to scorch Abraham, having touched only the band with which he was tied. Thus did God save Abraham, who thereafter left his home (at Ur) and gave up the faih of his fellowmen, and migrated to Shām.

Now all this is very much the repitition of exactly the same tradition as is met with in the accounts left to us by the ancient rabbis. Yet all this is said on the authority of such eminent personages as 'Alī b. Abu Ṭālib, 'Abdullāh b. 'Abbās, 'Abdullāh b. 'Umar, Qatāda, Ka'b, Mujāhid, Isḥāq and others. Later writers give greater details of this wonderful incident in the life of the Patriarch, telling us how not only the flames got quenched, but that the whole scene got changed into a lovely garden bearing all the sweetest and loveliest fruits, and how all the servants and deputies of Nimrod got burnt by that fire, and so on and so forth, details which conform to a still greater degree with the rabbinical lore.

And all this for the love of the wonderful! For even the apocryphal and legendary accounts of this great event as given by the ancient Hebrew writers have two versions, in one of which this episode of the terrible trial by fire finds no room whatsoever.[1] But the innocent and child-like fancy of our commentators and their readers could

[1] See A. S. Rappoport, *Myths and Legends of Ancient Israel*, London, 1928), I, 228—233 and 246—253.

hardly be satisfied with the simple and highly chaste and sensible account given by the Qur'ān.

Let us now turn to the facts and see what justification we can find for these explanations and comments so devoutly indulged in by a whole army of commentators. The surest testimony in the matter is naturally that of the Old Testament. A reference to Chapters XI to XXV of the Book of Genesis will easily solve the question. Abraham lives with his father Terah (and not Ādhar, who was his uncle and not father) and his brothers Haran and Nahor at Ur, the well known "Ur of the Chaldees," which was the place of his nativity. Terah was an idolator, and wanted his sons to be like unto himself. Of the three brothers only Abraham seems to have revolted. Observation, contemplation and experience had taught him that the images or even the bright heavenly bodies did not deserve to be adored and worshipped as gods. He "believed in the Lord; and he counted it to him for righteousness" (Gen. XV, 6). It is quite possible, therefore, that this apostacy of Abraham from the faith of his forefathers might have gained fame and would have consequently given rise to an opposition from his compatriots, who can even be conceived as having taken up the cudgels against him. It is here, however, that the story-mongers connect up the story with the name and person of king Nimrod (Namrūd of the Arabs) and bring him to the enactment of the interesting drama of the Furnace.

The Qur'ān takes up the same legend; but there is no mention of Nimrod, nor of the fact that Abraham was actually thrown into the fire. It only mentions the design on the part of the people: "They said, Burn him . . ." (XXI, 68). Then comes the verse which is the pivot of the whole story, *viz.*, "We said: O fire! be thou a means of coolness and comfort and peace to Abraham." (69). It is here that the fancy of the commentators runs wild,

and they feel compelled to resort to legend and conjure up the whole scene of the drama in which Nimrod also plays a part. A close study of its phraseology will reveal what its Author wished it to imply.

The verse contains three important words: نار and برد and سلام. The first of these— نار —is perhaps the most important word in this sentence, as it is this word that has led the commentators to accept the whole legend of the "furnace." Now the word نار does not only signify "fire," but also (*i*) light,[5] (*ii*) the internal fire, a biting and gnawing anxiety and care,[6] and (*iii*) opinion, counsel;[7] beside other implications which need not engage our attention at present. The use of the word as meaning 'fire' and 'light' is remarkably masterly, as the word UR, the name of Abraham's birthplace, also means (among other meanings) both 'fire' and 'light', and as Barry so well suggests,[8] it is this sense of the word UR that has given rise to this legend. And نار has been so admirably put in the dative case, thus implying, among other things, a direct address to the city of Ur. In the second sense it refers to the grave anxiety and anguish that these councils of their enemies must have been causing to Abraham and his father; and it is this anxiety that is required to change itself into perfect coolness of the mind and safety. In the third sense the word has evidently a reference to the conferences of the heathens and their decision to burn Abraham. This conference came to naught, and all their resolutions failed, for Terah and Abraham had decided already to quit the place.

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[5] *Tāj al-'Arūs*, art. نور. Cf. the Qur'ān XXVII, 8.

[6] Cf. the Qur'ān CIV, 6, 7.

[7] Ibn Athīr, *Nihāyah*, and *Qāmūs* (art. نور), both of which quote the Prophet's words لاتستضيئوا بنارالمشركين which are said to imply لاتشاوروهم, the word نار meaning opinion and counsel.

[8] Smith's *Dictionary of the Bible*, art. *Abraham*.

Thus the word برد suggests that the very torturesome feeling of anxiety and that gnawing care at last gave way to perfect calmness and safety.

The word برد implies coolness, calmness, as also pleasantness, enjoyment, ease and comfort; while the phrase برد امرنا means "Our affair or case became easy."[9] The words كوني بردا will, therefore, show that God (as the subject of قلنا) consoled the mind of Abraham and changed his anxiety into a calm and pleasant ease; while the phrase may also suggest the idea of departure on a journey, for برد مضجعه (lit. His bed or place of sleeping became cold) implies "He went on a journey."[10]

سلام primarily signifies "escape" (نجاة) and "rescue" (تخليص), as also safety and freedom from evils of any kind, or from trial and affliction . . . and particularly safety, security and freedom from evils of all kinds *for a traveller.* Again, سلام (as also) تسليم signifies "saluting or greeting one with a prayer for his life."

Let us read on. The next verse is, "And they desired a deceipt with him, but We made them the greatest of losers." This clearly shows that Abraham's enemies were so miserably defeated in their designs of inflicting a killing torture upon Abraham, who was all the time cool and calm and peaceful, for he and his father had already decided to secure safety for their person and life by leaving Ur for some other land. This fact is justified by the very next verse: "And We delivered him as well as Lot, (removing them) to the land we had blessed for all people" (71). This is corroborated by the O.T. account, where we read: "And Terah took Abraham his son, and Lot the son of Haran his son's son, and Sarai his

[9] *Tāj al-'Arūs*, art. برد

[10] Lane, *Lexicon*, art. برد

[11] *Tāj al 'Arūs* and Lane, *Lexicon*, art. سلم

daughter-in-law his son Abraham's wife; and they went forth with them from Ur of the Chaldees, to go into the land of Canaan, and dwelt there" (Gen. XI, 31). And afterwards the Lord spoke to Abraham and "said unto him. I am the Lord that brought thee out of Ur of the Chaldees, to give thee this land to inherit it" (Gen. XV, 7).

To sum up. No doubt the Qur'ān does adopt the legend, but while it recognises that Abraham's serious disbelief in his forefathers' faith and even his practical iconoclasm did attract the attention of all around him to the extent of making him a target for general criticism and universal animadversion and malice, yet it does not seem to recognise or lend support to the belief that he was actually thrown into fire. This because, as the Qur'ān seems to have it, he and his father had already decided to bid farewell to Ur for some other land offering happy prospects. Thus was the *fire* quenched; thus did it change into coolness and safety; and thus were the malicious designs of the enemies frustrated. Nimrod and his *furnace* have no place in the Qur'ānic text of the story.

As has already been pointed out above, the phraseology of the Qur'ān is remarkably expressive and eloquent. That Abraham should be "burned in fire" might have meant nothing more than that he and his father should be annoyed and harassed to such an extent as to make Ur quite *hot* for them to live in. An unceasing volley of relentless criticism against father and son, a general taboo, recurring threats of injury to their person and life, a constantly agonising discomfort caused by all this should have been enough to render Ur a veritable *furnace* for them. And the words بَرْد and سلام indicate the intended departure of the family, that not only ended all this opposition and rancour against them, but also became a cause of their security, peace and prosperity. They

were out of *fire* (Ur), safe and secure. This change of *fire* into a *garden* could have by no means been an instantaneous one, as it is alleged to have been, for the actual departure of Abraham's family from Ur must have surely been preceded by a considerably long period affording a good study, by all means available in that age, of the new home, its surroundings, its conditions, and of the prospects it could hold out to them of a happy and prosperous life. Various and numerous too would have been the causes that led ultimately to their determination of quitting the place where they had lived so long. And when they did leave the place, their enemies would have been sore indeed to find themselves all lost and hopelessly dismayed.

It is one of the characteristic features of the style of the Qur'ān that whenever it cites or quotes anything from the Old Testament on the ancient time-honoured legends and fables of the Hebrews, its purpose is to narrate the life-story of any particular person as an example, or to explain a point of character—national or individual—or to prove the victory of truth over falsehood. It is always to point a moral, and never to adorn a tale. It takes as much of the story as suits its special and definite purpose at the moment, and the narrative is always couched in a language which, though apparently conforming to the prevalent version of the story, really goes counter to it. And this is secured by the use of exquisitely chiselled phraseology, of words that easily and effectively blot out the merely playful and frivolous element and renders it highly forcible and instructive by giving the whole story an altogether new interpretation. Exactly the same is the case with the story of Abraham's supposed ordeal. And it is by no means difficult to gauge why the Qur'ān has brought in this narrative. Abraham's rejection of the long established idolatrous faith of his forefathers, his boldness and undaunted

courage which took the shape of actual iconoclasm, his unhesitated departure from his home, his adoption of the new home that gave him cheer and plenty, his subsequent arrival in Arabia and the building of the "House of God" at Mecca, which was to be for all time the centre of the universal Muslim polity, all this must certainly have gone a great way on the one hand in strengthening the hearts of the Muslims, infusing in them still greater courage and energy, a more brilliant hope for the bright future, a firmer belief in the truth of their cause; and on the other hand it must have dealt a deadly blow to the activities of the enemies of Islam, who would have realised the utter futility of all their misguided and ill-advised designs against the new faith, which, like Abraham's, sought to put an end to the existing heathenism in Arabia and the more or less universal misbelief in the world. And the pages of history bear eloquent testimony of the success of this policy, of the grand and remarkable effect this style of expression had on the people, on the history of Arabia, nay on the history of the whole world!

THE *TUHFATU'L-HIND* (OR INDIA'S PRESENT): AURANGZEB'S INTEREST IN INDIAN LITERATURE

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The Mughal Emperors of India were, in many respects, Indianised. They were in genuine love and real sympathy with India and things Indian; and the literature of India both classical and vernacular was not an exception.

The very founder of this dynasty, Babur, himself acquired such taste for Hindustani poetry and such command over the Hindustani language that we possess at least one couplet composed by him in mixed Hindustani and Turki.

The Persian translations of Sanskrit classics such as the *Mahābhārata* and scientific works such as the *Līlāvatī* made by the order of Akbar the Great, and the impetus given to 'Hindi' poetry by him and his accomplished general Khān-i-khānān 'Abdu'r-Raḥīm are facts well known to every student of Indian history. This helped a great deal in creating an interest in and encouraging the study of Sanskrit and Hindi among Muslims. One tangible result of this was that the number of Muslims knowing Sanskrit literature and composing poetry in 'Hindi' in those days was far greater than it is now.

The traditions established by Akbar and his courtiers passed on to his successors. Jahāngīr "took delight in Hindi songs and munificiently rewarded Hindi poets." Once by the order of that emperor Puhkara Kavi was, for some offence, put into prison. There he composed his well-known Rasa Ratna and regained his freedom as a

reward for that work. Such was Jahāngīr's love for Hindi poetry.

In my collection there are at least two manuscripts, showing that Shāhjahān also, like his illustrious father and more illustrious grandfather, was a patron of the indigenous literature of India. One of these manuscripts is the Persian translation of a Sanskrit book on horses made by the order of that emperor.

The other manuscript is a copy of the Sundara-siṅgāra composed by Sundara Kavi in Saṁvat 1688 and dedicated to the Emperor Shāhjahān.

In his Preface to the book the author, after eulogising his imperial patron, says :—

" Shāhajahān tehi kabina ko dene aganita dān
Tina meṅ Sundara sukavi ko kiyo bahuta sanumān
Naga bhūkhana manasaba dae hai hāthe sarupāy
Prathama diyo kavirāja pada bahura mahākavirāy."

The language of this book is 'Hindi,' but the characters in which this manuscript has been transcribed are Persian. This is, however, by no means an isolated phenomenon. There was a time when Persian script was so popular that books in 'Hindi' were generally written in that script even by Hindus. In my collection alone there is a considerable number of such manuscripts, as the following list will show :—

1. *Rasārṇava* by Sukhdeo Kavi on Nāyikā Bheda, transcribed by Gangādhar in A.H. 1213.

2. *Bhūkhā-bhūkhana* on Alaṅkāra, transcribed in A.H. 1213.

3. *Amara-Chandrikā* by Amareśa on rhetoric.

4. *Rasika-priyā* by Keshodās, composed in Saṁvat 1648.

5. *Rasa-rāja* by Matirām, transcribed by Mannu Lāl, Śiva Prasād, Ummed 'Alī and Tālib Ḥaq in A.H. 1218

6. *Alaṅkāra-muktāvalī* by Rājādhirāj Singh, transcribed in Saṁvat 1859.

7. *Rāma-chandra-chandrikā* by Keshodās, composed in Saṁvat 1658 and transcribed in Saṁvat 1860.

8. *Anekārtha* by Nandūdās.

9. *Nāma-mālā*, transcribed in A.H. 1215.

10. *Anwara-chandrikā* by Anwara.

11-12. Two unknown treatises on Nāyikā-bheda.

13. A miscellany, containing the *dohās* of Raḥīm, Aḥmad, Tulsī Dās, etc.

14. *Līlāvatī-Ṭīkā* by Vidyādhar.

15. *Bhagvad-Gītā* by Hariballabh, transcribed in Saṁvat 1874.

16. A book in Hindi verse by Bihārī Lāl.

With an apology for this digression I return to my subject. The love, rather devotion, of prince Dārā Shikoh to Sanskrit literature is only too well-known.

Even Aurangzeb was not without sympathy for Indian literature. A convincing proof of this fact is a rare Persian work entitled *Tuḥfatu'l-Hind*, a manuscript copy of which is in my collection, and a description of which I propose to give in the following pages. This book was written by Mirzā Muḥammad Ibn Fakhru'd-dīn Muḥammad for Aurangzeb in compliance with his desire to study the peculiarly Indian 'sciences,' and at the request of his foster-brother and vizir, Kokaltāsh Khān. The book comprises an Introduction dealing with the Deva-nāgarī script and Bhākhā Grammar; seven chapters on

(1) *Piṅgal* (or prosody);
(2) *Tuk* (or rhyme);
(3) *Alaṅkār* (or rhetoric);
(4) *Śriṅgār Ras* (or the Indian conception of Love);
(5) *Saṅgīt* (or Indian music);
(6) *Koka* (or sexology);

(7) *Sāmudrik* (or physiognomy); and a conclusion dealing with words, technical terms and allusions commonly used by 'Indians.'

The Introduction has been divided into two parts.

Part I dealing with Hindi script is again divided into four sections as follows :—

Section 1.—Hindi letters according to Persian terminology.

Section 2.—The Hindi alphabet; the consonants common in Hindi, Persian and Arabic, and those peculiar to Hindi; the forms of Hindi letters.

Section 3.—The Hindi vowel sounds.

Section 4.—The Hindi vowel symbols.

Part II of the Introduction deals with the 'Bhākhā' grammar. In the introductory remarks the author says that the languages used by the Indians are many. But those in which books have been written and poetical works have been composed, and which have been approved by good taste and sound judgment are three. Firstly Sanskrit, in which books on various sciences and arts are written, and which is believed by the Indians to be the language of the Upper World, and is, therefore, called *Ākāśa-Vāṇī* or *Deva-Vāṇī*, which means heavenly language or the language of the gods. Secondly Prakrit, in which the praises of kings, ministers and great men are mostly sung. It is supposed to be the language of the Nether World, and is, therefore, also known as *Pātāla-Vāṇī*. It is a mixture of Sanskrit and Bhākhā. Thirdly Bhākhā, in which charming poems are mostly composed and decsriptions of lovers and beloveds are generally given. It is the language of the world in which we live. The term Bhākhā is applied generally to all the languages except Sanskrit and Prakrit, and particularly to the language of Braj, which is a tract of land lying around Mathurā within a radius of four miles. The language of

Braj is the sweetest of all languages, and the language of the places lying in the Doab, *viz.*, the land between the Ganges and the Jumna, for instance Chandwar, is also considered to be sweet.

The author says that he undertook to write this grammar of Braj Bhāshā because that language possessed charming poems, sweet compositions and beautiful descriptions of the Lover and the Beloved, and because it was generally used by poets and men of genius. It is to be noted that the author claims to be the first to write on this subject.

In the chapter on Hindi Prosody one point of special interest is that in discussing the Hindi metres the author gives what could be the corresponding Arabic metres and illustrates them by Persian lines composed by himself. This shows that he had not only a thorough knowledge of Hindi and Arabic prosody but could also put his knowledge of the subject into practice.

In the chapter on Tuk or rhyme it is to be noted that the author says that as he could not find any very systematic book on the subject, he studied all the scattered rules about Tuk and systematised them into a science.

In the chapter on Alaṅkār or rhetoric the author, giving a brief account of the *rasas*, similes, *etc.*, gives the definitions of 17 well-known rhetorical artifices and illustrates them by Hindi and Persian lines, some of which have been composed by the author himself. In the latter part of this chapter the author claims to have invented or discovered four new *alaṅkārs* to which he gives the following names :—

(1) *Ādanta alaṅkāra;*

(2) *Palthā alaṅkāra*, which is of two kinds *Sarva Palthā* and *Viral Palthā*. Each of these two kinds is further divided into two kinds, *Samāta* and *Nimāta*, thus dividing the *Palthā alaṅkāra* into four kinds, *Samāta*

Sarva Palthā, *Nimāta Sarva Palthā*, *Samāta Viral Palthā* and *Nimāta Viral Palthā;*

(3) *Jadhāo alaṅkāra;* and

(4) *Kāntā alaṅkāra.*

The author then proceeds to enumerate and explain the twenty recognised defects of composition. These he generally illustrates by Persian lines or sentences.

In the remaining four chapters I have not been able to find out anything of special importance which I should bring to the notice of the readers.

One remarkable thing about the book is that the author has taken special care to give, wherever possible, Arabic equivalents of the Sanskrit terms which he has used.

FANCIFUL ETYMOLOGIES IN THE DHAMMAPADA

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1. The ancient texts of Indian literature, Sanskrit, Pāli and Prākrit, sometimes give very fantastic and popular etymologies while exposing the nature of certain technical terms. For instance, in the Chāndogya Upaniṣad (I. 2. 10-11) it has been laid down that the sages *Aṅgiras*, and *Bṛhaspati* studied *Prāṇa* and then the names of the sages themselves have been applied to *Prāṇa* in the following words :

'*etamu evāṅgirasaṃ manyante'ṅgānāṃ yadrasaḥ*
etamu eva bṛhaspatim manyante vāgghi bṛhatī tasyā eṣa patiḥ'

This (*Prāṇa*) they consider Aṅgiras as it is the life-fluid of the limbs.

This (*Prāṇa*) they consider *Bṛhaspati*, as speech is *Bṛhatī* and it is her master.

Sometimes the expositor may be clear in his mind about the correct derivation of his terms but at other times he might not have been so. For instance, when the average astrologer reads the following Mantra for propitiating the wrathful *Budha* he forgets that the verse originally was clearly applicable to sacrificial purposes only and that in putting it to his own use he has been led away by the similarity in sounds :

'*udbudhyasvāgne pratijāgṛhi tvamiṣṭāpūrtte sāṃsṛjethāmayaṃ ca. asmin sadhasthe adhyuttarasmin viśve devā yajamānaśca sīdata.*'—Ś. Yajur. 15. 54.

Arise, O Agni, awake and may you and This create *Iṣṭa* and *Pūrta*. In this, the best of sacrifices, may all the deities and the Sacrificer sit down.

Here the astrologer has been visibly led away by the words *budha* and *budhya(sva)* both of which he probably pronounced as *buddha*.

2. In Pāli and Prākrit literature the possibilities of fanciful etymologies were greater than in the case of Sanskrit works as in many cases the writers in the popular language were ignorant of Sanskrit. In the Dhammpada, there are a number of verses which explain the import of the terms used by the Buddhists. *e.g.*,

Verse 218—

Chandajāto anakkhāte manasā ca phuṭo siyā
kāmesu ca appaṭibaddhacitto 'uddhaṃsoto' ti
vuccati.

Verse 222—

Yo ve uppatitaṃ kodhaṃ rathaṃ bhantaṃ va dhāraye
taṃ ahaṃ sārathiṃ brūmi rasmiggāho itaro jano.

These verses are introduced either by *brūmi* 'I say' or by *vuccati* or *pavuccati* 'is called' and may be termed Declaratory. Dhammapada has the following Declaratory verses :

218, 222, 257, 258, 261, 263, 265, 266, 269, 270, 352, 367, 370, 378, 385, 386, 388, 391, 395, 396, 397, 398, 399, 400, 401, 402, 403, 404, 405, 406, 407, 408, 409, 410, 411, 412, 413, 414, 415, 416, 417, 418, 419, 420, 421 and 422

3. In these Declaratory verses one meets with not only fanciful etymologies but also with the denial of correct or incorrect etymologies. The following are the instances of denial found in the Dhammapada :

(*a*) *na tena bhikkhu hoti yāvatā bhikkhate pare*

—Verse 266.

(*b*) *na monena munī hoti*

—Verse 268.

(*c*) *na tena ariyo hoti yena pāṇāni hiṃsati*

—Verse 270.

4. The following are instances of the establishment of fanciful etymologies :

(*a*) *samaṇa* corresponds with Sanskrit *śramaṇa* (*śram* plus *yuc*) but here on account of the similarity in sounds the word has been connected with *śama* (peace) or with *sama* (equality)

yo ca sameti pāpāni . . . samitattā hi pāpānaṃ samaṇo ·

—Verse 265.

samacariyā samaṇo ti vuccati

—Verse 388.

(*b*) *munī* corresponds with Sanskrit *muni* derived by the grammarians as *man* plus *in* (*manerucca* . . . Uṇādi sūtra 4. 123) but here the word is connected with *munāti* ' knows '

yo munāti ubho loke munī tena pa vuccati

—Verse 269.

(*c*) *brāhmaṇo* corresponds with Sanskrit *brāhmaṇaḥ* derived as *brahman* plus *aṇ* but here it is connected with *bāhita* (Skt. *vāhita*) ' banished '

bāhitapāpo ti brāhmaṇo

—Verse 388.

(*d*) *pabbajita* corresponds with Sanskrit *pravrajita* ' one who has gone forth ' but here the word is derived from the causal form of the root in order to give a peculiar meaning

pabbājayam attano malaṃ tasmā pabbajito ti vuccati

—Verse 388.

(*e*) *bhikkhū* corresponds with Sanskrit *bhikṣuḥ* derived from *bhikṣ* ' to beg ' but as shown above the correct etymology has been denied in Verse 266 and an entire-

ly fantastic explanation offered in the following words:

vissaṃ dhammaṃ samādāya bhikkhu hoti na tāvatā.

Similarly, a fantastic explanation of the term *ārya* has been given as follows:

ahiṃsā savvapāṇānaṃ ariyo ti pavuccati

—Verse 270.

4. The derivation of *brāhmaṇo* from *bāhita* suggests the possibility of the actual pronunciation being *bahmaṇo* and not *brāhmaṇo* as found in the manuscripts. The possibility of the pronunciation having changed before an emendation in the written form cannot be denied.

5. The commentary of the Dhammapada, like all other commentaries, abounds in such fantastic etymologies as have been instanced above. Only one example will suffice:

mahesiṃ (Verse 422) which corresponds with Sanskrit *maharṣiṃ* has been explained as

mahantānaṃ sīlakkhandādīnaṃ esitattā mahesiṃ

—Vol. IV, p. 232

SOME DISPUTED DATES IN RAJPUT HISTORY, 1741—1761

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1741

12 May.—Peshwa Bālāji Bāji Rāo visits Sawāi Jai Singh. Next day J. S. returns the visit. On 20 May Peshwa takes leave to depart. [*SPD.* xxi. 2.]

28 May.—Battle of Gangwana between Jai S. and Bakht S. [*Vir.*]

4 July.—Imperial farman issued granting the deputy subahdari of Malwa to Bālāji, under Jai Singh. [*SPD.* xv. p. 86.]

1743

21 Sep.—Sawāi Jai S. dies, Ishwari S. succeeds at Jaipur. [*Vir* and *Vamsa* 3323.]

1744

10 July.—Hāḍā army besieges Jaipur qiladar in Bundi. They storm Bundi; repulse Fakhruddaulah (*en route* to Gujrat as newly appointed subahdar, on a pilgrimage to Ajmer) who had been hired as a partisan. Ummed S. occupied all Bundi territory. Ishwari S. goes to Delhi, war in Bundi suspended for some months. [*Vamsa.* 3354 *et seq.*]

1745

Feb.-March.—Marathas besiege Kota for two months; Jayapa Sindhia's arm wounded by a bullet. [*Vamsa.*]

c. 5 April.—Durjan Sal Hāḍā makes peace by ceding Kāprani to the Marathas.

18 Aug. and following.—Ummed S. Hāḍā defeats Nandram (the Jaipur agent) at Bichḍi, and recovers Bundi fort. But after 16 days another Jaipur army defeats Ummed at Devpur and recovers Bundi. [*Vamsa.* 3401 *et seq.*]

1747

9 Feb.—Rājāmal [or Āyāmal] the Jaipur diwān dies at Delhi. [*SPD.* ii. 1., xxvii. 24.]

1 March.—Haragovind Nātāni, the minister of Ishwari Singh, defeats Madho S., Khande Rao Holkar, Ummed S. and the Maharana at Rajmahal. [*SPD.* ii. 3, 4, 11, xxi. 24; *Vamsa* year wrong, should be 1803.]

March-Sep.—No rain, famine in Rajputana, Udaipur evacuated. [*SPD.* ii. 4, xxi. 19, *Vamsa.* 3449.]

23 Oct.—Kota Rao goes to Nathdwara; Maharana and Madho S. join him. [*Vamsa.* 3355.]

6 Dec.—Maharana's agents (Kishor Pancholi and Jai S. Sagtāwat of Pimpli), with Madho Singh's envoy Kanirām, meet Malhar Holkar at Sātgāon in pargana Ner, and buy his aid. [*SPD.* xxi. 17.]

1748

11 Jan.—Ahmad Shah Abdali seizes Lahor.

2 Mar.—Abdali captures Sarhind.

11 Mar.—Battle of Manupur, Abdali repulsed; Ishwari S. flees away from battle.

15 April.—Emperor Muhammad Shah dies; Ahmad Shah succeeds.

11 May.—Peshwa Bālāji in Jaipur territory. [*SPD.* xxvii. 30.]

29 June.—Bakht S. appointed subahdar of Gujrat. [*DC.*]

1 Aug. *et. seq.*—Battle of Bagru, Ishwari S. defeated. Heavy rain for days together. [*Vamsa,* 3496; *Rajwade*, vi. pp. 291-'92 and 648-'9.]

23 Oct.—Ummed S. recovers throne of Bundi. [*Vamsa,* 3542.]

1749

21 June.—Abhay S. dies; Ram S. succeeds at Jodhpur. [*DC. Vir* gives 19 June.]

Aug.—Ummed S. Hāḍā starts for Satara; *via* Bafgaon (the home of Holkar) reaches Satara, where Rajah Shahu Chhatrapati dies (15 Dec.). [*Vamsa,* 3587.]

9 Dec.—Salabat Kh. Zulfiqar Jang, Mir Bakhshi of the Delhi Empire, reaches Pataudi *en route* to Rajputana.

1750

1 Jan.—Suraj Mal Jat fights Salabat Kh. near Narnol (sarai Sabhachand). [*SPD.* xxi. 26; सुजान चरित्र page 41.]

14 April *et seq.*—Ishwari S. (with Ram S. and Khande Rao Holkar) confronts Salabat Kh. near Riān (south of Merta); artillery duel, peace negotiations. [*SPD*. ii. 16, xxi. 27, 35, *Siyar*, iii. 39.]

May.—Ishwari S. makes peace with Salabat, promising to pay 27 lakhs. [*SPD*. xxi. 25.]

12 July.—Ummed S. returns to Bundi from Puna. [*Vamsa*, 3603.]

July-Aug.—Ishwari S. joins Keshodas Khatri, son of Aya Mal. [*SPD*. ii. 16, 19, xxi. 34, *Vamsa* 3600.]

Sep.—Heavy rain; rivers and nalas in flood. [*SPD*. xxi. 31.]

Sep.—Salabat stays in Ajmer, collecting contributions; leaves for Delhi early Oct. [*SPD*. ii. 23, xxi. 31, 32.]

29 Sep.—Malhar Holkar starts from Khandesh and begins his march on Jaipur. [*SPD*. ii. 19, 22, 23.]

Ishwari S. starts against Rupnagar, to intervene in dispute between brothers. [*SPD*. xxi. 31, 38, ii. 17, 31.]

27 Nov.—Bakht S. defeats Ram S. at Dudāsar tank near Merta. [*SPD*. ii. 15, 17. *Vir* gives 28 Oct., and *Dayal S. Khyat*, 11 Nov.]

12 Dec.—Ishwari S. commits suicide. [*SPD*. ii. 31, 29, *Vamsa* 3611.]

14 Dec.—Khanderao Holkar enters Jaipur city.

27 Dec.—Madho S. arrives at Jaipur, is crowned. [*SPD* ii. 31.]

1751

4 Jan.—Jayapa Sindhia arrives near Jaipur. [*SPD.* ii. 31, but xxvii. 65 gives 6 Jan.]

10 Jan.—Massacre of Marathi visitors by mob in Jaipur city. [*SPD.* ii. 31.]

c. 12 Feb.—Holkar and Marathi army retire from Jaipur territory in order to join wazir Safdar Jang in invasion of Rohilkhand.

5 June.—Maharana Jagat S. II. dies; Pratap S. II. succeeds.

21 June.—Bakht S. drives Ram S. out of Jodhpur; crowns himself. [*Vir* gives 8 July O.S.]

1752

6 March.—Ahmad Shah Abdali enters Lahor, annexes subahs Lahor and Multan.

July.—Bakht S. expects a Maratha invasion in favour of Ram S. near Ajmer. [*TAhS.* 101*a*, corrected.]

21 Sep.—Bakht S. dies at Sonoli village; Bijay S. succeeds in Marwar. [*Vir*, which almost agrees with *Tarikh-i-Ahmad Shahi*, f. 43*b*, which says "Bakht S. was attacked with vomitting on 21 Sep. and died in a few days." *Dayal S.* gives 26 Aug. (wrong).]

1753

9 May.—Civil war between Safdar Jang and Emperor (led by Imad-ul-mulk, Mir Bakhshi) begins.

21 July.—A Bikaner contingent under Bakhtawar S. (diwān of Gaj S.) reaches Delhi to assist the Emperor. [*Tarikh-i-Ah. S.*, 65*b*.]

30 Oct.—Raghunath Rao (brother of the Peshwa) with a vast army enters Kota territory [full itinerary in *SPD.* xxvii. 79.]

16 Dec.—Haragovind Nātāni interviews Raghunath and settles the Jaipur tribute. 17 Dec. Ram S. waits on Raghunath.

1754

10 Jan.—Maharana Pratap S. II. dies [*DC.*]

c. 15 Nov.—Khande Rao Holkar slain at the siege of Kumbher. [*TAhS.*, but 19 March acc. to *D.C.*]

1 July.—Raghunath (at Delhi) detaches Jayapa Sindhia to Marwar to restore Ram S.

End of July.—Jayapa overcomes first Rathor opposition near Kishangarh, and advances.

6 Aug.—Jayapa Sindhia with a Maratha army reaches Merta, to assist Ram S. [*Rajwade*, i. letter no. 37.]

15 Sep.—Ram S. and Jayapa defeat Bijay S. and Gaj S. near Merta [at Chorāsan?] On 17 Sep. Ram S. and Jayapa sack Merta city for three hours. [*Tarikh-i-Alamgir Sani*, 21*a* and *b*.] Nāgor is besieged by them immediately after. [*Lekh* no. 124.]

1755

c. Feb.—Haragovind Nātāni (diwān of Jaipur) dies, Kanirām succeeds. [*SPD.* xxvii, 106, 107.]

21 Feb.—Jayapa's lieutenant captures Ajmer. [*SPD.* xxvii. 105.]

12 Apr.—Jayapa sets out for Marwar. [*Lekh*, 143.]

24 July.—Jayapa murdered in camp before Nāgor. [*T.AlS.* 59*a*, *D.C.*, *SPD.* ii. 48, xxvii. 116, *Lekh* no. 143.]

Early Oct.—Dataji Sindhia defeats Bijay S.'s force near Godowaz. [*SPD*. ii. 49.]

16 Oct. and 20 Oct.—Dataji defeats Anurudh S. Khangarot (Jaipur general) in March to Didwana [*SPD*.]

5 Nov.—Bijay S. escapes from Nāgor to Bikaner, but returns early in Dec.

1756

c. 28 Feb.—Peace between Sindhia and Bijay S. concluded. [*SPD*. ii. 60.]

5 May.—Dataji Sindhia lays siege to Rupnagar, is joined by Shamsher Bahadur; early in June goes to Ujjain. [*SPD*. ii. 62, 63, 65, xxi. 85.]

1758

15 May.—Jankoji Sindhia near Kota. [*SPD*. xxvii. 221.]

Sep.—Jankoji Sindhia and Malhar Holkar go towards Jaipur *viâ* Malpura. Dataji Sindhia at Rupnagar. On the death of the Rao of Kota, Malhar goes to Kota. [*SPD*. ii. 94, 98, xxvii. 230, 236.

1759

c. Nov.—Malhar Holkar fights Madho S. [*SPD*. ii. 107, 113.]

Dec.—Malhar captures Balvada. [*SPD*. xxi. 177.]

1761

3 April.—Maharana Raj Singh II dies, Ari S. II succeeds.

28-29 Nov.—Battle of Mangrol; Malhar routs Jaipur army. [*SPD*. ii. 5, 6, 7, xxi. 92, 93.]

ABBREVIATIONS

[I have given dates in the Old Style or unreformed calendar, which was followed in England till 2 Sep., 1752, when the New Style or reformed calendar was adopted by *adding eleven days*, so that the next day was counted as 14th Sep. The continental nations had reformed their calendar long before 1752. *Vīravinod* gives Christian dates in the New Style, which I have converted here to the Old Style in order to avoid confusion.]

DC.—*Delhi Chronicle*, a Persian MS. described by me in the Proceedings of the Bombay Session of the Indian Historical Records Commission.

T.Ah.S.—*Tarikh-i-Ahmad Shahi*, Br. Mus. Persian MS. Or. 2005.

T.Al.S.—*Tarikh-i-Alamgir Sani*, Br. Mus. Persian MS. Or. 1749.

Siyar.—*Siyar-ul-mutakhkharin*, Persian ed. printed in Calcutta, 1833.

Vamsa.—*Vaṁsha Bhāskar*, in Rajasthani.

Vir.—*Vīra Vinod*, in Hindi.

Dayal S.—*Dayal S. Khyat*, as given in Powlett's *Bikaner Gazetteer*, in Marathi.

SPD.—Selections from the Peshwas' Daftar, ed. by G. S. Sardesai (Bombay Govt. Press).

Rajwade.—*Marāṭhyānchyā Itihāsāchin Sādhanen*, ed. by V. K. Rajwade.

Lekh.—*Aitihāsik Patren Yādi wagairé Lekh*, ed. by G. S. Sardesai and others (Poona, 1930).

Note.—The figure in Roman numerasl gives the number of the volume, and that in Arabic numerals gives the *number* of the letter in the volume, except when *page* is explicitly mentioned.

MĀYĀ IN SĀṄKARA-VEDĀNTA: ITS OBJECTIVITY

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We find Prāṇa thus described by Śaṅkara in his commentary on the Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad . . . " The term Prāṇa is the world seed (बीजात्मना स्थितम्) and Brahma is defined as Sad-Brahma (सद्ब्रह्म) in relation to and in identification with (तदात्मना) the Prāṇa. It is this Prāṇa which before its manifestation existed *as a seed;* it became manifested as this non-intelligent world " (मा० का० भा०, 1. 2). Prior to its manifestation, this world of Nāma-rūpa is called as *Avyakta*. Śaṅkara informs us that the *Prāṇabīja* exists in *Pralaya*, dissolution of this world, also in *Suṣupti*, deep slumber of finite Self, in undeveloped or *Avyākrita* condition, *i.e.*, not yet differentiated in Space and time order.

" In the dreamless sleep (and in Pralaya) the Prāṇa was non-differentiated. Before their birth (*i.e.*, appearance in developed forms of Nāma-rūpa) all objects had their *being* in the form of potential (अव्याकृत) Prāṇa. It then became gradually developed or manifested in Space and time.[1]

" All the universe in the nature of effects and cause, together with the knowing self, enters into the supreme, undecaying Self during sleep . . . and by necessary im-

[1] "अव्याकृतस्य देशकालविशेषाभावात्...अव्याकृत एव प्राणः सुषुप्ते (प्रलये च)...सर्वभावानामुत्पत्तेः प्राक् प्राणबीजात्मनैव सत्त्वम् ।"

plication even in *Pralaya* . . . and that it is produced from thence."[2]

" The world in its prior condition was fit to be called as *Avyakta* (not-manifested), as it was reduced to the state of ' Power of Seed,' devoid of differentiated nāma-rūpa."[3]

This Prāṇa in Avyakta stage is synonymous with Māyā. The Brahma-Sūtra-Bhaṣya says—

"बीजशक्तिरव्यक्तशब्दनिर्देश्या...मायामयी महासुषुप्तिः" (I. 4. 3)

[" *i.e.*, This seed indicated by the term ' Avyakta ' . . . is like the deep slumber consisting of *Māyā*."]

The Māṇḍūkya-bhāṣya states—

"अव्याकृत एव प्राणः सुषुप्ते, प्रलये च...प्राणशब्दत्वमव्याकृतस्य" (मा० का० भा० 1. 2)

[" In the deep slumber and in the Pralaya, the Prāṇa becomes *Avyakta*. . . . The Prāṇa is known by the term Avyakta."]

Behind this Prāṇa or Māyā, there is Brahma as its Substratum (**अधिष्ठान**). This *Avyākṛita* (non-manifested) Prāṇa is not a self-existing entity, but it cannot be explained without referring to the *Being* of Brahma whose energy it is—

"मया अपकृष्टं परित्यक्तं शून्यं तत् स्यात्..... सर्वभूतानां बीजं तदहमर्जुन" (गी० भा०, 10. 39)

[" Anything into which ' I ' have not entered, from which ' I ' am removed, would be without Self (could not exist) and would be void."]

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[2] "समस्तं जगत् कार्यकारणलक्षणं, सह विज्ञानात्मना, परस्मिन्नक्षरे सुषुप्तिकाले संप्रतिष्ठते। सामर्थ्यात् प्रलयेऽपि।...तत एव चोत्पद्यत इति च सिद्धम्"— प्र० भा० 6. 1.

[3] प्रागवस्थायां परित्यक्तव्याकृतनामरूपं बीजशक्त्यवस्थम् अव्यक्तशब्दयोग्यं दर्शयति"—ब्र० सू० भा० 1. 4. 2.

Again

तमोबीजस्य स्वातन्त्र्येण प्रवृत्तिशंका स्यात्, तथा सति सांख्यसिद्धान्तापात इति आश्रयं (substratum) दर्शयति"—(Rāmatīrtha in उप० सा० 17. 27)

[" Some one might think that this ' Seed of Tamas,' *i.e.*, Prāṇa-bīja acts independently and in that case our theory might resemble the Sāṅkhya Prakṛiti; to disarm such suspicion the author (Śaṅkara) shows its Substratum (आश्रय, अधिष्ठान)".]

This seed of Māyā or Prāṇa existing *in* Brahma as its substratum in undifferentiated state identically blended in it, distributed itself gradually into *three* forms—the gross (स्थूल), subtle (सूक्ष्म) and the causal (कारण). Conditions of the Prāṇa—

"तदेवैकं त्रिधा ज्ञेयं मायाबीजं पुनः क्रमात् ।
मायाव्यात्माऽविकारोऽपि बहुधैको जलार्कवत् ॥"

(उप० सा० 17. 27)

[" One seed (of Māyā) gradually divided itself—into three forms. The intelligent Ātmā which is changeless, though one, appeared as many in connection with the three-fold *Māyā*, like the sun appearing as many when reflected in the rippling surface of a lake."]

These three forms of the Prāṇa may be compared with the three states of the finite individual self in its wakeful, dreaming and slumbering conditions respectively. The differentiations into gross states are the products of their subtler condition. The subtle differentiations are again the products of the Causal state which is called as the undifferentiated Causal form or seed-form of the Prāṇa (अव्याकृतप्राणावस्था). All these states were merged in Brahma in Avyakta form.

But what is the *relation* between Prāṇa and its substratum Brahma?

The Avyakta Prāṇa is really the *Swarūpa* (nature) of Brahma itself—

"मम परमेश्वरस्य विष्णोः 'स्वभूता'...माया" (गी० भा०, 7. 14)

[" This Māyā is inherent in Me, Viṣṇu, the Lord."]

"नामरूपबीजभूतात्...सर्वविकारापेक्षया परात् 'अक्षरात्' परं सर्वोपाधि-वर्जितम् 'अक्षरस्यैव' स्वरूपम्" (मु० भा०, 2. 1. 2)

[" The Māyā or Prāṇa, the seed of all names and forms, is termed 'Akṣara,' and this being the *source* of all changes does not itself change. The Brahma which is devoid of all determinations and limitations is the real 'Akṣara.' The former Akṣara—the Māyā-seed—is, in reality, the *Swarūpa, i.e.*, the nature of the Akṣara Brahma."]

There is thus a Swarūpa or Tādātmya relation तादात्म्य। between the Avyakta Prāṇa and Brahma in which it is submerged but not obliterated.

What is Tādātmya?

Śaṅkara defines this tādātmya (तादात्म्य) in his commentary on the Brihadāraṇyaka thus—

"यत्स्वरूपव्यतिरेकेण अग्रहणं यस्य, तस्य, 'तदात्मत्वं' दृष्टं लोके" (2. 4. 7)

[" Something which cannot have any being or action *apart* from that of the other is in *tādātmya* relation with it."]

Prāṇa then has no being or activity *apart* from that of Brahma which is its substratum. In all its successive forms, the Prāṇa works not apart from but in identity with Brahma .

"(नाम-रूपे) 'आत्मतादात्म्येनैव'...सर्वावस्थासु व्याक्रियेते"। (तै० भा०, 2 6)

[" All its differentiations and developments are, in all conditions, in intimate relation with Brahma, not apart from Brahma."]

" 'यदात्मकं' मयि वर्तते स्थितिकाले" (बृ० भा०, 2. 1. 20)

"प्रलये च कलानाम् 'आत्मभावागमनम्' (प्र० भा०, 6. 5)

"(जगत्) ब्रह्मणि लीयते—'तदात्मतया' श्लिष्यति...तद्व्यतिरेकेण अग्रहणात्; तस्मात् 'सर्वमिदं ब्रह्म' "—(छा० भा० 3. 14. 1)

[" The world of Nāma-rūpa exists not apart from Me, but in identity with My Swarūpa (स्वरूप)."]

[" When it disappears the ten-fold *kalā* (*i.e.*, all the differentiations) are merged in My nature and thus existed in identical relation with Me."]

[" In an order—reverse of that of birth, all this dissolves into Brahma—becomes identified with it—thus at all periods of time this universe remains one with Brahma and is never cognised *apart* from it, consequently this universe is Brahma itself, in reality."]

We find then that the Prāṇa or Māyā, when existing unmanifested in Brahma has no being or activity[4] *apart* from Brahma. " The Prāṇa had no independent being of its own or activity apart from Brahma and for this reason the Prāṇa *though existing* cannot violate or interfere with the unity—non-duality—of its substratum."[5] When the differentiations gradually develop under space and time limitations, they do not arise *separated* from or independent of, or apart from, Brahma, and when these differences go on operating (स्थितिकाले), we cannot say that they have made Brahma something else (अन्य) Brahma remains, unaffected, the same substantial being, under the appearance of differences. These differentiations again stand in Tādātmya (तादात्म्य) relation to their cause Prāṇa, as the latter is related to Brahma—its source, its substratum—in the same Tādātmya relation. They cannot make the causal substances something differ-

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[4] "नान्यत् किञ्चन मिषत्"—*i.e.*, "न किञ्चित् व्यापारवत्"—ऐ० भा०, 1. 1.

[5] "स्वतः सत्तावत्के स्वव्यापारे स्वातन्त्र्यमेव स्यात्...अतः अद्वितीयस्य न विरोधः"—Anandagiri in ऐतरेय भाष्य-टीका ।

ent (अन्य); because they are, in reality (परमार्थतः) not something different but express the nature of Brahma.

(2) To the Śruti, this Prāṇa, as soon as manifested, is known as *Sūtra* (सूत्र):—

"तदैतद् हिरण्यगर्भस्य सूत्रात्मनो जन्म, यदव्याकृतस्य जगतो व्याकरणम्"—बृ० भा०, 5. 5. 1

[" The differentiation of the undifferentiated world is the birth (or first manifestation) of *Hiraṇyagarbha* which is *Sūtra*."]

It is called *Sūtra*, because it weaves into itself all the differences of the world. It is this energy which related together all the existences, all the determinations (विशेष 's) in the world. It passes through all, it sustains all, as a piece of thread passes through and contains, in it, all the flowers of a garland.

"अन्यथा सक्तुमुष्टिवत् विशीर्येत"—बृ० भा०, 3. 6. 1

[" Otherwise, if it did not sustain—all the differences of the world of Nāma-rūpa would have been torn to fragments, scattered, like a handful of barley-powders (सक्तु)"]

But we have seen that it cannot act independently; it has Brahma as its substratum, as its source, as its sustaining ground. With a view to impress this fact upon our mind the Śruti calls Brahma as—

"सूत्रस्य सूत्रं, तस्य वै नियन्तारम्" and "प्राणस्य प्राणः"

[*i.e.*, " Brahma is the thread of all threads, it is the controller—the guide—of this thread." " It is the Prāṇa of the Prāṇa."]

Nīlakaṇṭha thus explains:—

" Strike a musical instrument, the strike will produce a general undifferentiated sound—अनुरणन. Then strike it more and more, varieties of sound would now be produced upon it. But all these varieties—these various degrees—high and low—of different sounds would all be heard *accompanied* by the *general anuraṇana* (अनुरणन)

first produced. As a piece of thread enters and touches all the different flowers in a garland, so 'I'—the self has entered and kept constantly touching all the mutually exclusive (व्यावृत्त) finite objects of the world. As the continued identity (अनुगत) remains distinguished from, and unaffected by, mutually exclusive objects, . . . so, I transcend the world."[6]

Each of the objects of the world is finite and it arises from its *negative relation* to others,[7] as Plato says—"in this distinction from each other things are limited and hence many." But as Brahma is present, as *sūtra*, in each, contains everything, the many are also one—Infinite. We thus find that the phenomenal objects are the expression of the active non-phenomenal essences (सामान्य) behind them, and these latter are all involved in the ultimate Essence—Brahma.

We have seen there is *Tādātmya* relation between this Prāṇa and Brahma and through this Prāṇa, Brahma is the Cause of all.

[6] "सामान्यरूपे मयि सर्वे विशेषाः प्रोता दुन्दुभ्यादिदृष्टान्तैः—रसतन्मात्ररूपे मयि सर्वे अब्विशेषाः प्रोताः...सूत्रवत् सर्वत्र अनुस्यूते मयि सर्वं परस्परव्यावृत्तं तत् प्रोतम्...अतः प्रपंचातीतोऽहम्"—गीता, 7. 7 &c.

[7] Sankara's *idea* is in this respect identical with Plato's—"A finite is that which has a limit. If something is limited it follows that beyond the limit, there is another something. Hence to be finite means to be limited by something else, and so on."

"अश्वत्वान्तं गोत्वमिति अन्तवदेव भवति . स च अन्तः (limit) भिन्नेषु वस्तुषु दृष्टः।"

Thus arises a couple and system of many inter-related finite things. But limit, according to Sankara, always involves negation (निवर्तकत्व)—तै० भा० 2. 1 —"The idea of the 'cow' negates or excludes the idea of the 'horse.' This is what keeps one thing separate from another thing. Each one negates or excludes the other cases from it." Thus one finite object negates another finite object. There are therefore series of finite objects —Many.

The Gītā-bhāṣya says—

" When Brahma is said to be not accessible to the thought or word of सत् (Existence), one may suppose it to be असत् (non-existence). To prevent this supposition, the Gītā declares its existence as *manifested* in the upādhis, through the senses of all living beings (13. 12-13). " There must be some self-conscious principle *behind the insentient principles in activity*, such as physical body; for, we invariably find self-consciousness lying behind all insentient objects *in activity*, such as carriage in motion." Brahma the sentient principle is not *actually engaged*(व्यापाराविष्टतया) in the particular activities; and in that supposition Brahma would be as if reduced to पररूप or assuming the character of that, with which it is connected. We should understand, Brahma manifests itself through the upādhis or limitations of the senses, through the *functions* of all the senses; that is to say, the knowable Brahma (ज्ञेय) functions as it were, through the functions of all the senses (' as it were '—*i.e.*, not actually engaged, only seems to be so engaged).

We have found that the term Māyā is used in Vedānta with regard to the world, both in its undeveloped and developed conditions. But there is another term Avidyā or Ajñāna which is often employed in this connection. But this has unfortunately led to a serious misconception. There are people who regard the world to be due to our Avidyā or Ajñāna—a subjective idea of the individual soul.

To a careful reader of Śaṅkarabhāṣya it would appear that a distinction is to be made between the Individual sense of Avidyā and the Cosmic sense of Avidyā. Under the influence of the individual Avidyā or Ajñāna, *we* superimpose the world of Nāma-rūpa on Brahma, and Brahma becoming thus *concealed* from our views, we look

upon the world of Nāma-rūpa as a self-sufficient, separate अन्य, स्वतन्त्र) and independent entity.

"नाम-रूपोपाधिदृष्टिरेव भवति स्वाभाविकी" (vide बृ० भा०, 3. 5. 1)

But Avidyā has got another sense in Vedānta. It is the ' Cosmic Avidyā ' and it is equivalent to Māyā (माया) or the Prāṇa (प्राण) described before.

Take the following passages :—

(1) "ईश्वरस्य आत्मभूते इव 'अविद्याकल्पिते' नामरूपे संसार-प्रपंच-बीजभूते...मायाशक्तिः प्रकृतिरिति...अभिलप्येते, ताभ्याम् 'अन्यः' सर्वज्ञ ईश्वरः" —(बृ० भा० 2. 1. 14)

[" The names and forms are constructed or produced (कल्पित, कृत) by Avidyā. They are, as it were, the self or nature of Īśwara . . . are called Māyā—Śakti or Prakṛiti . . . Īśwara is *distinct* from these names and forms."]

(2) "...अविद्यात्मिका हि सा बीजशक्तिरव्यक्तशब्दनिर्देश्या परमेश्वराश्रया मायामयी"—(ब्र० सू० भा०, 2. 2. 8)

[" The Seed-potency (bīja-śakti) of the world whose self or essence is Avidyā, is indicated by the term Avyakta (unevolved) and its substratum is the supreme Īśvara."]

In the two passages quoted here, *Avidyā* cannot be taken as the ' Individual Avidyā '; for the Avidyā inherent in an individual soul cannot be held to produce nāma-rūpa, cannot be the Cause of the whole material world including our body, senses, etc. Here Avidyā must denote the ' cosmic ' Avidyā or Māyā which is the Cause of the material world.

The ' individual ' Avidyā under whose influence we superimpose the world of nāma-rūpa on Brahma is false and may be destroyed by vidyā (true knowledge); but the ' Cosmic ' Avidyā is not so. The vidyā or true Knowledge destroys the Avidyā or the ignorance of an indivi-

dual and sublates for him the world imposed on, or identified with, Brahma :

"अविद्याध्यस्तो ब्रह्मणि एकस्मिन्नयं प्रपंचो विद्यया प्रविलाप्यते" (ब्र० सू० भा० 3. 2. 21)

But this vidyā is powerless with regard to the 'cosmic' Avidyā which is the causal seed of the world of nāma-rūpa, which *continues to exist* after the Mukti of Jīva or the individual soul.

This distinction in use between the 'Individual' Avidyā and the 'cosmic' Avidyā or Māyā shows conclusively that the world born of the latter is not a mere *subjective appearance*. The world does not vanish into nothingness the moment the individual soul attains Mukti. All that is involved in the attainment of Mukti is the displacement of the *false outlook* (अविद्याध्यस्त) by the true one, and not the annihilation of the world. The final realisation of Vāmadeva who declared his inner conviction by saying—"अहं मनुरभवं सूर्यश्च" does not show that *Manu*, *Sūryya*, etc., disappeared from the world. But since the world is not due to our *individual Avidyā*, its only *locus* is Brahma;—the false error of 'independent being' of the world which may be called as Adhyāsa—this alone disappears in the Mukti, and not the world itself.

In the quotation of the passage marked (1) above, Īśwara is described as *distinguished* from, independent of, the world of nāma-rūpa . . . " "ताभ्यामन्यः सर्वज्ञ ईश्वरः". This part of the commentary clearly shows that the world of nāma-rūpa cannot be our subjective construction. What does our mental construction really signify? It means that in place of supreme self our mind and our senses have constructed a world of nāma-rūpa, that there does not appear to us the supreme self at all, that the supreme self is entirely reduced to the world of names and forms (अविद्याध्यस्त). Such is the influence of our 'Individual Avidyā' or false knowledge. Everywhere, before us,

behind us, only the differences of nāma-rūpas appear and Brahma becomes concealed from our view. The world of nāma-rūpa is thus viewed by us as something separate (**स्वतन्त्र**), self-existent, entirely independent (**"नामरूपोपाधिदृष्टिरेव भवति स्वाभाविकी"**). But it is not a real view. The world is not really the construction of our mind. There is the supreme Brahma who underlies the differences of nāma-rūpa without being affected by them: the differences of nāma-rūpa cannot really conceal Brahma. Hence, Śaṅkara has said—**"ताभ्याम् अन्यः......ईश्वरः"**. If the world of nāma-rūpa were simply the *mental construction* of the finite self, no *distinction* in that case could be made between the world and Brahma, since under Adhyāsa the world would be superimposed on Brahma. But the fact is it is not only necessary to *distinguish* the world from God, it is equally necessary to distinguish it from illusion or *subjective phantasm*.

(*a*) We shall support this view of Ajñāna by Rāmatīrtha's view.

Rāmatīrtha, the most learned interpreter of Śaṅkara, in commenting on the celebrated *Vedānta-Sāra*, has established the important position that *Ajñāna* (**अज्ञान**) must not be understood in the sense of subjective notion of an individual soul.

What he says, we shall quote here :—

"मिथ्याज्ञानजन्यसंस्कारः अज्ञानम्, असत्प्रकाशनशक्तित्वेन असद्वा — इति मतद्वयं निरस्यति ।"

[*i.e.*, " Two doctrines about the Ajñāna are to be rejected, *viz.*, that Ajñāna or *ignorance* is an *impression derived from false cognition* and that it is non-existent (*i.e.*, something merely negative)"].

" The author," says Rāmatīrtha, " now rejects the alternative that ignorance (**अज्ञान**) is an erroneous cognition and a quality of the soul."

His argument is stated below :—

"सत्त्वरजस्तमोलक्षणास्त्रयो गुणाः, कारणमव्याकृतात्मकम् 'अज्ञानं' त्रिरूपेण त्रिगुणात्मकम् । तथा च, गुणस्य गुणवत्तानुपपत्तेर्न मिथ्याज्ञानम् 'अज्ञानम्' इत्यर्थः ।"

[" By reason of the three constituent elements—*Sattwa, Rajas and Tamas*—in the products, the cause—Ajñāna—also is composed of these three constituents. Since, therefore, a quality cannot possess qualities, the erroneous cognition which is a quality of the Soul, cannot be ignorance (*i.e.*, ajñāna); for, it possesses the three constituent elements (*i.e., objective* and not a *quality of the soul*)"].

Thus, refuting the opinion that Ajñāna is a subjective quality of the mind, he now goes on to show that it is positive (भावरूप) and not mere negation, thus :—

"ज्ञानाभावोऽज्ञानमिति मतं निरस्यति"

(*i.e.*, " He refutes the view that the ' ignorance ' is mere *absence of knowledge* ").

Then giving reasons in favour of the *positive* character of Ajñāna, he establishes the fact that it is a sort of relative entity and thus concludes :—

" They beheld the *power* (शक्ति) of *ātmā* self-illuminant, subject to its possessor, embraced by three constituents—Sattwa, Rajas and Tamas . . . Unless the soul were enveloped (आवृत), there could not exist the practical assurance—' it is not,' ' it shines not '—contradictory to another assurance—' it is.' ' it shines '—in the constant self-illumination of the supreme spirit " (Gough's translation).[8]

This आवरण or अज्ञान is explained as तम: (Tamas) with a slight admixture of रज: and सत्त्व.

[8] "देवस्य स्वयंप्रकाशस्य आत्मनः शक्तिमत्परतन्त्रां स्वगुणैः सत्त्वादिभिः निगूढामालिङ्गिताम्...अपश्यत् ।...ब्रह्मणः स्वप्रकाशत्वेन च 'अस्ति' 'प्रकाशते' इति,—तद्विपरीतव्यवहारस्य आत्मनि 'आवरणम्' अन्तरेण च अनुपपत्तिः ।"

(*b*) We shall also give here Śaṅkara's own view as expressed by himself.

Now, we shall show that Śaṅkara himself identified *Ajñāna* with the *Prāṇa-śakti* in his Māṇḍūkyabhāṣya. And this, we think, would be a conclusive proof about the objectivity of Ajñāna. As this is most important, we shall quote him fully.

In describing the conditon of *Pralaya* (and the dreamless *suṣupta* state of the finite self) we find the following observation in Śaṅkara's Brahma-sūtrabhāṣya :-

"मिथ्याज्ञानप्रतिबद्धा विभागशक्तिरनुमास्यते—अपीतावपि; एतेन मुक्तानां पुनरुत्पत्तिप्रसंगः प्रत्युक्तः, सम्यग् ज्ञानेन मिथ्याज्ञानस्य अपोदितत्वात्" (ब्र० सू० भा०, 2. 1. 9)

[" So, at the dissolution of the world (*Pralaya*) the presence of a *Causal potency* of differences—with which the Ajñāna or false notion is bound up—must be inferred. By this, the possibility for the reappearance of those who have already been released is precluded, since their ' false notion ' or *ajñāna* (which binds to Saṁsāra and causes difference) has been destroyed by true knowledge "].

But let us see how Śaṅkara expresses himself describing a *similar condition in his Māṇḍūkya-bhāṣya* :-

"बीजात्मकत्वाभ्युपगमात् सतः । जीवप्रसव—(सर्वपदार्थजातस्य उपलक्षणम्—आ० गि०)—बीजात्मकत्वमपरित्यज्यैव प्राणशब्दत्वं सतः ।... निर्बीजतयैव चेत्, सति प्रलीनानां सुषुप्तिप्रलययोः पुनरुत्थानानुपपत्तिः मुक्तानां च पुनरुत्पत्तिप्रसंगः । बीजाभावाविशेषात् ।"—मा० का० भा०, 1. 2 कारिका ।

[" We are to understand the term Sat (सत्) as containing the *causal seed*. The term ' sat ' denotes *prāṇa*, without leaving out the sense of its causal potentiality which is productive of all objects . . . If we abandon the idea of this *causal seed*, then the possibility for the reappearance of even those who have already been emani-

cipated will arise, along with those not emanicipated; since no productive *causal seed* exists "].

In comparing the two passages quoted above, it would be seen, what Śaṅkara described by the term *Ajñāna-śakti* in the Brahma-sūtra-bhāṣya, is the same as what he called by the term Prāṇa-bīja (the causal seed of Prāṇa) in the Māṇḍūkya-bhāṣya. The Ajñāna or ignorance being bound up with the causal seed of Prāṇa it is clearly an *objective matter* and not merely a *subjective notion*. This *bīja* (बीज) is the cosmic seed or the Prāṇa-energy of the Sat. Thus we find that according to Śaṅkara's own showing the world cannot be a subjective notion of the mind of man. It is called *Ajñāna*, because it is the *other*, *i.e.*, opposite (विपरीत) of jñāna (ज्ञान), or the Absolute Knowledge.

Here, we should like to call our reader's attention to the concluding remarks of Śaṅkara :—

"सबीजत्वाभ्युपगमेनैव सतः प्राणत्वव्यपदेशः, सर्वश्रुतिषु च कारणत्वव्यपदेशः ।...नेति नेति च बीजवत्त्वापनयनेन व्यपदेशः।"

[" In all Śrutis wherever the word 'Sat' has been said we are to take the existence of causal seed—*Prāṇa* with it . . . But where such terms as 'neti,' 'neti' occur in Śruti, Brahma devoid of this causal seed is to be understood." That is to say, Brahma with the causal Prāṇa existing *potentially* in it is to be called as Sad-brahma सद्ब्रह्म). It is this undifferentiated seed (बीज) which differentiated into the modifications of names and forms].

Śaṅkara also adds further down there :—

"इतरान् सर्वभावान् प्राणो बीजात्मा जनयति" (6th Kārikā)
("चेतोंशवो ये तान् पुरुषः पृथक् सृजति विषयाभावविलक्षणान्"

[" It is this *causal seed of Prāṇa* which is the productive cause of all objects of the world "].

[" But the *finite souls* have come out from the Absolute spirit directly, and they are different from the objects (विषय)"].

We see from all this that the *Ajñāna* is not a *subjective* idea merely, as many people erroneously believe; but an *objective* seed or matter which is described by Rāmatīrtha as " coloured by the potentiality of all effects ":—

('समस्तकार्यसंस्कारोपरंजितम्') ।

(*c*) Ānanda-giri, that famous commentator of Śaṅkara, also holds a similar view about Ajñāna. He first of all raises in anticipation an objector's view thus :—

"ननु, अनाद्यनिर्वाच्यम् 'अज्ञानं' संसारस्य 'बीजभूतं' नास्त्येव, मिथ्याज्ञान-तत्संस्काराणामज्ञानशब्दवाच्यत्वात्" ?

[" If some one urges the objection that since the word *Ajñāna* means *false mental conception* and its impressions, there does not exist Ajñāna as the beginningless *causal seed* of the world "].

Anticipating this objection, he discusses this point and gives his own conclusion on the subject thus :—

"अतः 'उपादानत्वेन' अज्ञानसिद्धिः"

[" Thus our conclusion is that—the beginningless Ajñāna is established as *the material cause*, of the world, and it is not a subjective *mental idea* merely "].

In another place also, his conclusion is thus given :—

"परिणामित्वात् तस्य 'परिणाम्युपादानं' वक्तव्यम् । तत्र वियदादेः परिणामित्वमङ्गीकृत्य अव्याकृतं 'परिणाम्युपादानम्' अस्ति ।

[" As the world is modification, it must have a modifiable material cause. Taking into consideration the fact that the ether and others are always transformed from one state into another, we hold that there exists a *transformable* material cause of the world in the form of Avyakta (prior to transformation or differentiation "].

In Śaṅkara's commentary on the Chāndogya Upaniṣad, the remarks made by him about the *Prāṇa* leaves no doubt in our mind that he considered it as a *Pariṇāmi-nitya* (transformable principle) and the Supreme Reality which constitutes the truth of the Prāṇa and stands beyond it as its ultimate Principle is the *Kūṭastha-nitya*. Thus he describes the Prāṇa here :—

"सर्वं क्रिया-कारक-फलभेदजातं प्राण एव, न प्राणाद् बहिर्भूतमस्ति"—(छा॰ भा॰, 7. 15).

[" It is Prāṇa consisting of all varieties of difference bound up in the relation of cause and effect which may be described as विकारानृतब्रह्म and outside of this Prāṇa nothing in the world exists "].

All phenomenal changes take place within this Prāṇa and to this Prāṇa " are fastened all differences as the spokes are fastened to the nave (of a wheel)." But Prāṇa is not the ultimate principle. " There is," Śaṅkara concludes, " a spirit greater and higher than this Prāṇa and he who realises this spirit is the true Ati-vādī (अतिवादी) not he who knows merly the nature of the Prāṇa."

This Prāṇa has been sometimes identified with the *Avidyā* and sometimes with the Māyā, as we have seen in the beginning of this paper.

Māyā or Avidyā is not therefore to be looked upon in Śaṅkara's philosophy as a mere subjective mental notion of the finite self, but it is the material cause of the nāma-rūpas under the control of the Absolute intelligent spirit. Our conclusion is that the Māyā in Śaṅkara's system is not a subjective notion but is *objective* in its character.

THE HYMNS OF SIR WILLIAM JONES

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Though the reputation of Sir William Jones as an Orientalist is quite wide-spread, it is perhaps not equally well-known that he was also a votary of the muse of Poetry and he has a large number of Indian poems to his credit. As an ardent student of Sanskrit Literature, he was naturally attracted to Hindu mythology and it is not surprising that his poetical hymns are all on Hindu gods and goddesses. It has been said of Keats that he was "to Grecian gods near allied" and a similar compliment is due to Sir William Jones with reference to the Hindu pantheon, though it does not imply any adherence to the Hindu faith on his part, nor any comparison in poetic inspiration and genius between the two poets.

The passionate love lyrics of Lawrence Hope in the *Garden of Kama* have made the name of the Hindu god of Love quite popular in recent decades in the West and it is also perhaps not difficult for readers of English Literature to recall the reference to Kama in Tennyson's *Palace of Art*, but Sir William has got a whole hymn to Camdeo containing a glowing tribute to his all-compelling power. He is the

> God of flowery shafts and flowery bow,
> Delight of all above and all below.

and Sir William cannot help asking:

> Can man resist thy power?

Has not Coleridge written in similar strain in the oft-quoted lines?

> All thoughts, all passions, all delights,
> Whatever stirs this mortal frame,

All are but ministers of Love,
And feed his sacred flame.

To an admirer of Kālidāsa and his *Kumārasambhava*, it was not a difficult transition from the subject of Camdeo to that of Durgā. Borrowing his materials from Kālidāsa's poems as Sir William Jones himself tells us in his prefatory note, he has given us an account in his *Hymn to Durga* of the famous episode of Durgā's penance to obtain the love of Śiva and the ultimate realisation of her hope, though at the terrible cost of the destruction of the beautiful form of the God of Love. The hymn has some beautiful passages, as when we are told that she gathered flowers for worship:

On a moon, when edg'd with light,
The lake-born flow'rs their sapphire cups expanded
Laughing at the scattered night,
A vale remote and silent pool she sought,
Smooth-footed, lotos-handed,
And braids of sacred blossoms wrought.

She was restless and in suspense for a long time:

Nor in drops of nectar'd sleep
Drank solace through the night,

but ultimately the radiant quire of the gods sang "strains of bridal rapture." Sir William does not however attempt any description of the final ecstasies of love for he tells his readers modestly,

Gods alone to Gods reveal
In what stupendous notes the immortals woo.

But now the strain is of a higher mood and Sir William writes in his *Hymn to Bhawani* of primeval Śakti or the goddess of Creative Power. Who that lives in Bengal, as Sir William did during his entire sojourn in India, can escape the fascination of the Śakti-cult? There are almost Miltonic touches in his account of the

evolution of creation from the original chaos of the Universe.

When time was drown'd in sacred sleep,
And raven darkness, brooded over the deep,—
Reposing on primeval pillows
Of tossing billows,
The forms of animated nature lay;
Till over, the wide abyss, where Love
Sat like a nestling dove,
From heaven's dun concave shot a golden ray.

The mother of gods, rich nature's queen, spread her genial fire over the earth and it began to teem with myriad forms of life. It is perhaps not necessary to discuss here the extent to which this account of cosmogony is coloured by Christian tradition and is not entirely faithful to the Hindu literature on the subject.

Indra, the Jupiter of the Hindu Pantheon—the parallel is complete, not only in their power and magnificence but also in their peccadilloes!—could not obviously escape treatment in a series of poems of this kind. He holds his great court in Heaven; even inspired bards cannot describe its beauties; who sees it maddens and who approaches dies:

For, with flame-darting eyes.
Around it roll a thousand sleepless dragons;
While from their diamond flagons
The feasting gods exhaustless nectar sip,
Which glows and sparkles on each fragrant lip.

Anybody who ventures to write a hymn to Sūrya, the Sun-god, runs the risk of unfavourable comparison with Keats, because of his *Hymn to Apollo* with its magnificent beginning:

God of the golden bow,
　　And of the golden lyre,
And of the golden hair,
　　And of the golden fire.

There is also Byron's vignette in honour of Apollo in his *Childe Harold*, with its tribute to "the god of life and poesy and light—the Sun in human limbs array'd." Sir William Jones begins with an invocation to the

> Fountain of living light,
> That o'er all nature streams,

and tells of his chariot's flight with its seven horses, common to the mythologies of all nations:

> The coursers fly releas'd:
> Then toss each verdent mane,
> And gallop o'er the smooth aerial vault.

The figure of Lakshmī rising from the ocean of milk must have reminded Sir William Jones of Venus rising from the Paphian sea and he has a hymn in her honour. Her numerous names, implying different manifestations of her beneficent activities are woven into the poem and we have even the story of Sudāman who found his grace through Kṛishṇa told in a few stanzas.

The next poem is a tribute to Nārāyaṇa:

> Spirit of Spirits! who, through every part
> Of space expanded and of endless time,
> Beyond the stretch of lab'ring thought sublime.

He is the source of all life in creation and He

> Glows in the rainbow, sparkles in the dream,
> Smiles in the bud, and glistens in the flow'r
> That crowns each vernal bow'r.

As in the case of the other divinities, he mentions the different manifestations of Nārāyaṇa by enumerating his other names well-known in Hindu Mythology.

It would have been surprising if Sir William Jones had not considered Sarasvatī worthy of a separate hymn. It is there—she receives her full meed of praise as the goddess of learning, the mother of Eloquence and Science who gives primeval truth the unfading bloom of youth

'with pointed reed'—apparently referring to the art of writing on leaves which has been the traditional way of preserving learning in India. The poem is also interesting for a reference to the pilgrim centre of Triveṇī in Allahabad :

> For thy balmy lore
> Drawn from that rubied cave
> Where meek ey'd pilgrims hail the triple wave.

There can be very few pictures more appealing to the student of romance than that of the Descent of Ganges and her flow along the provinces of Hindostan teeming with their millions of inhabitants and Sir William Jones has not escaped its fascination. The *Hymn to Ganga* describes the river from its flow and references are made to its ancient history and to the great cities on its banks well-known in legend and song. She was, according to the poet, the great civilizing influence in India, converting the original barbarism to the arts of peace and civilisation. The godless mountaineer roaming round his thickets drear has fallen before her mildness, wisdom and justice and has been won to peace and gentle virtue. Writing from Calcutta and conscious of the coming in of commerce on the high seas, the Ganges being linked with the great water-ways of the world to-day, Sir William has occasion to mention the British race and invoke a blessing on it :

> Nor frown, dread goddess, on a peerless race
> With lib'rated heart and martial grace
> Wafted from colder isles remote :
> As they preserve our laws and bid our terror cease,
> So be their darling laws preserv'd in health, in joy and peace!

At the conclusion of this brief account of the hymns on Indian subjects written by Sir William Jones, it is

perhaps difficult to suppress some general reflections. It is no use disguising the fact that the poetry of Sir William is not of the highest order. While it is generally futile to analyse the causes of failure in poetry, it is easy to see that the weight of Sir William's scholarship was always a heavy burden on his poetic art, though the lines which have been quoted here, do not give a correct indication of the weakness.

Again, it is only an intense and burning religious faith which can raise compositions on subjects of this kind into the heights of real poetry. Sir William was a devout Christian, though perhaps of a liberal kind and the reader is always kept under the impression that he is writing about divinities who hardly mean anything more to him than the shadowy figures of ancient mythology conjured back to life only for the purposes of scholarship.

It is also a pathetic reflection that the sovereignty of these members of the celestial pantheon is gradually slipping away even from the land of their origin and in the years to come, the hymns will be overshadowed more and more by the handicap of the growing want of faith in their subjects, if not of the actual unfamiliarity of their contents. Shall we join the lament of Schiller that Pan is dead, or on the other hand, rest assured with Elizabeth Browning?—

> What is true and just and honest,
> What is lovely, what is pure—
> All of praise that hath admonisht,—
> All of virtue, shall endure.

THE CONCEPT OF MUKTI IN INDIAN PHILOSOPHY

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What distinguishes Eastern from Western Philosophy is the concept of Mukti or emancipation from the chain of birth and death. It is considered the main goal of human life and is regarded as the most important of the four human pursuits, Dharma, (virtue), Artha, (wealth), Kāma, (enjoyment), and Mukti, (emancipation). It is human to aspire for happiness and avoid misery and pain. But so long as man has the physical body and the senses, he cannot obtain unmixed happiness. If he gets rid of the body and the senses, as he is believed to do in the state of Mukti, he is promised the enjoyment of unmixed happiness or at least the entire cessation of misery and pain. For this purpose a course of virtuous life is chalked out for him. The most important feature of such a life is renunciation of all worldly pleasures and the annihilation of all kinds of desire and hatred. For it is desire and hatred (Rāga and Dvesha) which are considered as the root-cause of birth and death, from which there is no escape.

Now the question is, " Is there a state of Mukti? The possibility of existence of such a state cannot even be dreamt of. Nor is there any proof about the existence of such a state. For man is a mass of desire, anger, and other passions which in all the systems of Indian philosophy are considered as the main cause of the chain of birth and death. Besides, the Vedas enjoin certain duties upon man with a view to the repayment of his three

debts. He has to observe certain duties in order to pay his ancestral debt (Pitṛiṛiṇa), certain other duties to absolve himself from the debt he owes to his preceptors (Ṛishiṛiṇa), some other duties to liquidate the debt due to his gods (Deva-ṛiṇa). Accordngly he cannot give up work and its results which are also the cause of birth and death."

According to Indian philosophers these objections do not hold good: in their view man can free himself from all passions or Kleśas, as they are called. For example, in deep sleep and in deep contemplation (Samādhi) he is free from all passions. The state of Mukti is compared to deep sleep and deep contemplation. The only difference between them is that while in deep sleep he is free from all passions for the time being, he is eternally free from the Kleśas in Mukti. When he wakes up from deep sleep, the Kleśas return to him and trouble him. But when he attains Mukti, that is, when he gets rid of rebirth with a physical body and the senses, he cannot have any Kleśas. Accordingly the Sāṅkhya-sūtra (5, 116) says that man attains Brahmahood in deep contemplation (Samādhi), in deep sleep (Sushupti), and in Moksha (that is, Mukti). Likewise the Bṛihadāraṇyak-opanishat says (2, 1) that Sushupti and Mukti are similar to each other. Desire, hatred, and other passions are the offspring of a vitiated mind. The mind is vitiated by false knowledge (Mithyā-jñāna). If false knowledge is replaced by true knowledge of things (Tatva-jñāna), all passionate thoughts must necessarily disappear once for all.

The Chārvākas do not believe in rebirth and say that death is Mukti, since all kinds of misery disappear in death. The following half verse is quoted as the Chārvāka definition of Mukti:—"Mokshastu maraṇam tach cha prāṇavāyu-nivartanam." (Sarvārthasiddhi 7, 75).

The Buddhists believe in rebirth and say that it is due to Vāsanā or chain of passions implanted in the mind. If passions are got rid of by renunciation of all worldly desires and by true knowledge, there will be no rebirth. Hence death with mind purged of all evil thoughts and passions is Mukti or Nirvāṇa, as they call it. (Ślokavārtika, p 533.)

The Jainas also believe in rebirth and say that when man has purged his mind of all black thoughts, he attains Kaivalya and rises higher and higher in space. He will have no rebirth and no misery or pain.

Some Mīmāṁsakas say that the attainment of the heavenly abode called Svarga by the performance of the Jyotishṭoma sacrifice is Mukti. The Bhāṭṭas say, as we shall see later in detail, that the realisation of one's own innate or intrinsic happiness (Ātmasaukhyānubhava) is Mukti. (Ślokavārtika, p. 534).

The Sāṅkhyas say that when a man releases himself from the bonds of Prakṛiti, Nature, and frees himself from all kinds of passions, he attains Kaivalya, the state of isolating himself from Prakṛiti.

According to Yoga philosophy existence with no attachment to any thing (Kaivalya) is Mukti.

The Vedāntins are of opinion that mere absence of misery is not Mukti. There is also the feeling of happiness (Ānanda) which is the nature of the soul. Hence, Mukti in their view is the attainment of true innate happiness due to the disappearance of passions and false knowledge.

The Naiyāyikas or the Indian Logicians have made a long discussion about the existence and nature of Mukti. (*Vide* Vātsyāyana's commentary on Gotama's Nyāyasūtras, under Apavarga). Mukti is defined as complete destruction of the twenty-one forms of misery; the twenty-one forms of misery are (1) the six senses, (2) the six kinds of

knowledge corresponding to the six senses, (3) the six kinds of objects corresponding to the six senses, (4) the physical body, (5) happiness, (6) and misery. The cessation of these twenty-one kinds of misery is termed Mukti. The idea of such a cessation of misery seems to have dawned on the mind of the Indian logicians from the observance of the state of deep sleep when the six senses are dormant with no sense of sense-objects and the body and of pleasure and pain. But there is no proof to demonstrate the existence of the soul without a body and the senses. For no such thing is perceived. Hence, perception cannot be a proof about its existence. Accordingly the Indian logicians have taken resort to syllogistic argument to prove its existence. Whatever comes into being like a wave one after another forming a chain is perishable like a flame of light which is a chain formed of flashes of light. Hence the chain of miseries is perishable. But Śrīdharabhaṭṭa discussing the nature of Mukti in his Nyāyakandalī refutes the above syllogistic argument and says that the only proof about the existence of a state of Mukti is the Upanishad passage which says that "The Soul being without a body, the feelings of pleasure and pain do not touch him." Udayana is, however, of opinion that the syllogistic argument is sound and acceptable. He also quotes Ṛig. 7, 59 12, and Śvetāśvatara 3, 8 in support of a state of Mukti. "The entire cessation of misery" is acceptable to all schools of Indian philisophy as a definition of Mukti. "Niśśreyasam punaḥ duḥkhanivṛittirātyantikī; atra cha vādināmavivāda eva" (Kiraṇāvalī).

If in the state of Mukti there is neither pleasure nor pain, then the liberated soul may be compared to a man who has fallen senseless. If so, how can such a state be called a Purushārtha, or object of human pursuit? The logicians reply that men care more for avoidance of

misery and pain than for the attainment of positive happiness. It is of frequent occurence that men commit suicide merely for getting rid of their present troubles; such men do not aspire for any happiness after death. There are, some people who undertake painful works with the hope of achieving some happiness in future. Such men may not care for a painless state called Mukti and may rather laugh at it. All that can be said of such people is that they are not fit candidates for our Mukti. Only those whose chief desire is to get rid of all misery and who with that object in view sacrifice all worldly pleasures and enjoyments are fit candidates for our Mukti, no matter if it is merely a state of painless existence. Such a form of Mukti is acceptable to the authors of the Nyāyamañjarī and the Kiraṇāvalī. That it is also acceptable to Gotama, the author of the Nyāyasūtras, is stated by Śrīharsha in his Naishadha. (17, 75.) He says :—

> Muktaye yaśśilātvāya śāstramūche sachētasām,
>
> gotamaṁ tamavetaiva yathā vittha tathaiva saḥ.

"He who taught rational beings a state of stone-like existence called Mukti is verily Gotama (the best ox; also his name); he is as you know him, having understood the above idea.'

Quite different is, however, the view ascribed to him by Mādhava in his Śaṅkaravijaya (16. 68-69). "A conceited logician asked Śaṅkarā that if he were an omniscient man he might distinguish between forms of Mukti in the opinion of Kaṇāda and Akshapāda; if he could not, he might as well give up his claim to omnisciency." The reply is that in the view of Kaṇāda it is a state of existence like the sky with the complete riddance of all qualities (misery is a quality). In the view of Akshapāda, however, it is a state of no misery with the feeling of happi-

ness in addition. In the Sarvasiddhāntasaṅgraha attributed to Śaṅkara the same difference between the views of Kaṇāda and Akshapāda is stated. "The experience of eternal pleasure even in the absence of objects of pleasure is a feature of Moksha (according to Akshapāda). It is better to be a jackal in the beautiful forests of the Vṛindāvana than to be in a state of Mukti devoid of all pleasure, according to the view of the Vaiśeshikas." This difference in the representation of Gotama's view on Mukti between Śrīharsha on the one hand and Śaṅkara and Mādhava on the other can be reconciled by admitting that there have been two schools of commentators on Gotama's Nyāyasūtras. One school is represented by Vātsyāyana and the other by Bhāsarvajña. The latter defines Mukti as "Sukhamātyantikaṁ yatra buddhigrāhyamatīndriyam, taṁ vai mokshaṁ vijānīyāt dushprāpamakṛitātmabhiḥ." ("One should know that to be Moksha where eternal happiness is perceived by the intellect and not by the senses and which is not attainable by the untrained.") Bhūshaṇa, the author of Nyāyabhūshaṇa, a commentary on Bhāsarvajña's commentary on Gotama's Nyāyasūtras, says that the insertion of the word "sukha" in the verse is to refute the view of Kaṇāda. In his commentary on Haribhadrasūri's Shaḍdarśanasamuchchaya, Guṇaratna says that there are seventeen commentaries on Bhāsarvajña's Nyāyasāra and that Nyāyabhūshaṇa is most important among them. Nyāyaikadeśin is another name given to Bhūshaṇa according to Mallinātha. In his commentary on Tārkikarakshā (Khaṇḍa 1, p. 166) he says that the Nyāyaikadeśins (a different school of Nyāya) are the followers of Bhūshaṇa. In his Nyāyapariśuddhi Vedāntadeśika says (Khaṇda 1, p. 17) that Bhūshaṇa has proved that Mukti is a state of perpetual pleasure or happiness. In Sarvamatasaṅgraha the Nyāyaikadeśins are represented as a school rejecting

Upamāna as a Pramāṇa. " Uktaṁ hi Pratyakshānumānāgamapramāṇavādino Nyāyaikadeśinah."

It appears that there was a school of Nyāyaikadeśins long before the time of Bhāsarvajña (about 900 A.D.), for Sureśvarāchārya refers to them in his Mānasollāsa (2, 17—19) and says that the Nyāyaikadeśins accepted only three Pramāṇas. These verses are quoted by Varadarāja in his Tārkikarakshā (p. 166).

In his commentary on the Nyāyasūtras Vātsyāyana refers to a sect of Śaivites, according to whom Mukti is a state of happiness with no misery and refutes their view by interpreting the word " Sukha " in the Āgama-verse quoted by them as " Duḥkhābhāva," absence of misery. It is evident therefore that the verse, " Sukhamātyantikaṁ yatra etc." defining Mukti must have been current at the time of Vātsyāyana (about the 4th Century A.D.). In quoting the verse Vātsyāyana uses the word " Āgama," as " Yadyapi kaśchidāgamassyāt muktasyātyantikaṁ sukhamiti." It is therefore clear that Āgama works were current in his time as Pramāṇa works like the Vedas. It may be said therefore that as Śaivites, Śaṅkara and Mādhava accepted the authority of Āgamas and followed the Nyāyaikandeśins in interpreting Gotama's Nyāyasūtras.

Raghunāthaśiromaṇi refers to the definition of Mukti given by the Bhāṭṭas (Kumārila and his followers) as a state of happiness and refutes it. In the Sarvasidhāntasaṅgraha the Bhāṭṭas are said to have defined Mukti as a state of happiness " Parānandānubhūtissyānmokshe tu vishayādrite." In the Mānameyodaya Kumārila's view on Mukti is stated to be " the Soul's experience of his own intrinsic happiness with complete cessation of all kinds of misery." (Māna. Verse 26). But Pārthasārathimiśra does not ascribe such a view of Mukti to Kumārila. In the Tarkapāda of his Śāstradīpikā in which he

says he has faithfully followed Kumārila's views (Kumārilamatenāhaṁ karishye śāstradīpikām) he says as follows:—" abhāvātmakatvameva svamatam upapattyabhidhānāt. ānandavachanaṁ tu upanyāsamātratvātparamatam. na hi muktasyānandānubhavassambhavati kāraṇābhāvāt. manassyāditi chenna amanaskatvaśruteḥ." (" Its definition as a negative state is his own view, since necessary proof is adduced. Its description as a state of happiness is only an exposition of the view of others. For it is not possible for a Mukta to experience happiness, as he has no mind and other organs. He has no mind, as the Veda denies it to him.") Gāgābhaṭṭa, a later writer on the Mimāṁsā work, Bhāṭṭachintāmaṇi, denies the experience of happiness in Mukti. It is only Nārāyaṇabhaṭṭa that admits the experience of happiness in Mukti.

From the above it is evident that as far back as Vātsyāyana and even earlier than his time there was a school of philosophers who admitted the experience of happiness in Mukti. " Nityaṁ sukhamātmano mahatvavanmokshe abhivyajyate," (" Eternal happiness like the Soul's greatness manifests itself in Moksha ") is a passage found in the Bhāshya of Vātsyāyana on the Nyāyasūtras. The view expressed in the above passage is stated in the commentary as the view of the Advaitins. Raghunāthaśiromaṇi and other logicians say that a liberated soul has no body and mind, and that without a body and the mind there can be no experience of happiness in Mukti. They quote the passage of the Chāndogyopanishat, " The soul having no body, happiness and misery do not touch him " (8, 12) in support of their view. As to the passage of the Taittirīya (2, 6) " Ānandam brahmaṇo rūpaṁ tachcha mokshe pratishṭhitam." (" Happiness is the nature of Brahman and it is eternally perceived in Moksha "), it is explained by them as referring to some kind of happi-

ness which is intrinsic to the soul and for the experience of which the soul requires neither a body nor the mind. But Gadādhara is opposed to this view and he says that the word " Ānanda " in the passage of the Taittirīya quoted above means absence of misery and not a positive form of happiness.

Like the Vedāntins the Jainas also admit the experience of eternal happiness in Mukti. In his commentary called Ratnāvatārikā on the last Sūtra of the Pramāṇanayatattvālokālaṅkāra, Ratnaprabhāchārya says that eternal happiness is experienced in Mukti, and quotes the Āgama verse " Sukhamātyantikaṁ yatra, etc." in support of his view.

Thus while the Buddhists and the logicians deny the experience of eternal happiness in Mukti, the Śaivite school of the Nyāyaikadeśins, the Vedāntins, and the Jainas admit the experience of happiness in Mukti. The latter say that while desire for worldly happiness and pleasure leads to rebirth and its miseries, desire for the eternal happiness of Mukti does not so bind a man and lead him to rebirth.

To sum up: just as the notion of spirit-worship is stated to have its origin in dream, so the notion of Mukti has its origin in sound sleep. The logicians are of opinion that in sound sleep the soul experiences neither happiness nor misery, while the Vedāntins say that there is the experience of happiness in sound sleep. In support of their view the Vedāntins point to the statement which a man awaking from sound sleep makes saying that " sukhamahamasvāpsam, I slept happily." Mukti is accordingly a long sleep with no return to rebirth. Rebirth is a result of desire and hatred which are implanted on the mind of man at the time of his death. If the mind is purged of these and other passions and is, as it were, free from all thoughts, at the time of death, then there is

no likelihood of there being a rebirth. This view of Mukti is common to all schools of Indian philosophers, the Brāhmaṇs, the Buddhists, and the Jainas,

Whether the concept of Mukti is logical or not is a controversial question. The arguments put forward in support of the notion are as endless as those advanced against it. However it was and is still an article of faith with a majority of the Brāhmans, the Buddhists and the Jainas. The effect of this religious sentiment on the social, economical, and political condition of ancient India was, however, for good. The aim being towards the other world, there was no communal conflict. Money being considered as a trash, there was no commercial or political calamity on account of wealth.

SOME UNKNOWN SANSKRIT POETS OF MITHILĀ

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Mithilā has been the centre of Sanskrit learning from time immemorial. No other part of India can boast of an unbroken tradition of scholars from the hoary age of the Vedas. It is only here that we find that from the time of *Janaka* down to the present day a continuous stream of scholarship has been flowing in the land. Although Nyāya has been the speciality of this place, and it can rightly boast of *Uddyotakara*, *Udayana*, *Vācaspati* and others, yet other branches of learning were not neglected here. Another very important contribution which Mithilā has made to Sanskrit learning is in the domain of Dharmaśāstra literature. Mr. P. V. Kane says: "From the days of the Yājñavalkya Smṛti down to the modern times the land of Mithilā has produced writers whose names are illustrious." (Hist. Dharm., p. 363). Even the province of poetry has not been forgotten. It is rather strange that the *nibandhakāras* have been famous as poets also. I propose to deal in this paper with some Maithila poets mentioned in a Sanskrit Anthology by a Maithila, which has preserved the names and verses of many unknown poets otherwise lost to us. As I have been able to find only one MS. of the work, it will not be possible for me to give different readings of the verses. There is only one MS. of this anthology named ***Rasika-jīvana*** in the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute of Poona. I have to thank Mr. P. K. Gode, Supdt. of the MSS. Department, for kindly lending it to me. The book has been referred to by Dr. S. K. De (Sanskrit

Poetics, I, p. 291) and Mr. P. K. Gode (Annals of the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, Vol. XII, pp. 296—399). The latter has tried to fix the date of its author *Gadādhara Bhaṭṭa* as *after A.D. 1650 or the middle of the 17th century A.D.* by means of internal evidence. I have been able to find more evidence which confirms the date arrived at by Mr. Gode.

The book is divided into ten Prabandhas and contains 1562 verses. Out of these, 581 verses are ascribed to their authors or sources and 981 are anonymous. There are 142 authors or works named, a list of which Mr. Gode has given in his article referred to above. I give here the names which are not included in Mr. Gode's list.

Ānandadeva (fol. 31).
Kīkākayi (fol. 5).
Trilocana (fol. 130).
Devagaṇa (fol. 136).
Dhanada (fol. 130).
Nāgamāyā (fol. 5).
Bhaṭṭabīja (fol. 107).
Bhānu (fol. 130 and 134).
Bhāratīkālidāsau (fol. 98).
Bherībhāṁkāra (fol. 2).
Matyupādhyāya (fol. 90).
Madhusūdanasarasvatī (fol. 5).
Muktāpīḍa (fol. 43).
Rāma (fol. 102).
Vaṁśīmiśra (fol. 7).
Vāhinīpati (fol. 111).
Vāhinīmahāpātra (fol. 45).
Śīlābhaṭṭārikā (fol. 73).
Śu-[Śa-]kavṛddhi (fols. 63 and 67).
Harihara (fol. 24).

Gadādharabhaṭṭa gives his parentage in the following verse :—

उमातनूजेन गदाधरेण प्रत्युद्भवं सेवितशङ्करेण ।
गौरीशपुत्रेण रसज्ञहेतोर्विरच्यते कश्चन काव्यबन्धः ॥ (Fol. 1).

The Colophon at the end of the MS. reads :—

इति श्रीभवानीभावनासक्तशाङ्करभट्टदामोदरभट्टसूनुश्रीगौरीपतिसूनुगदाधरभट्टेन विरचिते रसिकजीवने दशमः प्रबन्धः पूर्णः ॥ (Fol. 137).

From this we get the following genealogical table of our author :—

Dāmodarabhaṭṭa
|
Gaurīpati or Gaurīśa
|
Gadādharabhaṭṭa.

The author not only calls *Dāmodarabhhṭṭa* as *Śāṅkarabhaṭṭa*, but whenever he quotes the verses of *Śaṅkarabhaṭṭa* he refers to them as *Śaṅkaragurūṇām*. According to Aufrecht also *Dāmodara* was the pupil of *Śaṅkara* (C.C.I. 250a). It is, therefore, clear that *Śaṅkara* was the preceptor of *Dāmodara*. Now, we learn from Aufrecht that *Gaurīpati*, son of *Dāmodara*, wrote in 1640, a commentary *Ācārādarśabodhinī* on the *Ācārādarśa* of *Śrīdatta* (C.C.I. 172*a*). Therefore, *Gadādharabhaṭṭa* must have flourished somewhere about the year 1660 A.D.

According to Kane, *Śrīdatta Upādhyāya* is one of the earliest *nibandhakāras* of Mithilā; and as he names *Kalpataru*, *Harihara* and *Halāyudha's* work on Śrāddha, he must have flourished later than 1200 A.D. "As *Caṇḍeśvara* mentions his *Samayapradīpa*, *Śrīdatta* must have flourished before the first quarter of the 14th century. If, *Gaṇeśamiśra* mentioned in the *Ācārādarśa* be the same as *Gaṇeśvaramiśra*, the author of *Sugatisopāna* and uncle of *Caṇḍeśvara* (which appears extremely

probable), then *Śrīdatta* flourished a short time before *Caṇḍeśvara* and must have composed his works between 1275 and 1310 A.D." (Hist. Dharm., p. 365). The only verse of *Śrīdatta* found in the *Rasikajīvana* is:—

श्रेयः सदा दिशतु सालसपक्ष्मपाते
निद्रायिते अपि दृशौ भृशमुन्नमय्य।
सवा-[संवा-] ह्यमानचरणाम्बुजजातहर्षो
लक्ष्मीमुखेक्षणपरः परमेश्वरो वः॥ (Fol. 7).

Dāmodarabhaṭṭa, the grandfather of our author, refers to the Moghul Emperor Akbar as *Gājīndrākabarak-ṣitīśvara* in one of his verses quoted below. Therefore, it seems that *Dāmodara* enjoyed the patronage of some king who was at the court of the great Moghul Emperor and must have flourished at about the end of the 16th century A.D. I give here the seven verses ascribed to him in the *Rasikajīvana*:

I. दुरितसमूहवलाहकपटलीसंहरणपवमानम्।
शिवयोरङ्काभरणं वन्दे किञ्चित् गजाननं तेजः॥ (Fol. 2).

II. अहिभूषणोऽप्यभयदः कलितहालाहालोऽपि यो नित्यः।
दिग्वसनोऽप्यखिलेशः तं शशधरशेखरं वन्दे॥ (Fol. 2).

III. ब्रह्मादयोऽपि यदपाङ्गतरङ्गभङ्ग्या
सृष्टिस्थितिप्रलयकारणतां व्रजन्ति।
लावण्यवारिनिधिवीचिपरिप्लुतायै
तस्यै नमोऽस्तु सततं हरवल्लभायै॥ (Fol. 4).

IV. ब्रह्माण्डसम्पुटकलेवरमध्यवर्ति
चैतन्यपिण्डमिव मण्डलमस्ति यस्य।
आलोकितेऽपि दुरितानि निहन्ति यस्तं
मार्त्तण्डमादिपुरुषं प्रणमामि नित्यम्॥ (Fol. 5).

V. जम्बूद्वीपगृहप्रकाशनकरी स्नेहक्षपाधायिनी
नीत्योद्गीर्णमषीततिः खलजनश्रेणीपतङ्गान्तकृत्।
गाजीन्द्राकबरक्षितीश्वरमनश्चिन्तान्धकारापहा
यस्य क्षोणिपतेरराजदधिकं दीपोपमा लेखनी॥ (Fol. 14).

VI. आश्चर्यं समराम्बरे रिपुयशश्चन्द्रप्रतापार्कयोः
सर्वग्रासमयं सदैव तनुते त्वत्खड्गराहुः कथम् ।
किं चान्यत्परलोकनिर्भयभवांस्तस्मिन्प्रहत्योत्सवे
गृह्णाति त्यजतामकम्पहृदयो गन्नां समस्ता भुवः ॥ (Fol. 14).

VII. यत्कीर्तिर्वलयं भुवः सुविमलं सम्पाद्य संचारतः
क्रान्त्वा शीतगिरिं विधाय सरिता नाकस्य सख्यं दृढम् ।
आराध्यामृतभानुशेखरमलं सम्पाद्य तद्रूपतां
गच्छन्ती त्रिदशालयं द्रुतगतिः शीतांशुना स्पर्द्धते ॥ (Fol. 17).

The following eight verses are ascribed to *Śaṅkara-guru*, the preceptor of *Dāmodara* :—

I. हस्तपङ्कजनिविष्टमोदकव्याजसंचरदशेषपुमर्थम् ।
नौमि किंचिदवधूनितशुण्डादण्डकुण्डलितमण्डितगण्डम् ॥
(Fol. 1).

II. संसेवितभृगुतुङ्ग विद्योतितवेदवेदाङ्गम् ।
परिनर्तितभयरंगं मनसिजभङ्गं समाश्रये लिङ्गम् ॥ (Fol. 2).

III. अपर्णैव लता सेव्या विद्वद्भिरिति मे मतिः ।
यया वृतः पुराणोऽपि स्थाणुः सूतेऽमृतं फलम् ॥ (Fol. 4).

IV. सत्त्वादिस्थैरगणितगुणैर्हन्त विश्वं प्रसूय
व्यक्तं धत्ते प्रहसनकरीं या कुमारीति संज्ञाम् ।
मोहध्वान्तप्रसरविरतिर्विश्वमूर्तिः समन्ता–
दाद्या शक्तिः स्फुरतु मम सा दीपवद्देहगेहे ॥ (Fol. 4).

V. धुनोतु ध्वान्तं नस्तुलितदलितेन्दीवरवनं
घनस्निग्धं श्लक्ष्णं चिकुरनिकुरम्बं तव शिवे ।
यदीयं सौरभ्यं सहजसमुपालब्धुमनसो
वसन्त्यस्मिन् मन्ये बलमथनवाटीविटपिनाम् [नः ?] ॥ (Fol. 58).

VI. वहन्ती सिन्दूरं प्रबलकबरीभारतिमिर–
त्विषां वृन्दैर्वन्दीकृतमिव नवीनार्क० [कि] रणम् ।
तनोतु क्षेमं नस्तव वदनसौन्दर्यलहरी–
परीवाहः स्रोतःसरणिरिव सीमन्तसरणिः ॥ (Fol. 59).

VII. हरक्रोधज्वालावलिभिरवलीढेन वपुषा
गभीरे ते नाभीसरसि कृतझंपो मनसिजः ।
समुत्तस्थौ तस्मादचलतनये धूमलतिका
जनस्तां जानीते तव जननि रोमावलिरिति ॥ (Fol. 66).

VIII. न गुणाः क्वापि पूज्यन्ते सत्स्वीकारो हि गौरवम् ।
पीतिमा गुणसाम्येऽपि हरिद्रास्वर्णयोरिव ॥ (Fol. 136).

There are seventeen verses ascribed to *Gadādhara*. Out of these eleven bear the legend *mamāyaṁ* or *mamāyaṁ Gadādharasya* or *mamaite Gadādharasya*. The rest have the word *Gadādharasya* only after them. It is just possible that there was another *Gadādhara* who was different from our author: I give below only those verses which are by our author.

I. आद्दतकुपितभवानीकृतकरमालादिवन्धनव्यसनः ।
केलिकलाकलहादौ देवो वः शङ्करः पायात् ॥

II. विरञ्चिनारायणवन्दनीयो मानं विनेतुं गिरिशोऽपि यस्याः ।
कृपाकटाक्षे..........णानि व्यपेक्षते सावतु वो भवानी ॥

III. उत्फुल्लमानसरसीरुहचारुमध्यनिर्यन्मधुव्रतभरद्युतिहारिणीभिः ।
राधाविलोचनकटाक्षपरम्पराभिर्दृष्टो हरिस्तव सुखानि तनोतु कामम् ।

IV. उमातनूजेन गदाधरेण प्रत्युद्भवं सेवितशङ्करेण ।
गौरीशपुत्रेण रसज्ञहेतोर्विरच्यते कश्चन काव्यबन्धः ॥

V. इहोदाहरणं नानाकविनिर्मितसूक्तयः ।
लिख्यन्ते लक्ष्यवस्तूनां लक्षणान्यपि कुत्रचित् ॥ (Fol. 1).

VI. भिक्षुकोऽपि सकलेप्सितदाता प्रेतभूमिनिलयोऽपि पवित्रः ।
भूतमित्रमपि योऽभयसत्री तं विचित्रचरितं शिवमीडे ॥ (Fol. 3)

VII. सहचरि किं कथयेऽहं मधुविपिने कोऽपि गोपिकातनयः ।
दर्शनले (?) ताद्वनिताचेतोरत्नान्युपादत्ते ॥ (Fol. 8).

VIII. रत्नसानुशिखराङ्गणफुल्लत्कल्पपादपतलेषु निषण्णाः ।
उद्गृणन्ति नृप हंससवर्णं त्वद्यशः प्रवरकिन्नररामाः ॥ (Fol. 17.)

I am doubtful about this verse, as the following line stands at its end :—*mamāyaṁ khaṇḍapraśasteḥ*.

IX. शरासने सायकमादधाने श्रीरामभद्रक्षितिपालमौलौ ।
सुराङ्गनानां वरलालसानां वामानि नेत्राणि परिस्फुरन्ति ॥
(Fol. 19).

X. अस्याः कामनिवासरम्यभवनं वक्त्रं विलोक्यादरा-
न्निश्चित्येव सुधाकरं प्रियतमं भूमीगतं शोभनम् ।
नासामौक्तिककैतवेन रुचिरा तारापि सा रोहिणी
मन्ये तद्विरहासहिष्णुहृदया तत्संनिधिं सेवते ॥ (Fol. 61).

XI. आस्तां दूरतया तदीयवदनांभोजामृतास्वादनं
नेादेत्येव मनेारथोऽपि हृदये तत्सङ्गमाशां प्रति ।
उत्कण्ठाशिथिलीकृताङ्गलतिकं वीक्षेत मामेकदा
सस्नेहं यदि सा सरोजवदना धन्या वयं तावता ॥ (Fol. 80).

There is one verse ascribed to *Maithila*. He seems to be identical with *Maithila Kāyastha* about whom Aufrecht says :—" One of the poets mentioned in *Kavīndracandrodaya*." (C.C.I. p. 468*a*).

समुत्कीर्णे तन्व्या निशितनयनान्तेन मृदिते
स्तनद्वन्द्वस्पन्दैः स्मितलवसुधाभिः प्लुतिमति ।
मदन्तःकेदारे मदनकृषिकारेण जनिता
चिरादाशावल्ली किमिति न फलं हन्त लभते ॥ (Fol. 90).

INDIAN WORDS IN THE *HUMĀYŪN NĀMA*

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The *Humāyūn Nāma* of Gulbadan Begum, a daughter of Bābur, was not available to scholars generally until the unique MS. of the book in the British Museum[1] was carefully edited by Mrs. Annette S. Beveridge with an admirable introduction, an English translation of the text, critical notes, and a very useful biographical appendix.[2] She has tried to make her translation a very faithful one, but as she had to rely on a single MS. and as the text presented difficulties in ascertaining certain words and expressions, some of them not to be found in Persian dictionaries, one may not be inclined to consider her translation and explanations to be accurate in their details.

The first sentence of the text : حکم شده بود is translated as : " There has been an order issued " (p. 83), and the " order issued " is considered by the translator to be the same[3] as " mentioned by Abu'l-Faẓl for the gathering of material for the *Akbar Nāma*." Gulbadan Begum uses the word حکم " command " obviously as a polite form of expression for the request made to her by her nephew, the

[1] Rieu, *Catalogue of Persian MSS. in the British Museum*, London, 1879, Vol. I, p. 246, (Or. 166).

[2] Oriental Translation Fund, New Series I, *The History of Humāyūn* (*Humāyūn Nāma*), by Gulbadan Begum, London, 1902.

[3] *Humāyūn Nāma* (English translation), p. 83, f. n. 1.

Emperor. It has surely nothing to do with the order referred to by Abu'l-Fazl. Similarly, the sentence: "What is he like?" (p. 106) should have been: "Whom does he resemble?"

Some other difficulties:—

(1) ماحاضری (*mā ḥāẓirī*, not *mā ḥāẓarī* as transcribed by Mrs. Beveridge) has hardly any idea of *haste* about it, and cannot be rendered by "a *hasty* meal" (p. 102). Literally it is: "Whatever is ready (in the house to be served)", *i.e.*, "an unceremonious meal." Originally the Persian ending -*ī* (ی) was added to the Arabic ما حاضر "whatever present"; later the word ما "whatever" was dropped and حاضری (*ḥāẓirī*) assumed the sense of "breakfast." Hence, the Anglo-Indian "*chota hazri*." The translator's difficulty seems to have been that ماحضر (*mā ḥaẓar*), and not *mā ḥāẓir* or *mā ḥāẓirī*, was to be found in the dictionaries; but the latter expression occurs twice within six lines of the text (p. 18), and its correctness cannot be doubted, also because an analogous expression exists in the two forms: ما حاصل (*mā ḥāṣil*) and ماحصل (*mā ḥaṣal*) "the result or produce."

(2) پاندان (*pān-dān*) is "a *pān* box" and not "*pān-dishes*" (p. 123). The ending -*dān* does not mean 'a dish,' nor does it justify the plural -*es* in "dishes."

(3) جای نماز (*jāy namāz*) is by no means "an oratory" (p. 124). It is a carpet, *darī* or the like, on which one says his prayers.

(4) توشکهای خیال (*to<u>sh</u>ak-hāy <u>kh</u>ayāl*) are not "all imaginable pillows" (p. 124), but "figured cushions," and زربفت خیال (*zar-baft-i <u>kh</u>ayāl*) is "figured gold brocade."

The Arabic word *<u>kh</u>ayāl* does not only mean "imagination," but also "phantasm, or spectre" and "image or figure" which, for example, you see in a dream or in a mirror, and it is on that ground that in Arabic treatises on optics *<u>kh</u>ayāl* is invariably used as a technical term for

"image." In Persian also the word is found in this sense and has been used by eminent Persian poets:

(1) مگر بخواب به بینم خیال منظرِ دوست — Ḥāfiẓ.

(2) تحریرِ خیال خطِ او نقش بر آب است — Ḥāfiẓ.

(3) بیدار در زمانه ندیدی کسی مرا
در خواب اگر خیالِ تو گشتی مصورم — Ḥāfiẓ.

(4) آئینه‌گدازِ دیده بازان
پیغام دهِ خیال سازان — Faiẓī.

(5) خیال روی تو اندر ضمیرِ من بگذشت
مرا چو آینه شد مغزِ استخوان روشن — Kamāl.

In the same sense the word appears in the Persian composita *fānūs-i khayāl* and *fānūs-i khayālī*, both meaning "a lantern (cylindrical in shape, generally made of paper) in which figures of animals, etc., revolve by the smoke of the candle inside."[4] Also in Urdu literature occur both the forms of the word.[5]

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[4] Tajallī of Yazd: چو فانوسِ خیال این آسیا از دود می گردد

and Ṣā'ib: بر تن باد صبا پیرهن یوسف مصر
از تپ رشك تو فانوسِ خیالی شده است

[5] Nasīm of Lakhna'ū:
آنے لگے بیٹھے بیٹھے چکر ✽ فانوسِ خیال بن گیا گھر

and Zauq: مل گئیں خاك میں جو صورتیں، ہے اُن کا خیال
کیوں نہ فانوسِ خیالي ہو بگولا ہم کو؟

The more popular word in Urdu for this sort of lantern is *shikār-gāh*, literally "a hunting house" or "a hunting box," apparently on account of there being in it the images or shadows of animals of chase.

Mrs. Beveridge has generally followed her text slavishly, and has retained all the mistakes of the MS., and has perhaps added to them her own faulty readings. Thus, we find in the printed text رعنا (*ra'nā*) for the Indian word رانا (*rānā*); خرشالحان for خوشالحان (p. ۲۱.); مرقها for قرمعها (p. ۳۳), etc. Her own faulty readings seem to be responsible for errors like the following :—

p. ۱۵ : هیرانی for حیرانی; p. ۲۱ : ضعیف for ضعف and روندہ for روزه; p. ۲۵ : صابق for سابق; p. ۲۶ : مصمومه for معصومه; p. ۶۸ : استعاع for استماع; p. ۷۰ : بلای for بالای; and p. ۹۴ : بالا for بلا

Her emendation (p. ۲۳) صُفّه داده (*suffah dāda* and the English rendering of it " raised an estrade," p. 107) for the صفا داده (*safā dāda*) of the text is not very plausible, because, if that were the sense, one would expect a phrase like صُفّهٔ راست کرده (*suffa-ī rāst karda*). The author obviously meant to say : " having cleansed the apartment by sweeping it up." The خانه نه (p. ۴۳) I take as an example of dittography and I read simply خانه. This would make foot-note 2 of page 124 superfluous.

Gulbadan Begum wrote her Memoirs in the reign of Akbar, but it is certain that in giving an account of the days of Bābur and Humāyūn she used words and expressions which were then in use in the Persian spoken in the royal palace. Most of the words to be discussed in the following lines had surely been borrowed by the Persian-speaking conquerors of Hindustān long before the days of Akbar, when the two peoples had already come into close contact. Some of the Indian words used by the Princess surprise the reader, and the only inference to be drawn is that the early Mughul invaders adopted Indian manners and customs readily and without any prejudice.

The following words of Indian origin occur in the book :—

پاتر (*pātar*), " a dancing-girl " (p. ۱۲: یك پاتر خاصه از پاتران سلطان ابراهیم), probably used for the Indian dancing-girls employed in the royal palace, is the Hindī पातर of which the diminutive पतुरया (*paturiyā*) is often heard in Oudh.

پاندان (*pān-dān*), " a *pān*-box " with a *chhaparkhat* or a *palang* forms part of the equipment of the royal bed-chamber (p. ۳۳ : در مثمن خورد چهپرکت مرصع نهاده , پاندان و صراحی... and p. ۳۴ : در آن خانه چهپرکت از مرصع ...... انداخته).

" This word," says Mrs. Beveridge, " excites curiosity as to the time when Gulbadan's people learned to eat *pān*." It certainly did not take them very long to appreciate this Indian delicacy, so very much praised by Amīr Khusraw[6] before the Mughuls came to India.

پلنگ (*palang*), " a bed-stead " (p. ۷ : آن طومار را در بقچهٔ روپاك پیچیده بر بالای پلنگ بادشاهي نهادند) It appears from the context that Indian bedsteads were used in the apartments of Humāyūn and their Indian names پلنگ (*palang*) and چهپرکت (*chhaparkhat*) were in common use.

پهر (*pahar*), " a quarter of a day or night," *i.e.*, three hours (p. ۳۷ : تا سه پهر شب مجلس بود .... بعد از سه پهر حضرت آسایش فرمودند and again p. ۸۶ : تا دو پهر و سه گهری شب) Hindī पहर < Sanskrit प्रहर.

تاتو (*tātū*), " a pony " (p. ۷۱ : قوت آن نیست که تاتوئي لاغر توانم خرید). The word is the same as ٹٹو (*ṭaṭṭū*), written after the Persian or rather the Turkish pronun-

[6] The *Qirānu's-Sa'dain*, Aligarh, 1918, p. 185 and elsewhere.

ciation. In Turkish, there being no long vowels, an *alif* is often used to express a short *a*.

تالاب (*tālāb*), "a tank" (p. ۵۸ several times). The original of the word is Sanskrit तडाग (*taḍāga*),[7] the *ḍ* being turned into *ṛ* in Hindī. A further change of *ṛ* to *l* and of *g* to *o*, (or its elision before the *o* of the Śaurasenī ending) gave rise to *talāo*. This last form seems to have been responsible for the Persianised forms *tālāb* (being influenced by the Persian *āb*, also *āo*, "water").

جراءو (*jarā'ū*), "set with jewels" (p. ۱۳ : از جراءو و اشرفی و پارچه...بدهند), if not a scribe's mistake for جواهر, as Mrs. Beveridge conjectures, is the Indian word جڑاءو (*jaṛā'ū*), the equivalent of Ar. مرصع (*muraṣṣa'*).

جمدهر (*jamdhar*) "a dagger" (p. ۳۳ : کمر خنجر مرصع و جمدهر و کهپوۂ مرصع) is one of the many weapons enumerated by Gulbadan Begum while describing the arrangements and decorations of the *Khāna-i ṭilism* set up on the occasion of the commemoration of the accession of Humāyūn. The derivation of the word given by some of the Persian dictionaries as Ar. *janb* "side" and Pers. *dar* "rending" is to be rejected. The aspirate *dh* of the Indian word was naturally simplified to *d* by the Persians, but the word is Indian beyond all doubt, from S. *yamadhārā*, "the sharp edge of death" = यम (H. जम) "the god of death" and धारा "the (sharp) edge" (contracted into धर in Hindī, as is usual in the case of composita).

Besides the ordinary one-pointed *jamdhar*, there were two other kinds in use: *jamdhar-i du-lisāna* "a two-pointed *jamdhar*" and *jamdhar-i se-lisāna* "a three-

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[7] Also *taṭāka* in the *Uttararāmacarita* and elsewhere.

pointed *jamdhar* "[8] (Pers. *du* " two," *se* " three " and Ar. *lisān* " tongue " with the Persian suffix *-a*).

جنگل (*jangal*), a word which allured Kipling so much, occurs only twice or thrice in Gulbadan's work (p. ۹۳).

جیو (*jiu*, the somewhat archaic form of *jī*, " life,") used as a term of endearment and respect (p. ۲۳ : و هرگاه که حضرت عمه جیو تشریف ارزانی فرمایند). Bābur's sister Khānzāda Begum is so addressed by Gulbadan. Later we find the word in شیخو جیو, the pet-name of Jahāngīr.

چوکندی (*chaokhandī*), " an apartment with doors on all the four sides, located on the topmost storey of a building," (p. ۱۳) is a word which became very common in the later Persian literature.[9] and is the Persianized form of *chaokhandī* (= *chao-* " four " + S. खण्ड *khanda* " section " + *ī*), literally " any thing having four sections or sides."

چوکي (*chaokī*), " a watch-post " (p. ۹۳ : تا ... باحتیاط چوکی بدهند " so that they keep a careful watch "); literally " a square seat."

چهپرکت (*chhaparkat*), " a canopied bedstead " (p. ۳۳ and ۳۴, see also under پاندان). H. छप्पर (*chhappar*), " a light (thatched) roof " and खाट (*khāṭ*), " a bedstead."

سیر (*sēr*), " a unit of weight " (p. ۱۳).

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[8] See Egerton of Tatton's *Indian and Oriental Armour*, London 1896; Plate I. Nos. 26, 27 and 32.

[9] *Zuhūrī* : ز چوکندیش سایه بر آفتاب. It also assumed the meaning " a canopied elephant-litter," as will be seen from the following couplet by Sa'īd Ashraf :

چوکندی شکوهش اگر سایه افگند

فیل سپهر شانه بدوزد بزیر بار

کروتی (*karaotī*), " a water-bottle " (p. ٥٨ : ازکروتي خاصهٔ خود بهمه مردم آب می خوراندند).[10] The word seems to be akin to کروا करवा (*karrā*), " a pitcher with spout " = S. करक *karaka* " a water vessel," *karakapātrikā* " a leather vessel for holding water." Dr. Bābu Ram Saksena suggests that *karakapātrikā* > *kararattiā* > *karotī* would be quite a normal development.

کھپوہ (*khapwa*), " a kind of dagger " (p. ۳۳, see also under جمدھر) = *khapwā* (کھپوا खपवा), though not to be found in dictionaries, seems to be a word of popular idiom of Northern India which found its way into Persian books like the *Humāyūn Nāma* and *A'īn-i Akbarī*.[11] According to the latter the price of a *khapwā* ranged between 8 *annas* and 1½ gold *muhurs* (about 14½ *rupees*), whereas the price of a *jamdhar* went up to 2½ *muhurs*. The difference is explicable, as a *jamdhar* may be more elaborate.[12] *Khapwā* may perhaps be derived from *khāp* (खाप, खाँप), " a splinter, a slice," on account of the thinness and sharpness of its blade.

گری (*garī*), " a short space of time equal to 24 minutes " (p. ۱۰ : در دو سه گری) is doubtless our کھڑی, H. घड़ी, घरी. The *Burhān-i Qāṭi'* gives to it the meanings: (1) " any standard of measure for land, cloth, grain, liquids, or time," (2) " 22 minutes and 30 seconds," (3) " clepsydra." This is surely a confusion, examples of which are many in the *Burhān*.[13] The word is surely

[10] " (When the Emperor [Humāyūn] saw men flinging themselves into the wells from thirst, he let anyone drink from his own water-bottle)."

[11] Blochmann's edition, pp. 118 and 119.

[12] Egerton of Tatton, l. c.

[13] Vullers and Steingass follow the *Burhān* and say nothing about the origin of the word. *Gharī* " a measure of liquid and grain " is a different word entirely and is the feminine and diminutive of *gharā* " a pitcher." This word as well as *gharī*

not Persian. The only possibility of its being a Persian word would have been a derivation from the Avestic *gar*, " to be awake " " to keep a watch," had the root not died out.[14] Bartholomae believes the word *gardad* in the Neo-Persian phrase *bīdār gardad* to have a bearing on this word[15] but this is ridiculous.

گرهی (*garhī*), " a citadel " (p. ۲, etc.) is the Hindustānī *gaṛhī* (the diminutive of *gaṛh*).

لری (*larī*), " a string of pearls or the like " (p. ۳۳ : (هر لری دو کرهٔ آینه در پایان - قریب سی چهل لری‌ها ساخته و آویخته). This Hindustānī word لڑی (*laṛī*) shows that the ladies of the royal palace had also learned the Indian fashion of decorating the apartments on festive occasions.

لک (*lak*), " 100,000 " (pp. ۱۱, ۱۷, etc.) = S. लक्ष.

" a fold of cloth " is even to-day in common use in the Deccan, where the author of the *Burhān* apparently picked it up and perhaps considered it to be of Persian stock.

[14] It is not to be found in Middle Persian or Neo-Persian.

[15] *Altiran. Wb.*, Col. 511.

MITHILĀ

LATE RAI BAHADUR LALA SITA RAM, B.A.

MITHILĀ, the birth place of Lady Sītā, consort of Lord Rāma, claims special reverence from natives of Ayodhyā like the present writer, but presuming that the Janaka Vaideha was not the same as Sīradhvaja Janaka, but one of his ancestors, its importance begins at an earlier date. In the *Bṛihadāraṇyaka Upanishad* Janaka Vaideha, its king, appears as the pupil of Ṛishi Yājñavalkya and one of the most earnest seekers after truth. It will be shown further on that Janaka Vaideha was descended from the same stock as the rulers of Ayodhyā.

The origins of the words Videha and Mithilā are purely mythical. The Vishṇupurāṇa which is closely followed by the Bhāgavata gives the following origin of Mithilā, Videha and Janaka :

Origin.

" Nimi, the son of Ikshvāku, instituted a sacrifice that was to last for a thousand years and asked Vasishṭha to preside. Vasishṭha replied that he had already been engaged by Indra in a sacrifice which would last for 500 years and asked him to wait for the period. Nimi made no answer and Vasishṭha thought that he had agreed and went away. Nimi in the meantime employed Gautama and other Ṛishis and started his sacrifice. On the completion of Indra's Yajña, Vasishṭha came in all haste to Nimi but finding Gautama and others employed, he cursed Nimi that he should thenceforth cease to exist in a corporal form. He cursed Vasishṭha in turn and both abandoned their human bodies."

It may be noted here that Nimi accused Vasishṭha of avarice which is not very creditable to Brahmans of the Vedic age.

Vasishṭha was subsequently begotten by Urvaśī. Nimi's dead-body was preserved by oils and scents till the completion of the sacrifice. The gods offered to restore him to life but he declined. The Ṛishis then agitated his body and a boy was produced who was called Janaka on account of his extraordinary birth and Videha, because his father was bodiless. He is also known as Mithi because of his birth from agitation (manth मन्थ्). According to Vālmīki, however,

> Nimi most virtuous man from youth,
> The best of all who love the truth,
> His son and heir was Mithi and,
> His Janak first who ruled the land. (Griffith's translation.)

Pāṇini however derives Mithilā differently,

"मिथिलादयश्च" (३०११६०), मथ्यन्तेऽत्र रिपवो मिथिला नगरी

" Mithilā is the town where enemies are crushed."

In my opinion Pāṇini's explanation is more reasonable. Nimi was a son of Ikshvāku, the founder of the solar line of kings of Ayodhyā. One of his brothers established himself in Viśālā and founded the kingdom of Vaiśālī. Another went to Mithilā giving to his capital a signification cognate to *Ayodhyā* (' that, which cannot be conquered '). Apart from the legend of the Purāṇas, the origin of Videhas I have not been able to trace with any degree of certainty. The Bengal District Gazetteer, Durbhanga (p. 11), says that " according to a legend preserved in Vedic literature, it formed part of the country in which the Videhas settled on their migration from the Punjab. The legend relates that Agni, the god

of fire accompanied the Videhas on their march eastwards from the banks of the Saraswati and when they came to the broad stream of the Gandak, informed them that their home lay to the east of the river. Thenceforward the Videhas lived to the east of the Gandak where they cleared the marshes, cultivated the virgin soil and founded a great and powerful kingdom."

I have not yet been able to trace this legend.[1] In the Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa and the Bṛihadāraṇyaka Upanishad, the learned king who is so inquisitive and is ready to present a thousand kine for each theosophical truth, is Janaka, Vaideha, whose patronage of learning excited the envy of Ajātaśatru, the ruler of the neighbouring kingdom, and who is truly the Janaka (father) of his subjects. I am inclined to believe in the Purāṇa legend so far as it makes Nimi a son of Ikshvāku. Janaka was a great patron of theological learning. If his progenitors like the Vedic Aryans went to Mithilā with the sacrificial fire it evidently establishes their claim to belong to the period immediately succeeding the Vedic. This particular scion of Ikshvāku's family was most strictly religious. If he or one of the immediate descendants by his piety won the title of *Videha* in the strictly theosophical sense of the term, there can be little to be wondered at. Videha makes the nearest approach to the modern *jīvan-mukta* (जीवन्मुक्त). In India monasticity and royal dignity have gone hand in hand in the person of Aśoka the Great. The title won by one of the sovereigns was adopted by his successors, at least one of whom, the Janaka Videha of the *Bṛihadāraṇyaka*, with his teacher Yājñavalkya, has been immortalized as the first enunciator of the principles of Vedānta, afterwards consolidated by Bādarāyaṇa.

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[1] The legend is given in *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa*, I. 4. 1. 10ff. [K. C.]

The boundaries of Mithilā have been settled from time immemorial. According to the Purāṇas it extended from the river Kauśikī (modern Kosi) in the east to Gandak in the west and from the Ganges to the forests of the Himālayas in the north. The forest on the banks of Kosi was known as the Champāraṇya चंपारण्य and the *Śakti-saṅgama-sūtra* therefore gives the following eastern and western boundaries :

Boundaries.

" From the banks of the Gaṇḍaka to the forests of Champā the country is called Videha, also known as Tīrabhukti." The Maharajas of Darbhanga are called Mithileshas and when Akbar granted this country to their ancestors the grant was defined as follows :—

از کوس تا گوس و از گنگ تا سنگ

" From Kos to Gos and from the Ganges to the stone (Himalayas)." Kos is evidently Kosi. Why Gandak should be called *Gos* is not clear.

Mithilā therefore according to the Bengal Gazetteer, Muzaffarpur (p. 151), comprised the present districts of Champaran, Muzaffarpur, Durbhanga, parts of the districts of Monghyr, Bhagalpur, Purnea and the strip of Nepal Tarai lying between these districts and the lower ranges of the Himalayas. This however includes the kingdom of Vaiśālī which was always distinct from Mithilā though at the time of Hiuen Thsang's visit in the seventh century of the Christian era the country was ruled by Saṁvṛijjis or " united Vṛijjis." The boundaries of Vaiśālī are the Great Gandak to the west, little Gandak to the east and the Ganges to the south. Little Gandak also known as Burhi Gandak rises in the Champaran district in the Sumiraon range close to the Harha Pass, enters Muzaffarpur district in the village of Ghosewet and flows in a western direction towards Muzaffarpur which stands

on its southern bank. It then flows parallel to the Baghmati and passes into Durbhanga near Pusan 20 miles S. E. of Muzaffarpur and falls into the Ganges opposite Monghyr. The kingdom of Vaiśālī, therefore, evidently covered a part of the districts of Champaran, Muzaffarpur and Durbhanga. Little Gandak is, however, extremely changeable in its course and old beds which the stream has deserted are very common.

Tirhut.

Mithilā is also known as *Tirhut* which is the modern form of *Tīrabhukti*. *Tīrabhukti* is evidently derived from *tīra* and *bhukti* and my late lamented teacher, Mahamahopadhyaya Pandit Haraprasad Shastri rightly considered it to mean the province bordering on the Ganges and that the word *bhukti* was used in the sense of a province during the eleventh and twelfth centuries. Bhogapati is a very common name for the governor of a province and Bhukti evidently is a much older expression for a province than "Sena kings of Bengal."

"According to a tradition it means the land in which the three mythical *homas* (sacrifices in fire) were performed . . ., one at the birth of Sītā near Sitamarhi, the second at Dhanukha at the foot of the Himalayas, when the great celestial bow of Hara was broken by Rāma and the third at Janakpur, the capital of Mithilā (now in Nepal) at the marriage of Sītā." This signification can be squeezed out by making it Tribhukti (त्रिभुक्ति), but even then we shall have to attach an extraordinary signification to *bhukti*.

Yajñavat.

In the present inquiry however we are concerned only with the geography of Mithilā and it is therefore unnecessary to describe the past history of the country. We shall first of all take up the Yajñavat, the place of the sacrifice, which the Lord Rāma visited first on entering Mithilā after delivering Ahalyā from her curse. Now Sītā is

generally called the '*Devayajanasambhavā*' which Tawney translates as 'sprung up from a sacrifice to the gods,' and which may be more closely rendered as 'born from the sacrificial ground.' The honour of being the birth place of Sītā is claimed by Sitamarhi in Muzaffarpur district though this claim is disputed by Panoura, a place at the distance of one mile, both of which will be described later on. Vālmīki says that this Yajñavat was to the N.E. of the Ahalyāśrama. Sitamarhi is, however, to the south-west of Ahiari and we can only explain the difference by assuming that this Yajñavat is not the same as the Devayajana of Sītā's birth, and this Yajñavat was in the same direction from Ahiari as Janakpur. Construction of the Yajñavedis required very good mathematical knowledge as explained in the Sulbasūtras. Janaka was a great patron of learning and there was no dearth of mathematicians at his court. Probably after mysterious appearance of Sītā the place became too hallowed for another Yajña on the same spot. We may also note that according to the Adbhuta Rāmāyaṇa, Sītā was born in Kurukshetra which by the way is also called Devayajana (*Devā ha satraṁ nisheduḥ . . . 'teshāṁ kurukshetraṁ devayajanamāsa*'—Śatapathabrāhmaṇa). We are, however, perfectly justified in summarily dismissing the claims of this rival in favour of Sitamarhi, a place nearer home. But we shall come to Sitamarhi by and by.

We have yet to determine the locality of this Yajñavat. According to Vālmīki, Janaka came to see the party and asked Viśvāmitra to stop for twelve days during which period the Yajña was expected to be completed and inquired of him all about the young princes who accompained him; Viśvāmitra told him that they were sons of King Daśaratha of Ayodhyā, had killed the demons who used to disturb his sacrifices and restored Ahalyā to her husband.

The news of the reconciliation of his parents was exceedingly gratifying to Śatānanda, whose joy knew no bounds. He related to the young princes the marvellous deeds of the sage who had brought them thither. The next day Janaka invited them to the Yajña and here Viśvāmitra told the king that the princes were anxious to see the bow of Śiva. Janaka replied that he had vowed to give Sītā to the man who could string the bow. He also said that more than one suiter had tried his strength on the bow and gone back disappointed. Viśvāmitra, however, was certain of Rāma's superhuman strength and persisted in his request. Janaka thereupon ordered his servants to bring the bow from the city (pura), which they did in an iron box. It is evident therefore that (1) the bow was broken in the Yajñavat and (2) that Yajñavat was at some distance from the city. Now it is believed that the bow was broken at Dhanukha, 14 miles from Janakpur in Nepal territories, where a stone bow lying over a pond in a wilderness still preserves the record of the memorable exploit. The *Mithilā-tīrtha-prakāśa* says that the bow lies in Kusuma, a village in the Koradi pargana of Nepal. We are thus inclined to think that the Yajñavat was situated on the site of this Dhanukha to the N.E. of Mithilā. Viśvāmitra's party went straight to the place of the sacrifice to which they had been invited. There was a Yajña but certainly not a Dhānusha-Yajña though as the bow was broken there at the same time, the ordinary Vedic Yajña of Janaka assumed the name of Dhānushayajña by which name it has been known to posterity.

It may be noted here that whatever value there may be in the local tradition about the three Yajñas which gave the name of Tribhukti to the province, the second Yajña was certainly performed at the time the bow was broken.

Viśvāmitra stayed in Mithilā, and messengers were sent by Janaka inviting Daśaratha to come and celebrate the marriage of his sons. After the Yajña was completed they must have gone to the capital and awaited the arrival of the marriage party. Before taking up the capital, Mithilā, we must not pass over another important incident which though mentioned by Vālmīki is still generally believed. It is the Lord Rāma's visit to the king's flower garden before the bow was broken. Tradition points to the village of Phulahar in the north east corner of the Beni Patti thānā (of Darbhanga district) as the flower garden where the king's priests used to gather flowers for the worship of the gods and identifies its temple with that of Devī Girijā who was worshipped by Sītā before her marriage with Rāma. (Bengal Gazetteer—Durbhanga, page 11).

The flower garden.

Mithilā is now divided into two portions one of which belongs to Nepal Government and the other lies within British territory. British Mithilā is known as Tirhut division and comprises the districts of Muzaffarpur, Durbhanga, Champaran and Saran.

The old capital of Mithilā lies in Nepal. We have already remarked that at the time of Hieun Thsang's visit it was governed by Vṛijjis who seem to have succeeded the Lichchavis, the precursors of the Guptas, to whom their territory seems to have passed after the marriage of Kumāra Devī with Chandragupta I. It became subsequently a wilderness. Three hundred and fifty years ago one Sūr Kiśor, a Sādhu of the Rāmānandī sect, and a native of Galta in Jaipur State, a great votary of Sītā, was so tormented by robbers that he had to remain for seven days without food. He then composed the following stanzas :—

The capital.

जहँ तीरथ तहँ दुष्ट बास जिविका नहिँ लहिये।
असन बसन जहँ मिलै तहाँ सतसंग न पाहिये ॥
रार चोर बटपार कुटिल निर्धन दुख देहीं।
सहवासिन सेा बैर दूर कहँ बसै सनेहीं ॥
कह सूर किशोर मिले नहीं यथायोग्य चहिये जहाँ।
कलिकाल ग्रस्यो अति प्रबल ह्वै हाय राम रहिये कहाँ ॥

" Wherever there is a holy place, there rogues live and one cannot earn livelihood.

" One cannot get food or raiment nor good company,

" Quarrelsome men, thieves, robbers and paupers torment you

" Even companions become enemies, how far one has to live,

" Says Sūr Kiśor, it is impossible to get the suitable place,

· " The iron age has overpowered us. Alas! Rāma, where am I to live? "

The same night Lady Sītā appeared in a dream and ordered him to go to Mithilā.

Sūr Kiśore left Jaipur and passing through Chitrakūṭ reached Ayodhyā and stopped in Januara, a village described in my note on Ayodhyā. With the help of some sādhus of Ayodhyā he went towards Janakpur and traced the ruins. Here they tried to clear the jungle. An official of the Nepal Government happened to pass that way and on learning the object of their mission promised to give them every assistance. The ruins were cleared and several coins and images were found confirming the tradition that the site was that of Janakpur.

Sūr Kiśor commenced building a temple of Sītā which was completed only a century ago. One of his successors made it over to the Maharaja of Tikamgarh who built a very large temple here of the shape of Kanakbhavan of

Ayodhyā. It is locally called Naulākha. Here the management is entirely in the hands of the Raj officials and food is supplied gratis to poor pilgrims.

The present town of Mithilā is nothing more than a moderate sized village in which there are very few pacca houses. In fact the only pacca house ten years ago was that of the Mahant. To the south of the Mahant's house and adjoining it there is a very large temple of the Lord Rāma and his brothers. To the east of this temple there are two tanks of water, the Gaṅgāsāgar and the Dhanush-sāgar with ordinary flights of steps leading to the water. Adjoining them are temples of Śiva, Jānakī, Rāma and Janaka. To the south of the temple of Śiva and Rāma there is another tank called the Rāmsāgar. To the west of the temple of Rāma adjoining the Mahant's house are Ratnasar, Daśrathkuṇḍa and Agnikuṇḍa. There are several katcha tanks near Janakpur. It is said that there are 72 tanks and 52 kuṭīs of sādhus.

There is a large gathering of pilgrims on the Sudi Chait 9th and in the month of Aghan. The marriage of Rāma and Sītā is then celebrated with great pomp.

The place next in importance to Janakpur is Sitamarhi though it does not seem to have been visited by Rāma. It is the headquarters of the sub-division of that name in Muzaffarpur district. It is situated on the west bank of the river Lakhauti. A large fair takes place in the month of Chait, the principal day being the ninth of Śukla-paksha commonly called the Ramnaumī, the day on which Rāma is said to have been born in Oudh. It was at Sitamarhi that Raja Janaka when ploughing his field drove his ploughshare into an earthen pot. Out of this sprang up the lovely Jānakī or Sītā whose life is described in the Rāmāyaṇa. The tank where she is said to have risen up is still pointed

Sitamarhi.

out but the honour is also claimed by another place, Panoura, situated three miles south of Sitamarhi. (Statistical Account of Bengal, Champaran, page 67.)

In Sitamarhi there are four or five temples in an enclosure in addition to the temple of Śiva. In Panoura a mile to the west there is a tank with a temple of Śiva close to it. It is said that Sītā was found here and after her appearance a tank was built on the spot by King Janaka.

We have disposed of all the localities connected with the subject matter of enquiry. But an account of Mithilā will be incomplete without a description of the principal places of Puranic interest and Puranic "legend inspired by local patriotism makes this tract of country the home of several ṛishis."

Mithilā the home of the learned.

The first and foremost of them whose name has already been mentioned is Yājñavalkya. 'A large banian tree at Jagban near the Kamatoul station of the B.N.W.R. is adored as his hermitage.' Ṛishyaśṛiṅga who was invited by Daśaratha to perform his putreshṭi yajña also belonged to Yogivana (Jagban). Singheshwara in the Madhepur sub-division of Bhagalpur district is stated by Mr. Day to be the site of his āśrama. The Raghopur state is 60 miles to the east of Durbham and Singheshwar is 24 miles to the east of it. There is a temple of Śiva inside an enclosure. In 'Mithilā-tīrtha-prakāśa,' Singheshwar is a shrine dedicated to Śiva and the āśrama of Ṛishyaśṛiṅga is said to be in Yogivana (Jagban) near Ahiari in Jarail pargana. It is called vibhāṇḍakâśrama but Vibhāṇḍaka was the father of Ṛishyaśṛiṅga and we have no reason to believe that he had a separate hermitage.

The Yājñavalkyâśrama of 'Mithilā-tīrtha-prakāśa' lies near Dhanukha in Nepal in the same village (Kusuma).

Of the other ṛishis whose nativity is claimed by Mithilā the name of Gautama has already been mentioned. His āśrama is at Brahmapur at some distance from Ahiari. Kapila, the founder of the Sāṅkhya philosophy, is said to have had his hermitage on the site of Kapileshwar in Janakpur itself though the Bengal District Gazetteer gives the honour to Kakraul to the eastern junction of Kamla and Karaia a little to the west of Madhubani where an image of Śiva is said to have been installed by the sage.

The propounder of the Pūrva Mīmāṁsā is also said to have lived at the junction of Yamuni and Kamla.

I have no materials at my disposal to judge the validity of these claims but there is not the least doubt that Mithilā was from time immemorial a great centre of learning and, though a native of Ayodhyā and a votary of Lord Rāma, must above all worship it as the land which his consort purified by condescending to be born in, "it must be duly honoured as the home where the enlightened and the learned might always find a generous patron, peace and safety, where courts were devoted to learning and culture and where poets and philoshophers lived in honour and affluence." (Bengal District Gazetteer, Durbhanga, p. 22).

And this same Mithilā in recent times is the birth place of the profound scholar Mahamahopadhyaya Dr. Ganga Nath Jha, M.A., D.Litt., LL.D.

NOTES ON THE TRIKĀYA-DOCTRINE

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There are two great processes in India's religious history : on the one side the monistic tendency, beginning in the Veda, developing in the Upaniṣad, finding its philosophical completion in the Vedāntsūtras; the contrary stream runs from the atheistic Buddhism (at least in its fundamentals) to the polymorphous edifice of Mahāyāna. In the latter movement which has become known just in the recent years there is a hardly yet exhausted field for research in religious psychology. How and why the Hīnayāna lost its soil in favour of Mahāyāna is one of the most attractive problems in Indian cultural history. It is true : Hīnayāna has never been, or, only for a very limited time, an undivided, homogenous system. On the other hand, Mahāyāna did not come into existence at once, it had its forerunners, may be latent and in a primitive garb, without the ontological superstructure, even deficient in the principal notions.

But there are many bridges which led from the Hīnayāna to the Mahāyāna. It is the purpose of the following lines to show the possibility of one of those ways in the *kāya*-doctrine,[1] one of the most remarkable and interesting features of the early and developed Mahāyāna.

[1] The previous treatments are quoted in the latest books on that subject: D. T. Suzuki, Studies in the Lankavatara Sutra, London 1930 (cf. also his translation of the Text, London 1932); Nalinaksha Dutt, Aspects of Mahāyāna Buddhism and its Relation to Hīnayāna, London 1930. Some notes by the late Mr. Haraprasāda Shāstri in B. C. Law's Buddhistic Studies, Calcutta, 1931, p. 856 ff.; L. Scherman, Buddha im Fürstenschmuck, Abhandl. d. Bayr. Akad. d. Wiss., phil.-hist. Kl., N. F., 7, 1932, p. 11 f.; L. de La Vallée Poussin, Notes et bibliographie bouddh.

There are the passages in Dīghanikāya. In IX 21 the Buddha asks: What do you understand, Poṭṭhapāda, under the Self?—As material I understand the Self, Sir, possessing a form, consisting of the four great elements, feeding on material food.—And when your Self, P., would be material, possessing a form, consisting of the four great elements, feeding on material food, if it would be so, then, P., your consciousness must be something else and something else your Self. Now, for this reason, you must know this, P., that something else would be the consciousness, something else the Self. May it be so, P., that this Self is material, possessing a form, consisting of the four great elements, feeding on material food, but some phenomena of consciousness of the man in this world come into existence, some phenomena of consciousness cease. For this reason, P., you must know this that something else must be the consciousness, something else the Self. 22. As spiritual I understand the Self, Sir, possessing the main and secondary limbs, not deprived of the organs of sensorial faculties. (The Buddha repeats the arguments, given in 21, with the necessary alterations). 23 Without form I understand the Self, Sir, consisting of consciousness. (The Buddha repeats the arguments *mutatis mutandis*).

D. IX, 39: There exist, P., these three attainments of the Self[2]: the attainment of the material Self, the attainment of the spiritual Self, the attainment of the Self without form. And of which kind, P., is the attainment of the material Self? Possessing a form, consisting of the four great elements, feeding on material food, such

(Mélanges chinois et bouddhiques I, Bruxelles 1932), p. 399 f. —Some scholars have even tried to date the beginning of the *Trikāya*-doctrine; cf. Bibliographie bouddh. II, No. 163, IV-V, No. 68 and J. W. Hauer, Studia Indo-Iranica, p. 126 ff.

[2] *Atta-paṭilābha* means, as Buddhaghosa remarks (Sumaṅgalavil. Vol. II, p. 380) *attabhāva-paṭilābha*.

is the attainment of the material Self. And of which kind is the attainment of the spiritual Self? Possessing a form, being spiritual, possessing the main and secondary limbs, not deprived of the organs of the sensorial faculties, thus is the attainment of the spiritual Self. And of which kind is the attainment of the Self without form? Possessing no form, being consciousness, thus is the attainment of the Self without form.

The essential contents of these passages can be summarized in the sentence: the Self is threefold, (1) material, (2) spiritual, (3) without form.

In Buddhaghosa's Commentary on D. IX. 39 (Sumaṅgalav. Vol. II, p. 380) a connection is constructed with the eschatological or mythological view. He says that by the attainment of the material state of Self the Buddha teaches the existence dominated by delights in the *kāmabhava*, as found with beings from the Avīci up to the Paranimmitta-vāsavatti. The second Self belongs according to Buddhaghosa, to the *rūpabhava*, comprising the first *jhānabhūmi* up to the Akaniṭṭha-Brahmaloka, the third one is reaching from the Ākāsānañcāyatana-Brahmaloka up to the Neva-saññā nāsaññāyatana-Brahmaloka. These three forms of *attabhāva* correspond to the three spheres of existence: the *kāma-*, *rūpa-*, and *arūpa-bhava*. In D. I 3, 10ff. another repartition of *attā* is shown which resembles that of D. IX 21ff. (1) The *attā*, having a form, consisting of the four great elements, having its original (in an act of begetting) by parents, no doubt identical with the *oḷārika*. (2) The second *attā* in §11 is called *dibbo rūpī kāmāvacaro kabaliṅkārāhārabhakkho*. From the term *dibbo* results the superhuman being who owns such an *attā*; Buddhaghosa (l.c. Vol. I. p. 120) therefore refers correctly to the *kāmāvacara-devas*, while the former belongs to the world of men. (3) The third *attā* in D. I. 3, 12, is again divine, possesses a form,

but it is spiritual, though having all main and secondary limbs and is not deficient in the sensorial organs; beings like those belong to the Brahma-worlds, says the commentator. In the §13—16 are *attās* described who have left behind the form, reaching from the plane of the infinite up to the plane where are neither ideas nor no-ideas.

In D. II 83 a monk comes to know: this my body (*kāya*) has a form, consists of the four great elements, has its origin (in an act of begetting) by parents, is a heap of gruel and boiled rice, is not perpetual, subject to rubbing, galling,[3] breaking and destruction. The *kāya* is here described by the same words as the *attā* in I 3, 10, nearly the same as the *oḷārika-attabhāra* in IX 21, especially 39. The monk proceeds in his meditating; when his mind, in this way concentrated, is clear, cleansed, free from blemish, without defilement, tender, ready for work, firm, immovable, he (the monk) directs and bends his mind to the creation of a spiritual body. Thus he creates out from that (material) body another body, possessing a form, being spiritual, possessing all the main and secondary limbs, not deficient in the sensorial organs. The similes in §86 want to illustrate that the spiritual one is enclosed in the material like a sword in the sheath. One would translate that in other words, the spiritual body emanates from the material by the act of meditation. The further step taken by the meditating monk, whose mental conditions are described as in §85. runs thus: he directs and bends his mind to the forms of supernatural (psycho-physical) faculties: being one, he becomes many, being many, he becomes one, till he reaches with his body even up to the Brahma-worlds.

[3] On the ambiguity of these words cf. T. W. Rhys Davids SBB II, p. 87, n. 1.

All these passages show clearly that there has been the conception of different forms of being which has been contaminated with the cosmological system of different beings, namely classes of gods.

In A. III 125 (Vol. I p. 278 f.) the *devaputta* Hatthaka, filling with splendour from his beautiful appearance the whole Jetavana, approaches the Lord; but as he cannot find any support and sinks down, as clarified butter or oil, poured out on sand, trickles down, the Lord says to him: *oḷārikaṁ, Hatthaka, attabhāvaṁ abhinimmināhi*, "take, Hatthaka, a material body." Before Brahmā appears in the assembly of the Tāvatiṁsa a splendid light comes forth from the Northern direction, a splendour becomes visible, surpassing even the majestic glory of the gods; and then appears Brahmā Sanaṁkumāra. *Yadā bhante Brahmā Sanaṁkumāro devānaṁ Tāvatiṁsānaṁ pātu bhavati, oḷārikaṁ attabhāvam abhinimminitvā pātu bhavati. Yo kho pana bhante Brahmuno pakativaṇṇo anabhisambhavanīyo so devānaṁ Tāvatiṁsānaṁ cakkhupathasmiṁ*, "When, Lord, B. S. appears in the assembly of the Tāvatiṁsa gods, he appears by creating for himself a material body. For that which is the natural appearance of B., that, Lord, is unbearable for the sight of the T." (D. XVIII 15; 16; Cf. XIX 15f. =Vol. II, p. 209f., esp. 225f.) Brahmā assumes the appearance of the youth Pañcasikha and by sitting down on the couch of each of the Tāvatiṁsa gods he creates thirty-three shapes of himself (D. XVIII 18=II p. 211). These passages show that the conception of three different appearances, one for men, one for gods and one for the highest being, was, at least in some mythological garb, in existence in the canonical scriptures.

Buddha "the man" is not always the man in the Nikāyas. The A. II 36 (=Vol. II, p. 38) refers to the answers of the Buddha given to the Brahman Doṇa's

questions: He is neither a god, nor a *gandharva*, nor a *yakṣa*, nor a man, he is a Buddha. It is true that this passage must be understood in the sense of Buddha's mentality and Buddhist cosmology, namely that the Buddha is above all the beings, which are bound to be reborn. Nevertheless, the Brahman Doṇa sees on the path where he followed the Buddha in the latter's foot-steps one of the marks of a *mahāpurisa*, the wheel. In D. XVI 3, 41—47 the Buddha expresses his regret that Ānanda did not ask him to live further; for, by his *iddhipāda* the Buddha is able to live for a Kalpa or for a part of it. Wherever the Buddha appears, in the assemblies of men or gods, he assumes the colour and the voice[4] of them; after having instructed them he disappears, and they ask: Who is this who speaks, a god or a man? Who is this who disappeared, a god or a man? (D. XVI 3 21f.) The Kathāvatthu XVIII 1 shows that the question of Buddha's human origin vexed his believers; otherwise the passage would not use the argument of his birth in the Lumbinī. The Commentary (JPTS. 1889, p. 171), quoting the heretical view (*laddhi*) of the Vetulyaka, that the Lord had his origin—*ayoniso*—in the Tusita-heaven, that he sent only a *nimittarūpa* to the earth for teaching the law, in the person of Ānanda (Comm. on Kathāv. XVIII 2), is to some extent not in contradiction with a passage like D. XVI 3, 15: *Bodhisatto Tusitā kāyā*[5] *cavitvā* . . . This his birth-story itself contained all the germs for the development of his supernatural entity.

The passages quoted above (p. 3f.) identify with the material *attā* the *kāya*, they call it possessing a form; the

[4] *Vaṇṇa* and *sara*, the meaning is somewhat doubtful; see PTS. Dict. s. v. *vaṇṇa* 8.

[5] Windisch, Buddhas Geburt 107 n. 1, is right in referring o Lalitav. (ed. Lefmann), p. 60, 15 and explains *kāya* by *nikāya*. But in Latitav. 51, 7 the splendour is coming from the *tathārūpa kāya*.

step to a *rūpa-kāya* was really not far. It is true, we find the term in the Divyāv. first in differentiation from the *dharmakāya*.[6] But we must refer to the verb *abhinimmināti*, occurring so many times in connection with the transformation of the body, and, what must be underlined, also in the Vetulyaka heterodoxy (Comm. Kathāv. XVIII 2), later on substituted by the verb or noun from the root *nirmā*. In the Suvarṇaprabhāsas, II. v. 26 and 28 (p. 15) we find the two bodies *nirmitakāya* and *dharmakāya* only.

The expression *manomaya*, referring to a higher realm of existence, reaches back on the one side to the Upaniṣad, on the other side it can be traced in connection with the *sambhogakāya* unto the Mahāyānistic texts.[7] The suffix-*maya* is explained in Vasubandhu's Abhidh. IV. 113d (=transl. L. de La Vallée Poussin III, p. 234) as "having the nature of something," as, *e.g.*, a *tṛṇamaya gṛha* is a house made of grass. In accordance with that it is said for *manomayakāya*, *manonirjātatvāt* (III 40c =Vol. II, p. 122), because the being comes into existence without any factor like blood and semen; its synonyms are *gandharva*, *antarābhava*. Beings like that belong to the *rūpadhātu*, having a form, all limbs, organs, graceful appearance, colour, are radiating by themselves, able to walk through the air, feeding on joy, living a long time. The very qualities and abilities owned the first men according to D. XXVII 10 (Vol. III, p. 84). The *sambhogakāya* is called on the other hand *manomaya*, made of mind; it is still visible (*rūpavān*).[8] In connection with the suprahuman birth, the *manomayarūpa* of the Tathāgata

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[6] See the passages quoted and discussed by N. Dutt, l. c., p. 103 f.

[7] Cf. L. de La Vallée Poussin, JRAS. 1906, p. 961; on *manomayakāya* in Laṅkāvat. cf. Suzuki, Studies, p. 208 ff., *etc.*

[8] De La Vallée Poussin l. c.

is mentioned often in the Lokottara text, Mahāvastu, I. 218, 15; II. 20, 16. Not to be understood as the *sambhogakāya* of the later Mahāyāna, it must be conceded that a *manomayakāya*, mentioned in the D., must belong to a higher stage of the existence, either in meditation, or in the ontological sense, as divine beings possess it. The *manomayakāya*, according to D. II 83. emanating from the material by meditation, finds its counterpart in a Tibetan text, where *samādhi* is said to be the characteristic of the *sambhogakāya*.[9]

The differentiation of a material and non-material world[10] to which still the deities were subjected led to the conception of the idea that the Buddha must be something higher than those *arūpa*-beings; *dhamma* was in canonical texts already the essence of the Highest, a metaphysical notion, identified with *brahman*, *ātman* and the Buddha himself.[11] This is the sense of the *dharmakāya* as another name, a metaphorical term for the Tathāgata in D. XXVII 9 (Vol. III, p. 84). In the Nāmasaṁgīti still the *dharmakāya* is called free from form (*arūpa*), it rests

[9] Rockhill, The Life of the Buddha, p. 200; in the Laṅkāvat. p. 81, Suzuki, transl., p. 72, Studies, p. 210. Suzuki says, Studies p. 212 (cf. 145, 331), that the *manomaya* is a forerunner of the later *nirmāṇakāya*. I am not so sure. In the Commentary of Buddhaghosa (see above) we have learnt that the second, *manomaya-attabhāva*, belongs to the rūpabhava and reaches up to the Akaniṭṭha-heaven. In the Laṅkāvat. we do not meet with the term *sambhogakāya*, but *Niṣyanda Buddha*, who has his abode in the Akaniṣṭha-heaven, being the highest of all the rūpa-worlds (Text, p. 56, Translation, p. 50, Studies, p. 324). In verse 3 of the 4th Chapter, the Laṅkāvat. says:

pratyātmavedyā śuddhā ca bhūmireṣā mamātmikā,

maheśvaraṁ paraṁ sthānam Akaniṣṭho virājate.

For *Akaniṣṭhaga* as a name of the Buddha, cf. JRAS. 1906, p. 450, 958, 967. That the term *sambhoga* is late, as the idea of a mediate stage of the Buddha between *nirmāṇa* and *dharma*, has been remarked by Dutt, p. 120 f., 326.

[10] In the Canon the *kāmabhava* seems to be a later subdivision of the *rūpa*-world; see PTS. Dict. s. v. *rūpa* 2.

[11] See M. und W. Geiger, Dhamma, p. 76—80.

in the *arūpadhātu*.[12] The third existence, *arūpa-atta-bhāva*, is attributed to the gods from the sphere of unlimited space up to the sphere where there is no idea (*saññā*) nor absence of ideas; or, the *arūpa*-stage is only *vijñāna* (see above). If the Nirvāṇa was above them, it had to be without any mental activity, it was the Absolute. The identity of *nirvāṇa* and *dharma* by the way of old speculations of the absoluteness of *brahman* and its identification with *dhamma* must have been the source of the later speculations on the Absolute.[13] *Dharmakāya* in young Hīnayāna texts show still the immanent correlation between the *rūpa*- and *arūpa*-world, the latter being the substitute for the Absolute, later on the *dharmakāya*.

It would be wrong to try to explain the *trikāya*-doctrine only from a speculative point of view.[14] The steps of development, the occurrence of only two bodies for instance in the Suvarṇaprabha, where, II 28a, *dharmakāyo hi Sambuddhō, dharmadhātus Tathāgataḥ*, shows the conception nearly of the Hīnayāna; but never, unless in distinctly philosophical works, the idea of *trikāya* became free of cosmological, mythological features. To quote the Laṅkāvatāra p.51,7f., in Suzuki's translation

[12] JRAS. 1906, p. 956 and n. 3.

[13] Th. Stcherbatsky, The Conception of Buddhist Nirvāṇa, Leingrad 1927. See the different views according to p. 231 f., esp., p. 26 f.

[14] That means that the philological-historical side of the problems should not be avoided generally. A dictionary of all the terms common to Hīnayāna and Mahāyāna would show the development of meanings, originally without any philosophical intention. E. g., in D. II, 85, IX, 22, 39, the *manomaya attā* is *sabbaṅga-paccaṅgī ahīnindriyo:* in Lalitav. 54, 4 the elephant gets these attributes, cf. the *manomayarūpa* of the Tathāgatas in the Mahāvastu. In Abhidh. III 98 (translation Vol. II, p. 204) the first beings are described in this way. The meaning of *abhinirmā* begins in Hīnayāna texts. The relation between *nirmāṇa-kāya* in Buddhism and *nirmāṇa-citta* in Yoga has been traced by Gopi Nath Kaviraja, The Saraswati Bhavana Studies, Vol. I, p. 47 ff. and by J. W. Hauer, op. cit.

p. 46 : "(Thus the Bodhisattvas) will attain the Tathāgata-body... which entering into the realm of Māyā, reaches all the Buddha-lands, the heavenly mansions of Tushita, and the abode of Akanishṭha[15]."

[15] In connection with the development of the idea of three stages either of the soul or of Buddha, Brahman, Viṣṇu, more could be said, if the chronology of the relevant texts would stand on a more solid basis.

DATE OF SKANDASVĀMIN

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The date of Skandasvāmin depends on the date of Harisvāmin, the commentator of the *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa*. The latter gives valuable information about himself, his relationship to Skandasvāmin and his date. He was the head of the department of law of Vikramāditya, the emperor of Avanti or Mālava. The verse is the following :–

श्रीमतोऽवन्तिनाथस्य विक्रमस्य क्षितीशितुः ।
धर्माध्यक्षो हरिस्वामी व्याख्यां कुर्वे यथामति ॥ [1]

"I Harisvāmī, the head of (the department of) law of H.M. the emperor Vikramāditya, lord of Avanti, am going to explain (the ŚB) to the best of my intellectual effort."

He states that he was a pupil of Skandasvāmin :—

यः सम्राट् कृतवान् सप्त सोमसंस्थास्तथर्क्श्रुतिम् ।
व्याख्यां कृत्वाध्यापयन्मां श्रीस्कन्दस्वाम्यस्ति मे गुरुः ॥

"Śrī Skandasvāmī is my teacher who—a sovereign (among scholars)—established the seven Soma-institutions and having written a commentary taught me the revealed scripture, *i.e.*, the Ṛgveda."

The date is given in the following verse :—

sic. यदाब्दी (= ब्दा) नां कलेर्जग्मुः सप्तत्रिंशच्छतानि वै ।
चत्वारिंशत्समाश्चान्यास्तदा भाष्यमिदं कृतम् ॥ [2]

"This commentary was written when 3700 and another 40 years of the Kali age had passed away."

[1] See my *Indices to the Nirukta*, Introduction, pp. 29, 30.
[2] *Ibid.*

The Kali era began on the 18th of February 3102 B.C. The commentary was thus composed in 638 A.D. We do not know how old was Harisvāmin when he wrote this commentary. But if we take into consideration the maturity of spirit revealed in the commentary, he could hardly have written it say before he was 40 years old, although it may be the work of his old age. But even if we assign the minimum age of 40 years to Harisvāmin in 638 A.D., he would hardly receive instruction in Vedic exegesis from Skandasvāmin say before the age of 20, *i.e.*, 618 A.D. At the time of teaching him, Skandasvāmin had written a commentary on the Ṛgveda. Skandasvāmin must have been at least a middle-aged man when he wrote his commentary on the Ṛgveda, *i.e.*, he would be about 40 years old in 618 A.D. So his date will fall in the last quarter of the 6th century and the first quarter of the 7th century A.D.

But if Harisvāmin was older than 40 in 638 A.D., the date of Skandasvāmin will be pushed back slightly further. This is the only possible conclusion, if we accept the evidence supplied by Harisvāmin. But if this evidence is subjected to a critical examination, it is impossible to accept the statement as it stands. Thus, according to Harisvāmin we must assume the existence of an emperor Vikramāditya at Avanti in 638 A.D. But there was no Vikramāditya at Avanti in 638 A.D. And there could not be any emperor assuming the grand title of Vikramāditya at Avanti in 638 A.D. as Harshavardhana[3] was the undisputed emperor of Northern India from 606 to 647 A.D. The only defeat suffered by him was in 620 A.D.

[3] Harshavardhana cannot be identified with Harsha Vikramāditya mentioned in *the Rājataraṅgiṇī* iii, 125, 128, as this Harsha is called शकारि which is not the title of Harshavardhana of Thanesar.

at the hands of Pulikeśin II when the Narbada was fixed as the southern boundary of his empire. Avanti or Mālava was therefore an integral part of his empire. After 620 A.D. Harsha never met with a reverse and reigned peacefully till 647 A.D. There could be, therefore, no Vikramāditya at Avanti in 638 A.D. And as far as my historical knowledge goes, there was no Vikramāditya at Avanti even during a period of two or three centuries after the death of Harsha.

Let us now see if there was any Vikramāditya in Mālava before the time of Harsha. For this it will be necessary to make a brief survey of the history of Mālava for two or three centuries previous to the reign of Harsha.

The western Satraps ruled over Mālava in the first century A.D. when the Śaka Chashṭana established his kingdom at Ujjain. His grandson Rudradāman I extended his empire in the second century A.D. over the greater part of Western India, including Surāshṭra, Cutch, and Sind. Chandragupta II Vikramāditya slew the last Satrap Rudrasiṁha and annexed Mālava to the Gupta empire about 395 A.D. None of the Western Satraps ever assumed the title of Vikramāditya, so none of them could be identified with the patron of Harisvāmin. Chandragupta II, no doubt, assumed the title of Vikramāditya, but he was not merely the lord of Avanti but of the whole of Northern India. *He could not be appropriately described as merely the lord of Avanti.* For him, this description is unsuitable as it is not comprehensive enough and would suffer from the fault of *avyāpti*. Mālava remained a part of the Gupta empire till it was wrested by the Huns under Toramāna towards the close of the 5th century A.D. Mālava was ruled by the Huns till their leader Mihirakula was defeated by Yaśodharman in c.528 A.D. Yaśodharman was a king of central India. His inscriptions have been discovered at Mandasor, the

ancient Daśapura, about 100 miles from Ujjain. His victory over the Huns must have extended his sway over Ujjain and the rest of Mālava. As he was able to deliver India from the tyranny of the rule of the Huns, he assumed the title of Vikramāditya. As Avanti or Mālava formed the home province of his empire, he could be appropriately described as the lord of Avanti. In my opinion Yaśodharman is the only king who can be identified with the patron of Harisvāmin. The only obstacle which stands in the way of this identification is the date given by Harisvāmin himself. Now the text of the verse—which gives the date—is corrupt and has not been properly preserved. I therefore propose an emendation of the text and read the verse as follows :—

यदादी (=ब्दा) नां कलेर्जग्मुः षट्त्रिंशच्छतकानि वै ।
चत्वारिंशत्समाश्चान्यास्तदा भाष्यमिदं कृतम् ॥

" I wrote this commentary when 3600 and another 40 years of the Kali age had passed away."

This will give the date of the composition of the commentary of Harisvāmin as 538 A.D. Yaśodharman consolidated his kingdom after his great victory over the Huns in 528 A.D. and could thus be the patron of Harisvāmin in 538 A.D.

I may add that after Yaśodharman we do not come across any other Vikramāditya in Mālava. Yaśodharman had a long reign. He died c. 583 A.D. After his death his kingdom fell into pieces. Mālava seems to have become divided into two independent states, one of the Eastern Mālava with its capital at Ujjain[4] and the other of Western Mālava including Valabhī, and Saurāshṭra. Śīlāditya

[4] There is a difference of opinion. Some think Ujjain was the capital of Western Mālava. The division of Eastern and Western Mālava is assumed by most historians but the testimony of Bāṇa shows that there was no such division. He simply speaks of one Mālava only.

the son of Yaśodharman seems to be the ruler of Western Mālava only. But he seems to have lost his independence about 593 A.D. There are a few passages in Bāṇa's *Harsha-charita* which if pieced together give an indication of Śīlāditya's loss of independence. Prabhākaravardhana married Yaśovatī. Although it is not expressly stated, she seems to be the daughter of Yaśodharman. This is shown by her very name. There are several cases on record where the later Guptas named their daughters after the father's name, *e.g.*, Harsha-guptā daughter of Harshagupta was married to Ādityavarman, Mahāsena-guptā a daughter of Mahāsengupta was married to Ādityavardhana, father of Prabhākaravardhana. On the analogy of the practice among the Guptas, it may be presumed that Yaśodharman named his daughter after himself. If Yaśovatī[5] was the daughter of Yaśo-dharman, then Śīlāditya would be her brother, who presented his son Bhaṇḍi to attend upon the sons of Prabhākaravardhana. Bāṇa remarks :—

अस्मिन्नेव तु काले देव्या यशोवत्या भ्राता सुतमष्टवर्षदेशीयं........ भण्डिनामानमनुचरं कुमारयोरर्पितवान्। Ch. IV. p. 149.

"At this very time, the brother of Queen Yaśovatī made over his son named Bhaṇḍi—eight years old—as an attendant on the princes."

Bāṇa does not expressly mention the name of the queen's brother. But as shown above it must be *Śīlāditya*. Ordinarily an independent king would not suffer the humiliation of surrendering his son to attend upon the princes of another king. From this remark of Bāṇa, it is clear that *Śīlāditya* must have been defeated by Prabhā-karavardhana and must have been compelled to surrender his son as a hostage. In this light we can now understand

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[5] The name is spelt as Yaśomatī in Harsha's Madhuban Copper Plate. Ep. Ind., I, 72.

another remark of Bāṇa. In the *Harshacharita*, Prabhākaravardhana is described as मालवलक्ष्मीलतापरशुः, Ch. IV, p. 132, 'an axe to the creeper in the form of prosperity of Mālava.'

Śīlāditya, however, appears to have lost his kingdom altogether. This is indicated by a verse of Kalhaṇa, the author of the *Rājataraṅgiṇī* :—

वैरिनिर्वासितं पित्र्ये विक्रमादित्यजं न्यधात् ।
राज्ये प्रतापशीलं स शीलादित्यपराभिधम् ॥

"He (Pravarasena II of Kashmir) put Pratāpaśīla, also called Śīlāditya, the son of Vikramāditya, on the throne of his paternal kingdom, when he had been driven out by his enemies."

Śīlāditya lost his kingdom but regained it with the help of the Huna King Pravarasena, son of Toramāna.[6] But he was finally crushed by Rājyavardhana in 606 A.D., as is shown by the following remark of Bāṇa :—

तस्माच्च हेलानिर्जितमालवानीकमपि Ch. VI, p. 208.

"Although he (Rājyavardhana) vanquished the army of the Mālava King with the greatest possible ease . . ."

With this defeat the kingdom of the Western Mālava came to an end. This is further supported by the fact that Hiuen Tsang who visited Western Mālava in 641-2 A.D. does not mention any reigning king. His Śīlāditya who ruled 60 years before his visit[7] and who is identified by Sylvain Lévi with the Buddhist Śīlāditya I must be

[6] This Toramāna seems to be different from the father of Mihirakula. See M. A. Stein, *A Chronicle of the Kings of Kashmīr*, Introduction, pp. 82, 141.

[7] V. A. Smith, *The Early History of India*, 4th ed., p. 343. Hiuen-Tsang, *Si-yu-ki*, translated by Beal ii. 261. A reign of 50 years is assigned to Śīlāditya by the Chinese pilgrim. This is almost impossible in the case of Śīlāditya son of Yaśodharman, but will suit Yaśodharman himself, who can be better identified with the Chinese pilgrim's Śīlāditya.

different from the brother-in-law of Prabhākaravardhana. Nothing more is heard of him in the kingdom of Western Mālava. At any rate, Dhruvabhaṭṭa, a nephew of Śīlāditya, and King of Valabhī, was a subordinate king and attended Harsha's assemblies at Kannauj and Allahabad in 643 A.D. Thus in Western Mālava there was no king who could assume the title of Vikramāditya in 638 A.D.[8]

Let us now turn to the kingdom of Eastern Mālava with its capital at Ujjain. After the breakup of the Magadha Empire, the later Guptas are known to have ruled over Eastern Mālava.[9] They probably kept quiet during the reign of Yaśodharman. But after his death, they began to raise their head. They must have thus come into conflict with Prabhākaravardhana who seems to have inflicted defeat and a humiliating treaty on them. By the terms of this treaty, two princes named Kumāragupta and Mādhavagupta were surrendered by the Gupta King of Eastern Mālava as hostages and they were

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[8] A word may be said with regard to the cause of enmity between Prabhākaravardhana and his brother-in-law Śīlāditya. Prabhākaravardhana's matrimonial alliance with Yaśodharman must have given a stimulus to the former's ambition, to which the latter's death must have served as a fillip. Prabhākaravardhana waged a war against the Huns and was probably successful to a certain extent; that is why Bāṇa describes him as 'a lion to the deer in the form of Huns' (हूणहरिणकेसरी ch. IV p. 132). He also fought and vanquished the Kings of Sind, Gāndhāra, Gurjar and Lāṭa (सिन्धुराजज्वरो गुर्जरप्रजागरो गान्धाराधिपगन्धद्विपकूटपाकलो लाटपाटवपाटच्चरः op. cit.). Śīlāditya could not look with equanimity on the growing power and prestige of Prabhākarvardhana. As he himself could not offer effective resistance alone, he reversed the anti-Hun policy of his father Yaśodharman and cultivated friendly alliance with the foreigners. His pro-Hun tendency is shown by the name Bhaṇḍi—a Hunic name—which he gave to his son. This is further proved by the fact that he was restored to his throne by a Hun King Pravarasena II of Kashmir. The pursuit of a pro-Hun policy by Śīlāditya would explain, in my opinion, the cause of estrangement between him and his brother-in-law Prabhākaravardhana.

[9] Rama Shankar Tripathi: Early Position of Harṣa, Malaviya Commemoration Volume, p. 265.

appointed to attend upon the sons of Prabhākaravardhana.. This trend of events is indicated by the following passage from *the Harshacharita* of Bāṇa :—

परीक्षितौ शुची विनीतौ विक्रान्तावभिरूपौ मालवराजपुत्रौ भ्रातरौ..... कुमारगुप्तमाधवगुप्तावस्माभिर्भवतोरनुचरत्वार्थमिमौ निर्दिष्टौ ।

"I (Prabhākaravardhana) have appointed these two princes, the brothers Kumāragupta and Mādhavagupta, sons of the King of Mālava, who have been tested, who are pure, modest, spirited and goodlooking, *to attend* upon you."

Both the princes are then brought in. The scene of their entrance is thus described by Bāṇa :—

प्रविश्य च दूरादेव चतुर्भिरङ्गैरुत्तमाङ्गेन च गां स्पृशन्तौ नमश्चक्रतुः । स्निग्धनरेन्द्रदृष्टिनिर्दिष्टामुचितां भूमिं भेजाते । मुहूर्तं च स्थित्वा भूपतिरादिदेश तौ—'अद्यप्रभृति भवद्भ्यां कुमारावनुवर्तनीयौ' इति । 'यथाज्ञापयति देवः' इति मेदिनीदोलायमानमौलिभ्यामुत्थाय राज्यवर्धनहर्षौ प्रणेमतुः ।...ततश्चारभ्य......सततपार्श्ववर्तिनौ कुमारयोस्तौ बभूवतुः ।

—Ch. IV, p. 155.

"Having entered, they saluted from afar,—their four limbs and head touching the ground. They took their seats in a proper place indicated by a kindly glance from the king. After a short while, the king gave them instructions, 'From to-day, you should both attend on the princes.' 'As Your Majesty commands,' they said, and rising saluted Rājyavardhana and Harsha, with their crowns swinging on the ground . . . From that day . . . they both became constant companions of the princes."

From this description of Bāṇa, it is clear that Prabhākaravardhana must have subdued the Gupta King of Mālava, who was compelled to surrender his two sons to serve as attendants on the princes. But the spirit of the Mālava king was not broken. When Prabhākaravardhana fell seriously ill, the Gupta king of Mālava attacked Kannauj, seized and slew Grahavarman, son-in-

law of Prabhākaravardhana and imprisoned his daughter Rājyaśrī. Bāṇa's words may again be quoted :—

'देव...यस्मिन्नहन्यवनिपतिरुपरत इत्यभूद् वार्ता तस्मिन्नेव देवो ग्रहवर्मा दुरात्मना मालवराजेन जीवलोकमात्मनः सुकृतेन सह त्याजितः। भर्तृदारिकापि राज्यश्रीः कालायसनिगडयुगलचुम्बितचरणा चौराङ्गनेव संयता कान्यकुब्जे कारायां निक्षिप्ता। किंवदन्ती च यथा किलानायकं साधनं मत्वा जिघृक्षुः सुदुर्मतिरेतामपि भुवमाजिगमिषति। इति विज्ञापिते प्रभुः प्रभवतीति'।

—Ch. VI, p. 204.

" 'Your Majesty . . . on the very day on which the rumour that the king is dead spread about, H. M. Grahavarman was cut off from the world of the living along with his noble deeds by the wicked king of Mālava. The princess Rājyaśrī with her feet kissed by a pair of black iron fetters was thrown in the prison at Kānyakubja, confined like a common brigand's wife. It is also said that the wicked king is about to invade this land as well, as he is desirous of seizing it and he imagines the army to be without a leader at the moment. This is what I have to report. The matter now rests with your majesty.' "

On hearing the report of this dreadful calamity, Rājyavardhana immediately marched against the king of Mālava and took a terrible revenge. The king of Mālava was probably slain as nothing further is heard of him. His kingdom seems to have been annexed. His treasury and other parapharnalia were forfeited. Although Rājyavardhana routed the Mālava army without any difficulty he was treacherously slain by the king of Gauḍa, an ally of the Mālava king. But the death of Rājyavardhana did not make any difference as far as Mālava was concerned. Harsha later on received all the wealth of the Mālava King through Bhaṇḍi, who followed Rājyavardhana against Mālava. Bāṇa states :—

कदाचित्तु राज्यवर्धनभुजबलोपार्जितमशेषं मालवराजसाधनमादायागतं समीप एवावासितं लेखहारकाद् भण्डिमशृणोत् —Ch. VII, p. 252.

" Once he (Harsha) heard from messengers that Bhaṇḍi

who had arrived and brought with him all the wealth of the Mālava King, acquired, through the strength of arms, by Rājyavardhana—was encamped not far off."

On the following day Harsha inspected the treasures brought by Bhaṇḍi. Among other things, there were (1) thousands of elephants अनेकसहस्रसंख्याकान्करिणः (2) horses as swift as antelopes हरिणरंहसो हरीन् (3) wonderful ornaments अलंकाराणां विशेषान् (4) pearl necklaces तारान् हारान् (5) yaktail chowries वालव्यजनानि (6) a white umbrella श्वेतातपत्रम् (7) beautiful women वारविलासिनीः (8) royal paraphernalia like lion-thrones, couches, *etc.*, सिंहासनशयनासंदीप्रभृतीनि राज्योपकरणानि (9) all the followers of the Mālava King with their feet restrained with iron fetters, (10) and chests of treasure laden with heaps of precious stones with their numbers recorded on documents अशेषांश्च ससंख्यालेख्यपत्रान् सालंकारापीडपीडान् कोषकलशान्—Ch. VII, p. 254.

Having inspected the booty, King Harsha ordered his officers to take charge of the property according to their respective functions.

अथालोच्य तत्सर्वमवनिपालः स्वीकर्तुं यथाधिकारमादिदेशाध्यक्षान् ।

This shows that the Mālava King was completely crushed. Bāṇa nowhere mentions the name of the Mālava King but states that he was a Gupta:

स पुनरवादीत् 'देव देवभूयंगते देवे राज्यवर्धने गुप्तनाम्ना च गृहीते कुशस्थले देवी राज्यश्रीः परिभ्रश्य बन्धनाद्विन्ध्याटवीं सपरिवारा प्रविष्टा' इति ।
—Ch. VII, p. 253.

" He spoke again, ' Sire, when H. M. Rājyavardhana had attained the state of the celestial, and Kuśasthala (*i.e.*, Kannauj) was captured by a person named *Gupta*, Queen Rājyaśrī escaped from imprisonment and entered, with her retinue, the Vindhya forest.' " Bāṇa probably felt too great a contempt for the Mālava King to mention his name. But his name has been recorded in the Madhuban

Copper Plate inscription[10] of Harsha in the following verse :—

राजानो युधि दुष्टवाजिन इव श्रीदेवगुप्तादयः
कृत्वा येन कशाप्रहारविमुखा सर्वे समं संयताः ।
उत्खाय द्विषतो विजित्य वसुधां कृत्वा प्रजानां प्रियं
प्राणानुज्झितवानरातिभवने सत्यानुरोधेन यः ॥

"By whom, all kings like Devagupta and others were vanquished with downcast faces in battle, like wicked horses with a stroke of whip, who after uprooting his enemies, conquering the earth and doing what was agreeable to his subjects, gave up his life in the mansion of his foe, through adherence to truth."

Rājyavardhana engaged, during his life, in two battles only. In early youth he was sent by his father against the Huns. This is described by Bāṇa in the following words :—

अथ कदाचिद्राजा राज्यवर्धनं कवचहरमाहूय हूणान्हन्तुं हरिणानिव हरिर्हरिणेशकिशोरमपरिमितबलानुयातं चिरंतनैरमात्यैरनुरक्तैश्च महासामन्तैः कृत्वा साभिसरमुत्तरापथं प्राहिणोत् । —Ch. V, p. 166.

"Now once upon a time, the king summoned Rājyavardhana who wore an armour and sent him to the North to slay the Hunas as a lion sends his whelp to kill deer. He was followed by a great force and attended upon by experienced counsellors and devoted great feudal barons."

Immediately after his return from the campaign of the North, Rājyavardhana had to march on a punitive expedition against the King of Mālava. Soon after his conquest of Mālava, he was treacherously killed by the Gauḍa King. So Devagupta, mentioned in the Madhuban copper plate as having been vanquished by Rājyavardhana must be the King of Mālava. After the absolute victory of Rājyavardhana, the whole army and treasure of the Mālava King was forfeited to Harsha.

[10] Ep. Ind. Vol. I, p. 72

The line of rulers of Eastern Mālava came to an end about 606 A.D. When Hiuen Tsang visited Eastern Mālava in 641 A.D., the state was then administered by Brāhmaṇa officers of Harsha. Thus there could be no Vikramāditya in Eastern Mālava in 638 A.D.

If we accept the statement of Harisvāmin as recorded in the verse quoted above, we are confronted with a dilemma. We are asked to believe in the existence of a Vikramāditya in Mālava in 638 A.D. which as detailed above is out of question. The only solution of the difficulty is to emend the text of the verse so as to make Harisvāmin a contemporary of Yaśodharman, who can be the only person to be appropriately identified with the patron of the commentator of the *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa*. If Harisvāmin composed his commentary in 538 A.D., then Skandasvāmin, his teacher, can be assigned with justice to the end of the 5th century or the beginning of the 6th century A.D.[11]

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[11] The original sources of information for the history of this period are the following: —

(1) Bāṇa, *Harshacharita* Skt. text Bombay, 1892. There is a standard English translation by E. B. Cowell and F. W. Thomas, London, 1897, although I have given my own translation throughout, as the former in places is not quite literal.

(2) Kalhaṇa, *Rājataraṅgiṇī*, Skt. text edited by M. A. Stein, Bombay 1892. It was translated into English by the Editor of the Skt. text and published in 2 Vols., Westminister, 1900.

(3) Hiuen-Tsang, *Si-yu-ki*, translated into English by Beal.

(4) The Madhuban Copper Plate of Harsha, Ep. Ind., Vol. I and VII, the Banskhera Copper Plate of Harsha, Ep. Ind., Vol. IV; the Aihole inscription of Pulikeśin, Ep. Ind., Vol. VI, p. 1; and inscriptions Nos. 33, 35, 42, and 52 in Fleet's *Corpus Inscriptionum Indicarum*, Vol. IV.

(5) The original sources have been utilised by (*a*) A. F. Rudolf Hoernle, *Some Problems of Ancient Indian History*, J.R.A.S., 1903, pp. 545—570, (*b*) V. A. Smith, *The Early History of India*, Oxford, 1924, (*c*) Radhakumud Mookerji, *Harsha*, Oxford, 1926, (*d*) Rama Shankar Tripathi, *Early Position of Harsa*, Malaviya Commemoration Vol., pp. 261—276.

PARASMAIPADA AND ĀTMANEPADA

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In the ancient I.E. languages the verbal conjugation is clearly distinguishable into two main groups known to Sanskrit grammarians as *Parasmaipada* and *Ātmanepada* and to the western scholars as the Active and the Middle Voice respectively. With all the connotations implied from our English Grammar the term "voice" seems rather misleading, whereas the Sanskrit terms are quite clear and the meaning, too, is defined by these names quite exactly. The distinction between the two is rather subtle. *Parasmaipada* is "the *pada* for another." When the action done is reflected back upon some one other than the doer thereof, the verb should be *parasmaipada*. When it is reflected back upon the doer himself, then the verb is in the *ātmanepada*—"the *pada* for oneself." These are the basic senses of these two forms, and in older forms of the I.E. languages we see the distinction between the two strictly observed. In many cases the *pada* is determined by the very meaning of the root itself: thus रम् ('to sport'), लभ् ('to gain'), अश् ('to extend') ईश् ('to be master') are obviously *ātmanepada*; so also मृ ('to die') and डी ('to fly'). In Latin the so-called "deponent verbs" are relics of an *ātmanepada* conjugation. These are defined in Latin grammars as "verbs with passive personal endings and a reflexive or active meaning." Such are *morior* ('to die'), *querror* ('to complain'), *patior* ('to suffer'), *potior* ('to be master of'), *mīror* ('to wonder'), *etc.* The *ātmanepada* endings are preserved in the Latin passive

alone and so the original true *ātmanepada* verbs that have survived in the language have been classified as these irregular "deponents."[1] In Greek this distinction between the two *padas* is very carefully observed in the earlier writings and even in the later period the active and the middle senses are clearly indicated in Greek.[2] In the Avesta, too, the distinction between *parasmaipada* and *ātmanepada* is very clear and in the metrical portion at least (*i.e.*, in the *Gāθās* and in the *Yašts*) has been carefully observed.

An extended use of the *ātmanepada* is when there is some advantage accruing to the doer of the action. A good example is the root यज् ('to worship') and its present participle यजमान, which are found in all stages of the Sanskrit language. Instances of the use of this root in the *parasmaipada* are also common in the Vedas. Another noteworthy instance of this sort of "*ātmanepada* of advantage" is from the *Bhagavad-Gītā* (xvi. 18)—असौ मया हतः शत्रुर्हनिष्ये चापरानपि. Here the root हन् ('to kill'), usually *parasmaipada*, has been used deliberately in the *ātmanepada* in order to imply the advantage that would accrue by the slaying of the enemy.[3] क्षि ('to rule'), वृ ('to choose,' Av. *var*) are also *ātmanepada* for the same reason, *viz.*, that some advantage accrues to the doer of the action.

In the passive voice the verb is always *ātmanepada* in all the I.E. languages which have preserved the double set of endings. This is but natural, for even if the verb is originally *parsmaipada* (*i.e.*, the action is reflected back upon the object of the verb), in the passive construction

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[1] George M. Lane, *A Latin Grammar*, §§725, 798 and 1486 ff.

[2] See Pharr, *Homeric Greek*, §§1057-1068.

[3] It cannot be contended that the *ātmanepada* has been used for metrical reasons, because it is equally easy to have हनिष्यामि चापरानपि.

the object becomes the grammatical subject of the verb and hence necessarily demands *ātmanepada* endings.

The main idea of the *ātmanepada* seems to be to emphasise the doer of the action, and hence that part of the finite form which implies the doer is emphasised or stressed. In other words, in the *ātmanepada*, the ending (प्रत्यय) gets the accent. If we compare some of the *parasmaipada* endings with the corresponding *ātmanepada* ones, we find the latter have the fuller or the stronger grade. Thus -सि and -से, -ति and -ते (Gāθ. Av. -*ā* and -*e*), -मस् (Av. -mo) and -महे (Av. -*maide*), -अन्ति and -अन्ते; and in Greek -μι and -μαι, τι and ται, -μεν and μεθα (-μεσθα) etc. The so-called " strong " and " weak " bases in certain of the Sanskrit conjugations in the Present system depend upon this fact. The difference between चिनोति and चिनुते is just this that in the latter the actor is emphasised and hence the accent falling on the ending gives us the strong form -ते.

HEMANTAŚIŚIRAU AND AHORĀTRE
(Pāṇ. II. 4. 28)

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The Veda knows six seasons of the year: *grīṣmáḥ* 'Summer,' *varṣā́ṇi* (or *varṣā́ḥ*) 'rains,' '*śarád*, 'autumn,' *hemantáḥ* 'winter,' *śiśiráḥ* 'early spring' and *vasantáḥ* 'spring' (A.V. xii. 1. 36). Sometimes their number is only five, *hemanta* and *śiśira* being taken as one: *pañcartavo hemantaśiśirayoḥ samāsena*, Ait. Br. I. 1. In this case, the name of the fifth season is *hemantaśiśiráu* (T.S. I. 6. 2. 3; IV. 3. 3. 2; V.S. X. 14; K.S. XXXIX. 7.; M. S. II. 7. 20).

According to Pāṇini II. 4. 28, *hemantaśiśirāv ahorātre ca cchandasi*, this form is used in the Veda (*chandasi*), from which we must infer that he did not recognize it as a correct form in his own language (*bhāṣā*). Pāṇini did not say *hemantaśiśirau*, although it is to be found in later writers again (cp. BR., Rāj. Tar. IV. 401). He must have said either *hemantaśiśire* in the dual, or—which is more likely—*hemantaśiśiram* in the singular. He knew *śiśira* as a neuter and therefore was of opinion that in Vedic *hemantaśiśirau* the gender of the first member of the compound prevailed. As the Kāśikā remarks, his rule is a *paravalliṅgāpavādaḥ*, the word *pūrvavat* being in force from Pāṇ. II. 4. 27.

Now *śiśira* is masculine in AV. VI. 55. 2, XII. 1. 36 and in ŚB. II. 1. 3. 1, *etc.* J. Wackernagel in his *Altindische Grammatik* has therefore not accepted Pāṇini's teaching (II. 1. §15a, note). And apparently he is right: *hemantaśiśirau* is formed of *hemantá-* m. + *śiśira-* m. But his statement that *śiśira* is a neuter only in classical Sanskrit is not quite accurate. There was a

reason for Pāṇini to teach *hemantaśiśirau* the way he did. In the Black Yajurveda with which he was very familiar, as we know from L. V. Schroeder's editions of the MS. and the KS.,[1] *śiśira* is a neuter. It occurs as such in MS. IV. 9. 18 *śiśiram pratiṣṭhānam* (*yajuḥ*); KS. VIII, 1, 6; MS. I. 8. 2 *átha śiśiram asṛjyata tásmād etád ṛtūn m áśāntaṁ krūrám;* KS. VI. 2, XXXIV. 9 (*brāhmaṇa*); and in a *ṛc* quoted by Yāska, Nir. I. 10, *śiśiraṁ jīvanāya kám*.[2] Yet the dvandva is formed in all the Saṁhitās alike: *hemanta-śiśirau* (cf. passages given above).

The second part of Pāṇini's rule '*ahorātre*' is really an exception to the following prescription, according to which, *rātra-* in the end of a dvandva or tatpuruṣa (cf. II. 4. 26) takes masculine endings. *Ahorātre* (since AV) and its plural *ahoratrāṇi* (since RV X. 190. 2) are current Vedic forms. Again we must infer from Pāṇini's rule that he did not know or recognise these forms in his own language, though they may occur in later writers (cf. BR. Pañcatantra, I. v. 329, *ahorātrāṇi*).

But he knew *ahorātra* as a word of the spoken language. Although he omits to teach the form in which *ahan* appears before *rātra* (cp. vārt. 1. on Pāṇ VIII. 2. 68), he has taught *rātra* for *rātri* after *ahaḥ* in V. 4. 87 and makes use of the stem in his work several times: II. 1. 45 *ktenāhorātrāvayavāḥ*, III. 3. 137 *kālavibhāge cānahorātrāṇām*, VI. 2. 33 *paripratyupāpā varjyamānāhorātrāvayaveṣu*.

None of these passages is characteristic as to the gender. But since Pāṇini explicitly confines the neuter gender of the dvandva to the Veda, there can be no doubt

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[1] Cf. particularly L. V. Schroeder's MS., page xiv ff. and Z. D. M. G. XXXIII, p. 194 ff.

[2] Note the accent *śiśiram* in all the accentuated passages, MS. I. 8. 2, IV. 9. 18, Nir. I. 10. *Śiśiram* corresponds to *śiśiráḥ* as *rákṣaḥ* n. to *rakṣáḥ* m., *káraṇam* n. 'act' to *karaṇá* 'active' (cf. Macdonell, Vedic Grammar, §86).

that he used *ahorātra* as a masculine, in accordance with his rule II. 4. 29.

Ahorātra as a masculine occurs in Patañjali's Mahābhāṣya in the singular: Patañjali on vārt. on Pāṇ. VIII. 2. 68 and on Pāṇ. IV. 2. 4, where he defines Pāṇini's rule *nakṣatreṇa yuktaḥ kālaḥ* (IV. 2. 3) in the following way *kaḥ punaḥ kālo nakṣatreṇa yujyate? ahorātraḥ*.

The plural *ahorātrāḥ* is easier traced. It occurs, for example, in *mantras* given in younger Vedic texts: ŚG. III. 15. 5 *ahorātrās ca saṁdhijāḥ*, T. A. X. 1. 2 *ahorātrās ca sarvaśaḥ*; VS. XXVII. 45, ŚB. VIII. 1. 4. 8, have *ahorātrās te kalpantām* instead of KS. XXXX. 6, TA. IV. 19. 1, *ahorātrāṇi te kalpantām* (cp. Bloomfield's Concordance). Furthermore we read in AV. IV. 35. 4

Yásmān mā́sā nírmitās triṁśádarāḥ saṁvatsaró yásmān nírmito dvā́daśāraḥ.

ahorātrā́[3] *yáṁ pariyánto nā́pús ténaudanénā́ti tarāṇi mṛtyúm.*

Pāṇini's explanation for the gender of *ahorātre*, *ahorātrāṇi* holds good. Other examples for dvandva-compounds in the dual taking the gender of the first member are *aśvavaḍavau* (Pāṇ. II. 4. 27) and Vedic *ukthārkā́* n., *ukthamadā́ni*, *ukṣavaśáu*, *dīkṣātapásī* (Wackernagel, *op. cit.*, § 15*a*).

Ahorātraḥ on the other hand presents difficulties. A dvandva in the singular is regularly a neuter. As we have *aśvavaḍavam* besides *aśvavaḍavau* (Pāṇ. II. 4. 12) or classical *varṣāśaradam* for Vedic *varṣāśarádau*, classical *śūdrāryam* for Vedic *śūdrāryáu* (Wackernagel, *op. cit.*, § 69*c*), we expect *ahorātram* for Vedic *ahorātré*. And we are not to be quite disappointed, for we find actually *ahorātram* in Mānava Dharmaśāstra I. 64, where it is

[3] Whatever may be the reading of the Padapātha, *pariyanto* shows clearly enough that *ahorātrā* is sandhi form for *ahorātrāh* and not a neuter plural in *ā*.

defined as consisting of 30 muhūrtas, *i.e.*, as the solar day. In I. 65 we meet with *ahorātre*—but it does not mean 'day and night' as in the Veda, it is the dual of *ahorātram* signifying 'two (kinds of) solar days,' namely the human and the divine day: *ahorātre vibhajate sūryo mānuṣadaivike*.

The form considered correct by Pāṇini (II. 4. 29) and used by Patañjali, *viz.*, *ahorātraḥ*, is obviously later than *ahorātrāḥ* and fashioned on this plural. First, *ahorātraḥ* seems to have replaced *ahorātrāṇi*. What was the reason?

I think we may guess it from the quoted AV. passages. Here the days (*ahorātrāḥ*, m.) are named together with the year (*saṁvatsaraḥ*, m.) and the months (*māsāḥ*, m.). Other parts of the year often mentioned together with the months and days are the seasons (*ṛtavaḥ*, m.) and the half-months (*ardhamāsāḥ*, m.). They are all masculine and have apparently drawn *ahorātrāṇi* into their analogy. *Ahorātrāḥ* means the full solar days, each consisting of day and night; they are the smallest of the regularly and continually repeating parts of the year. Later on *ahorātrāḥ* must have caused the formation of a singular *ahorātraḥ*. But the process does not seem to have finished with this.

The parts of the full day—the *ahorātrāvayavāḥ* (Pāṇ. II. 1. 45, VI. 2. 33)—*pūrvarātra*, *apararātra*, *pūrvāhṇa*, *aparāhṇa*, *madhyāhna*, *etc.*, and the time-units *dvyaha* 'time of two days,' *etc.*,[4] which appear in Vedic texts only in certain adverbial cases as *pūrvāhṇe*, *sāyāhnāt* (Wacker-

[4] According to the vārtika of the Siddhāntakaumudī "*Saṁkhyā-pūrvaṁ rātraṁ klībam*," *dvirātra*, *trirātra*, etc., form an exception. But the Kāśikā has *dvirātraḥ*, etc. In *Patañjali* (on vārt. 1 on Pāṇ. I. 4. 48) only *trirātra* occurs, and this only once, and in the accusative, so that a decision is not possible. In Bhāṣya II. p. 162. l. 2. f. *triṁśad-rātraḥ*, *pañcadaśarātraḥ*, we find the masculine used.

nagel, *op. cit.* §49*b*), are all masculine. Wackernagel says ' for unknown reason ' (15*c*), but I think we cannot be very wrong, if we believe that they have followed *ahorātraḥ* as *ahorātraḥ* has followed *māsaḥ*, *etc.* The result was that Pāṇini could teach : (*dvandvatatpuruṣayoḥ* II. 4. 26) *rātrāhnāhāḥ puṁsi* II. 4. 30. He has, however, to be censured : classical *sudināha*, Vedic *puṇyāhá* are *neuters*, as remarks vārt. I on Pāṇ. II. 4. 30 and so is *bhadrāhá*, AV. VI. 128. 1ff. As these words did not designate days in their strictly temporal aspect, *i.e.*, as units of time, they were removed from the influence of *ahorātraḥ*, etc.

OTTOROKORRHA

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There is nothing new to be said concerning the Uttarakurus. The allusions to this people in Sanskrit literature were quite sufficiently examined long ago by Lassen in an article published in the *Zeitschrift für die Kunde des Morgenlandes* (II, pp. 62 sqq.) and in his *Indische Alterthumskunde* (1847) I, pp. 511 sqq., 846 sqq. (=1861, I, pp. 612-3, 1018). The early references were also examined by Muir in his *Sanskrit Texts*, Vol. II, pp. 332 sqq., and summaries of the information are given in Zimmer's *Altindisches Leben*, pp. 101-2, and by Professor Berriedale Keith in the *Vedic Index* (I, p. 84) and in the *Cambridge History of India* (I, pp. 118-9, 121). A real country being clearly contemplated in the earliest notices (*Aitareya-Brāhmaṇa*, VIII, 14 and 23), which speak of the people as *pareṇa Himavantam*, 'beyond the Himālaya,' these authorities are inclined to identify their country with Kashmir.

The Pali *Vinaya-piṭaka* (Mahāvagga, I, 19, Pārājika, I, 2) mentions the Uttara-Kuru country, with its *Anotatta-daha* (=Sanskrit *Anavatapta-hrada*), as a region which conceivably might be visited. But generally in the later literature the two appear only in connection with the schematistic geographical system which places the Uttara-Kurus, as the northern continent, to the north of Himavat and south of Gandhamādana. Concerning this geographical system, which in its main features was common to Brāhmaṇical, Jaina, and Buddhist beliefs and which rules exclusively in the Purāṇic and later (including Tibetan, *etc.*) literature, it is sufficient to refer to

Professor Kirfel's *Kosmographie der Inder* (see Index). According to this system the Anavatapta lake is identified with *Mānasa-saro-vara*; and from its northern side issues the river Sītā or Śītā, which flows out into the north-eastern ocean. The identification of this river, which is named in the *Mahā-Bhārata* (see Sörensen's Index), with the Tārīm of Chinese Turkestan (including, no doubt, its affluent, the Zarafshan or Yarkand river), appears very plainly in Huian-tsang's account (see Beal, *Buddhist Records of the Western World*, I, pp. 12-3 and notes, and Stein, *Ancient Khotan*, pp. 27, 35). This may, however, not have been the original association, since the name of the river was attached at one period to the Jaxartes, or Syr-daryā, which still retains it (J.R.A.S. 1906, p. 202). The Sītā (in Ktesias *Side*, in the later Greek writers *Silias* or *Sillas*) was a legendary stream, having light water whereon all objects (according to the *Mahā-Bhārata*, XII, 82, 3099, even boats) refused to float. The paradisiacal conception of the Uttara-Kuru realm, including as one notable feature a marked freedom of women, is vividly expounded in the *Mahā-Bhārata* (VI, 6, XIII. 57), and the *Rāmāyaṇa* (IV, 44, 81 sqq.).

Concerning Ptolemy's *Ottorokorrha(s)* mountain (and city) and *Ottorokorrhai* people also nearly all that is necessary has been stated by Lassen (loc. cit.) and Vivien de Saint-Martin (*Étude sur la Géographie Grecque et Latine de l'Inde*, pp. 425 sqq.) and reproduced by McCrindle in the notes to his translation of Ptolemy, pp. 298 sqq. It is pointed out that Ptolemy in his account (VI. 16) of Serike records the Ottorokorrhai as a real people settled in the south of Chinese Turkestan, along the Hemodos and the Chinese mountains, and that for their town Ottorokorrha he gives according to his system a definite longitude and latitude, which locates them between Khotan on the west and Thogara (in Kan-su) on the east.

Moreover, he places in the mountains of the Ottorokorrha country one of the sources of the river Bautisos, *i.e.*, the Cer-cen river. Ptolemy's date was about 180 A.D., and his information goes back to about 100 A.D., being derived from the work of Marinus of Tyre, who used the reports of the trade-agents of a merchant Maes travelling in Chinese Turkestan (A. Herrmann, *Die alten Seidenstrassen zwischen China und Syrien*, 1910, pp. 18-19). Since, however, the name *Ottorokorrha* is certainly the reflexion of the Indian *Uttara-kuru*, which is many centuries older, it is evident, as was remarked by Vivien de Saint-Martin, p. 414, that among the agents or informants of Maes there had been an Indian intermediary.

Now that more is known of the Himālayan countries and of Chinese Turkestan it would no longer be absurd to suppose that even the Vedic Indians had received, say through the Bactrians or through the Dards, some vague reports of peoples in Chinese Turkestan. But evidently it was in the course of a first real acquaintance with the country, at the time of the Buddhist propaganda in the first century A.D., that Indians found there a region to which they applied the old familiar designation *Uttara-Kuru*. What circumstance led to this identification? And why have we no hint of it in at least the Buddhist literature of later times, when the country had become familiarly known to pilgrims and resident communities? As has been observed by M. Sylvain Lévi (*Bulletin de l'École Française d'Extrême-Orient*, IV, pp. 558 sqq., V, pp. 253 sqq.), some of that literature is acquainted with cities and peoples in Chinese Turkestan and centres in that region. Perhaps the penchant, nowhere stronger than among Indians and Central-Asians, for etymologizing names may supply an answer to these questions. In the eastern part of Chinese Turkestan, between the Cer-cen river and Lop-nor on the north and the mountains

on the south, lay the kingdom originally known to the Chinese as Lou-lan, which name has been shown (Stein *Serindia*, pp. 415-6) to represent a form *Krora* or *Korara*, applied in the Kharoṣṭhī documents to people of the Shan-shan kingdom: the district in which lay their capital town Yü-ni was called *Kroraýina*. It seems quite likely that this name, possibly in connection with some social feature, such as the relatively notable freedom of women in the country, may have suggested the application of the name *Uttara-Kuru*.

Why is it, then, that no trace of such Central-Asian *Uttara-Kurus* transpires in the Sanskrit literature, whether Brāhmaṇical or Buddhist? Perhaps this was a result of increased knowledge of Central Asia, which must have resulted from the travels of pilgrims and traders during the period of Kushan rule in India and from the establishment of an Indian administrative system and language in Shan-shan itself. In the course of the second century A.D. the old kingdom of Lou-lan became finally merged in the enlarged state known to the Chinese as Shan-shan (the name of Lou-lan, indeed was changed by the Chinese at an earlier date in the first century B.C.): in the Kharoṣṭhī documents the Korara people and the town Kroraýina appear only as elements in the enlarged state. Accordingly the original idea of a people identical with the legendary Uttara-Kurus may have lapsed for want of a basis: just as the old fable connecting Britain with the Roman Brutus failed to maintain itself in the country known as England.

The certainty (for such it is) of an Indian intermediary for one item of Ptolemy's information suggests a question concerning the name of the Cer-cen river, which he gives as *Bautisos* (elsewhere it is Bautes) and which the Chinese give as *A-nou-ta* (Stein, *Serindia*, p. 297). Elsewhere (*Acta Orientalia*, XII, p. 58, XIII, p. 44) we

have suggested that the Greek form was originally *Nabautes* and identical with both the Chinese and a name *Narote* occurring in the Kharoṣṭhī documents from Chinese Turkestan. Now the same Chinese characters are used (Rosenberg, *A Study of Buddhism*, p. 484, Col. 3) to represent the name of the great Nāga-king of Indian mythology, Sanskrit *Anavatapta*, Pali *Anotatta*: and this suggests that in the native name of the river the etymologizing Indians had found a reflex of that old Nāga designation. Upon reflection indeed the thing will seem to have been inevitable, once the Korara country had been identified with the realm of the Uttara-Kurus, associated from time immemorial with the Anavatapta, or Anotatta, lake and its Nāga divinity: that the latter was known to the Buddhists of Central Asia might have been confidently assumed, even if he were not several times mentioned in the local records of Khotan.

EVOLUTION OF THE MYTH OF AHALYĀ MAITREYĪ

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The earliest reference to the story of Ahalyā occurs in the Brāhmaṇas[1] At one place in the Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa, Indra has been given the epithet 'the paramour of Ahalyā' (*Ahalyāyai jāraḥ*, iii. 3. 4, 18). While explaining the above epithet, the Ṣaḍviṁśa Brāhmaṇa (i, 1) clearly says that Indra was the paramour of Ahalyā-Maitreyī. A similar reference is found in the Jaiminīya Brāhmaṇa also (ii, 79), but no details about this well-known story have been given in any of the Brāhmaṇas nor do we come across any reference to the curse of Gautama and the deliverance from it by Rāma.

The first detailed version of the story of Ahalyā is found in the Rāmāyaṇa of Vālmīki (Bālakāṇḍa, Sargas 48-49).[2] The story as it is related in this first Sanskrit Kāvya by Viśvāmitra to Rāma has been summarised below :[3]

"This asylum formerly belonged to Gautama, and here in days of yore Gautama in company with Ahalyā carried on austerities. Perceiving occasion, Śachī's Lord, assuming the form of that ascetic approached Ahalyā. Out of curiosity that one of perverse understanding consented to the proposals of the chief of celestials. When after the meeting, Indra was about to leave

[1] Macdonell and Keith: Vedic Index, 'Ahalyā Maitreyī.'

[2] In his well-known Hindi book Shri Gōsvāmi Tulsīdās jī kā Jīvancharita (Bankipur, 1916, pp. 404-405), Babu Shiv Nandan Sahai has drawn attention to the references to the story of Ahalyā found in the post-Vedic Sanskrit literature.

[3] The summary is based on the English translation of the epic by M. N. Dutt, Calcutta, 1892.

the cottage he saw Gautama returning. Seeing the wicked thousand-eyed deity in the guise of an ascetic, the anchorite, fired with rage, said—'And since assuming my form thou hast done this foul deed, thou shalt lose thy scrotum.' Gautama cursed his wife also—'For a thousand years thou shalt live here feeding upon air, without food, tormented with repentance *and thou shalt remain in this hermitage unseen of any* (*adṛśyā sarvabhūtānām*). And when the son of Daśāratha, Rāma, shall come to this wood, thou shalt be cleansed of thy sin and shall in thy own form regain my side.' Having said this Gautama forsaking this hermitage, began to carry on penances on the summit of the Himavat (Sarga 48)."

In the next Sarga, after describing in detail how Indra was given the scrotum of a ram by the gods, Viśvāmitra addressed Rāma—'Therefore do thou enter the hermitage and deliver the divine Ahalyā.' "On hearing this Rāma along with Lakṣmaṇa and Viśvāmitra, entered the asylum, and they beheld that magnificent dame flaming in ascetic energy, and incapable of being gazed at too near even by the celestials and the Asuras . . . And by virtue of Gautama's word, *she had been incapable of being seen by any in the three worlds, till the sight of Rāma*. And now the curse having come to an end, she could be perceived by them. And the two descendants of Raghu then took hold of her feet; but remembering Gautama's words she on her part took hold of theirs. And with a collected mind she extended unto them the rites of hospitality. Gautama also, happy on his union with Ahalyā, honored Rāma highly. And having duly received signal honors from the ascetic, Rāma set out for Mithilā."

The next detailed but slightly evolved version of the story occurs in the Adhyātma Rāmāyaṇa which is said to be a part of the Brahmāṇḍa Purāṇa. Here are the relevant portions of the story as put in the mouth of Viśvā-

mitra in the Bālakāṇḍa, Sarga 5 of this Rāmāyaṇa.[4] "There was a Ṛishi named Gautama who worshipped Hari through austerities. Unto him Brahmā gave in marriage his daughter Ahalyā. With her that great ascetic lived in this Aśrama. The god Indra was ever seeking for opportunity to overpower her. Once upon a time as Gautama had gone out he approached her in the guise of the Muni. Having visited her he forthwith came out. In the meantime the Muni also returned home. Seeing Indra coming out of his house disguised as himself the Muni got very angry and cursed the king of gods thus—' Attached as thou art to lust, o sinful wretch, do thou take thousand lustful forms.' He also cursed Ahalyā —' O vile wretch, do thou remain in my Āśrama *fixed on a slab of stone* (*Śilāyām . . . tiṣṭha.*) meditating with a single heart upon the supreme Lord Rāma. On the expiry of many thousands of years when the auspicious Rāma, the son of Daśaratha, shall visit this Āśrama with his brother and shall ride the stone upon which thou art fixed, thou shalt be purified from sin and worshipping Rāma with faith . . . be freed from this curse and shalt serve me happily as before.' Saying so Gautama went to the Himālaya. Since that time Ahalyā is sitting in this auspicious Aśrama, *unseen by all creatures* subsisting upon air and waiting for the touch of the dust of thy feet." After this is described the deliverance of Ahalyā which is followed by a long *stuti* of Rāma by Ahalyā in which she describes the efficacy of the dust of the feet of Rāma and in which she ultimately identifies him with the ancient Puruṣa. ' Having thus hymned Rāma, who was standing in front of her, having bowed and circumambulated him, Ahalyā went to her husband with Rāma's permission."

[4] The summary is based on the English translation of the Adhyātma Rāmāyaṇa by Lala Baij Nath, Allahabad 1913.

Brief references to the story of Ahalyā are scattered throughout the Sanskrit literature dealing with Rāma. For instance Kālidāsa in the Raghuvaṁśa briefly refers to the story in two verses.[5] The story is referred to in some of the Purāṇas also. For instance the version found in the Padma Purāṇa[6] is similar to that found in the Kāvya of Kālidāsa[7].

The latest evolved form of the legend of Ahalyā occurs in the Ramaite literature written in the modern Indo-Aryan languages. The description found in the Rāma-carita-mānasa (Bālakāṇḍa, Dohās 242-43 in the Sabhā edition) written by Gōsvāmī Tulsīdās (1575 A.D.) is representa-

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[5] तैः शिवेषु वसतिर्गताध्वभिः
सायमाश्रमतरुष्वगृह्यत ।
येषु दीर्घतपसः परिग्रहो
वासवक्षणकलत्रतां ययौ ॥
प्रत्यपद्यत चिराय यत्पुनश्
चारु गौतमवधूः शिलामयी ।
स्वं वपुः स किल किल्बिषच्छिदां
रामपादरजसामनुग्रहः ॥

रघुवंश, सर्ग ११, श्लोक ३३-३४ ।

[6] मुनयो रघुशार्दूलसहिताः पुण्यचेतसः ।
गच्छतस्तस्य रामस्य पादाब्जेन महात्मनः ॥१३३॥
अभूत्सा पावनीभूता समाक्रान्ता महाशिला ।
साऽपि शप्ता पुरा भर्त्रा गौतमेन द्विजन्मना ॥१३४॥
अहल्या रघुनाथस्य पादस्पर्शाच्छुभाऽभवत् ।

पद्मपुराण, खण्ड ६, अध्याय २६९ ।

[7] I am idebted to my learned colleague Pt. K. C. Chaṭṭōpādhyāya for drawing my attention towards the mention of the story of Ahalyā in the Kathāsaritsāgara. The story occurs in Book III, Chapter XVII (For English translation see 'The Ocean of Story' by Tawney and Penzer, Vol. II, pp. 45, 46). According to this version of the story the curse of Gautama was as follows:— **पापशीले, चिरं शिलाभावमवाप्नुहि आराघवलोकनादिति** 'Harlot, take for a long time the nature of a stone until thou behold Rāma wandering in the forest.'

tive of this comparatively modern outlook. Here is the English version of the text as given by Growse.[8] "On the way he (Rāma) spied a hermitage without bird, deer or any living creature near it, and observing a remarkable stone inquired of the saint about it, who in reply gave him the whole history—'Gautama's wife was by a curse turned into a hard rock, and is now longing for the dust of your lotus feet, O Raghubīr, show mercy upon her'." Then follows the deliverance of Ahalyā in whose mouth is put a long *stuti* in praise of the greatness of Rāma.

"Thus full of jubilation, with oft-renewed prostration,
did Gautama's long lost bride,
With the boon she most had craved, thus graciously
return to her husband's side."

Here are a few conclusions drawn from the important references to the story metioned above.

(1) The earliest references, as found in the Brāhmaṇas, clearly show that the story of Ahalyā is based on mythology or religious allegory and not on any historical or even legendary account. The commentators have variously interpreted the original version of the allegory. Kumārila Bhaṭṭa in the Śiṣṭācāra Prakaraṇa of the Tantra-vārtika suggests that the sun, because of its great splendour, is called Indra, while night is called Ahalyā because it disappears during the daytime. Now because Indra in the form of the sun makes the night (Ahalyā) disappear hence he has been given the epithet *Ahalyā-jāra* and not because of any illicit connection with another's wife[9].

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[8] Growse, F. S.: The Rāmāyaṇa of Tulsīdās, Vol. I, Cawnpore, 1891, pp. 132, 133.

[9] एवं समस्ततेजाः परमैश्वर्य्यनिमित्तेन्द्रशब्दवाच्यः सवितैवाहनि लीयमानतया रात्रेरहल्याशब्दवाच्यायाः क्षयात्मकजरणहेतुत्वाज्जीर्यत्यस्मादनेनैवोदितेनेत्यादित्य एवाहल्याजार इत्युच्यते न तु परस्त्रीव्यभिचारात् ।

तन्त्रवार्त्तिक, अध्याय १, पाद ३, सूत्र ७ ।

(2) Another remarkable feature of the earliest version of the story is that references to the curse of Gautama and the deliverance of Ahalyā by Rāma do not occur here. The story was most probably modified later on by the devotees of Viṣṇu to show his greatness, particularly in contrast to the still popular Vedic god Indra.

(3) Vālmīki has given prominence to the misbehaviour of Indra but Ahalyā's conversion into a stone-slab on account of the curse of Gautama and her taking the original form by the touch of the dust of the feet of Rāma are not mentioned in the great epic. According to Vālmīki's version she was 'incapable of being seen by any in the three worlds till the sight of Rāma.' Further it is Rāma and Lakṣmaṇa who first touch the feet of Ahalyā. It is clear that the epic version of the story belongs to a period when the efficacy of the name or the dust of the feet of Rāma had not been established.

(4) The version of the Adhyātma Rāmāyaṇa represents an intermediate stage with reference to the curse of Gautama. Here Ahalyā is not changed into a stone but performs penance fixed on a stone-slab and when Rāma touches this stone-slab with his feet she is released from the effect of the curse. In this version we, for the first time, find a long eulogy of Nārāyaṇa who has taken the form of Rāma. The misdemeanour of Indra and the deliverance by the Rāma form of Viṣṇu both occur side by side.

(5) The modern version of the story as found in the Rāma-carita-mānasa is further modified to suit the tastes of a perfect devotee of Rāma. The pious-hearted Tulsīdas could not brook the narration of the fall of Ahalyā, even though by mistake. He merely makes a guarded reference to her earlier life. From Tulsīdās's point of view, the deliverance of the fallen lady by Rāma is of greater significance and he consequently narrates the story from this place. The conversion of Ahalyā into a

stone-slab and her resuming the original form through touch of the feet of Rāma's feet have, however, been clearly mentioned by Tulsīdās. The praise of Rāma by Ahalyā is the most prominent portion of the story in the Mānasa and here the influence of the Adhyātma Rāmāyaṇa is clearly traceable.

Thus we find that this famous legend of Ahalyā begins with Indra, the paramour of Ahalyā, and ultimately merges into the greatness of Rāma, the saviour of the fallen lady. The story is a fine specimen of the gradual evolution of a Brahmanic legend or allegory and its gradual adaptation by the devotees of Viṣṇu to serve their own purpose. It has a peculiar importance from both these points of view.

SYNTAX OF THE DATIVE CASE IN THE ṚGVEDA

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The close relation of the Ṛgvedic dative to the verb.

Speyer in his Vedische und Sanskrit Syntax (p. 13) points out that the Indo-germanic dative was from the very beginning a "To-and-for Case." This observation, although generally correct, is incomplete, for it ignores another indispensable and dominating fact involved in the ancient conception of the dative—the part played by the *verb* in regulating its central notion. We are so accustomed to such phrases as "A box for the journey," "A book for study," that we cannot conceive that the dative of the ancient Indo-Germanic people was dominated by some action on the part of an Agent, an action (in the widest sense, including *being*) referring to a person in most cases, but also to things.

To consider this point let us consult the most ancient literary record of the Indo-Germanic people, *viz.*, the Ṛgveda. Thus '*agnáye*' the dative form of the word *agni-* (which, in certain respects, is, perhaps, the most important word in the Ṛgveda) occurs 45 times in the Ṛgveda. In connection with these 45 forms not a single substantive occurs; with all these forms distinct verbs (a participle only in one case) have been used.

Again, '*jánāya*' the dative form of the word *jána-* occurs 30 times in the Ṛgveda. In connection with 26 of these dative forms distinct verbs have been used; while in connection with only four of these forms substantives and adjectives have been employed. That even these four substantives and adjectives are either dim verbal or predi-

cative forms or are connected therewith will be evident from a notice of all these four forms which I give as follows :—

(1) *śáṁ jánāya*—"Happiness to mankind": (Ṛg. IX, 11. 3.). Evidently here the word *bharatu* "may be" is understood and "happiness" is virtually connected with the verb.

(2) *jánāya júṣṭaḥ* (Ṛg. 9. 9. 2.): "Pleased with the person (offering praise)."

(3) *jánāya júṣṭam* (Ṛg. 1. 44. 4).

(4) *jánāyedaṁ surijñānám* (Ṛg. 7. 104. 12): "(It is) easy for a knowing person." The last three are evidently predicative forms.

Again, take *asmábhyam*, the dative plural form of *asmád-*. This form occurs 94 times in the Ṛgveda of which 89 forms are distinctly connected with verbs, and only on five occasions is the form connected with substantives and adjectives. That the same remark holds good of these latter will be evident from a notice of these forms as given below :—

(1) *śám asmábhyam astu* (Ṛg. 5. 47. 7): "May happiness be to us."

(2) *asmábhyaṁ soma gāturit* (Ṛg. 9. 65. 13): "Soma (be) a guide to us."

(3) *asmábhyaṁ* (*vartiḥ*) *yātam* (Ṛg. 1. 117. 2): "Come to our house."

(4) *asmábhyam ápratishkutaḥ* (Ṛg. 1. 7. 6): "Not disappointing us."

(5) *asmábhyaṁ gāturittamaḥ. . . yāhi* (Ṛg. 9. 106. 6): "Come, O our best guide."

Except in (5) and (3) the dative though directly connected with substantives and adjectives is indirectly dominated by the verb.

The above mentioned forms of the dative are all illustrations of the dative of persons, and it remains to be seen whether the verb equally holds the position of a dominating factor of the dative of things in the Ṛgveda. Let me mention an example. The word *ūtáye* (dative of *ūtí-*, " protection ") occurs 83 times in the Ṛgveda; on 82 occasions it is entirely connected with verbs; it is connected with a substantive in a single case (Ṛg. 9. 66. 4).

Even in the above exceptional case where *ūtáye* is directly connected with a substantive, in the sentence " *párasva sákhibhya ūtáye* " (9. 66. 4.). " Come for protection to (your) friends," the indirect connection with a verb is apparent. The dative in the Ṛgveda, then, indicates that some *action* is performed for a person or a thing.

In this connection the observation of D. B. Monro[1] (A Grammar of the Homeric Dialect, 143) is of some interest. " The true dative expresses the person to or for whom some thing is done, or who is regarded as chiefly affected or interested." That some thing is done, or some one is affected, is apparent from the data of the Ṛgveda. But that the entity for which the action is done should be necessarily a person is contradicted by the material afforded by the Ṛgveda, where side by side with persons we find (as shown in *ūtáye* above) abstract things equally and copiously connected with verbal action. There are, then, no historical literary records in the Ṛgveda for Mr. Monro's view, though ethnologically his view may be sound and may refer to pre-historic times.

These data amply substantiate the traditional view, upheld by ancient Indian Grammarians, and propounded by Pāṇini in 1. 4. 32 (*karmaṇā yam abhipraiti sa sampradānam*) " that which is intended by means of *action* is the

[1] Quoted by Prof. Giles in his Manual of Comparative Philology, second edition, p. 323.

dative," that some action is a necessary and governing element in the conception at least of the Ṛgvedic dative.

The further observation of Speyer (*Ibid.*, p. 13) that the dative of purpose and the dative of persons (" Receiver ") were a later development out of the " To-and-for-Case " is merely conjectural and he does not adduce facts or data to support his view. On the other hand, from the material given above and to follow, it would be evident that there is copious evidence of both these so-called developed forms of the dative in all the chronological strata of the Ṛgveda. According to Speyer, who follows Roth, the dative signifying the objective of movement, the " Wohincasus," forms an earlier stage in the Ṛgveda, and the dative signifying the person as a receiver, or the dative of purpose is a later development. Facts, however, show that quite the reverse is the case. Let us take two typical cases. If we take two verbs, say *gam-* to go and *dā-* to give, the Ṛgveda ought to show copious evidence of the dative " Wohincasus " and comparatively scanty material for the dative of persons (the Receiver). But what are the facts? My calculation shows that the verb *gam-* in the Ṛgveda is connected with 54 case-forms, out of which only one (1. 106. 2 *āgata sarvátātaye*, " come to the battle ") is dative and that too belongs to a portion which pertains to a later chronological stratum of the Ṛgveda. This is the only dative " Wohincasus " which the verb *gam-* gives to us in the later chronological strata of the Ṛgveda. Of the other 53 forms, 6 are locative and 47 are accusative. On the other hand, the verb *dā-* ' to give ' in the Ṛgveda is connected with 115 case-forms out of which as many as 110 are dative, and of course signify without exception, the dative of persons. These data, then, amply show that the dative of persons is neither a rare occurrence in the Ṛgveda nor a later development, for it is copiously met with in all chrono-

logical strata of the Ṛgveda. It is the dative "Wohincasus" which is, comparatively speaking, so rare in the Ṛgveda.

That the verb holds a dominating position in relation to the dative, that the dative of persons is quite copious in the Ṛgveda and the "Wohincasus" dative is comparatively rare in our Veda can be established from another group of data which I give below :-

1. The accusative form *agním* occurs 246 times in the Ṛgveda and is of course exclusively connected with verbs. Of these 246 verbs only 2 imply "to give." I say *imply*, for even they do not directly signify "to give." One of them *jāgṛvā́ṁsaḥ* (6. 1. 3.) literally means "awakened," the other *pipṛtam* (6. 60. 12) literally means "fill." The dative form *agnáye*, however, as already indicated above, occurs 45 times in the Ṛgveda, and is exclusively connected with verbs. Of these 45 verbs as many as 10 mean "to give" and only two mean "to go, flow, move, etc." So it is the dative (of persons of course) and not the accusative which has monopolized the verb "to give," while the "Wohincasus" dative occurs only twice.

Another interesting fact in this connection is the number of verbs meaning "to worship"; as many as 10 of these mean "to worship" and these also show another 10 forms of the dative of persons. In fact, deducting three forms, two connected with the verb "to go" or "to move" and one connected with the verb meaning "to be able to," the remaining 42 forms of *agnáye* are datives of persons.

2. In the same way the word *jánāya* which is strictly a dative of person occurs thirty times in our Veda, and is connected with 26 verbs, only two of which mean "to go or move." Another interesting fact in connection with *jánāya* is that as many as 10 verbs meaning "to make"

or "create" are connected with it. This further substantiates our view of the dominating position of action as expressed by the verb in relation to the dative case in the Ṛgveda.

The above facts will be clear from the following tables.

Number and meaning of verbs connected with the word *agním* in the Ṛgveda :—

To give	... 2	To increase	... 6
To praise	... 46	To urge	... 3
To worship, etc.	... 24	To reveal	... 1
To choose	... 12	To send	... 1
To tell	... 8	To bear	... 5
To call, invoke	... 28	To obtain	... 1
To beg	... 17	To shake	... 1
To set, establish	... 14	To refer	... 1
To kindle	... 17	To please	... 1
To produce	... 30	To abandon	... 1
To know	... 6	To sprinkle	... 1
To come	... 8	To bring	... 9
To remove	... 1	To protect	... 2

TOTAL ... 246.

Number and meaning of verbs connected with the word *agnáye* in the Ṛgveda :—

To speak	... 7	To make	... 6
To convey	... 5	To praise	... 4
To give	... 10	To worship	... 10
To go	... 2	To be able to	... 1

TOTAL ... 45.

Number and meanings of verbs connected with the word *jánāya* in the Ṛgveda :—

To speak	... 1	To bring	... 5
To give	... 5	To shine	... 1
To make	... 10	To fill	... 2
To go	... 2		

TOTAL	... ...	26
Substantives (already mentioned)	... ...	4
GRAND TOTAL	...	30

From the results established in the above discussion it will not be surprising to note the striking feature of the dative case in the Ṛgveda—the vast variety of verbs used in connection with it. Almost every shade of meaning represented by the verb can be traced in relation to the Ṛgvedic dative. For arrangement's sake I shall classify verbs into four divisions, *viz.*, verbs signifying (*a*) Communication (in the widest sense), (*b*) Feeling, (*c*) Action, (*d*) Movement.

The vast variety of verbs used in connection with the dative.

A. Communication.

Verbs meaning " to give, to speak, to beg, to report, to open, to reveal, to bring, to carry, to send, *etc.*" will come under this heading. It will be noted that by them is intended a sort of contact or approachment between one entity (a person or a thing) and another expressed by the dative, generally a person.

(1) To give :—

It is the use of this verb to which the dative in Latin and in Sanskrit (*sampradāna*) owes its name. And although ancient Indian Grammarians in general hold the

essence of the dative to be an "intended object" (animate or inanimate), there have been Indian authorities according to whom the Dative essentially signifies "to give." This was the opinion of the vṛttikāra of Pāṇini (as mentioned by Bhaṭṭoji Dīkshita in his Śabdakaustubha, p. 534), but the opinion was rejected by Patañjali who urged that in a sentence as *khaṇḍikopādhyāyaḥ tasmai capeṭāṁ dadāti*, "The angry teacher gives him a slap on the face," we cannot reasonably assume that an actual giving is meant, and yet the dative (*tasmai*) is used here. The material offered by the Ṛgveda shows that although this use of the dative, as established above, belongs to the very oldest chronological strata of the Ṛgveda, it is by no means the decisively predominant meaning. Other verbs, as "to worship, praise, *etc.*" equally hold their own against this use in the Ṛgveda. The name dative or *sampradāna* was only symbolic or representative and did not cover the full import of the case. Of the various examples of the dative used in connection with the verb *dā-* "to give," a couple of examples will suffice here :—

(a) *śunám asmábhyam ūtáye váruṇo mitró (a)ryamā́ yacchatu.*—Ṛg. X. 126. 7.

"May Varuṇa, Mitra and Aryaman give us happiness for (our) protection."

Note the impersonal dative (*ūtáye*) in the sense of purpose and the dative of person (*asmábhyam*) in the same sentence.

(*b*) *yás túbhyam agne (a)mṛ́tāya dā́śat.*—4. 2. 9.

"He, O Agni, who offers Thee, the Immortal One."

(2) To give up, abandon :—

(*a*) *ayám agnirabhiśastáye no ná párā dāt.*—5. 3. 12.

"May not this Agni abandon us to the (false) accuser,"

(*b*) *mā no (a)gné (a)vasṛjo (a)ghā́ya.*—1. 189. 5.
"Do not, O Agni, abandon us to evil."

(3) To subject or bring under subjection :—

(*a*) *mā́ no nidé ca vákta*re *randhīḥ.*—7. 31. 5.
"Do not subject us to the accuser and the false speaker."

(*b*) *mā́ no (a)gné (a)mataye mā́ (a)vī ratā́yai rīradhaḥ.* 3. 16. 5.
"Do not expose us to folly or to cowardice."

(4) To beg :—

(*a*) *īmahe (a)gnim̐ suritā́ya.*—3. 2. 13.
"We beg wealth of Agni."

Note the impersonal dative used here. The thing begged is put in the dative, but the person begged of is put in the accusative. This is the general rule with this verb in the Ṛgveda.

(*b*) *īmahe tám̐ rāyé.*—1. 10. 6.
"We beg wealth of him."

(5) To speak, to call :—

(*a*) *dyukshā́ya . . . váco ghritā́t svā́dīyo mádhunaśca vocata.*—8. 24. 20.
"To bright Indra, speak words sweeter than honey and ghee."

(*b*) *kathā́ áditaye pṛcchyámānaḥ pratibravaḥ.*—4. 3. 8.
"When questioned, how would you tell Aditi of my sins?"

(*c*) *víśve (a)hvanta devā́ḥ . . . indrā́ya.*—5. 29. 8.
"All the gods called Indra."

(6) To listen :—

ó shú svasāraḥ kārā́ve śṛṇota.—3. 33. 9.
"Listen attentively, O rivers, to the Yajamāna."

(7) To report :—

(*a*) *kathā ha tád váruṇāya tvám agne . . . garhase.*—4. 3. 5.

"How would you report this, O Agni, to Varuṇa?"

(*b*) *prá no mitrāya váruṇāya voco (á)nāgasaḥ.*—7. 62. 2.

"Report to Mitra and Varuṇa our innocence."

(8) To praise, to sing :—

(*a*) *devāya śastim amṛtāya śaṁsa.*—4. 3. 3.

"Praise immortal God."

(*b*) *prá . . . harmi stómam índrāya.*—1. 61. 1.

"I offer praise to Indra."

(*c*) *úpāsmai gāyata naraḥ.*—9. 11. 1.

"Sing, O men, unto him."

(9) To worship, salute, serve :—

(*a*) *kásmai devāya havishā vidhema.*—10. 121. 1.

"Which God should we worship with oblations?"

(*b*) *indrāya gātúruśatīva yeme.*—5. 32. 10.

"The earth, like a loving wife, served Indra."

(*c*) *nyásmai devī svádhitir jihīte.*—5. 32. 10.

"The Goddess Svadhiti bows low before him."

(10) To open, reveal, shine :—

(*a*) *ápāvṛṇor jyótirāryāya.*—2. 11. 18.

"Thou hast revealed the light to the Ārya."

(*b*) *sádanaṁ sám ásmai máhi trishīmat súkṛto ví hí khyán.*—3. 31. 12.

"The Angirasas showed him the great bright home of blessed Indra."

(c) *Agnírāyáve śuśoca.*—7. 4. 3.
"Agni shines unto man."

(11) To sell:—

mahé párā śulkāya deyām, ná sahásrāya nāyutāya.—6. 1. 5.
"I would not sell it even at a very high price, not for a thousand, not even for ten thousand."

(12) To send:—

(a) *sám asmábhyam purudhā gā́ ishaṇya.*—3. 50. 3.
"Send us cows, O great giver!"

(b) *tásmā índrāya . . . práhiṇotanāpaḥ.*—10. 30. 7.
"Send the waters to that Indra."

(13) To convey, carry, bring:—

(a) *agnáye stutím prábharadhvam.*—7. 5. 1.
"Convey praise to Agni."

(b) *úshastáccitrámābharāsmábhyam.*—1. 92. 13.
"Bring us, O dawn, that beautiful one."

(14) To hurl, throw:—

(a) *sá drúhvaṇe mánushe . . . āsavishat . . . śárum.*—10. 99. 7.
"He hurled the thunderbolt on the man who opposed him."

(b) *ásmai prabhara . . . vṛtrāya vájram.*—1. 61. 12.
"Hurl the thunderbolt on this Vṛtra."

B. Feelings.

Next in importance to verbs of communication, verbs signifying various shades of feeling (in the widest sense, including cognition in general) are copiously met with in

the Ṛgveda. Like the verbs of communication they generally refer to the dative of persons.

(1) To be kind :—

arasāya padváte mṛḍa.—10. 165. 1.

" Be kind, O Rudra, to the quadruped (the cow) that gives us food."

(2) To please, to make happy :—

(*a*) *aṁśúrásmai páramāno rúśat.*—9. 91. 3.

" Soma, while, flowing, pleases him."

(*b*) *indrāya vishṇuḥ . . . ajinvat.*—1. 156. 5.

" Vishṇu rendered Indra happy."

(3) To appreciate or recognise :—

(*agníḥ*) *ciketat ásmai.*—1. 69. 5.

" Agni appreciates him."

(4) To trust :—

(*a*) *śráddadhati trishṭmata indrāya.*—1. 55. 5.

" They trust in glorious Indra."

(*b*) *śrát te asmā adhāyi.*—1. 104. 7.

" We have reposed our confidence in this, thy (power)."

(5) To wish, pray :—

(*a*) *tvám agne vāghate yád rékṇaḥ paramáṁ vanóshi.* 1. 31. 14.

" O Agni, the supreme wealth which you wish (for) the yajamāna."

(*b*) *táthā kṛṇu yáthā ta uśmásīshṭáye.*—1. 30. 12.

" Do so as we pray thee for our desired object."

(*c*) *varivasyánn uśáne kāvyāya.*—6. 20. 11.

" Wishing wealth to Uśanas, the son of Kavi."

(6) To be angry, bear malice :—

(*a*) *kím asmábhyam jātavedo hriṇīshe.*—7. 100. 14. "Why are you angry with us, O Agni!"

(*b*) *gurú dvésho árarushe dadhanti.*—7. 56. 19.

"They entertain great animosity against him who does not offer oblations."

C. *Action (for the sake of).*

Verbs signifying action (as distinguished from 'feeling' and 'communication' specified above) represent a vast range and include anything that is produced, done, created, effected or merely exists for the sake of a person or a thing. While the verbs of feeling and communication generally refer to the dative of persons, verbs of action in this restricted sense are equally connected with persons or things. It is here that the dative of purpose and of *things* becomes prominent in the Ṛgveda, but even then it does by no means replace or drive out the dative of persons. It should, however, be also clearly understood that while the verbs of 'communication' and 'feeling' directly govern the dative, as if it were accusative, the verbs of 'action,' though connected with the dative and dominating its central notion in the Ṛgveda, do not grammatically affect it. It seems as if the dative of purpose was the original dative *par excellence* and Indian tradition, according to which the dative signified purpose or intention (cf. Vaiyākaraṇa Bhūshaṇa, Benares, page 112), favours it. There is no doubt that this use of the dative as connected with verbs of action, but grammatically not governed by them, is in the Ṛgveda incomparably larger than the dative grammatically governed by verbs, but a development on either side within the field of the Ṛgveda is hard to trace.

(1) To spread :—

stṛṇīta barhir adhvaráya sādhú.—7. 43. 2.

" Properly spread the grass for the Yajña."

(2) To attempt, take measures :—

(*a*) *cikitsantī mānushāya ksháyāya.*—1. 123. 1.

" Taking measures for human habitation."

(*b*) *ā yé kṛṇvānáso (a)mṛtatvāya gātúm.*—1. 72. 9.

" Those who have been trying (taking steps) for immortality."

(3) To create, make, produce, accomplish :—

(*a*) *jyótir andháya cakrathur vicákshe.*—1. 117. 7.

" They created light (*i.e.*, sight) for the blind man to see."

(For the use of this infinitive see the section on the infinitive.)

(*b*) *jinvā gávishṭaye dhiyaḥ.*—9. 108. 10.

" Accomplish the task of the Yajamāna."

(4) To render fit or eligible :—

(*a*) *itthā yáthā te ūtáye rāyá ṛtáya . . . syāma.*—5. 20. 4.

" Grant that we may be fit for thy protection, wealth and truth."

(*b*) *prá me námīshé bhujé bhūt.*—10. 48. 9.

" My devotee is fit for food and enjoyment."

(5) To fix, place, appoint, direct :—

(*a*) *yuvám narā stuvaté pajriyāya kakshívate aradatam purámdhiyam.*—1. 116. 7.

" O Aśvins, you ordained a vigorous mind for Aṅgiras Kakshīvat."

(b) *rāyé ca naḥ svapatyā́ ishé dhāḥ.*—1. 54. 11.

"Lead (lit. fix) us to wealth, and food accompanied by good progeny."

(6) To destroy :—

ā́ryāya viśó (a)vatārīr dā́sīḥ.—6. 25. 2.

"Thou hast destroyed the *dasyu* people for the sake of the Ārya."

(7) To win :—

asmábhyaṁ sáṁjayataṁ dhánāni.—1. 108. 13.

"Win wealth for us."

D. Movement.

Verbs signifying "to move, to come, to approach, to reach," refer to the object of movement, the 'Wohincasus.' I give below some examples of the dative as 'Wohincasus.' It will be noticed that several examples of the object of movement are datives of "the Receiver." This further reduces the importance of the 'Wohincasus' dative in the Ṛgveda.

(1) *só (a)dhvarā́ya párinīyate kaviḥ.*—3. 2. 7.

"The wise one is led to the Yajña."

(2) *índrāgnī avasā́gatam asmábhyam.*—7. 94. 7.

"Come to us, O Indra and Agni, with your protection."

(3) *tasthur mamrúshīḥ prā́yáve.*—1. 140. 8.

"The flames set out to meet Agni who was coming to them."

(4) *asmábhyam pavasva dhā́rayā.*—9. 2. 9.

"Flow unto us, O Soma, in a shower."

In this connection Speyer points out (page 11) that the 'Wohincasus' may refer to a person, and his theory

is (p. 13) that the dative of the receiver (the object of giving) is a later development of the 'Wohincasus.' But if the object of movement is a person, there is no reason why a hard and fast line should be drawn between that dative of person which is a 'Wohincasus' (the object of movement) and that dative of person who is the receiver. The difference between these two datives of persons may be a difference of degree, but it cannot be a difference of kind. For instance, in the above two examples nos. 2 and 4, when it is said, "come to us", "flow unto us," there is no reason to suppose that the dative of persons in these sentences being a 'Wohincasus' is fundamentally and essentially different from the dative which Speyer calls the 'Receiver.' Is there absolutely no nuance of the "Receiver" in these two examples? Is not a faint glimpse of giving or receiving involved in the coming and the flowing asked for in these two sentences? Is not the person who wants the coming and flowing interested in or affected by the action concerned? In my opinion the central and controlling element in all these so-called stages in the development of the dative, *viz.*, predicative *action*, is present in both the cases, only with this difference that the verb like all verbs of action as specified above, does not grammatically govern the 'Wohincasus' dative, while it does govern Speyer's "Receiver-dative."

Datives connected with substantives and adjectives.

The dative connected with substantives and adjectives is comparatively rare in the Ṛgveda; and in many cases, as shown above, the so-called substantives and adjectives are dim verbal forms. This dative may be classified into six kinds :—

1. The Dative of Advantage.
2. The Dative of Disadvantage.
3. The Dative of Relation.
4. The Dative of Possession.

5. The Dative of Capacity.
6. The Dative of Representation.

1. The Dative of Advantage.

Adjectives signifying 'kind,' 'amiable,' 'useful,' *etc.*, and substantives signifying 'guide' 'benefactor,' *etc.*, can be brought under this heading.

A. Kind:

prámatiś ca kārávɛ.—1. 31. 9.

"And (O Agni) be kind to the Yajamāna."

B. Amiable:

rā́jā viśā́m átithiś cā́rur āyávɛ.—2. 2. 8.

"The Lord of his people, a guest amiable to the Yajamāna."

C. Easy:

patháḥ sugám no (a)syái devávītaye kṛdhi.—2. 23. 7.

"Make our path easy for this Yajña."

D. Well-wishing:

kārávɛ jaraṇyúr vipraḥ préshṭhaḥ.—10. 61. 23.

"The Brahman wishing distinction to the Yajamāna became their favourite."

E. Guide:

asmábhyaṁ gātuvíttamaḥ . . . yāhi.—9. 106. 6.

"Come to us as our best guide."

F. Benefactor:

ásmā urucákrir ádbhutaḥ.—2. 26. 4.

"(Bṛhaspati) is a great benefactor of this (Yajamāna)."

G. Useful :

ásmā bhava sūpavañcanā.—10. 18. 11.

" Be useful to him."

2. The Dative of Disadvantage.

ṛshidvishe marutaḥ . . . sṛjata dvisham.—1. 39. 10.

" O Maruts! Create a Destroyer of the enemy of Ṛshis."

3. The Dative of Relation.

(*a*) *gambhīré cid bhavati gādhám ásmai.*—6. 24. 8.

" For him deep places become shallow."

(*b*) *sábandhū ubhé (á)smai.*—3. 1. 10.

" Heaven and earth are his friends."

(*c*) *áhāny asmai sudínā bhavanti.*—7. 11. 2.

" For him (the sacrificer) all days become good days."

(*d*) *viśvāhā (a)smai śaraṇāḥ santvatra.*—10. 18. 12.

" May the dust of the earth be a home every day to him."

(*e*) *vibhúr viśvasmai bhúvanāya.*—1. 31. 2.

" (He) who has all forms in the whole universe."

(*f*) *śayúḥ katidhā cidāyáve.*—1. 31. 2.

" In how many ways present with every man ! "

(*g*) *tvā́m agne prathamám āyúm āyáve devā́ akṛṇvan náhushasya viśpátim.*—1. 31. 12.

" The Gods appointed thee, O Agni, as a general *under* the human king, Nahusha."

(*h*) *viśvasmai kármaṇe puróhitaḥ.*—1. 55. 3.

" A leader in every action."

4. *The Dative of Possession (giving the sense of the genitive).*

(*a*) *prá yātaṁ varámā jánāya.*—7. 70. 5.

"Come to the Yajamāna's Yajña."

(*b*) *índrāya távishīr ánuttāḥ.*—3. 31. 13.

"Indra's powers are natural."

(*c*) *asmábhyaṁ vartír yātam.*—1. 117. 2.

"Come to our house."

5. *The Dative of Capacity (used in connection with adjectives and particles meaning "fit," "capable).*

(*a*) *tám ā no (a)rkám amṛ́tāya júshṭam imé dhāsuḥ.*—7. 97. 5.

"They have bestowed upon us this food which is enough for immortality."

(*b*) *yó (a)smā áraṁ sūktáiḥ.*—1. 70. 5.

"Who offers praise worthy of him (Agni)."

(*c*) *bhūtam . . . . áśvāvate rathíne śáktam árvate.*—10. 40. 5.

"O Aśvins, you are fit to meet the enemy, equipped with horses and cars."

6. *The Dative of Representation (somebody acting on behalf of another).*

(*a*) *indram asmábhyaṁ yācatāt.*—9. 86. 41.

"Beg Indra on our behalf."

(*b*) *sidhrā agne dhiyo (a)smé.*—10. 7. 4.

"O Agni, praise on our behalf has been offered."

There is no doubt that the infinitive in the very kernel of the Ṛgveda has a tendency to develop the essential sense of the verb, *viz.*, action (cf. *máhi kárma kártave* ' ' to do great actions ' 2. 22. 1, also cf. 3. 35. 7., 3. 43. 29), but its close relation and even occasional identity with the dative can be illustrated by the following examples :—

The infinitive and its relation to the dative.

1. The infinitive used strictly as a noun in the dative case :—

(*a*) *mā́ no nidé ca váktave* (*a*)*ryó randhīḥ.*—7. 31. 5.

" Do not expose us, O Lord, to the (false) accuser and the (harsh) speaker."

Here the infinitive *váktave* (' speaker ') is used as a Noun in the dative case.

(*b*) Infinitive used as abstract noun.

yáṁ yūdhyamānā ávase hávante.—2. 12. 9.

" Whom they, while fighting, call for protection."

2. The infinitive has not only been used as a noun in the dative case; but reverse examples can also be shown, *i.e.*, the noun in the dative case has been used in the sense of the infinitive. Here are a few examples :—

(*a*) *vidaṁ mánave gātúm ishṭáye.*—10. 49. 9.

" I gave the man the way to traverse."

(*b*) (*ágnim mitráṁ ná*) *jarā́yai ácchā vada.*—1. 38. 13.

" Tell also Agni, the friend, to praise."

Here the dative noun *jarā́yai* is used in the infinitive sense.

(*c*) *muñcā́mi tvā havíshā jīvanāya kám ajñātayakshmā́t.*—1. 161. 1.

" By means of homa, I cure you of this mysterious disease, in order that you may live."

These examples show the frequent syntactical identity of the dative and the infinitive.

3. The infinitive, connected with another word in the genitive case, becomes a dative noun in the following examples :—

(*a*) *sū mṛdhaḥ śiśratho jīváse naḥ.*—2. 28. 7.

" Thoroughly oppress injurious beings for our life." (Also cf. 6. 69. 5., 7. 62. 5.)

(*b*) (*nidhāyi*) . . . *agnir mánusha īrayádhyai.*—4. 2. 1

" Agni was set up for man's access to Heaven."

(*c*) *ishyann árṇāṁsy apā̃ṁ carádhyai.*—1. 61. 12.

" Bringing down showers for the movement of waters."

The above examples further confirm the frequent syntactical identity of the dative and the infinitive.

4. Association of both the dative and the infinitive in the sense of purpose.

(*a*) *kṛdhī na ūrdhvān̄ carát͡hāya jīváse.*—1. 36. 14.

" Raise us for movement and for life."

(*b*) *ā ta etu mánaḥ púnaḥ krátve dákshāya jīváse.*—10. 57. 4.

" May your mind come to us again for action, tor power and for life! "

Note the unity and continuity of the same strain in these different grammatical forms.

The dative in attraction to the infinitive.

Dr. Giles in his *Manual of Comparative Philology* (p. 328) suggests that the frequent use in Latin of the dative (in the sense of the accusative) when another infinitive is used in the same sentence (e.g., *hoc mihi haud laborist laborem hunc potiri*) could have been developed, through attraction to the infinitive. The example quoted from Delbrück could be reinforced by several more examples.

But the further interesting point is that in the Ṛgveda this attraction has affected not only the accusative case, but all other cases as well. Here are some examples :—

(1) Nominative :—

pávitāraḥ punītána sómam indrāya pātave.—9. 4. 4.

"O pressers of Soma! press the soma, so that Indra may drink it (lit. for Indra to drink)."

(2) Genitive :—

īḍéṇyo (á)rbhāya jīváse.—1. 146. 5.

"He is praised for the longevity of the Yajamāna."

(3) Locative :—

ihá ksh« áyāya jīváse.—10. 58. 1.

"To live in this world."

(4) Accusative :—

Here is a striking example in which the accusative seems to have been affected, not only by the attraction of the infinitive, but also of phonetic analogy :—

víśvasmai sáhase sáhadhyai.—6. 1. 1.

"To subdue every powerful foe."

SELF AND NON-SELF IN EARLY BUDDHISM

LATE PROF. DR. M. WINTERNITZ.

Unless we assume that the whole Tipiṭaka is a grand falsification of the monks who have entirely misunderstood the teaching of their Master,[1] Gotama Buddha must have taught a *doctrine of salvation.* "Salvation" meant to him—as to other teachers of his time—release from Saṁsāra, from the Ill (dukkha, Unrest, Suffering) caused by the ever returning round of birth, old age, death and rebirth. The deeper cause of all this Ill is ignorance, hence salvation can only be attained by true knowledge. Therefore the Buddha was, as all teachers of salvation in India have been since the times of the oldest Upaniṣads, also a philosophical thinker.

To talk of Buddhism as "mere ethics" or "merely a doctrine of salvation" is no less wrong than talking of it as if it had been only a system of philosophy. Religion and philosophy have never been separated in India, least of all in Buddhism.

Now in India, as elsewhere, new philosophical ideas are always based on earlier thoughts, whether they be accepted or modified or contradicted. It is true, the philosophical ideas of the oldest Upaniṣads probably came to Gotama Buddha only as a faint echo from past centuries.[2] It is characteristic that *Brahman* in Buddhist texts is only known as a masculine, as a personal god, while the

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[1] This is what Mrs. *Rhys Davids* wants us to believe, though she does not express it as bluntly as Georg *Grimm* (Die Wissenschaft des Buddhismus, Leipzig, 1923, p. 2 note), who speaks of the "killing of the Buddha idea by its professed guardians," the learned monks.

[2] Cf. H. *Oldenberg*, Die Lehre der Upanishaden und die Anfänge des Buddhismus, 1915, p. 285 ff.

Upaniṣadic *neuter Brahman* is entirely unknown. On the other hand, there cannot be the least doubt that Buddha was familiar with Sāṁkhya and Yoga ideas, such as we first meet with in the second stratum of the Upaniṣad literature. The tradition that Gotama went to two teachers of Sāṁkhya and Yoga, has all the appearance of being based on historical facts.

Neither the mythological aspect of the soul as a kind of homunculus in the heart of man, or as being identical with Prāṇa, or as wandering about in dreams, leaving the body for a time and returning to it again, nor the metaphysical idea of the unity of the inner Ātman and the universal Paramātman are ever discussed in the numerous passages dealing with the Anattavāda. It is the doctrine of a permanent eternal soul, taught by the Sāṁkhya and by the Jainas, against which the Anattavāda is directed.

There has been much discussion about the real meaning of this *Anattavāda*, both among the followers of the different sects of Buddhism, and among European scholars. Years ago Prof. F. Otto *Schrader*[3] expressed it as his opinion that Buddha did not deny a soul, but that his views about the soul were so very different from the traditional views, that he must needs appear to his contemporaries as a denier of the soul. More recently Prof. O. *Strauss* said: " The majority of scholars who know Buddhism from the original documents, today incline to the opinion, that the assertion that earliest Buddhism denied the soul and held Nirvāṇa to be Nought, cannot be upheld."[4] Georg *Grimm* calls the denial of a soul a " monstrosity " invented in degenerated Buddhism by men of weak intellects who misunderstood Buddha's

[3] Ueber den Stand der indischen Philosophie zur Zeit Mahavīras und Buddhas, Strassburg, 1902, p. 5.

[4] Deutsche Literaturzeitung, 1929, col. 214.

teaching that the self was unknowable, for a denial of the self.[5] Similarly, Mrs. *Rhys Davids* tells us in her latest book[6] that to imagine that a man like Gotama of the Sakyans was "trampling upon" the Upaniṣadic idea of Ātman as the Divine in man, "is to libel him unspeakably." Dr. Karl *Seidenstücker*[7] says that the very Anattā doctrine, if rightly understood, presupposes the reality of the Ātman as a matter of course. Professor J. W. *Hauer*[8] declares: "If there is anything certain, it seems to me to be this, that Buddha stuck to a last reality in man, only he did not identify it with anything that is in any way to be grasped by ordinary experience." Professor A. B. *Keith*[9] again says: "We cannot doubt that the Buddha held the doctrine of retribution and, this being admitted, it becomes impossible logically to believe that he held the doctrine of the denial of the Ātman as it is presented in the Pāli texts." On the other hand, Professor Th. *Stcherbatsky*[10] says with regard to the Anātmavāda: "Whosoever wishes to understand Buddhism must fully realize the decision and the vigour with which this doctrine is professed and defended. In this respect Buddhism stands alone among the great philosophies and religions of mankind.' Prof. *Stcherbatsky*[11] relies chiefly on the scientific representation of the Anātmavāda by Vasubandhu. His strongest argument seems to me to be that the later phases of Buddhist philosophy all presuppose the denial of a permanent Ego.

[5] Die Wissenschaft des Buddhismus, p. 1 f. and 27.
[6] A Manual of Buddhism (1932), p. 154.
[7] Zeitschrift für Buddhismus IX, 1931, p. 242.
[8] Der Yoga als Heilsweg, Stuttgart 1932, p. 50 f.
[9] Bulletin of the School of Oriental Studies VI, 1931, p. 400.
[10] Bulletin of the School of Oriental Studies VI, 1931, p. 873.
[11] See also his paper "The Soul Theory of the Buddhists" (Bulletin de l' Académie des Sciences de Russie 1919), p. 823 ff.

Though we cannot, as Prof. *Stcherbatsky* rightly points out, expect to find in the Pāli Canon anything like the scientific precision found in a Śāstra like that of Vasubandhu, it is after all the Pāli Canon in which—in spite of all scepticism as to its being the genuine word of Buddha which I share with Mrs. *Rhys Davids*, Professor *Keith* and others—we can hope to find the most visible traces of the original teaching of Gotama the Buddha.

It may, therefore, be of some use, to survey once more the most important passages on Anattā and Attā in the Pāli Canon.

The most authoritative passage on the Anattā doctrine, at least according to the canon of the Theravādins, is the *Anattalakkhaṇa-Sutta*[12] which was preached by the Buddha to the first five Bhikkhus immediately after the Dhammacakkappavattana-Sutta. Here it is said:

Neither the body (rūpa), nor any one of the psychical factors of individual existence, feelings, ideas, volitions, consciousness (vedanā, saññā, saṅkhārā, viññāṇa), can be said to be *attā*, the Self. For they are all subject to Ill, and we are not able to say with regard to them: "Let my body, my feelings, *etc.*, be such and such." Moreover, these five Khandhas or factors of individual existence, are perishable (anicca) and therefore represent Ill or Unrest (dukkha). Of anything that is perishable, subject to change, representing Ill, it cannot be said: "This is mine, this am I, this is my self." Having gained this knowledge, the monk turns away from body, feelings, ideas, volitions and consciousness with disgust, gets rid of passions, and realises his emancipation, knowing that "destroyed is rebirth, accomplished the holy life, done is the task, there is no further return to this condition."

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[12] Vinayap., Mahāvagga 1, 6, 38 ff. = Saṁyutta 59 (III. p. 66 ff.)

What is emphasized here and repeated over and over again in the Pāli Suttas, is this: Our physical being as well as our feeling, perceiving and thinking, volitions and activities, and even our very consciousness are ever changing and impermanent, causing Unrest or Ill (dukkha), hence they cannot be an eternal, permanent self (attā), and it is mere conceit to say: "I am this," "this is mine," "this is myself" or even "I am." This conceit of "I" and "mine" must be got rid of by him who would reach the goal of Nirvāṇa. This is the very essence of the Buddha-Dhamma.[13] The *Sakkāyadiṭṭhi*,[14] *i.e.*, the belief that individual existence is an absolute reality involving the existence of an eternal soul, is often denounced as heresy. To speak of an individual called by such and such a name, is mere convention.[15] The doctrine of an individual's eternal soul (*attavāda*) is a doctrine of fools. Denounced is also the Sassatavāda, "the doctrine of the Eternal," as it is taught f. i. in the Kaṭha-Upaniṣad, in the Bhagavadgītā, and in the Sāṁkhya system. But the *Ucchedavāda*, "the doctrine of Annihilation," also is denounced as heretical.[16] It is true that of the Tathāgata who has got rid of the conceit of "I" and "mine," no consciousness can be pointed out anywhere either in this life, or when he has passed away. But this does not mean that he does not exist, but only that he is untraceable, unknowable, not to be described in any way whatsoever.

In none of the numerous passages in which the Anattā theory is discussed, do we find any positive statement about an attā. Mrs. *Rhys Davids* and Dr. K. *Seidenstücker*, indeed, tell us that all the passages on the Anattā

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[13] See especially Aṅguttara, Vol. I, p. 133 f.

[14] I do not think that this *sakkāyadiṭṭhi* can be separated from the Sāṁkhya *sat-kārya-vāda*, s. S. N. *Dasgupta*, History of Indian Philosophy I, p. 257 f.

[15] Cf. Majjhima 44, Saṁyutta V, 10.

[16] Majjhima 22, Vol. I, p. 136 ff.

imply that there *is* an eternal permanent self, different from our physical and psychical being, the Ātman of the Upaniṣads, the real man, the "Man in Man." If this were so, it would indeed be strange that our texts or the Buddha himself should have so carefully avoided saying this directly. On the contrary, all kinds of speculations and erroneous views about an eternal self are even declared to be a hindrance on the way to Nirvāṇa. Questions regarding the nature of such a self are not answered by the Buddha, because such knowledge can never lead to the end of Ill.[17]

On the other hand, the self or ego in the conventional meaning of the word is never denied. It is not denied that there is a self which thinks, speaks, feels, acts and experiences the results of *karman* in the course of rebirths. Only to believe that this self is an absolute reality, eternal and everlasting, is declared to be an utterly erroneous view. Hence it is possible to speak, in this sense of the word, of seeking or knowing one's self, of controlling and restraining one's self, and of man being responsible for his own deeds.

Mrs. *Rhys Davids* has often quoted the little story in the Vinaya Piṭaka (Mahāvagga 1, 14), in which the Buddha tells the young men who are in search of a runaway woman: "Were it not better that you were seeking the self?" There may be in these words a faint echo of Chāndogya-Upaniṣad VIII, 1, 1 and similar Upaniṣadic sayings, but this certainly does not mean that what Buddha understood by "self" is the "God who is the self of you," as Mrs. *Rhys Davids* thinks, but the whole context shows, and the whole Tipiṭaka proves, that "seek the self" means here: "Learn the truth about the self, as it is taught in the Anattalakkhaṇa Sutta and ever so

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[17] See f. i. Majjhima 2.

many other Suttas, *viz.*, that the five Khandhas are not an eternal self." In the Aṅguttara Nikāya (Vol. IV, p. 114) it is said that a monk is called "self-knowing" (attaññū) when he knows: "So far am I advanced in faith, virtue, learning, renunciation, wisdom, and illumination."

It is true that the conversation between King Pasenadi of Kosala and his consort Queen Mallikā[18] does remind us of the famous Upaniṣad dialogue between Yājñavalkya and his wife Maitreyī.[19] But we know that the Buddha liked to make use of Brahmanical phrases and reminiscences, though putting quite a different meaning into them. What the dialogue in question means is clearly expressed in the *gāthā*: "Wandering through all the quarters of the world in his thought, one never finds anywhere one dearer than the self. Thus it is also with others: the self is dear to every one. Therefore he who loves the self should not do harm to another." Mrs. *Rhys Davids*[20] thinks that this conclusion with its teaching of "pseudoethics" is not original, but that the "self" in the dialogue must not be understood as meaning "my own self" in the ordinary sense, but that it must be taken as meaning the "Divine Kinsman, the immanently Divine in every man," for "the assertion that a man is supremely dear to himself sticks in the gullet." I do not see why the Buddhist saying should "stick in the gullet" any more than the "Love thy neighbour as thyself" of the Old and the New Testament, or the "golden rule" (so little followed): "Do by others as you would be done by."

The whole chapter in which the dialogue of King Pasenadi and Mallikā occurs, is concerned with moral teaching, and has nothing to do with metaphysics. The

[18] Saṁyutta III, 1, 8, Vol. I, p. 75.
[19] Bṛhadār. Up. II. 4; IV, 5.
[20] Sakya, p. 188.

same King Pasenadi says a few pages earlier: "For whom, now, is the self a dear friend, and for whom is the self a hateful enemy? . . . They whose conduct in deed, word, and thought is evil, for them the self is a hateful enemy. Even though they were to say: 'Dear to us is the self,' nevertheless the self is for them a hateful enemy. Why is this? Because that which an enemy would do to an enemy, even that are they themselves doing to the self. Therefore for them is the self a hateful enemy. And they whose conduct in deed, word, and thought is virtuous, for them is the self a dear friend," etc.[21]

Numerous are the passages in the Nikāyas in which attā, "self," is used merely as "a conventional label for the totality of any living individual,"[22] in order to impress some moral teaching, f. i. in the Attavagga of the Dhammapada (vss. 157—166). In such sayings as "Rouse thyself by thyself, restrain thyself by thyself," *etc.*, or "For the self is the guardian of the self, the self is the refuge of the self, therefore curb thyself as a merchant curbs a good horse,"[23] the "self" certainly has nothing to do with an eternal soul.

In Aṅguttara III, 40, 4 (Vol. I, p. 149) also attā, "self" comes very near our "conscience": "There is no secret place in the world where thou couldst conceal thy wicked deed, thy self (attā), O man, knows whether it is true or false. Thou slightest, indeed, O my friend, thy noble self, if thou wouldst conceal from thy self the wickedness that is in thy self."

That the individual is responsible for his deeds, is clearly brought out, in a mythological manner in the

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[21] Saṁyutta III, 1, 4 in the translation of Mrs. *Rhys Davids* (Kindred Sayings I, p. 98 f.) who (in 1917) says in her note that she assigns "no metaphysical import to this dramatization of consciousness into a dual subject."

[22] Mrs. *Rhys Davids* in Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics XI, 351.

[23] Dhammapada 379 f.

Devadūta-Sutta (Majjhima 130), when King Yama tells the evil-doer, before he hands him over to the tortures of hells:[24] "Your deeds were not committed by your parents or by your brothers and sisters, or by your friends and kinsfolk, or by recluses and brahmins, or by the gods, they were committed by none but yourself, and it is you yourself who will reap the fruits thereof."[25]

This responsibility for one's deeds is also emphasized in the Dhammapada verse (165): "By one's self the wicked deed has been done, by one's self one becomes impure, by one's self the wicked deed remains undone, by one's self one becomes pure. Purity and impurity belong to one's self, it is impossible that one should purify another."

In all these and many other Suttas dealing with the Anattā theory, nowhere the question of any contradiction between this theory and the doctrine of transmigration and Karman is raised. Such discussions are found in the Milindapañha, where the difficulty is solved by the theory of *Saṁtāna*,[26] that is, of "a living continuous fluid complex, which does not remain quite the same for two consecutive moments, but which continues for an endless number of existences, bridging an endless number of deaths, without becoming completely different from itself."[27] The Milindapañha (II, 2, 6) explains this by such similes as that of the man who steals mango fruits

[24] These tortures are described with such a Sadistic gusto that I cannot bring myself to believe that this description of hells could ever have come from the mouth of the Buddha or any of his early disciples.

[25] Majjhima, Vol. III, p. 180 f., translation by Lord *Chalmers*, Further Dialogues of the Buddha, Vol. II, p. 256. See also Aṅguttara III, 35 (Vol. I, p. 140).

[26] The word saṁtāna occurs only in Saṁyutta, Vol. III, p. 143, but not in the technical meaning.

[27] L. de *La Vallée Poussin*, The Way to Nirvana, Cambridge 1917, p. 35.

and is punished as a thief in spite of his saying that the mango fruits he has stolen are not the same which the man had planted.

In the Nikāyas it seems that the Paṭiccasamuppāda doctrine was sufficient to show in which way one existence is connected with former and with future existences, and that the real connecting link between the existences of one individual is his *Karman*. As it is said in the Saṁyutta XII, 37: "This, ye monks, is not your body, nor that of others. You have rather to see in it, ye monks, the old *deed* (kammaṁ), the result of actions, volitions and feelings (in former existences)."

The warning, so often repeated in the Pāli Suttas, against the conceit of "I" and "mine," against thinking that one's individual existence is an absolute reality, has also an ethical character. For the ordinary follower of Buddha, who does not and cannot aspire to final emancipation, the religion of "non-self-ism" is practically a religion of *unselfishness*. In this sense it is understood by modern Buddhists.[28] But the Anattatā doctrine in its proper meaning also, as the belief that the notion of individuality has to be entirely got rid of in order to reach Nirvāṇa, has at least an ethical import. This is proved by the fact that *Upādāna*, the cause of craving (taṇhā) which is at the root of Ill (dukkha), is not only the clinging to sensuality (kāma), but also the clinging to the Attavāda.[29]

It is not a psychological or logical error to say: "I am," "this is mine," "this is my self," but a moral defect. Mrs. *Rhys Davids*[30] has already compared with this the Sāṁkhya aphorism (Sāṁkhya Kārikā 64): nāsmi

[28] See S. *Tachibana*, The Ethics of Buddhism, London 1926, p. 180 ff., and T. *Matsumoto* in Europäische Revue, 1931, p. 569 ff.

[29] Dīgha Nikāya, XV, Vol. II, p. 58.

[30] Sakya, p. 196.

na me nāhaṁ, " I am not, not of me, not I ", which is said to follow from a study of the Sāṁkhya Principles (tattva). In the Yogasūtra (II, 3), too, the " conceit of I am " (asmitā) appears in the list of the moral defects (kleśa) together with ignorance, lust, hatred, and attachment.

Almost in literal agreement with the Buddhist Suttas we read in the Mārkaṇḍeya Purāṇa (38, 6) : " The idea of ' mine ' is the root of Ill, the idea ' this is not mine ' is final beatitude." Or : " He who wishes to become free, must give up attachment with all his might ; where there is no attachment, there is an end of the talk ' That is mine.' Having abandoned the idea of ' mine ' (nirmamatvam) leads to bliss " (ib. 39, 3f.). Subāhu tells the King of Kāśī : In order to reach final emancipation, " thou shalt form no notion of ' mine,' nor of ' I,' O King " (ib. 44, 22). The section of the Mārkaṇḍeya Purāṇa in which these sentences occur is mainly a treatise on Yoga. But what is said about the duties and characteristics of the Yogin differs little from the Arhat ideal found in the Buddhist texts.

As the Anattā doctrine is both psychology and ethics, so the final goal of Buddhist teaching, the Nirvāṇa, is both metaphysics and ethics, and the fundamental truth on which all Buddhist teaching is based—the fact of dukkha or Ill—is not only philosophy but ethics as well.

Whatever may be understood by Buddhists or Brahmans by Nirvāṇa or Mokṣa, whether it be joining the infinite Nought which is as real to the Indian way of thinking as is the Ākāśa, the Void, or union with the Deity, the Absolute, the Brahman, or the All in which the individual is merged,—it always means the abandonment of the notion of individuality, and with this it implies the truth (whether it is expressly stated or not) that man cannot be freed from Ill and suffering, unless he forgets his own self, unless he realizes that he is a

mere particle of the All, and that bliss can only be reached by him who gives himself up to the greater All, which if viewed from an ethical point of view, results in the Mahāyāna ideal of the Bodhisattva who says: "What right have I to make any difference between my self and that of my neighbour, between my own welfare and his?" And finally, the truth of Ill or *Leiden* (suffering), the first of the Four Noble Truths of the Buddha,—is not its deepest meaning that of *Mitleiden* (suffering with others), resulting in *Mitleid* (compassion)? It is, after all, not Buddhist philosophy—whether we value it as low as Professor *Keith* does, or as highly as Professor *Stcherbatsky* values it—, which has won the hearts of the unnumbered millions, but the *Religion of Love and Compassion*, which the teaching of the Buddha has been from the beginning, and has remained during all its phases.

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MAHĀMAHOPĀDHYĀYA Dr. GANGANATHA JHA

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